Signed | May 12, 1881 |
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The Treaty of Bardo (French: Traité du Bardo, Arabic: معاهدة باردو) or Treaty of Qsar es-S'id, Treaty of Ksar Said established a French protectorate over Tunisia that lasted until World War II. It was signed on 12 May 1881 between representatives of the French Republic and the Tunisian bey Muhammed as-Sadiq, placing Tunisia under the control of the French Resident-General.
The treaty allowed France to control certain geographical areas under the guise of re-establishing order and protecting the Bey from internal opposition and also gave France responsibility for foreign-policy decisions of Tunisia. Later, the Conventions of La Marsa of 8 June 1883 gave France a right to intervene in Tunisia's domestic affairs. Thus subject to the Resident-General’s absolute power, the country lost almost all autonomy not only in external but in practice also in internal affairs.[1]
Name
The name of the treaty originated with the site of the residence of the Tunis court, Le Bardo, where the Husainid beys had established themselves in the early-18th century.
Background
A raid on Algeria by the Tunisian Khroumir tribe had served as a pretext for French armed forces to invade Tunisia in April 1881. Jules Ferry, the French foreign minister, managed to send a French expeditionary force of approximately 36,000 troops to defeat the Khroumer tribe. The French met little resistance from either the Kroumer tribe or from as-Sadiq. Eventually, the French withdrew their forces after signing the treaty. The military occupation was stated to be temporary.[2]
References
- ↑ Ikeda, Ryo (2015). The Imperialism of French Decolonisaton : French Policy and the Anglo-American Response in Tunisia and Morocco. Palgrave Macmillan. p. 14. ISBN 978-1-137-36895-9. OCLC 914166414.
- ↑
Stearns, Peter N., ed. (2001). The Encyclopedia of World History: Ancient, Medieval, and Modern, Chronologically Arranged (6 ed.). Houghton Mifflin Harcourt. p. 473. ISBN 0-395-65237-5.
Treaty of Bardo, establishing a French protectorate over Tunis. This went back to the assurances of Salisbury and Bismarck during the Congress of Berlin, but the French government had not acted because of the indifference of French public opinion in matters of colonial expansion and because of distrust of Bismarck's motives. The question was precipitated by the activity of the Italians, determined to make good their failure to secure gains at the Berlin Congress at Austria's expense. The affair initiated a long period of Franco-Italian tension and modified the Mediterranean situation to Britain's disadvantage. Gladstone protested, but the British government was committed by Salisbury's assurances.
Sources
Further reading
- Ling, Dwight L. "Paul Cambon, Coordinator of Tunisia." The Historian 19.4 (1957): 436–455.