Anti-Iranian sentiment or Iranophobia, also called anti-Persian sentiment or Persophobia,[1] refers to feelings and expressions of hostility, hatred, discrimination, or prejudice towards Iranian people on the basis of an irrational disdain for their national and cultural affiliation. The opposite phenomenon, in which one holds notable feelings of love or interest towards Iranian people for the same reasons, is known as Iranophilia or Persophilia.

Historically, discrimination and prejudice against Iranians (and against Persians in particular) has been a recurring theme in the Arab world, particularly since the Arab conquest of Iran in the 7th century.

In the Arab world

Early Muslim conquests

"Ajam" slur

The word "ʻajam" is derived from the root ʻ-J-M and refers to "unclear, vague and/or incomprehensible" as opposed to "ʻarabi", which means "clear, understandable; with perfect Arabic tongue".[2] ʻAjam came to mean "one who mumbles" or “has difficulty speaking”,[3] similar to the Slavic ethnonym and their usage of "mutes" to refer to Germans. It came to be "applied especially to Persians", and the distinction of the two terms is found already in pre- and early Islamic literature (ʻAjam Temtemī).[4][5] "In general, ajam was a pejorative term, used by Arabs because of their contrived social and political superiority in early Islam.", as summarized by Clifford Bosworth.[4] Although Arabic dictionaries state that the word ʻajami is used for all non-Arabs, the designation was primarily used for Persians.[6]

Zoroastrian-based slurs

Many Sunni fundamentalist Arabs use slurs against Persians by calling them "fire worshippers" and "majus". Majus or majusi (ماجوس) is an Arabic term for the Magi in Zoroastrianism.

Umayyad period

Patrick Clawson states, "The Iranians chafed under Umayyad rule. The Umayyads rose from traditional Arab aristocracy. They tended to marry other Arabs, creating an ethnic stratification that discriminated against Iranians. Even as Arabs adopted traditional Iranian bureaucracy, Arab tribalism disadvantaged Iranians."[7]

Many Arab Muslims believed that Iranian converts should not clothe themselves as Arabs, and many other forms discrimination that existed.[8][9] Mu'awiya I, is said to have sent a letter addressed to Ziyad ibn Abih, the then governor of Iraq, wrote:[10]

And keep an eye on the Mawali (non Arab) and those Ajam who have accepted Islam and choose the style of Umar Ibn Khattab in dealing with them because in that is humiliation and degradation for them. And let Arab marry their women but their women should not marry Arab. Let Arab be their inheritors but they should not be inheritors of Arab. Reduce their subsistence and benefits and make them go in front in wars and let them maintain the roads, cut the trees and do not let them be the Imam of Arab in congregational prayers and do not let anyone of them be in the front row of prayer when Arab are present, unless the row is not completed by Arab. Do not appoint anyone of them as a Governor on the border of Muslims and do not appoint anyone as a Governor in any city. No one from them should be a Governor for making rules and decisions for Muslims because this was the style and habit of Umar. May Allah, from the Ummah of Muhammad (S.A.W), and particularly from Bani-Umayyah reward him, reward him greatly..

— Mu'awiya

Mistreatment of Iranians and other non-Arabs during the early period of Islam is well documented. Under the Umayyads, many mawlas (non-Arab Muslims) employed by a patron enjoyed favourable positions as equal to Arab Muslims, but they were generally victims of cultural bias and even sometimes considered to be on an equal footing of a slave. According to sources of that time, the mistreatment of mawlas was a general rule. They were denied any positions in the government under Umayyad rule.[11]

The Umayyid Arabs are even reported to have prevented the mawali from having kunyahs, as an Arab was only considered worthy of a kunya.[12] They were required to pay taxes for not being an Arab:

During the early centuries of Islam when the Islamic empire was really an Arab kingdom, the Iranians, Central Asians and other non-Arab peoples who had converted to Islam in growing numbers as mawali or 'clients' of an Arab lord or clan, had in practice acquired an inferior socio-economic and racial status compared to Arab Muslims, though the mawali themselves fared better than the empire's non-Muslim subjects, the Ahl al-Dhimmah ('people of the covenant'). The ةawali, for instance, paid special taxes, often similar to the jizyaا (poll tax) and the kharaj (land tax) levied on the Zoroastrians and other non-Muslim subjects, taxes which were never paid by the Arab Muslims.

— Farhad Daftary, [13]
References in Persian literature

Zarrinkoub presents a lengthy discussion on the large flux and influence of the victorious Arabs on the literature, language, culture and society of Persia during the two centuries following the Islamic conquest of Persia in his book Two Centuries of Silence.[14]

Suppression of Iranian languages

After the Islamic conquest of the Sassanid Empire, during the reign of the Ummayad dynasty, the Arab conquerors imposed Arabic as the primary language of the subject peoples throughout their empire. Not happy with the prevalence of the Iranian languages in the divan, Hajjāj ibn Yusuf ordered the official language of the conquered lands to be replaced by Arabic, sometimes by force.[15] According to Biruni

When Qutaibah bin Muslim under the command of Al-Hajjaj bin Yousef was sent to Khwarazmia with a military expedition and conquered it for the second time, he swiftly killed whoever wrote the Khwarazmian native language that knew of the Khwarazmian history, science and culture. He then killed all their Zoroastrian priests and burned and wasted their books, until gradually the illiterate only remained, who knew nothing of writing and hence their history was mostly forgotten.

— Biruni From The Remaining Signs of Past Centuries, [16]

It is difficult to imagine the Arabs not implementing anti-Persian policies in the light of such events, writes Zarrinkoub in his famous Two Centuries of Silence,[17] where he exclusively writes of this topic. Reports of Persian speakers being tortured are also given in al-Aghānī.[18]

After Safavid conversion of Iran to Shia Islam

Predominantly-Shia Islamic Iran has always exhibited a sympathetic side for Ali (the cousin and son-in-law of Muhammad) and his progeny. Even when Persia was largely Sunni, that was still evident, as can be seen from the writings remaining from that era. Rumi for example praises Ali in a section entitled "Learn from ʻAli". It recounts Ali's explanation as to why he declined to kill someone who had spit in his face as ʻAli was defeating him in battle. Persian literature in praise of Ali's progeny is quite ubiquitous and abundant.[19] These all stem from numerous traditions regarding Ali's favor of Persians being as equals to Arabs.

Several early Shiite sources speak of a dispute arising between an Arab and an Iranian woman. Referring the case to ʻAli for arbitration, ʻAli reportedly did not allow any discrimination between the two to take place. His judgment thus invited the protest of the Arab woman. Thereupon, ʻAli replied, "In the Qurʼan, I did not find the progeny of Ishmael (the Arabs) to be any higher than the Iranians."[20][21]

In another such tradition, Ali was once reciting a sermon in the city of Kufah, when Ash'as ibn Qays, a commander in the Arab army protested, "Amir-al-Momeneen! These Iranians are excelling the Arabs right in front of your eyes and you are doing nothing about it!" He then roared, "I will show them who the Arabs are!" Ali immediately retorted, "While fat Arabs rest in soft beds, the Iranians work hard on the hottest days to please God with their efforts. And what do these Arabs want from me? To ostracize the Iranians and become an oppressor! I swear by the God that splits the nucleus and creates Man, I heard the prophet once say, just as you strike the Iranians with your swords in the name of Islam, so will the Iranians one day strike you back the same way for Islam."[22][21]

When the Sassanid city of Anbar fell to the forces of Mu'awiyeh, news reached Ali that the city had been sacked and plundered spilling much innocent blood.[21] Early Shi'ite sources report that Ali gathered all the people of Kufa to the mosque and gave a fiery sermon. After describing the massacre, he said, "If somebody hearing this news now faints and dies of grief, I fully approve of it!"[23][21] According to Kasraie, It is from here that Ali is said to have had more sympathy for Iranians while author S. Nureddin Abtahi claims that Umar highly resented them.[24][21] However, a hadith on Ali's banning of the game of shatranj (chess), narrates that Ali said "Chess is the gambling game of the Ajam"[25]

Modern era

Iraq

It was in Baghdad where the first Arab nationalists, mainly of Palestinian and Syrian descent, formed the basis of their overall philosophies. Prominent among them were individuals such as Mohammad Amin al-Husayni (the Mufti of Jerusalem) and Syrian nationalists such as Shukri al-Quwatli and Jamil Mardam. Sati' al-Husri, who served as advisor to the Ministry of Education and later as Director General of Education and Dean of the College of Law, was particularly instrumental in shaping the Iraqi educational system. Other prominent Pan-Arabists were Michel Aflaq and Khairallah Talfah, as well as Sati' al-Husri, Salah al-Din al-Bitar, Zaki al-Arsuzi and Sami Shwkat (brother of Naji Shawkat). These individuals formed the nucleus and genesis of true pan-Arabism.

Sati' al-Husri's campaigns against schools suspected of being positive towards Persia are well documented.[26] One dramatic example is found in the 1920s when the Iraqi Ministry of Education ordered Husri to appoint Muhammad Al-Jawahiri as a teacher in a Baghdad school. A short excerpt of Husri's interview with the teacher is revealing:[27]

"Husri: First, I want to know your nationality.
Jawahiri: I am an Iranian.
Husri: In that case we cannot appoint you."

Saddam Hussein forced out tens of thousands of people of Persian origin from Iraq in the 1970s, after having been accused of being spies for Iran and Israel.[28][29] Today, many of them live in Iran.[30][31]

Iran–Iraq War

Early on in his career, Saddam Hussein and pan-Arab ideologues targeted the Arabs of southwest Iran in an endeavour to have them separate and join 'the Arab nation.'[32] Hussein made no effort to conceal Arab nationalism in his war against Iran (which he called "the second Battle of al-Qādisiyyah).[32] An intense campaign of propaganda during his reign meant that many school children were taught that Iran provoked Iraq into invading and that the invasion was fully justified.[33]

"Yellow revolution", "yellow wind", "yellow storm" were thrown as slurs by Saddam Hussein against Iran due to Hulagu's 1258 sack of Baghdad during the Mongol wars and the terms "Persian" and "Elamites" were also used by Saddam as insults.[34]

On 2 April 1980, a half-year before the outbreak of the war, Saddam Hussein visited Al-Mustansiriya University in Baghdad. By drawing parallels to the 7th-Century defeat of Persia in the Battle of al-Qādisiyyah, he announced:

"In your name, brothers, and on behalf of the Iraqis and Arabs everywhere, we tell those [Persian] cowards who try to avenge Al-Qadisiyah that the spirit of Al-Qadisiyah as well as the blood and honor of the people of Al-Qadisiyah who carried the message on their spearheads are greater than their attempts."[35][36][37]

Saddam also accused Iranians of "murdering the second (Umar), third (Uthman) and fourth (Ali) Caliphs of Islam", invading the three islands of Abu Musa and Greater and Lesser Tunbs in the Persian Gulf and attempting to destroy the Arabic language and civilization.[38]

In the war, Iraq made extensive use of chemical weapons (such as mustard gas) against Iranian troops and civilians as well as Iraqi Kurds. Iran expected a condemnation by UN of this act and sent allegation to UN. At time (-1985) the UN Security Council issued statements that "chemical weapons had been used in the war." However, in these UN-statements Iraq was not mentioned by name, so that the situation is viewed as "in a way, the international community remained silent as Iraq used weapons of mass destruction against Iranian as well as Iraqi Kurds" and it is believed that the United States had prevented UN from condemning Iraq.[39]

In December 2006, Hussein said he would take responsibility "with honour" for any attacks on Iran using conventional or chemical weapons during the 1980–1988 war, but he took issue with charges he ordered attacks on Iraqis.[40][41]

On the execution day, Hussein said, "I spent my whole life fighting the infidels and the intruders, [...] I destroyed the invaders and the Persians." He also stressed that the Iraqis should fight the Americans and the Persians.[42] Mowaffak al Rubiae, Iraq's National Security adviser, who was a witness to Hussein's execution described him as repeatedly shouting "down with Persians."[43] Hussein built an anti-Iranian monument called Hands of Victory in Baghdad in 1989 to commemorate his declaration of victory over Iran in the Iran-Iraq war (though the war is generally considered a stalemate). After his fall, it was reported that the new Iraqi government had organized the Committee for Removing Symbols of the Saddam Era and that the Hands of Victory monument had begun to be dismantled. However, the demolition was later halted.[44]

2019 Iraqi protests

Since 2019, anti-Iranian unrest has spiked in Iraq as Iran was blamed for sectarianism and political interferences. This has transcended into football during the 2022 FIFA World Cup qualification, with Iran and Iraq shared each win after two games.[45]

After the overthrow of Saddam Hussein, these two Shia countries have built close relations.[46]

United Arab Emirates

Persian Gulf naming dispute

The name of the Persian Gulf has become contested by some Arab countries since the 1960s[47] in connection with the emergence of pan-Arabism and Arab nationalism, resulting in the invention of the toponym "Arabian Gulf" (Arabic: الخليج العربي) (used in some Arab countries),[48][49] "the Gulf" and other alternatives such as the "Gulf of Basra", as it was known during the Ottoman rule of the region.[50]

Saudi Arabia

Al-Salafi magazine, quoted in The Times, states, "Iran has become more dangerous than Israel itself. The Iranian Revolution has come to renew the Persian presence in the region. This is the real clash of civilizations."[51]

In response to accusations made by Iran's supreme leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei that Saudi authorities were responsible for killing Muslims injured during the 2015 Mina stampede, Abdul-Aziz ibn Abdullah Al ash-Sheikh, Grand Mufti of Saudi Arabia, stated in 2016 that Iranian leaders are descendants of Zoroastrians and are "not Muslims."[52]

Bahrain

Since the Islamic Revolution, Bahrain and Iran have always been tense. In 1981, Bahraini Shia fundamentalists orchestrated a coup attempt under the auspices of a front organisation, the Islamic Front for the Liberation of Bahrain in hope to install an Iran-based cleric to rule Bahrain.[53] Since then, the two countries do not enjoy strong relations. Iran's support for the March 2011 protests in Bahrain increased tensions between Bahrain and Iran, with Bahrain accusing Iran of funding the protests to destabilize the island.[54][55][56] Eventually, Bahrain cut ties with Iran in 2016 following the 2016 attack on the Saudi diplomatic missions in Iran and the Iranian threat to Bahrain.[57][58]

During the 2002 World Cup qualification between Bahrain and Iran, Bahrain beat Iran 3–1, thus Iran lost the chance to qualify directly for the World Cup to rival Saudi Arabia. Bahrainis had waved the flag of Saudi Arabia to demonstrate its solidarity with the Saudis and anti-Iranian sentiment.[59] The same thing occurred 20 years later, with Bahrainis whistling at the Iranian National Anthem and jeering at the Iranian team. The match also ended with a Bahraini victory.[60]

Kuwait

Kuwaitis of Iranian descent are subjected to discrimination and xenophobic hate campaigns. The anti-preservation attitude of the Kuwaiti government towards Kuwaiti Persian will eventually lead to the disappearance of the language in Kuwaiti society, as Abdulmuhsen Dashti projects.[61] The government of Kuwait tries to delegitimise the use of the language in as many domains as possible.[61]

The Persian language has been considered a significant threat to the dominant Sunni Arab population. In 2012, MP Muhammad Hassan al-Kandari called for a "firm legal action" against an advertisement for teaching the Persian language in Rumaithiya.[62] The Kuwaiti television series Karimo attempted to address the identity crisis of Kuwaitis of Iranian descent.[63] The show showed Kuwaiti actors speaking fluent Persian;[63] which resulted in some racist discourse against the Ajam community.[64] The Alrai TV channel advertised the show in Farsi and Arabic.[63]

In 2009, it was estimated that 70-89% of Kuwaiti Ajam aged 23-39 and 40-70 spoke Persian fluently as their native language; whereas only 28% of Kuwaiti Ajam aged 12-22 spoke Persian.[65] Cultural, political, and economic marginalization creates a strong incentive for Kuwaiti Ajam to abandon their language in favor of Arabic which is widely perceived as a more prestigious language. This happens because Kuwaiti Ajam families want to achieve a higher social status, have a better chance to get employment and/or acceptance in a given social network so they adopt the cultural and linguistic traits of socially dominant groups with enough power imbalance to culturally integrate them, through various means of ingroup and outgroup coercion. The generation of young Kuwaiti Ajam born between 1983 and 1993 are reported to have a minimal proficiency in their language unlike the older generations of Kuwaiti Ajam.[65][66] Since the 1980s and 1990s, many Kuwaiti Ajam parents have reported an unwillingness to pass the Persian language on to their children, as it will hurdle their integration into the dominant culture.[65] The Ajam feel pressure to abandon ties that could be interpreted as showing belonging to Iran, as Persian is synonymous with Iranian, and the Persian language is actually called Iranian in Kuwaiti Arabic.[66] In several interviews conducted by PhD student Batoul Hasan, Ajam youth have shown hesitation to use or learn Persian due to stigmatisation and prejudice in Kuwait.[66][65]

UNESCO recognise Kuwaiti Persian as an endangered language.[67] The decline of Kuwaiti Persian is a reflection of the forced homogeneity of Kuwait's national identity and marginalisation of ethnic, linguistic and cultural diversity among Kuwaiti citizens.[68][69] Unlike Bahrain and Dubai where the Ajam citizens still speak their language (including the youngest generations).[70]

Lebanon

The 2019–20 Lebanese protests saw Iran and its ally Hezbollah got antagonized by Lebanese protesters over the increasing economic decline and Iranian meddling on Lebanese sectarian system.[71][72]

Jordan

The outbreak of Iranian Revolution and subsequent establishment of an Islamic regime in Iran changed drastically relationship from positive to negative. Jordan immediately backed Saddam Hussein on the Iran–Iraq War of 1980s[73] and Iran severed diplomatic tie with Jordan aftermath. Due to Jordan's support for Iraq, even during the Gulf War,[74] it took a decade before Iran and Jordan could normalize its relations.

Furthermore, Jordanian solidarity with majority of its Gulf allies have further strained relationship with Iran and increases anti-Iranian sentiment.[75] Jordan has strongly opposed Iranian influence in Iraq and Syria, and has sought to work with Saudi Arabia, Israel and Russia to remove Iranian influence.[76][77][78][79]

In 2017, Jordan summoned the Iranian envoy over its political remarks calling for anti-kingdom uprisings among Arab countries.[80]

Al-Qaeda

Ayman al-Zawahiri, leader of Al-Qaeda since 2011, has increasingly singled out Iran and Shia Muslims in his messages over the years, claiming in 2008 that "Persians" are the enemy of Arabs and that Iran cooperated with the U.S. during the occupation of Iraq.[81]

In the United States

A man is raising a sign that reads "deport all Iranians, get the hell out of my country"during a 1979 Washington, DC, student protest of the Iran hostage crisis.

Iran's Islamic Revolution

Iran hostage crisis

The Iranian hostage crisis of the US embassy in Tehran in November 1979 precipitated a wave of anti-Iranian sentiment in the United States, against the new Islamic regime and Iranian nationals and immigrants. Even though such sentiments gradually declined after the release of the hostages at the start of 1981. In response, some Iranian immigrants to the US have distanced themselves from their nationality and instead identify primarily on the basis of their ethnic or religious affiliations.[82]

According to the Public Affairs Alliance of Iranian Americans (PAAIA), nearly half of Iranian Americans surveyed in 2008 by Zogby International have themselves experienced or personally know another Iranian American who has experienced discrimination because of their ethnicity or country of origin. The most common types of discrimination reported are airport security, social discrimination, employment or business discrimination, racial profiling and discrimination at the hands of immigration officials.[83]

For three decades (starting in 1979), a BBQ restaurant in Houston, Texas hung an anti-Iranian poster featuring a re-enactment of lynching.[84][85][86] This restaurant poster has drawn both protesters and fans to the restaurant in 2011.[85][87]

Neda Maghbouleh is an American-born Canadian sociologist and author, with a focus on the racialization of migrants from Iran, as well as the entire Middle Eastern and North African region.[88][89]

Iran–United States conflict

In January 2020, the fear of “Iranophobia” has raised in the Iranian-American community by the US killing of top Iranian commander Qassem Soliemani led to an intensifying crisis between Iran and the United States. Following some reactions of the United States including, patrols of Law enforcement in streets Lily Tajaddini, an Iranian-American activist in Washington, DC, declared “Posts like this insinuate that Iran is a terrorist country and thus Iranians are terrorists. It makes people feel scared to say they are Iranian in fear of how others might react”.The news tells people that Iranians are terrorists.[90]

A survey conducted by the Public Affairs Alliance of Iranian Americans (a non-profit for Iranian Americans) mentioned that "more than 50 percent of Iranian Americans oppose any kind of action by the US against Iran". Mana Kharrazi, an Iranian-American community organizer reported that violent reactions on Iran were not accepted by some parts of the Iranian-American community.[90]

Depictions of Iranians in Hollywood

Since the 1980s and especially since the 1990s, Hollywood's depiction of Iranians has vilified Iranians as in[91] television programs such as 24,[92] John Doe, On Wings of Eagles (1986),[93] and Escape From Iran: The Canadian Caper (1981), which was based on a true story.[94] Critics maintain that Hollywood's "tall walls of exclusion and discrimination have yet to crumble when it comes to the movie industry's persistent misrepresentation of Iranians and their collective identity".[95] In March 2013, Iran complained to Hollywood about various films, such as Ben Affleck's Oscar-winning Argo, that portray the country in an unrealistically negative light.[96]

For decades, U.S. entertainment companies have been tried to illustrate Iran as a bloodthirsty country concerned about "bringing down America".[97]

Not Without My Daughter (1991)

The 1991 film Not Without My Daughter was criticized for its portrayal of Iranian society. Filmed in Israel, it was based on the autobiography by Betty Mahmoody. In the book and film, an American woman (Mahmoody) traveled to Tehran with her young daughter to visit her Iranian-born family of her husband. Mahmoody's husband then undergoes a strange transformation in Iran, ranging from an educated and sophisticated citizen to an abusive, backwards peasant, eventually deciding that they will not return to the United States. Betty is told that she can divorce him and leave, but their daughter must stay in Tehran under Islamic law. Ultimately, after 18 months in Iran, Betty and her daughter escape to the American embassy in Turkey.

Several Western critics, including Roger Ebert of the Chicago Sun Times and Caryn James of The New York Times, criticized the film for stereotyping Iranians as misogynistic and fanatical. According to Ebert, the film depicts Islamic society "in shrill terms", where women are "willing or unwilling captives of their men", deprived of "what in the West would be considered basic human rights". Furthermore, Ebert says, "No attempt is made—deliberately, I assume—to explain the Muslim point of view, except in rigid sets of commands and rote statements".[98][99] Ebert then contends, "If a movie of such a vitriolic and spiteful nature were to be made in America about any other ethnic group, it would be denounced as racist and prejudiced."[100]

According to Jane Campbell, the film "only serves to reinforce the media stereotype of Iranians as terrorists who, if not actively bombing public buildings or holding airline passengers hostage, are untrustworthy, irrational, cruel, and barbaric."[101][102]

The film was also criticized in Iran. A 2002 Islamic Republic News Agency article claimed that the film "[made] smears...against Iran" and "stereotyped Iranians as cruel characters and wife-beaters". In a Finnish documentary, Without My Daughter,[103] film maker Alexis Kouros tells Mahmoody's husband's side of the story, showing Iranian eyewitnesses accusing the Hollywood film of spreading lies and "treasons". Alice Sharif, an American woman living with her Iranian husband in Tehran, accuses Mahmoody and the filmmakers of deliberately attempting to foment anti-Iranian sentiment in the United States.[104][105]

Alexander (2004)

The 2004 film Alexander by American director Oliver Stone has been accused of negative and inaccurate portrayal of Persians. In particular, according to historian Kaveh Farrokh, the Persian soldiers who fought at the Battle of Gaugamela are wrongly portrayed as unclean, disorganized, and wearing turbans, in contrast to the well-disciplined Greek army.[106] The destruction of Persepolis was done by Alexander who is a hated figure in eyes of Iranians.[107] According to Lloyd Llewellyn-Jones, Professor of Ancient History at Cardiff University: "Oliver Stone's movie Alexander (2004) displays all the familiar Orientalist notions about the inferiority and picturesqueness of Eastern societies. So much so, indeed, that in terms of its portrayal of East–West relationships, Alexander has to be seen as a stale cultural statement and a worn-out reflection of the continuing Western preoccupation with an imaginary exotic Orient."[108]

300 (2007)

The 2007 film 300 by Zack Snyder, is an adaptation of Frank Miller's 1998 graphic novel, was criticized for its portrayal of combatants, perceived as racist,[109] in the Persian army at the Battle of Thermopylae. Reviewers in the United States and elsewhere "noted the political overtones of the West-against-Iran story line and the way Persians are depicted as decadent, sexually flamboyant and evil in contrast to the noble Greeks".[110] With bootleg versions of the film already available in Tehran with the film's international release and news of the film's surprising success at the U.S. box office, it prompted widespread anger in Iran. Azadeh Moaveni of Time reported, "All of Tehran was outraged. Everywhere I went yesterday, the talk vibrated with indignation over the film".[111] Newspapers in Iran featured headlines such as "Hollywood declares war on Iranians" and "300 AGAINST 70 MILLION" (Iran's population). Ayende-No, an independent Iranian newspaper, said that "[t]he film depicts Iranians as demons, without culture, feeling or humanity, who think of nothing except attacking other nations and killing people".[111] Four Iranian Members of Parliament have called for Muslim countries to ban the film,[112] and a group of Iranian film makers submitted a letter of protest to UNESCO regarding the film's alleged misrepresentation of Iranian history and culture.[113] Iran's cultural advisor to president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad has called the film an "American attempt for psychological warfare against Iran".[114]

Moaveni identified two factors which may have contributed to the intensity of Iranian indignation over the film. First, she describes the timing of the film's release, on the eve of Norouz, the Persian New Year, as "inauspicious." Second, Iranians tend to view the era depicted in the film as "a particularly noble page in their history". Moaveni also suggests that "the box office success of 300, compared with the relative flop of Alexander (another spurious period epic dealing with Persians), is cause for considerable alarm, signaling ominous U.S. intentions".[111]

According to The Guardian, Iranian critics of 300, ranging from bloggers to government officials, have described the movie "as a calculated attempt to demonise Iran at a time of intensifying U.S. pressure over the country's nuclear programme".[112] An Iranian government spokesman described the film as "hostile behavior which is the result of cultural and psychological warfare".[112] Moaveni reported that the Iranians she interacted with were "adamant that the movie was secretly funded by the U.S. government to prepare Americans for going to war against Iran".[111]

Dana Stevens of Slate states, "If 300, the new battle epic based on the graphic novel by Frank Miller and Lynn Varley, had been made in Germany in the mid-1930s, it would be studied today alongside The Eternal Jew as a textbook example of how race-baiting fantasy and nationalist myth can serve as an incitement to total war. Since it is a product of the post-ideological, post-Xbox 21st century, 300 will instead be talked about as a technical achievement, the next blip on the increasingly blurry line between movies and video games.[115]

Argo (2012)

Argo has not been shown in public in Iran. It narrates the story of the 1979 Iran hostage crisis and the rescue of six American diplomats by the Central Intelligence Agency. The film faced several reactions from supporters of the Islamic republic and opponents. The film was criticized for a negative portrayal of Iranians, including both revolutionaries and civilians.[96]

In the Netherlands

Iran's nuclear program

In 2015, requests of the Ministries of Education and Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands to monitor Iranian students prevented them from studying at the University of Twente in the city of Enschede and Eindhoven University of Technology in the city of Eindhoven. The latter university had even asked the AIVD, the Dutch intelligence service, to monitor Iranian students. AIVD stated that it was not its duty to do so, and the University decided to stop admitting any applicants from Iran, regardless of the degree sought. The Dutch government said that it fears the theft of sensitive nuclear technology that could assist the Iranian government in constructing nuclear weapons. After protests were lodged, the Dutch government announced again that Iranian students and Dutch citizens of Iranian heritage were not allowed to study at many Dutch universities or go to some areas in the Netherlands.[116][117]

Additionally, in 2008 several other universities stated that the government had prohibited them from admitting students from Iran, and technical colleges were not allowed to give Iranian students access to knowledge of nuclear technology.[118][119] It was noted that it was the first time after the German occupation during the Second World War that ethnic-, religion- or racial-based restrictions were imposed in the Netherlands. Harry van Bommel, a parliamentarian of the Dutch Socialist Party (SP), condemned the berufsverbot, deliberately using a German word associated with the Second World War.[120][121]

Although the Dutch authorities state that the UN security council's resolution 1737 (2006) authorises them and obliges all member states of the UN to take such a measure, it remains the only country to have done so.[122]

On 3 February 2010, a court in The Hague ruled that the Dutch government's policy to ban Iranian-born students and scientists from certain master's degrees and from nuclear research facilities was overly broad and in violation of an international civil rights treaty.[123]

In the Turkic world

Turkey

According to a 2013 survey, 75% of Turks look at Iran unfavorably against 14% with favorable views.[124] Political scientist Shireen Hunter writes that there are two significant groups in Turkey that are hostile towards Iran: "the military establishment and the ultra-Kemalist elite" and the "ultranationalists with pan-Turkist aspirations" (such as the Grey Wolves).[125] Canadian author Kaveh Farrokh also suggests that pan-Turkist groups (the Grey Wolves in particular) have encouraged anti-Iranian sentiments.[126]

Ottoman Empire

Historically, the Shia Muslims were discriminated in the Ottoman Empire as they were associated with their Iranian/Persian neighbors. In Turkey, relatively large communities of Turks, Kurds and Zazas are Alevi Shia, while some areas in Eastern Anatolia, notably Kars and Ağrı, are Twelver Shia.[127]

Azerbaijan

Historic falsifications in the Republic of Azerbaijan, in relation to Iran and its history, are "backed by state and state backed non-governmental organizational bodies", ranging "from elementary school all the way to the highest level of universities".[128]

As a result of the two Russo-Persian Wars of the 19th century, the border between what is present-day Iran and the Republic of Azerbaijan was formed.[129] Although there had not been a historical Azerbaijani state to speak of in history, the demarcation, set at the Aras river, left significant numbers of what were later coined "Azerbaijanis" to the north of the Aras river.[129][130] During the existence of the Azerbaijan SSR of the Soviet Union, pan-Turkist political elites of Baku who were loyal to the Communist cause, in tandem with Soviet-era historical revisionism and myth-building, invented a national history based on the existence of an Azeri nation-state that dominated the areas to the north and south of the Aras river, which was supposedly torn apart by an Iranian-Russian conspiracy in the Treaty of Turkmenchay of 1828.[131][129] This "imagined community" was cherished, promoted and institutionalized in formal history books of the educational system of the Azerbaijan SSR and the post-Soviet Azerbaijan Republic.[131] As the Soviet Union was a closed society, and its people were unaware of the actual realities regarding Iran and its Azeri citizens, the elites in Soviet Azerbaijan kept cherishing and promoting the idea of a "united Azerbaijan" in their activities.[132] This romantic thought led to the founding of nostalgic literary works, known as the "literature of longing"; examples amongst this genre are, for instance, Foggy Tabriz by Mammed Said Ordubadi, and The Coming Day by Mirza Ibrahimov.[132] As a rule, works belonging to the "literature of longing" genre were characterized by depicting the life of Iranian Azeris as a misery due to suppression by the "Fars" (Persians), and by narrating fictional stories about Iranian Azeris waiting for the day when their "brothers" from the "north" would come and liberate them.[132] Works that belonged to this genre, as the historian and political scientist Zaur Gasimov explains, "were examples of blatant Azerbaijani nationalism stigmatizing the “division” of the nation along the river Araxes, as well as denunciations of economic and cultural exploitation of Iranian Azerbaijanis, etc."[133] Gasimov adds: "an important by-product of this literary genre was strongly articulated anti-Iranian rhetoric. Tolerance and even support of this anti-Iranian rhetoric by the communist authorities were obvious."[133]

During the Soviet nation building campaign, any event, both past and present, that had ever occurred in what is the present-day Azerbaijan Republic and Iranian Azerbaijan were rebranded as phenomenons of "Azerbaijani culture".[134] Any Iranian ruler or poet that had lived in the area was assigned to the newly rebranded identity of the Transcaucasian Turkophones, in other words "Azerbaijanis".[135] According to Michael P. Croissant: "It was charged that the "two Azerbaijans", once united, were separated artificially by a conspiracy between imperial Russia and Iran".[129] This notion based on illegitimate historic revisionism suited Soviet political purposes well (based on "anti-imperialism"), and became the basis for irredentism among Azerbaijani nationalists in the last years of the Soviet Union, shortly prior to the establishment of the Azerbaijan Republic in 1991.[129]

In the Republic of Azerbaijan, periods and aspects of Iranian history are usually claimed as being an "Azerbaijani" product in a distortion of history, and historic Iranian figures, such as the Persian poet Nizami Ganjavi are called "Azerbaijanis", contrary to universally acknowledged fact.[136][137] In the Azerbaijan SSR, forgeries such as an alleged "Turkish divan" and falsified verses were published in order to "Turkify" Nizami Ganjavi.[137] Although this type of irredentism was initially the result of the nation building policy of the Soviets, it became an instrument for "biased, pseudo-academic approaches and political speculations" in the nationalistic aspirations of the young Azerbaijan Republic.[136] In the modern Azerbaijan Repuiblic, historiography is written with the aim of retroactively Turkifying many of the peoples and kingdoms that existed prior to the arrival of Turks in the region, including the Iranian Medes.[138]

According to professor of history George Bournoutian:[139]

"As noted, in order to construct an Azerbaijani national history and identity based on the territorial definition of a nation, as well as to reduce the influence of Islam and Iran, the Azeri nationalists, prompted by Moscow devised an "Azeri" alphabet, which replaced the Arabo-Persian script. In the 1930s a number of Soviet historians, including the prominent Russian Orientalist, Ilya Petrushevskii, were instructed by the Kremlin to accept the totally unsubstantiated notion that the territory of the former Iranian khanates (except Yerevan, which had become Soviet Armenia) was part of an Azerbaijani nation. Petrushevskii's two important studies dealing with the South Caucasus, therefore, use the term Azerbaijan and Azerbaijani in his works on the history of the region from the sixteenth to the nineteenth centuries. Other Russian academics went even further and claimed that an Azeri nation had existed from ancient times and had continued to the present. Since all the Russian surveys and almost all nineteenth-century Russian primary sources referred to the Muslims who resided in the South Caucasus as "Tatars" and not "Azerbaijanis", Soviet historians simply substituted Azerbaijani for Tatars. Azeri historians and writers, starting in 1937, followed suit and began to view the three-thousand-year history of the region as that of Azerbaijan. The pre-Iranian, Iranian, and Arab eras were expunged. Anyone who lived in the territory of Soviet Azerbaijan was classified as Azeri; hence the great Iranian poet Nezami, who had written only in Persian, became the national poet of Azerbaijan."

Bournoutian adds:[140]

Although after Stalin's death arguments rose between Azerbaijani historians and Soviet Iranologists dealing with the history of the region in ancient times (specifically the era of the Medes), no Soviet historian dared to question the use of the term Azerbaijan or Azerbaijani in modern times. As late as 1991, the Institute of History of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR, published a book by an Azeri historian, in which it noy only equated the "Tatars" with the present-day Azeris, but the author, discussing the population numbers in 1842, also included Nakhichevan and Ordubad in "Azerbaijan". The author, just like Petrushevskii, totally ignored the fact that between 1828 and 1921, Nakhichivan and Ordubad were first part of the Armenian Province and then part of the Yerevan guberniia and had only become part of Soviet Azerbaijan, some eight decades later (...) Although the overwhelming number of nineteenth-century Russian and Iranian, as well as present-day European historians view the Iranian province of Azarbayjan and the present-day Republic of Azerbaijan as two separate geographical and political entities, modern Azeri historians and geographers view it as a single state that has been separated into "northern" and "southern" sectors and which will be united in the future. (...) Since the collapse of the Soviet Union the current Azeri historians have not only continued to use the terms "northern" and "southern" Azerbaijan, but also assert that the present-day Armenian Republic was a part of northern Azerbaijan. In their fury over what they view as the "Armenian occupation" of Nagorno-Karabakh [which incidentally was an autonomous Armenian region within Soviet Azerbaijan], Azeri politicians and historians deny any historic Armenian presence in the South Caucasus and add that all Armenian architectural monuments located in the present-day Republic of Azerbaijan are not Armenian but [Caucasian] Albanian."

Since 1918, political elites with Pan-Turkist-oriented sentiments in the area that comprises the present-day Azerbaijan Republic have depended on the concept of ethnic nationalism in order to create an anti-Iranian sense of ethnicity amongst Iranian Azeris.[141] According to political adviser Eldar Mamedov, "Anti-Iranian policies [have been] carried out by various Azerbaijani governments since the 1990s."[142] Azerbaijan's second President Abulfaz Elchibey (1992–93) and his government has been widely described as pursuing Pan-Turkic and anti-Iranian policies.[143][144][145][146] Iranian Azerbaijani intellectuals who have promoted Iranian cultural and national identity and put forth a reaction to early pan-Turkist claims over Iran's Azerbaijan region have been dubbed traitors to the "Azerbaijani nation" within the pan-Turkist media of the Republic of Azerbaijan.[147] The Azerbaijani government also lends support to anti-Iranian scholars situated in the West.[148] In addition to being Turkocentric, Azerbaijan's post-Soviet national identity is strongly anti-Iran. It has been built in various ways to oppose Iran as "the other," not just as a country but also as a culture and historical entity. Nowadays, being Azerbaijani means rejecting any ties to Iran.[149]

In Israel

Iran–Israel proxy conflict

Anti-Iranian sentiment in Israel has been mostly the direct result of the establishment of the Islamic theocracy in Iran since 1979. However, most Israelis point their open hostility against the Islamic government rather than against normal Iranian citizens.[150] Thus, anti-Iranian policies in Israel have been mostly owned by the conflict between the Islamic government of Iran and Israel, rather than the normal populace.[151][152]

In Russia

Russian Empire

In the 19th century, during the existence of the Russian Empire, Russians dealt with Iran as an inferior "Orient", and held its people in contempt whilst ridiculing all aspects of Iranian culture.[153] The Russian version of contemporaneous Western attitudes of superiority differed however. As Russian national identity was divided between East and West and Russian culture held many Asian elements, Russians consequently felt equivocal and even inferior to Western Europeans. In order to stem the tide of this particular inferiority complex, they tried to overcompensate to Western European powers by overemphasizing their own Europeanness and Christian faith, and by expressing scornfully their low opinion of Iranians. The historian Elena Andreeva adds that this trend was not only very apparent in over 200 Russian travelogues written about Iran and published in the course of the 19th and early 20th centuries, but also in diplomatic and other official documents.[153]

See also

Look up Persophobia in Wiktionary, the free dictionary.
Look up Iranophobia in Wiktionary, the free dictionary.

References

  1. ↑ Ram, H. (2009): Iranophobia: The Logic of an Israeli Obsession, Stanford University Press, ISBN 9780804760676
  2. ↑ See also Muhammad ibn Ya`qub Firuzabadi (1987) [14XX]. al-Qamus al-muhit. Mu'assasat al-Risalah.; Ibn Manzur (2000). Lisan al-'Arab. Dar Sader.
  3. ↑ Ignaz Goldziher, Arab und 'Agam. Muhammedanische Studien I. Halle. 1889-1890. I p. 101. tr. London 1967-1971, I, p. 98 [C. E. Bosworth.
  4. 1 2 Bosworth 1984, p. 700.
  5. ↑ Goldziher. Muhammedanische Studien I, p. 103. tr I, p. 99
  6. ↑ Franz Rosenthal, "The Muqaddimah: An Introduction to History By Ibn Khaldun, 'Abd al-Rahman b. Muhammad Ibn Haldun", Princeton University Press, 1967, ISBN 0-691-09797-6, p. 311 (footnote 1206)
  7. ↑ Patrick Clawson. Eternal Iran. Palgrave Macmillan. 2005. ISBN 1-4039-6276-6, p. 17.
  8. ↑ "Ignaz Goldziher. Mohammedanische Studien". Vol 2. p. 138–9
  9. ↑
    • "Ansab al Ashraf" or "Futuh al-Buldan" by Baladhuri, p. 417.
    • "Tarikh-i Sistan". p82.
    • "Tarikh e Qum". p254-6.
  10. ↑ Sulaym ibn Qays. "Hadith No.23". The Book of Sulaym ibn Qays (PDF). Archived from the original (PDF) on 2019-11-11. Retrieved 2019-11-11.
  11. ↑ Gianluca Palo Parolin (2009). Citizenship in the Arab World: Kin, Religion and Nation-state. Amsterdam University Press. pp. 63, 64. ISBN 9789089640451.
  12. ↑ Jurji Zaydan, p. 228 (زیدان، جرجی، تاریخ تمدن اسلام ، ترجمه علی جواهرکلام، تهران: امیرکبیر ، چاپ نهم ، 137)
  13. ↑ "The Institute of Ismaili Studies - Sectarian and National Movements in Iran, Khurasan and Transoxania During Umayyad and Early 'Abbasid Times". iis.ac.uk.
  14. ↑ ʻAbd al-Ḥusayn Zarrīnʹkūb (1379). Dū qarn-i sukūt : sarguz̲asht-i ḥavādis̲ va awz̤āʻ-i tārīkhī dar dū qarn-i avval-i Islām (Two Centuries of Silence). Tihrān: Sukhan. OCLC 46632917. ISBN 964-5983-33-6.
  15. ↑ Cambridge History of Iran, by Richard Nelson Frye, Abdolhosein Zarrinkoub, et al. Section on The Arab Conquest of Iran and its aftermath. Vol 4, 1975, London, p. 46
  16. ↑ وقتی قتبیه بن مسلم سردار حجاج، بار دوم بخوارزم رفت و آن را باز گشود هرکس را که خط خوارزمی می نوشت و از تاریخ و علوم و اخبار گذشته آگاهی داشت از دم تیغ بی دریغ درگذاشت و موبدان و هیربدان قوم را یکسر هلاک نمود و کتابهاشان همه بسوزانید و تباه کرد تا آنکه رفته رفته مردم امی ماندند و از خط و کتابت بی بهره گشتند و اخبار آنها اکثر فراموش شد و از میان رفت Biruni From The Remaining Signs of Past Centuries (الآثار الباقية عن القرون الخالية), pp. 35, 36, 48
  17. ↑ Zarrinkoub, Abdolhossein, Dū qarn-i sukūt : sarguz̲asht-i ḥavādis̲ va awz̤āʻ-i tārīkhī dar dū qarn-i avval-i Islām (Two Centuries of Silence), Tihrān: Sukhan, 1379 (2000), OCLC 46632917
  18. ↑ al-Aghānī (الاغانی). Abū al-Faraj al-Isfahāni. Vol 4, p. 423
  19. ↑ Ahmad Khanlari, Mahmoud Fazilat (2017). "The Manifestation of Guardianship in the Persian Poetry from the Beginning Till the End of the Safavid Era" (PDF). INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF SCIENTIFIC STUDY. Archived from the original (PDF) on 2018-08-03. Retrieved 2018-08-03.
  20. ↑ Algharat. Vol. 1. p. 70.; Tarikh-i Yaghubi. Vol. 2. p. 183.; Bihar-ol-Anwar. Vol. 41. p. 137.
  21. 1 2 3 4 5 Kasraie, Nima (February 2005). "More Muslim than others?". The Iranian.
  22. ↑ Shaykh 'Abbas al-Qummi. Safinat-ol Bihar. Vol. 2. p. 693.; Sharh Nahj-ul Balaghih Ebn Abi-alhadid. Vol. 19. p. 124.
  23. ↑ Nahj ol Balagheh. Sobhi Saleh. Sermon 27
  24. ↑ Abtahi, S. Nureddin. Iranian dar Quran va rivayat. p75.
  25. ↑ Aleem Domun. "Gambling (Qimar)". quran.mu. Retrieved 27 October 2016.
  26. ↑ See for example: Republic of Fear: The Politics of Modern Iraq, By Kanan Makiya, 1998 ISBN 0-520-21439-0, p. 152–154
  27. ↑ Samir El-Khalil, Republic of Fear, New York: Pantheon Books, 1989, p. 153–154
  28. ↑ Saddam: His Rise and Fall, by Con Coughlin, 2005, ISBN 0-06-050543-5, p. 148
  29. ↑ Saddam Hussein: An American Obsession By Andrew Cockburn, Patrick Cockburn, ISBN 1-85984-422-7, p. 80
  30. ↑ The Iraq War: Hidden Agendas and Babylonian Intrigue, by Raphael Israeli, ISBN 1-903900-90-5, 2004, p.49
  31. ↑ A History of Iraq, by Charles Tripp, ISBN 0-521-52900-X, 2002, p. 230
  32. 1 2 Saddam Hussein: A Political Biography by Efraim Karsh, Inari Rautsi, Dr Joseph M Stowell- P145
  33. ↑ Con Coughlin. Saddam: His Rise and Fall, page 19. ISBN 978-0-06-050543-1: Quoted from Samir al-Khalil. Republic of Fear, 1989. University of California press. pg 17
  34. ↑ Jerry M. Long (17 August 2009). Saddam's War of Words: Politics, Religion, and the Iraqi Invasion of Kuwait. University of Texas Press. pp. 69–. ISBN 978-0-292-77816-0.
  35. ↑ Saddām, 'Address given'. Baghdād, Voice of the Masses in Arabic, 1200 GMT 02 April 1980. FBIS-MEA-80-066. 03 April 1980, E2-3.
  36. ↑ Duelfer, Charles (2008). Hide and Seek: The Search for Truth in Iraq. Hachette UK. pp. Section 2. ISBN 9780786744114.
  37. ↑ Mock, MD Robert (April–June 2006). "The Rise of the Ancient Persian Empire with the Pahlavi Dictator, the Shah of Iran. Daniel's Vision of the Ram and the He-Goat". BibleSearchers.com.
  38. ↑ Tallal Etrisi طلال عتریسی in: Arab-Iranian Relations, edited by: Khair El-Din Haseeb. 1998. ISBN 1-86064-156-3
  39. ↑ S. M. Gieling, Iran-Iraq War, in Encyclopædia Iranica, 2006.
  40. ↑ "Saddam admits Iran gas attacks". Archived from the original on 2007-05-27. Retrieved 2006-12-18.
  41. ↑ "Business & Financial News, Breaking US & International News - Reuters.com". Archived from the original on 5 May 2008. Retrieved 8 February 2015.
  42. ↑ "BBC NEWS - Middle East - Witness to Saddam's death". Retrieved 8 February 2015.
  43. ↑ "A Historic Day For Iraq". Sky News. 2006-12-30. Archived from the original on 22 January 2007. Retrieved 2006-12-30.
  44. ↑ Iraq Dismantles Saddam’s Big Monument - Newsweek: World News - MSNBC.com
  45. ↑ "Why Iraq-Iran football matches are more than games".
  46. ↑ "Iraqis celebrate soccer win against Iran as symbolic victory". timesofisrael.
  47. ↑ Eilts, Hermann F. (Autumn 1980). "Security Considerations in the Persian Gulf". International Security. Vol. 5, No. 2. pp. 79–113.
  48. ↑ Abedin, Mahan (4 December 2004). "All at Sea over 'the Gulf'". Asia Times Online. Retrieved 13 May 2012.
  49. ↑ Bosworth, C. Edmund (1980). "The Nomenclature of the Persian Gulf". In Cottrell, Alvin J. (ed.). The Persian Gulf States: A General Survey. Baltimore, Maryland: Johns Hopkins University Press. pp. xvii–xxxvi. Not until the early 1960s does a major new development occur with the adoption by the Arab states bordering on the Gulf of the expression al-Khalij al-Arabi as a weapon in the psychological war with Iran for political influence in the Gulf; but the story of these events belongs to a subsequent chapter on modern political and diplomatic history of the Gulf. (p. xxxiii.)
  50. ↑ "The Coast of Arabia the Red Sea, and Persian Sea of Bassora Past the Straits of Hormuz to India, Gujarat and Cape Comorin". 1707.
  51. ↑ The Times: An unholy alliance threatening catastrophe. Anatole Kaletsky. Jan 4, 2007.
  52. ↑ al-Shihri, Abdullah; Batrawy, Aya. "Saudi Arabia's top cleric says Iran's leaders 'not Muslims'". Associated Press. Retrieved 2 December 2020.
  53. ↑ Persian Gulf States Table of Contents U.S. Library of Congress
  54. ↑ Staff writer (16 March 2011). "Iran Condemns Bahraini Assault" Archived 2012-10-24 at the Wayback Machine. Reuters (via The Irish Times).
  55. ↑ "Iran FM Discusses Bahrain Crisis with UN, AL Chiefs". Iranian Students News Agency. 16 March 2011. Archived from the original on 18 March 2011. Retrieved 2 November 2016.
  56. ↑ Slavin, Barbara (20 July 2011). "Bitter Divides Persist Below Bahrain's Relatively Calm Surface". IPS News. Archived from the original on 20 September 2011. Retrieved 2 November 2016.
  57. ↑ "عن بنا | وكالة أنباء البحرين". www.bna.bh. Retrieved 2021-03-27.
  58. ↑ Ahmed A Omran. "Bahrain Severs Diplomatic Ties with Iran". Wall Street Journal. Retrieved 2 November 2016.
  59. ↑ "History of Iran vs Bahrain". www.teammelli.com. Archived from the original on 2022-12-21. Retrieved 2021-03-27.
  60. ↑ "FIFA fines Bahrain after fans whistle Iran anthem". Tehran Times. 2019-11-16. Retrieved 2021-03-27.
  61. 1 2 AbdulMohsen Dashti (2004). "Language Maintenance or Shift? An Ethnographic Investigation of the Use of Farsi among Kuwaiti Ajams: A Case Study". Arab Journal for the Humanities. 22 (87): 73–249.
  62. ↑ الالكترونية, جريدة الآن. "ليس مقبولاً ربط الشيعة في الخليج بإيران.. بنظر د. صلاح الفضلي". Alaan Online Newspaper.
  63. 1 2 3 Andrew Hammond (2017). Pop Culture in North Africa and the Middle East: Entertainment and Society Around the World. California: ABC-CLIO. p. 143. ISBN 9781440833847.
  64. ↑ "كريمو مسلسل كويتي باللغة الفارسية". September 7, 2010 – via YouTube.
  65. 1 2 3 4 Enam Al-Wer, Uri Horesh, Bruno Herin, Rudolf De Jong, ed. (2020). Arabic Sociolinguistics. Cambridge University Press. pp. 122–125. ISBN 9781316865521.{{cite book}}: CS1 maint: multiple names: editors list (link)
  66. 1 2 3 Batoul Hassan (2009). "Ideology, Identity, and Linguistic Capital: A Sociolinguistic Investigation of Language Shift Among the Ajam of Kuwait". The University of Essex.
  67. ↑ "Kuwaiti Persian". UNESCO.
  68. ↑ Rana Almutawa (18 December 2018). "Monolithic Representations of 'Arabness': From the Arab Nationalists to the Arab Gulf".
  69. ↑ Shaikha AlBahaweed (17 January 2023). "رحلة البحث عن الهوية الكويتية: هل يؤثر التجنيس على الهوية الوطنية؟". Manshoor (in Arabic).
  70. ↑ Rana AlMutawa (2024). Everyday Life in the Spectacular City: Making Home in Dubai. Univ of California Press. p. 180-181. ISBN 9780520395060.
  71. ↑ Collard, Rebecca (27 November 2019). "Untouchable No More: Hezbollah's Fading Reputation". Foreign Policy. Retrieved 2021-03-27.
  72. ↑ "Protests in Lebanon are a problem for Hezbollah". www.lowyinstitute.org. Archived from the original on 2020-11-27. Retrieved 2021-03-27.
  73. ↑ Ryan, Curtis (19 March 2019). "Between Iraq and a Hard Place: Jordanian-Iraqi Relations" (PDF). Middle East Report (215): 40–42. doi:10.2307/1520157. JSTOR 1520157.
  74. ↑ Cowell, Alan (7 February 1991). "WAR IN THE GULF: Jordan; Jordanian Ends Neutrality, Assailing Allied War Effort". The New York Times. Archived from the original on 10 February 2018. Retrieved 19 March 2019.
  75. ↑ "Jordan and Saudi Arabia draw closer". Country.eiu.com. Archived from the original on 6 December 2018. Retrieved 19 March 2019.
  76. ↑ "Concern In Jordan Over Pro-Iranian Forces On Border". Memri.org. Archived from the original on 8 February 2019. Retrieved 19 March 2019.
  77. ↑ "Iran in Jordan-Syria relations". Middle East Monitor. 2 October 2018. Archived from the original on 3 October 2018. Retrieved 19 March 2019.
  78. ↑ Bar'el, Zvi (17 June 2018). "Analysis : The Jordanian King's Roller-coaster Ride Into Syria to Stop Iran". Haaretz.com. Archived from the original on 6 February 2019. Retrieved 19 March 2019.
  79. ↑ "Jordan-Iran Relations: History and Future". International Institute for Iranian Studies (in Arabic). 2016-12-27. Retrieved 2020-02-18.
  80. ↑ "Jordan summons Iranian ambassador to protest Iranian official's remarks - Xinhua | English.news.cn". www.xinhuanet.com. Retrieved 2021-03-27.
  81. ↑ "Al-Qaida tape blasts Iran for working with U.S." Associated Press. September 8, 2008. Retrieved December 2, 2020.
  82. ↑ Bozorgmehr, Mehdi (2001-05-02). "No solidarity: Iranians in the U.S." The Iranian. Archived from the original on 10 February 2007. Retrieved 2007-02-02.
  83. ↑ "Survey of Iranian Americans: 84% Support Establishing U.S. Interest Section in Iran". Retrieved 8 February 2015.
  84. ↑ Falkenberg, Lisa (2011-11-10). "Falkenberg: Anti-Iranian poster 'history, not hate' at Texan's joint". Chron. Retrieved 2022-02-11.
  85. 1 2 Casiano, Louis (2011-11-06). "BBQ joint with 'Iranian' poster draws fans and foes". Chron. Retrieved 2022-02-11.
  86. ↑ Rufca, Sarah (November 4, 2011). "Why I can't feign outrage at the racist Iranian hanging poster in a Katy barbecue restaurant". CultureMap Houston. Retrieved 2022-02-11.
  87. ↑ Ambrose, Amber (2011-11-04). "A Side of Lynching With Your Barbecue Plate". Eater Houston. Retrieved 2022-02-11.
  88. ↑ Nasir, Noreen; Contreras, Russell (February 5, 2020). "'Othered' in the US: Old Story Plays Out Daily". Newspapers.com. The Herald-Sun, Associated Press. p. A8. Retrieved 2022-02-11.
  89. ↑ Taxin, Amy (February 13, 2019). "After The 1979 Revolution". Newspapers.com. The Desert Sun. pp. A11, A14. Retrieved 2022-02-11.
  90. 1 2 Sadeque, Samira. "Fears of increased 'Iranophobia' grip Iranian-American community". aljazeera.
  91. ↑ The U.S. Media and the Middle East: Image and Perception. Praeger, 1997; Greenwood, 1995.
  92. ↑ Los Angeles Times: Iranians moving past negative depictions in pop culture June 27, 2010.
  93. ↑ Tv View; 'On Wings Of Eagles' Plods To Superficial Heights, The New York Times.
  94. ↑ "Escape from Iran: The Canadian Caper", (1981) (TV), IMDB.
  95. ↑ "'Axis of Evil' Seeps into Hollywood". Asia Times. March 15, 2007.
  96. 1 2 Kamali Dehghan, Saeed (12 March 2013). "Iran to sue Hollywood over a series of films, including the Oscar-winning Argo". The Guardian.
  97. ↑ Zeitchik, Steven. "The Trump administration is seeking to demonize Iran. Hollywood has been doing that for years". washington post.
  98. ↑ Ebert, Roger (1991-01-11). "Not Without My Daughter". Chicago Sun Times. Archived from the original on 2011-06-05. Retrieved 2007-03-20.
  99. ↑ James, Caryn (1991-01-27). "Embrace the Stereotype; Kiss the Movie Goodbye". The New York Times. Retrieved 2007-03-20.
  100. ↑ Ebert, Roger. "Not Without My Daughter", Chicago Sun Times, January 11, 1991.
  101. ↑ Campbell, J. (1997). Portrayals of Iranians in U.S. Motion Pictures. p. 180.
  102. ↑ "THE IRANIAN: Features, Iranins in U.S. media, Yahya Kamalipour". iranian.com.
  103. ↑ "Finnish documentary counters anti-Iran propaganda in US film". netnative.com. Archived from the original on 2007-02-20. Retrieved 2007-03-15.
  104. ↑ "Finnish documentary counters anti-Iran propaganda in US film" (reprint). Islamic Republic News Agency. 2002-11-22. Archived from the original on 20 February 2007. Retrieved 2007-03-20.
  105. ↑ Nesselson, Lisa (2003-04-10). "Without My Daughter". Variety. Retrieved 2007-03-20.
  106. ↑ "World: Oliver Stone's Alexander Stirs Up Controversy", RadioFreeEurope.
  107. ↑ Tait, Robert (13 December 2008). "Hollywood film accused of insulting Iran". the guardian.
  108. ↑ Llewellyn-Jones, Lloyd (2017). "The Achaemenid Empire". In Daryaee, Touraj (ed.). King of the Seven Climes: A History of the Ancient Iranian World (3000 BCE - 651 CE). Irvine, CA: UCI Jordan Center for Persian Studies. p. 64. ISBN 978-0692864401.
  109. ↑ Golsorkhi, Masoud (2007-03-19). "A racist gorefest". The Guardian. London. Archived from the original on 21 March 2007. Retrieved 2007-03-21.
  110. ↑ Karimi, Nasser (2007-03-13). "Iranians Outraged by '300' Movie". London. Associated Press. Archived from the original (reprint) on 17 March 2007. Retrieved 2007-03-14.
  111. 1 2 3 4 Moaveni, Azadeh (2007-03-13). "300 Versus 70 Million Iranians". Time. Archived from the original on 16 March 2007. Retrieved 2007-03-14.
  112. 1 2 3 Tait, Robert (2007-03-14). "Iran accuses Hollywood of 'psychological warfare'". The Guardian. London. Archived from the original on 17 March 2007. Retrieved 2007-03-14.
  113. ↑ See Baztab newspaper, accessed March 15, 2007 "اعتراض كارگردانان ايراني به سكوت يونسكو در برابر فيلم "300"". Archived from the original on 2007-03-17. Retrieved 2007-03-15.
  114. ↑ "واكنش مشاور رئیس جمهور به فیلم 300". Sharif News. Archived from the original on 16 March 2007. Retrieved 2007-03-21.
  115. ↑ Stevens, Dana (March 8, 2007). "A Movie Only a Spartan Could Love". Slate.com. Archived from the original on 17 June 2008. Retrieved 2008-06-22.
  116. ↑ "IraanseStudenten: Stop verdachtmaking van Iraniers". Retrieved 8 February 2015.
  117. ↑ "Dutch Universities Rejecting Iranian Students due to "Nuclear Threat"". Payvand.com. January 2008. Archived from the original on 2008-01-04. Retrieved 2018-08-03.
  118. ↑ "Dutch Universities Rejecting Iranian Students due to Nuclear Threat". Archived from the original on 2008-01-20. Retrieved 2008-10-11.
  119. ↑ "IraanseStudenten: Stop verdachtmaking van Iraniers". iraansestudenten.nl.
  120. ↑ "1930-1945". seniorplaza.nl.
  121. ↑ "Weblog Harry van Bommel » Berufsverbot voor Iraanse studenten". sp.nl. Archived from the original on 2008-02-01. Retrieved 2008-01-31.
  122. ↑ "Facsimile of letter from Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken" (PDF). Iraansestudenten.nl. 2007-09-19. Archived from the original (PDF) on 2008-02-27. Retrieved 2016-10-27.
  123. ↑ Enserink, Martin (2015-12-31). "Court Rebukes Dutch Policy on Iranian Scientists". News. Retrieved 2016-01-02.
  124. ↑ Poushter, Jacob (31 October 2014). "The Turkish people don't look favorably upon the U.S., or any other country, really". Pew Research Center.
  125. ↑ Hunter, Shireen T. (2010). Iran's Foreign Policy in the Post-Soviet Era: Resisting the New International Order. Santa Barbara, California: ABC-CLIO. p. 158. ISBN 9780313381942.
  126. ↑ Farrokh, Kaveh. "Pan-Turanianism Takes Atim At Azerbaijan: A Geopolitical Agenda". Rozaneh Magazine. Pan-Turanian activists have attempted to turn these celebrations into anti-Persian events. There are reports that Grey Wolves activists from Turkey and the Republic of Azerbaijan join the celebrations, chant anti-Iranian slogans and distribute anti-Iran literature.
  127. ↑ Karin Vorhoff. 1995. Zwischen Glaube, Nation und neuer Gemeinschaft: Alevitische Identitat in der Türkei der Gegenwart, pp. 107-108.
  128. ↑ Lornejad, Siavash; Doostzadeh, Ali (2012). Arakelova, Victoria; Asatrian, Garnik (eds.). On the modern politicization of the Persian poet Nezami Ganjavi (PDF). Caucasian Centre for Iranian Studies. p. 85 (note 277).
  129. 1 2 3 4 5 Croissant, Michael P. (1998). The Armenia-Azerbaijan Conflict: Causes and Implications. Praeger Publishers. p. 61.
  130. ↑ Lornejad, Siavash; Doostzadeh, Ali (2012). Arakelova, Victoria; Asatrian, Garnik (eds.). On the modern politicization of the Persian poet Nezami Ganjavi (PDF). Caucasian Centre for Iranian Studies. pp. 9–10 (note 26).
  131. 1 2 Ahmadi, Hamid (2017). "The Clash of Nationalisms: Iranian response to Baku's irredentism". In Kamrava, Mehran (ed.). The Great Game in West Asia: Iran, Turkey and the South Caucasus. Oxford University Press. pp. 109–110. ISBN 978-0190869663.
  132. 1 2 3 Ahmadi, Hamid (2017). "The Clash of Nationalisms: Iranian response to Baku's irredentism". In Kamrava, Mehran (ed.). The Great Game in West Asia: Iran, Turkey and the South Caucasus. Oxford University Press. p. 110. ISBN 978-0190869663.
  133. 1 2 Gasimov, Zaur (2022). "Observing Iran from Baku: Iranian Studies in Soviet and Post-Soviet Azerbaijan". Iranian Studies. 55 (1): 49. doi:10.1080/00210862.2020.1865136. S2CID 233889871.
  134. ↑ Lornejad, Siavash; Doostzadeh, Ali (2012). Arakelova, Victoria; Asatrian, Garnik (eds.). On the modern politicization of the Persian poet Nezami Ganjavi. Caucasian Centre for Iranian Studies. p. 17.
  135. ↑ Lornejad, Siavash; Doostzadeh, Ali (2012). Arakelova, Victoria; Asatrian, Garnik (eds.). On the modern politicization of the Persian poet Nezami Ganjavi (PDF). Caucasian Centre for Iranian Studies. p. 17.
  136. 1 2 Lornejad, Siavash; Doostzadeh, Ali (2012). Arakelova, Victoria; Asatrian, Garnik (eds.). On the modern politicization of the Persian poet Nezami Ganjavi. Caucasian Centre for Iranian Studies. pp. i, 91–92.
  137. 1 2 Talattof, Kamran (2012). "Reviewed Work: Ali Doostzadeh, On the Modern Politicization of the Persian Poet Nezami Ganjavi (Yerevan Series for Oriental Studies—1) by Siavash Lornejad". Iran & the Caucasus. 16 (3): 380–383. doi:10.1163/1573384X-20120025.
  138. ↑ Lornejad, Siavash; Doostzadeh, Ali (2012). Arakelova, Victoria; Asatrian, Garnik (eds.). On the modern politicization of the Persian poet Nezami Ganjavi. Caucasian Centre for Iranian Studies. pp. 18, 85 (note 277).
  139. ↑ Bournoutian, George (2016). The 1820 Russian Survey of the Khanate of Shirvan: A Primary Source on the Demography and Economy of an Iranian Province prior to its Annexation by Russia. Gibb Memorial Trust. p. xvi.
  140. ↑ Bournoutian, George (2016). The 1820 Russian Survey of the Khanate of Shirvan: A Primary Source on the Demography and Economy of an Iranian Province prior to its Annexation by Russia. Gibb Memorial Trust. pp. xvii, xv, xviii.
  141. ↑ Ahmadi, Hamid (2017). "The Clash of Nationalisms: Iranian response to Baku's irredentism". In Kamrava, Mehran (ed.). The Great Game in West Asia: Iran, Turkey and the South Caucasus. Oxford University Press. p. 106. ISBN 978-0190869663.
  142. ↑ Mamedov, Eldar (31 October 2014). "Azerbaijan: Time to Address the Potential Salafi Danger". eurasianet.org. Open Society Institute.
  143. ↑ Cornell, Svante (2005). Small Nations and Great Powers: A Study of Ethnopolitical Conflict in the Caucasus. Routledge. p. 87. ISBN 9781135796693. Elchibey's anti-Iranian rhetoric and the subsequent deterioration of Azerbaijani-Iranian relations to below freezing point...
  144. ↑ Peimani, Hooman (1999). Iran and the United States: The Rise of the West Asian Regional Grouping. Praeger. p. 35. ISBN 9780275964542. Characterized by its anti-Iranian, anti-Russian, pro-Turkish outlook, the Elchibey government's pursuit of pan-Turkism...
  145. ↑ Grogan, Michael S. (2000). National security imperatives and the neorealist state: Iran and realpolitik. Naval Postgraduate School. pp. 68–69. Elchibey was anti-Iranian, pan-Azeri
  146. ↑ Eichensehr, Kristen E.; Reisman, William Michael, eds. (2009). Stopping Wars and Making Peace: Studies in International Intervention. Martinus Nijhoff Publishers. p. 57. ISBN 9789004178557. radically pro-Turkish and anti-Iranian President Elchibey in June made Iran unacceptable to Azerbaijan as a mediator.
  147. ↑ Ahmadi, Hamid (2017). "The Clash of Nationalisms: Iranian response to Baku's irredentism". In Kamrava, Mehran (ed.). The Great Game in West Asia: Iran, Turkey and the South Caucasus. Oxford University Press. p. 121. ISBN 978-0190869663.
  148. ↑ Heiran-Nia, Javad; Monshipouri, Mahmood (2023). Kamrava, Mehran (ed.). "Raisi and Iran's Foreign Policy Toward the South Caucasus". The Muslim World. 113 (1–2): 131. doi:10.1111/muwo.12460. S2CID 257093804.
  149. ↑ Mamedov 2017, p. 31.
  150. ↑ Kaye, Dalia Dassa; Nader, Alireza; Roshan, Parisa (2011). "Israeli Perceptions of and Policies Toward Iran". Israel and Iran. RAND Corporation. pp. 19–54. ISBN 9780833058607. JSTOR 10.7249/mg1143osd.8.
  151. ↑ "As Israel's anti-Iran strategy shifts into higher gear, worries of fresh conflict grow - Al-Monitor: The Pulse of the Middle East". 13 September 2019.
  152. ↑ Feldinger, Lauren Gelfond (10 October 2013). "7 Things You Might Not Know About Iranian Views of Israel". The Daily Beast.
  153. 1 2 Andreeva, Elena (2014). "RUSSIA i. Russo-Iranian Relations up to the Bolshevik Revolution". In Yarshater, Ehsan (ed.). Encyclopædia Iranica, Online Edition. Encyclopædia Iranica Foundation.

Further reading

Wikimedia Commons has media related to Anti-Iranian sentiment.
This article is issued from Wikipedia. The text is licensed under Creative Commons - Attribution - Sharealike. Additional terms may apply for the media files.