Burmese–Siamese War (1759–1760)
Part of Burmese–Siamese wars

A map of the Burmese-Siamese War (1759-1760)
DateDecember 1759 – May 1760
Location
Result Inconclusive
Territorial
changes
Burma captures the Tennasserim coast down to TavoyMergui frontier[1]
Belligerents
Konbaung dynastyKonbaung dynasty (Burma) Ayutthaya Kingdom (Siam)
Commanders and leaders
Konbaung dynasty Alaungpaya 
Konbaung dynasty Hsinbyushin
Konbaung dynasty Minkhaung Nawrahta
Ekkathat
Uthumphon
Units involved

Konbaung dynasty Royal Burmese Army including:

Konbaung dynasty Shan regiments
Konbaung dynasty Mon regiments
Konbaung dynasty Cassay Horse
Royal Siamese Army
Strength

Invasion force:

40,000 men[2][3]
3,000 cavalry [4]
Rearguard:
6,000 musketeers
500 cavalry[5]
Tenasserim and Gulf of Siam theaters (initial):
27,000 men
1,300 cavalry
200 elephants[6]
Gulf of Siam (later):
60,000 men[7]
Suphanburi and Ayutthaya:
45,000 men
3,000 cavalry
300 elephants[6]
Casualties and losses
Unknown Unknown

The Burmese–Siamese War (1759–1760) (Burmese: ယိုးဒယား-မြန်မာစစ် (၁၇၅၉–၁၇၆၀); Thai: สงครามพม่า-สยาม (พ.ศ. 2302–2303)) was the first military conflict between the Konbaung dynasty of Burma (Myanmar) and the Ban Phlu Luang Dynasty of the Ayutthaya Kingdom of Siam. It reignited the centuries-long conflict between the two Southeast Asian states that would last for another century. The Burmese were "on the brink of victory" when they suddenly withdrew from their siege of Ayutthaya because their king Alaungpaya had fallen ill.[6] He died three weeks later, ending the war.

The casus belli were over the control of the Tenasserim coast and its trade,[8][9] and the Siamese support for ethnic Mon rebels of the fallen Restored Hanthawaddy Kingdom.[6][10] The newly founded Konbaung Dynasty had wanted to reestablish Burmese authority in the upper Tenasserim coast (present-day Mon State) where the Siamese had provided support to the Mon rebels and deployed their troops. The Siamese had refused Burmese demands to hand over the Mon leaders or to stop their intrusions into what the Burmese considered their territory.[11]

The war began in December 1759 when 40,000 Burmese troops led by Alaungpaya and his son Hsinbyushin invaded down the Tenasserim coast from Martaban. Their battle plan was to go around the heavily defended Siamese positions along shorter, more direct invasion routes. The invasion force overran relatively thin Siamese defenses in the coast, crossed the Tenasserim Hills to the shore of the Gulf of Siam, and turned north towards Ayutthaya. Taken by surprise, the Siamese scrambled to meet the Burmese in their south, and put up spirited defensive stands en route to Ayutthaya. But battle-hardened Burmese forces overcame numerically superior Siamese defenses and reached the outskirts of Siamese capital on 11 April 1760. But only five days into the siege, the Burmese king suddenly fell ill and the Burmese command decided to withdraw.[6] An effective rearguard operation by General Minkhaung Nawrahta allowed for an orderly withdrawal.[12]

The war was inconclusive. While the Burmese regained control of the upper coast down to the Tavoy, they had not eliminated the threat to their hold on the peripheral regions, which remained tenuous. They were forced to deal with Siamese-supported ethnic rebellions in the coast (1762, 1764) as well as in Lan Na (1761–1763). The Burmese would launch their next invasion in 1765, and topple the three-centuries-old Ayutthaya Kingdom in 1767.

Background

Summary of Burmese–Mon–Siamese conflicts

Burmese King Tabinshweti of Toungoo dynasty conquered the Mon Kingdom of Hanthawaddy in Lower Burma in 1539.[13]:94[14] However, the Mons, also called the Talaings, soon rebelled and had to be reconquered by King Bayinnaung in 1551.[13]:105 Burmese kings of Toungoo dynasty established their royal capital at Pegu or Hanthawaddy, which had been the Mon royal seat, respecting Mon culture.[15] In 1555, Bayinnaung conquered the Shan-occupied Ava and Upper Burma,[13]:108[14] uniting Burma under a single rule for the first time since the Pagan kingdom. Bayinnaung went on to conquer Lanna Chiang Mai (1558), Manipur (1560) and Tavoy (1562). In 1563, King Bayinnaung led his Burmese armies to invade neighboring Siamese Kingdom of Ayutthaya. King Thammaracha of Phitsanulok, a Siamese vassal king, allied with the Burmese king.[16]:80 Bayinnaung then went on to lay siege on Ayutthaya, resulting in the surrender of Ayutthaya in 1564.[16]:81 However, conflicts between Ayutthaya and Burmese-backed Phitsanulok prompted Bayinnaung to send another invasion force to attack Ayutthaya. Ayutthaya fell to Burmese invaders in 1569.[16]:82 Bayinnaung appointed Thammaracha as King of Ayutthaya and his vassal.[16]:82 During his reign, Burmese king Bayinnaung expanded his kingdom to unprecedented territorial size and influence. Bayinnaung appointed his own son, Nawrahta Minsaw, to be King of Chiang Mai and ruler over Lanna.

Bayinnaung died in 1581, leaving the throne to his son Nanda Bayin.[14] Burma then entered a period of decline. Naresuan broke his Siam kingdom free from Burmese domination in 1584. In 1586, Nanda Bayin himself marched Burmese forces to attack and lay siege on Ayutthaya in retaliation but failed to reconquer Ayutthaya. After 1587, Burmese forces would not reach Ayutthayan outskirts again for the next two hundred years (until 1760). In 1592, Nanda Bayin sent his son the crown prince Mingyi Swa to invade Siam. Naresuan intercepted the Burmese at Western frontiers near Suphanburi, leading to the Battle of Nong Sarai in 1593,[15][16]:88 in which Naresuan prevailed over Burmese invaders and the Burmese crown prince was killed in battle. After the victory, Siam went on offensives, reclaiming Tavoy and Tenasserim in 1593 and taking control of Martaban in 1594. Burma disintegrated into competing princely regimes of Ava, Prome and Toungoo. Even King Nawrahta Minsaw of Chiang Mai, himself a son of Bayinnaung, submitted to Naresuan, bringing Lanna under Ayutthayan domination. The Burmese Prince of Toungoo, in collaboration with Arakan Kingdom,[13]:122 successfully seized Pegu the Burmese capital in 1599.[13]:123 Naresuan embarked on his grand campaign to invade Lower Burma in 1600. Prince of Toungoo brought Burmese king Nanda Bayin to his hometown at Toungoo, leaving the Arakanese to freely plunder and burn down Pegu.[14] Naresuan followed to Toungoo, laying siege on the city but did not succeed and turned back. Nanda Bayin the Burmese king himself was assassinated in 1600 by Nat Shin Naung, son of the Toungoo prince.

After the death of Nanda Bayin, Burma descended into civil war with regional regimes sprang up at Ava, Prome, Toungoo and Syriam. In 1603, Prince Nyaungyan of Ava attacked Shan States, which were allies of Siam. Naresuan led Siamese armies to support the Shans but died on his way in 1605. Nyaungyan also died in 1605 during his Shan campaign,[13]:128 succeeded by his son Anaukpetlun. From Ava, Anaukpetlun conquered all of his rival regional regimes, uniting Burma again under his rule. In 1613, Anaukpetlun reestablished Pegu as Burmese royal capital. The new Burmese king also reconquered Martaban, Tavoy (1614)[14] and Chiang Mai (1615)[13]:132[14] from Siam. After this, Burmese–Siamese conflicts cooled down and reached stalemate, with Burma being in control of Lanna, Martaban and Tavoy and Siam controlling Tenasserim. King Thalun moved Burmese capital from Pegu in Lower Burma to Ava in Upper Burma in 1636,[13]:135 The Mons of Lower Burma were then neglected by the Burmese court,[15] allowing them to be more autonomous. In 1660, Qing China invaded Burma in search for Southern Ming Yongli Emperor who had taken refuge in Burma.[17] The panicked Lanna King of Chiang Mai requested aid from King Narai of Ayutthaya. Burma conscripted Mon people to fight Chinese invaders, leading to Mon rebellion at Martaban in 1661.[15] King Narai led Siamese forces north to Lanna but the Chiang Mai king annulled this alliance as the war turned to Burmese favor. Burmese king Pindale sent Burmese armies to subjugate the Mon rebellion, proceeding to invade Western Siam through the Three Pagodas Pass.[15] The Siamese repelled Burmese invaders in 1661 at Saiyok near Kanchanaburi. King Narai conquered Chiang Mai[18] in late 1661. Siam retaliated by attacking Tavoy up to Martaban on Tenasserim Coast in 1662. However, Siam did not seek to permanently occupy Lanna and the Mon lands so these Siamese conquests reverted back to Burmese rule.

Decline and Fall of Toungoo dynasty

In 1704, King Charairongba of Meitei Kangleipak Kingdom married off his sister Chakpa Makhao Ngambi to Burmese king Sanay.[19] However, Sanay reportedly mistreated Chakpa Makhao Ngambi, not making her his chief queen as promised. Charairongba then died with a broken heart in 1709, instructing his son and successor Pamheiba to avenge Burma. Pamheiba, the new king of Kangleipak, under influence of Indian guru Shantidas Goswami, converted his kingdom to Hindu Vaishnavism,[20] renamed his kingdom Manipur and renamed himself with a Persianate name Gharib Niwaz. In 1716, the new Burmese king Taninganway sent his envoys asking for a Manipuri princess to marry. Gharib Niwaz, remembering the grudges of his father, was offended by this request. Gharib Niwaz sent his forces to ambush the Burmese envoys,[19] leading to Burmese–Manipuri Wars. Gharib Niwaz led his Manipuri armies to invade and plunder Northwestern Burmese towns along the Chindwin and Mu rivers including Myedu, Tabayin and Mingin. Repeated Manipuri invasions weakened Burma. In 1727, Lanna Chiang Mai broke free from Burmese rule and the Shan State of Mogaung did the same in 1734 with the help of Manipur.[21] Indian Brahmins also told Gharib Niwaz that he should bath in the sacred water of Irrawaddy River,[14] where the Burmese royal capital of Ava situated. The most devastating invasion came in 1739 when Gharib Niwaz seized and burnt down Sagaing,[22] which was just opposite of Ava on the Irrawaddy. Gharib Niwaz, however, did not proceed to attack Ava but instead performed sacred bathing ritual in the Irrawaddy river. Maha Damayaza Dipati, the last Burmese king of Toungoo dynasty, reached a truce with Gharib Niwaz in 1740 with the Manipuri king withdrawing.[22]

After the transfer of Burmese capital from Pegu to Ava in 1635, Burmese court had been sending Myowun or governors to govern Pegu, also called Hanthawaddy, over the Mons or Talaings in Lower Burma. The Mons, however, had been largely neglected[15] by the Burmese court and they strove for independence. In 1737, a Burmese official Maung Tha Aung became the Myowun of Pegu. Maung Tha Aung imposed heavy taxation on the Mons and became unpopular.[13]:142 In 1740, when the Burmese court of Ava was dealing with devastating Manipuri invasion, Maung Tha Aung took this opportunity to rebel[13]:142 and declared himself a Minlaung or pretender. Maung Tha Aung, however, received no support from local Mon populace. King Damayaza of Burma sent his uncle[14] to successfully subjugate and execute Maung Tha Aung the unpopular governor. Burmese court appointed another governor to Pegu but the Mons had enough with Burmese rule. Recent Burmese failures encouraged the Talaings to arise.[23] The Mons found cooperation with the Gwe Shans (Shans or Karens who had migrated from Karen Hills to Burma)[24] in their uprising against Burma in 1740. The uprising was led by a Buddhist monk and Minlaung millenarian pretender Smim Htaw[14][15] (Ethnic origin of Smim Htaw is uncertain. Mon chronicles state that Smim Htaw was of the Gwe Shans but Burmese sources point out that Smim Htaw was a son of a fugitive Burmese prince).[13]:142[24][23] Thorasengmu, a Peguan official,[24] murdered the new Pegu governor and declared Smim Htaw the King of Pegu, thus restoring the long-defunct Hanthawaddy Kingdom of the Mons[15] in Lower Burma. Smim Htaw made Thorasengmu his prime minister with the title Binnya Dala and married his daughter.[24] Smim Htaw then proceeded to attack Prome to the north. Burmese governors of Martaban and Tavoy, in their panic of Mon insurgency, fled to seek shelter at Ayutthaya in 1742 under protection of King Borommakot.[14][23] Burmese king sent envoys to Ayutthaya in 1744,[14] requesting repatriation of the two Burmese governors. Borommakot reciprocated by dispatching Siamese envoys in 1745[14] to bring these two governors back to Burma. Siamese ambassadors declared open support to Burma against the Mons.[23] Smim Htaw, fearing Siamese attacks in his rear, retreated from Prome. According to Thai chronicles, Burmese–Siamese relations by this time went amicably but, in Burmese perspective, the Burmese court was suspicious about Siam's true allegiance.

Smim Htaw the King of Pegu had a queen who was a daughter of his prime minister Binnya Dala. In 1744, in response to Siamese support to Burma, Smim Htaw sought alliance with Lanna by marrying a daughter of King Ong Kham of Chiang Mai as his second queen. This marriage, however, upset the first queen as Smim Htaw favored his Lanna queen over his first one. The first queen relayed her grievances to her father Binnya Dala, who then conspired against Smim Htaw. In 1746, while Smim Htaw was venturing out to catch some elephants, Binnya Dala seized power in Pegu,[23] declaring himself new king (Burmese sources suggested that Binnya Dala might originally be a Shan, perhaps Northern Thai, elephant mahout from Chiang Mai).[13]:145 Binnya Dala was a better expansionist than Smim Htaw as he sent his brother Upayaza to successfully took Prome and Toungoo in 1746. In 1747, Smim Htaw rallied his Karen forces in attempt to reclaim his throne but was defeated and took refuge in Ayutthaya, Siam.[24] In 1748, King Gharib Niwaz abdicated the throne of Manipur in favor of his son Chitsai.[25] Next year, in 1749, Gharib Niwaz marched his army to Ava in order to marry off his niece to the Burmese king.[25] Out of desperation, Burmese court sent tributes to Chinese governor of Yunnan in 1750, requesting military aid against the Mons.[14] Chinese forces did come but left Burma after the Burmese failed to capture Madara.[13] Also in 1750, the new Manipur king Chitsai expelled his father the abdicated king out of Imphal.[25] Gharib Niwaz ended up seeking shelter at Ava with the Burmese king[25] with whom he had reconciled.

In 1751, Hanthawaddy court signed a treaty with French representative Sieur de Bruno, allowing the French to establish a military post at Syriam, while the Mons obtaining French firearms.[15] The Mons then had the advantage of updated European weaponry over the Burmese. Finally in 1751, Binnya Dala sent the Mon forces of 27,000 men under the command of his younger brother Upayaza with his another sibling Talaban as vanguard along the Irrawaddy north to attack the Burmese royal seat of Ava. The Mon forces reached Ava in early 1752. After many defeats, manpower and supplies dwindling, Ava eventually capitulated in March 1752.[13]:147[23] Damayaza the last king of Toungoo dynasty surrendered without resistance. Upayaza took the Burmese king and his family down south to Pegu, leaving Talaban to be in charge of Ava, which was burnt to the grounds.[13]:148[14] Centuries-old Toungoo dynasty was overthrown by the Talaings, who conquered their former overlord – Burma. Gharib Niwaz the abdicated Manipur king, who had been staying in Ava, left Ava to return to Manipur but was assassinated midway by the agents of his own son Chitsai.[25] Upayaza the Mon prince, convinced that Upper Burma had been thoroughly pacified, was more concerned about prospective Siamese retaliation[14] from Tenasserim than potential Burmese resurgence in Upper Burma.

Reign of Borommakot

Phetracha ascended the Siamese throne in aftermath of the Siamese Revolution of 1688, establishing the Ban Phlu Luang dynasty, facing regional rebellions at Nakhon Ratchasima in 1689, 1699–1700[26] and at Nakhon Si Thammarat in 1700 and 1704–1705,[27] which took great efforts to quell. At the death of Phetracha in 1703, his son Phra Chao Suea succeeded the throne and executed his half-brother and rival claimant Prince Phra Khwan.[27] After Phra Chao Suea, his son King Thaisa ascended the throne in 1709. Thaisa made his younger brother Prince Phon the Wangna Prince of the Front Palace and heir presumptive. As internal instability had plagued Siam, Siamese court sought to reduce the powers of nobility and regional governors in order to stabilize politics but the opposite actually came true – royal princes and nobles gained more power and Ayutthaya lost control of its periphery. Government structure of Late Ayutthaya served to prevent internal rebellions rather than to defend against Burmese invasions, which had become a distant past memory. Meanwhile, Siamese trade with Qing China flourished. As Southern China suffered from rice shortages,[28] Siam capitalized this situation by daring the Haijin or Chinese ban on overseas trade by sending rice in tributary junks to trade at Canton in 1722.[27][29] Emperor Kangxi allowed the import of cheaper Siamese rice into ports of Canton, Amoy and Ningbo, under the guise of tributary submissions, to relieve famines.[27][28] This might partially lead to Emperor Yongzheng lifting the Haijin ban in 1727. This Sino–Siamese commercial-tributary relations generated revenue for Siamese royal court and private merchants alike. In 1730, Prince Phon of the Front Palace discovered an anti-Buddhist Christian catechism composed by French missionary Louis Laneau, resulting in King Thaisa banning Christian proselytizing through Siamese alphabets and conversion of native Siamese people to Christianity.[30] Siamese court erected stone steles at Catholic seminaries at Ayutthaya and Mergui to enforce this edict.

On his deathbed in 1733, King Thaisa gave the throne to his two sons instead of his younger brother Prince Phon, who had been the Wangna and technically heir presumptive, resulting in a civil war in Ayutthaya between the uncle and his nephews.[16]:110 Prince Phon initially suffered setbacks to the verge of defeat but his subordinate Khun Chamnan volunteered to rally against the enemies in last resort.[16]:110 Khun Chamnan valiantly marched against the two princes and miraculously prevailed. Two sons of Thaisa, claimants to the throne, were captured and executed. Prince Phon ascended the Siamese throne as King Borommakot in 1733.[26] Borommakot rewarded his meritorious subject Khun Chamnan with title Chaophraya Chamnan Borirak and position of Phrakhlang or trade minister[16]:111[27] as de facto Prime Minister of Siam with immense powers. Borommakot attempted to solve the chronic problem of princely conflicts by creation of Krom or manpower regiment assigned to each prince as the method to control manpower allocation among the princes.[26] Conscripted commoner males preferred to become Phrai Som (princely servants) in the Kroms instead of Phrai Luang (direct royal servants), who were subjected to more labor tasks.[23] Moreover, Sino–Siamese rice trade continued to expand, leading to growth of export-oriented private rice plantations. These proto-middle class Siamese people, who had enriched themselves from trades, avoided royal conscriptions to partake in more profitable activities. Phrai Luang – effective available manpower – was reduced in numbers.[23] Long hiatus from external threats and manpower shortage crippled Siamese defense system.[31] In 1742, Siamese court issued a campaign to round up ten thousands of conscription evaders.[16]:114

The reign of King Borommakot coincided with last years of Burmese Toungoo dynasty. In 1742, Burmese governors of Martaban and Tavoy fled the Mon insurrection to seek shelter in Ayutthaya.[23] These Burmese governors told Borommakot, in derogatory words, that Smim Htaw the King of Hanthawaddy was of 'lowborn' Gwe Shan origin.[24] Burmese king Damayaza sent envoys to Ayutthaya in 1744,[14] asking for the return of the two Burmese governors. Borommakot responded by sending a diplomatic mission to Ava in 1745[14] to repatriate the Burmese governors. Siamese envoys declared open support to Burma in this BurmeseMon conflict.[23] Siam considered the rising Mon kingdom in nearer Lower Burma to be a greater threat than crumbling Ava Kingdom in farther Upper Burma.[24][23] Smim Htaw attempted to normalize relations with Siam by sending a request for one of any daughters of Borommakot to marry in 1745. Borommakot, however, was greatly offended by this request as he considered Smim Htaw to be a 'forest-dweller'[24] aspiring to become royalty. In 1746, Smim Htaw was dethroned by his chancellor Binnya Dala and ended up taking refuge in Ayutthaya in 1747.[24] The Siamese king imprisoned Smim Htaw for his previous offense of asking for Siamese princess for marriage. Binnya Ran, a Mon military man loyal to Smim Htaw, also sought shelter in Siam with 400 Mon people. Borommakot granted Phosamton rice fields north of Ayutthaya[32] (modern Bang Pahan district) for the Mon refugees to settle. Binnya Dala sent emissaries to Ayutthaya in 1748, coming for Smim Htaw and urging Borommakot not to shelter his nemesis. Borommakot, not wanting to send Smim Htaw to his doom, instead sent Smim Htaw off to China.[24] Smim Htaw, however, managed to disembark somewhere in Vietnam and made his journey to Chiang Mai in 1749, joining his wife there. In 1750, Smim Htaw asked his father-in-law King of Chiang Mai for Lanna forces to reclaim his Hanthawaddy kingdom but was refused.[24] Perhaps hearing about this, Binnya Ran stole Siamese firearms and gathered some Mon men, taking off to the west in 1750 to support Smim Htaw but was intercepted and captured by Siamese authorities. Borommakot then considered Binnya Ran a rebel and had him executed along with his Mon followers.

Rise of Konbaung dynasty

Aung Zeiya was born in 1716 at Moksobo village to the northwest of Burmese capital of Ava. He grew up to become the Myothugyi or village headman of Moksobo. When the Talaings besieged Ava in early 1752, Aung Zeiya had been the governor and tax collector of forty villages under his jurisdiction.[13]:150[33] Upayaza the Mon commander demanded submission from local Burmese leaders in Upper Burma. Aung Zeiya and his retinue was one of many communities in Upper Burma that stayed defiant to the Mon conquerors. In February 1752, about one month before the eventual fall of Ava, Aung Zeiya declared himself Alaungpaya or Future Buddha Bodhisattava, becoming a Minlaung[33] or royal claimant and founding the Konbaung dynasty. Ava fell to the Talaings in March 1752. Alaungpaya renamed his village Shwebo with the official gilded name of Rattana Theingka, digging moats and erecting walls, transforming his village into a royal capital and citadel. Upayaza was more concerned of possible Siamese attacks from Tenasserim so, after the conquest of Ava, Upayaza ordered all of the Mon forces to return to Pegu in Lower Burma, leaving some forces under Talaban to occupy Ava.[14] This redeployment of Hanthawaddy troops proved a critical turning point in Burmese history as it gave nascent Upper Burmese resistance groups much needed breathing room. The Hanthawaddy command left less than 10,000 men to pacify all of Upper Burma.[34] Historians call the redeployment premature, pointing out that the Siamese threat was never as grave as any counterforce that could rise from Upper Burma, the traditional home of political power in Burma.

Alaungpaya resisted and killed Mon officials sent to subjugate him in May 1752. In June, Talaban himself led a Mon army to put down this undaunting Burmese resistance but was too defeated.[13]:152 Pegu's inattention to Upper Burma allowed Alaungpaya time to subjugate petty regimes and unify Upper Burma under his rule. In late 1573, Alaungpaya assigned his seventeen-year-old son Prince Thado Minsaw (later King Hsinbyushin) to lay siege on Ava. Thado Minsaw finally took Ava in January 1574. Upayaza and Talaban arrived from Hanthawaddy in attempts to reconquer Ava but was repelled.[13]:154 Hanthawaddy then lost control over Upper Burma to the new rising Konbaung regime. In 1574, the Burmese natives of Prome insurrected and drove out the Mon occupiers.[33] Talaban laid siege on Prome in order to regain the city but was defeated and expelled by the incoming Alaungpaya in 1755.[13]:155 Merely three years after the Mon conquest of Ava in 1752, the Mons lost their grounds in Burma to this vehement Burmese resurgence.

After taking control of all Upper Burma down to Prome, Alaungpaya made rapid concentrated offensives on Lower Burma. Alaungpaya, however, soon realized that he had one disadvantage. The Mons had signed a treaty with French representative Sieur de Bruno in 1751, allowing the French to establish themselves in Syriam and exchange for supplying Hanthawaddy with European firearms.[15] In order to beat Pegu, Alaungpaya also had to acquire European weapons. Upon attacking Dagon in 1755, Alaungpaya request supply of firearms from the British at Negrais[33] (modern Hainggyi at the mouth of Pathein River). British response to Alaungpaya's request took long time and Alaungpaya conquered Dagon first in mid-1755, renaming the city 'Rangoon' ("End of Strife"). Alaungpaya proceeded to attack Syriam, which was a difficult one because both the British and the French had been residing in the city and providing the defenses. As the British learnt that the French had strong supports to Pegu, just before the Seven Years' War, they decided to declare support for Alaungpaya[33] to counter the French. Alaungpaya, however, was suspicious and angry at the British when he learned that a British warship Arcot fought for the Mons at Syriam.[33] In late 1755, contemplating northern attacks from either Manipur or the Shans in his rear, Alaungpaya left his besieging forces at Syriam with himself personally went north to Ava and sent Burmese forces to attack Manipur. The Burmese attacked and plundered Manipur in 1755, leaving so much damages that the event was called 'First Devastation' (Koolthakahalba) in Manipuri history.[22]

Alaungpaya personally returned to Syriam front in early 1756. The siege of Syriam took eleven months. Sieur de Bruno asked for additional French forces from Pondicherry to Syriam. Arrival of French reinforcements would strengthen Syriam defenders. In July 1766, Alaungpaya created the Golden Company of Syriam,[14] consisting of 93 Burmese fighters[14] who would sacrifice their lives to French gunshots as vanguard in order to pave way for Alaungpaya to take Syriam. Alaungpaya finally conquered Syriam on 25 July 1756. Two French reinforcement ships arrived only three days late.[14] Alaungpaya tortured Sieur de Bruno and forced the French headman to write a letter to lure the arriving French ships to enter Syriam. Unaware that Syriam had fallen, the two French ships arrived, only to be seized by the Burmese. The Burmese seized a great number of French firearms from the ships, including cannons, field guns and muskets – a great haul to Alaungpaya's armory.[14] Sieur de Bruno was executed by fire roasting. Alaungpaya's conquest of Syriam virtually ended French support to Pegu and left the Mons isolated.

Alaungpaya attacked the Mon capital of Pegu in October 1756.[13]:163 Cornered and desperate, the Hanthawaddy court only sued for peace. Binnya Dala the King of Pegu agreed to send his daughter, whom Talaban had romantic interest on, to become a consort of Alaungpaya.[13]:164 Binnya Dala's younger brother Upayaza led the Hanthawaddy princess to visit Alaungpaya at his camps, where Alaungpaya held Upayaza hostage. The Mons were initially satisfied with this arrangement except for Talaban, who did not acknowledge this decision.[13]:164 Talaban rode off to fight the Burmese, breaking through the Burmese siege and going towards Sittaung River,[13]:164 eventually to Chiang Mai. With the Peguans lured into believing that the truce was genuine, Alaungpaya again resumed attacks on Pegu. The Peguans, then deprived of most of their commanders who had surrendered to Alaungpaya, defended their city in last resort. Alaungpaya eventually conquered Pegu city on 6 May 1757, ending the seventeen-year-old Neo-Hanthawaddy Kingdom of the Mons. The royal city of Pegu or Hanthawaddy, constructed two centuries ago by the great king Bayinnaung, was utterly and completely destroyed on this occasion. Alaungpaya took Binnya Dala the last King of Pegu, his brother Upayaza, captured Mon people to Rangoon, which became new administrative center of Lower Burma replacing Pegu.[35] Alaungpaya 'commanded' the British to visit him at Prome.[33] Thomas Lester, a British delegate from Negrais, went to visit the Burmese king at Prome in 1757. Lester was made to crawl on his knees to approach Alaungpaya.[33] AngloBurmese Treaty of 1757 was concluded, granting British permission to settle at Negrais and Bassein in exchange for annual British supply of gunpowder to Alaungpaya.[33]

Internal Conflicts of Ayutthaya

Reign of King Borommakot was remembered as the 'golden age' of Ayutthaya. His demise foreshadowed the end of Ayutthaya kingdom itself. When Alaungpaya was campaigning his way down to Lower Burma, Borommakot sent a religious mission to restore Theravada Buddhism in Sri Lankan Kingdom of Kandy in 1752–1753.[26] Borommakot had three sons born to his principal queens – Thammathibet, Ekkathat and Uthumphon, they held the superior rank of Kromma Khun. Borommakot made Thammathibet Wangna or Front Palace Prince and heir presumptive in 1741. Chaophraya Chamnam Borirak died in 1753,[27] leaving political vacuum in which competing princes rushed to fill in. Prince Thammathibet initially emerged powerful as he was the royal heir. However, Thammathibet faced opposition from Chao Sam Krom of the Three Princes, who were sons of Borommakot born to secondary consorts. They were Prince Chitsunthorn, Prince Sunthornthep and Prince Sepphakdi. These three princes where ranked as Kromma Muen. In 1755, Borommakot appointed new ministers Chaophraya Aphairacha as Samuha Nayok or Prime Minister and Chaophraya Kalahom Khlongklaeb as Minister of Military.

The Three Princes appointed some of their servants to the rank of Khun, which surpassed the limit of their own princely ranks as they could only promote their servants to the rank of Muen. Prince Thammathibet took this violation of princely ranks seriously and took matters into his own hands by arresting those servants of the Three Princes to be punished. In April 1756, Prince Sunthornthep, one of the Three Princes, retaliated by telling their father King Borommakot that Thammathibet had been in an adulterous relationship with Princess Sangwan, a princess consort of Borommakot. Thammathibet was arrested and he confessed his crime. Prince Thammathibet was whipped with rattan blows, succumbed to his wounds and died in April 1756.[26] After the death of Prince Thammathibet, the position of Front Palace became vacant.[16]:115 In March 1757, Prince Kromma Muen Thepphiphit, another son of Borommakot, in concert with other ministers of Chatusadom including the Prime Minister Aphairacha, Kalahom the Minister of Military and Phrakhlang the trade minister, proposed to make Uthumphon the new Wangna. Uthumphon initially refused, saying that he had an elder brother, Ekkathat. However, Borommakot intentionally passed over Ekkathat, citing that EKkathat was incompetent[26] and sure to bring disaster to kingdom. Uthumphon reluctantly accepted the position and was made Wangna Prince of the Front Palace in 1757. Borommakot also exiled Ekkathat to become a monk at Wat Lamut temple to the northeast of Ayutthaya to keep him from powers.

Borommokot died in April 1758.[16]:115 Uthumphon faced opposition from the Three Princes, who laid their competing claims to kingship. Ekkathat, who had been Buddhist monk at Wat Lamut temple, traveled to Ayutthaya to support Uthumphon. The Three Princes sent their forces to break into the royal armory to seize a large number of guns. With civil war looming, five Buddhist prelates beseeched the Three Princes to cease their belligerent actions. The Three Princes complied with the virtuous monks, went to visit and paid obeisance to the new king Uthumphon. However, Ekkathat secretly ordered policemen to arrest the Three Princes to be executed. Uthumphon took the throne in May 1758[26] but Ekkathat stayed at Suriyat Amarin Palace, not returning to Wat Lamut temple despite being a Buddhist monk to impose pressure on his brother Uthumphon. Uthumphon finally gave in, after merely a month on the throne, by abdicating in favor of his elder brother in June. Uthumphon went to become a monk at Wat Pradu Songtham, earning him epithet Khun Luang Hawat or the King Who Sought Temple. Ekkathat then ascended the throne as the last king of Ayutthaya in June 1758. Ekkathat brought two ministers Phraya Ratchamontri Pin and Chamuen Si Sorarak Chim, brothers of Ekkathat's favorite consort, to government. Phraya Ratchamontri and Chamuen Si Sorarak wielded immense powers in Siamese royal court, even surpassing those ministers of Chatusadom.

Officials and ministers of royal court were upset and offended by the rule of brothers of Ekkathat's consort. In November 1758, dissatisfying ministers, including Chaophraya Aphairacha the Prime Minister and Phraya Yommaraj the Head of Police Bureau, conspired to overthrow Ekkathat in favor of Uthumphon the temple king, whom they considered more capable. The conspiring ministers approached Prince Thepphiphit, who agreed to take lead. Prince Thepphiphit and the conspirators visited Uthumphon at his temple, informing Uthumphon about the plans. Uthumphon, however, preferred religious life and did not trust the conspirators so Uthumphon went to tell Ekkathat about this seditious plot in exchange for Ekkathat not killing the conspirators. Aphairacha, Yommaraj and other conspirators were arrested, not killed but imprisoned. Prince Thepphiphit fled to the west but was caught. Ekkathat then boarded his half-brother Thepphiphit on a Dutch ship to be deported to Sri Lanka in 1758 for his rebel attempt.[26] Ekkathat also threatened to execute Phraya Phrakhlang for his unproved implication in the plot. The panicked trade minister then gave a large sum of money to the king. Ekkathat then spared Phrakhlang and appointed him Chaophraya Phrakhlang the new Samuha Nayok or Prime Minister, replacing Aphairacha. By 1759, pro-Uthumphon supporters had been purged and expelled from royal court as Ekkathat's allies rose to power.

Tenasserim to 1740

The control of Tenasserim coast (present-day Mon State and Tanintharyi Region in Myanmar) in the early 18th century was divided between Burma and Siam, with the Burmese controlling down to Tavoy (Dawei) and the Siamese controlling the rest. Throughout history, both kingdoms had claimed the entire coast (the Siamese to Martaban, and the Burmese to Junkceylon), and control had changed hands several times. The Burmese Pagan Dynasty controlled the entire coast until 1287. Throughout 14th and 16th centuries, Siamese kingdoms (first Sukhothai, later Ayutthaya) controlled much of the coast, up to just south of present-day Mawlamyaing. In the mid-16th century, the Burmese under Toungoo kings Tabinshwehti and Bayinnaung tried to regain the coast, first failing in 1548, and finally succeeding in 1564 when they conquered all of Siam for the first time. The Siamese revolted in 1584, and under their king Naresuan regained the lower coast by 1593 and the entire coast by 1594. The Burmese retook the upper coast down to Tavoy in 1615, but failed to recover the rest.[1]

This arrangement lasted until 1740 (although the Siamese unsuccessfully tried to take the upper coast in 1662–65). During this period, Mergui on the Andaman Sea was the primary port of Siam through which its trade with India and the West was conducted.[1]

Siamese policy change and support of Mon resistance

For the Siamese, the situation they had feared—the emergence of a strong power in Burma—had come true although it was the Upper Burma-based Konbaung Dynasty, not Restored Hanthawaddy they were originally concerned about (ironically, the Siamese were partly responsible for the initial success of Konbaung Dynasty as their occupation of the upper coast helped divert the main body of Hanthawaddy troops southward). In a policy switch, they now actively supported Mon resistance groups still operating in the upper coast where Burmese control was still nominal.

After the Konbaung sack of Pegu in 1757, the governors of Martaban and Tavoy had sent in tribute to Alaungpaya to avoid the same fate[36] (the Tavoy governor turned out to be paying dual tribute, and would be executed later). While the Burmese now claimed the upper Tenasserim coast down to Tavoy, their hold of Lower Burma was still tenuous and especially in the southernmost Tenasserim coast it was largely nominal. Indeed, once Konbaung armies returned north in 1758 for their expeditions in Manipur and northern Shan States, the Mons of Lower Burma rose in rebellion.[37]

The rebellion initially was successful, driving out the Burmese governor from Pegu. It was eventually put down by local Konbaung garrisons. Mon resistance leaders and their followers fled to the Siamese controlled Tenasserim coast and remained active there. The border became the scene of chronic raiding and counter-raiding.[37][38]

Casus belli

Alaungpaya was concerned by the continuing flow of Mon rebels to the Siamese controlled territories, believing that the Mons would always be plotting to rebel and win back Lower Burma[37](his concern proved justified. The Mons put up several rebellions in 1758, 1762, 1774, 1783, 1792, and 1824–1826. Each failed rebellion was followed by more Mon flight to Siam[39]). Alaungpaya demanded that the Siamese stop their support of the Mon rebels, surrender their leaders, and cease intrusions into the upper coast, which he considered Burmese territory. The Siamese king Ekkathat refused Burmese demands, instead prepared for war.[11]

While historians generally agree that the Siamese support of the Mon rebels and their cross border raids were some of the causes of war, they do not agree on (other) ulterior motives. Some British colonial era historians of Burmese history (Arthur Phayre, G.E. Harvey) outright downplay the aforementioned reasons as "pretexts", and have suggested that the primary cause of the war was Alaungpaya's desire to restore Bayinnaung's empire (which included Siam).[40][41] David Wyatt, a historian of Thai history, acknowledges that Alaungpaya could have feared "Ayutthaya's backing for the revival of the Kingdom of Pegu" but adds that Alaungpaya, "apparently a rather crude country fellow with scant experience of statecraft was simply continuing to do what he early demonstrated he could do best: lead armies to warfare".[42]

But Burmese historian Htin Aung strongly counters that their analyses greatly understate Alaungpaya's genuine concern for his still nascent and unstable rule in Lower Burma, and that Alaungpaya never invaded Arakan as the Arakanese never showed him any hostility, although Sandoway in southern Arakan had sent him tribute in 1755.[11] Historian Thant Myint-U also points out the Siamese longstanding policy of keeping "a buffer against their aged-old enemies the Burmese" has extended down to the modern era where families of insurgent Burmese leaders are allowed to live in Thailand, and insurgent armies are free to buy arms, ammunition, and other supplies.[43]

Later Western historians provide a somewhat more balanced view. D.G.E. Hall writes that the "chronic raiding" by the Siamese and Mon rebels "alone would have provided an adequate casus belli" although he adds "for a monarch unable to settle down to a peaceable existence".[38] David I. Steinberg, et al., concur that the casus belli grew out of a local rebellion in Tavoy in which the Siamese were thought to be involved.[10] More recently, Helen James states that Alaungpaya likely wanted to capture Siam's trans-peninsula trade, while granting that his "subsidiary motivation" was to stop Siamese attacks and Siamese support for the Mons.[6]

Prelude to war

Siamese battle plan

In 1758, at the death of King Borommakot, Ayutthaya was the wealthiest city in mainland Southeast Asia. After a brief succession struggle, one of Borommakot's sons, Ekkathat, emerged as king after another son Uthumphon gave up the throne to become a monk. As king, Ekkathat faced the developing situation in the west left behind by his father. He refused Alaungpaya's demands, and prepared for war.

The Siamese battle plan was a defensive one. Ekkathat improved the defenses of Ayutthaya and took up prepared positions all along the routes that the previous Burmese invasions had followed. The main Siamese forces were massed to the westward approaches of Ayutthaya[44] (previous Burmese invasions had always come via the Three Pagodas Pass in the west, and sometimes also by Chiang Mai in the north). Ekkathat's Ayutthaya defenses included a small number of Dutch-manned warships, as well as several cannon-mounted war-boats manned by foreigners ("feringhis and Mahomedans").[45] To guard the coast and the Gulf of Siam flank, he deployed two smaller armies, totaling 20 regiments (27,000 men, 1,300 cavalry and 500 elephants). Of the total, only 7,000 infantrymen and 300 cavalry were deployed in the Tenasserim coast itself.

Ekkathat asked his old rival and brother Uthumphon to leave the monkhood, and made him the commander-in-chief.

Burmese battle plan

The Burmese too had begun to assemble their invasion force, starting during their new year celebrations in April 1759, gathering troops from all over Upper Burma, including from recently conquered northern Shan States and Manipur. By late 1759, Alaungpaya had massed a force of 40 regiments (40,000 men including 3,000 cavalry) at Yangon. Of the 3,000 cavalry, 2,000 were Manipuri "Cassay Horse", who had just been press-ganged into Alaungpaya's service after the Burmese conquest of Manipur in 1758.[46]

The Burmese battle plan was to go around the heavily defended Siamese positions along the Three Pagodas Pass-Ayutthaya corridor. They selected a longer but less defended route: Go south to Tenasserim, cross the Tenasserim Hills over to Gulf of Siam, and turn north to Ayutthaya.[47] To that end, the Burmese had assembled a fleet of 300 ships to transport a portion of their troops directly to the Tenasserim coast.[46]

Alaungpaya was to lead the invasion personally, and his second son Hsinbyushin was his second-in-command. His first son Naungdawgyi was left to administer the country (two of his other sons, a 14-year-old Bodawpaya and a 16-year-old Amyint Mintha were to lead a small battalion each[48]). Also in his service were his top generals including the likes of Minkhaung Nawrahta who like all Burmese leadership had plenty of military experience. Some in the court urged him to stay behind and allow Hsinbyushin to lead the operation but the king refused.[49]

First clashes of war

According to the Burmese chronicles, the first clashes of war occurred towards the end of the monsoon season in the Tavoy frontier. On 20 September 1759 (15th waning of Tawthalin 1121 ME), Alaungpaya was informed of Siamese attacks on Burmese shipping around Tavoy and continued Siamese intrusions into the Tavoy frontier.[50] To be sure, it could very well be Burmese justification but it could also be that the Siamese were already enforcing their forward perimeter even by then.

Tenasserim Coast campaign

Capture of Tavoy

On 21 December 1759 (3rd waxing of Pyatho 1121 ME), Alaungpaya and his invasion army, numbering 46,000 infantrymen and 3,500 cavalry left Yangon for Martaban at the frontier. At Martaban, instead of taking the usual route via the Three Pagodas Pass, the Burmese invaded south, with Hsinbyushin leading the vanguard of six regiments (5,000 men, 500 horses) to Tavoy.[51] Tavoy was easily occupied, and its hapless governor, who was torn between two greater powers and paying dual tribute, was executed.[6] The Burmese army paused for three days for the rest of army to arrive by land and by sea.

Capture of Mergui

After the rest of the Burmese army had arrived, Alaungpaya's army marched and besieged Mergui. The vastly outnumbered Siamese garrison of 7,000 infantrymen and 300 cavalry was easily overran by the Burmese army. In less than two weeks of the war, the Burmese had captured both Mergui and the town of Tenasserim, and controlled the entire Tennaserim coast.[51]

Gulf of Siam campaign

Capture of Kui Buri

Knowing that the main Siamese armies would be moving to their south to meet his armies, Alaungpaya did not pause. The Burmese troops quickly moved eastward, crossed over the Tenasserim Hills, and reached present-day Prachuap Khiri Khan Province on the shore of the Gulf of Siam.[36] The southern flank was defended by a Siamese army of 20,000 infantrymen, 1,000 cavalry and 200 elephants, in addition to the 7,000-strong Siamese army that retreated from Tenasserim.[52] Likewise, because of the minimal Siamese resistance in the coast, the 40,000-strong Burmese army was still largely intact although the invasion army was hemmed in the narrow strip of coastline by the Gulf of Siam. The Siamese defenses met the invading force outside Kui Buri but were defeated and forced to retreat.

Capture of Pranburi

After defeating the Siamese army at Kui Buri, the Burmese marched 40 km and faced another army at Pranburi. The Burmese won the battle and took the city. After capturing Pranburi, the Burmese encountered much stiffer Siamese resistance.

Siamese reinforcements

Seeing the success of the Burmese invasion, Ekkathat reinforced the front with a land and naval force consisting of 60,000 men with 4,000 guns. The guns in the land force were mounted on carriages and elephants while those in the naval force were placed on war boats.[7] Over the next two months (February and March 1760), battle-hardened Burmese forces overcame several spirited Siamese stands, and took Phetchaburi and Ratchaburi.[6][52]

Mainland Siam campaign

Battle of Suphan Buri

By capturing Ratchaburi, the Burmese had now fought their way out of the narrow Kra Isthmus and made it to mainland Siam by late March 1760 (early Tagu 1121 ME). As the Burmese forces marched towards Ayutthaya, a Siamese force of 30,000 infantrymen and 3,000 cavalry was sent to halt the Burmese army from crossing the Tha Chin River in Suphan Buri. The Burmese launched a three pronged attack (led by Hsinbyushin in the center flanked by generals Minkhaung Nawrahta and Minhla Thiri) on heavily fortified Siamese positions around the city. The Burmese took heavy losses but ultimately prevailed, taking five senior Siamese commanders and their war elephants.[6][53]

Siege of Ayutthaya (1760)

Siamese city of Ayutthaya, c. 1662-63

Despite heavy losses at Suphan Buri, the Burmese army had to march on towards Ayutthaya. They could not rest since the monsoon season was a little over a month away. As Ayutthaya was surrounded by several rivers, laying siege in the rainy season would have been a daunting task. The whole country would be under several feet of water. Half of the remaining Burmese forces were down with dysentery and Alaungpaya himself was not well.[12]

Nevertheless, the Burmese arrived at the environs of Ayutthaya on 11 April 1760. The Siamese sent a new 15,000-strong army to meet the invaders. But the force, which was probably made up of fresh conscripts, was promptly defeated by the battle-hardened Burmese army, though no longer in full strength. To avoid a long siege, the Burmese king sent envoys into the city, calling upon the Siamese king to surrender, promising that he would not be dethroned. Ekkathat sent envoys of his own to negotiate but found Alaungpaya's terms unacceptable, and negotiations broke down completely.[11] Starting on 14 April, during the Burmese and Siamese new year's celebrations, the Burmese began bombarding the city itself for the next three days.[6]

But the Burmese king's health deteriorated rapidly. He was suffering from either dysentery[11] or scrofula.[6] According to the Siamese sources, he was wounded by the bursting of a shell from a battery whose installation he was personally supervising but the Burmese sources definitely state that he became ill with dysentery. There was no reason for the Burmese chronicles to hide the truth since it is more glorious for a Burmese king to die of wounds received on the battlefield than to die of a common ailment. Moreover, if he had been wounded in the full view of the army, it would have been known to the whole army, creating confusion.[11]

Rearguard

The Burmese command kept Alaungpaya's serious illness a secret and ordered a general withdrawal, giving the excuse that the king was indisposed. The king selected the friend of his childhood, Minkhaung Nawrahta, for the signal honor of commanding the rearguard. These were the "pick of the army"—500 cavalry and 6,000 infantrymen, every man of whom had a musket. Minkhaung Nawrahta spread them out and waited. It was two days before the Siamese realized that the main Burmese army had left. The full Siamese force then came out. His men watched the ring closing round them, and fearing to be cut off, pleaded the general to let them fight further back. But he said "Friends, the safety of our Lord the King lies in our keeping. Let us not fight further back lest the sounds of guns break his further sleep." With his leadership, the Burmese forces withdrew in good order, collecting army stragglers along the way.[11][12]

Death of Alaungpaya and end of war

Alaungpaya died on 11 May 1760 near Martaban, after being rushed by the advance guard. With his death, the war ended.

Aftermath

After Alaungpaya's death, the new Burmese king Naungdawgyi was embroiled in several rebellions, including that of Minkhaung Nawrahta, and could not resume the war.

The war was inconclusive. For all their work, the Burmese gained little of their original objectives. Siam very much remained a thorn to the stability of Burmese peripheral regions. In the following years, Siam continued to provide support to Mon rebels in the south who raised a major rebellion in 1762 as well as those in Lan Na in the north (1761–63). The only lasting territorial gain the Burmese achieved was the upper Tenasserim coast, on which they previously had only a nominal claim (the Siamese retook the lower coast up to Mergui in 1761).[1] Although the Siamese troops no longer openly intruded the border, the Mon rebels continued to operate from the Siamese territory. In 1764, the Mon governor of Tavoy, who was made governor by Alaungpaya only four years earlier, revolted until it was put down in November 1764. Likewise, the instabilities in Lan Na resumed soon after the Burmese army left in February 1764, forcing the army to return again later in the year.[54] The inconclusive nature of the war would lead to the next war in 1765.

Analysis

The Burmese success in getting to Ayutthaya is generally attributed to their strategy of going around the established Siamese defenses along the traditional invasion routes.[38] But it is not clear it was the main reason for their success. While the Burmese made the right decision to first attack a lightly defended Tenasserim coast (only 7,000 troops), once they had crossed over to the side of Gulf of Siam, they faced increasingly stiff Siamese resistance. Though the Siamese were initially surprised by the Burmese attack route, they readjusted, and shifted their main forces south.[7] In fact, the latter battles by the Gulf of Siam were costly for the invasion force. The Burmese chronicles report that the Burmese took substantial losses just to break out of the narrow isthmus although they also report that the Siamese also lost more men and ammunition (indeed, the Burmese found the geography of the narrow isthmus so unfavorable to the attacking force that they would revert to attacking Ayutthaya through more direct routes in their next invasion in 1765).

A more likely reason for Burmese success could be that the Burmese, who had been fighting successive wars since 1740, were much more battle-hardened. Their military leaders were all "self-made military men",[55] all of whom had substantial military experience under their belt. On the other hand, it is not clear how much military experience the Siamese leaders or their soldiers had since Siam had been at peace for a long time. The Siamese king had to ask his brother to disrobe to lead the war. The lack of military experience of the Siamese command, probably explains why the Siamese defenses despite having geographic defensive advantages and numerical superiority still lost to a smaller, partial-strength Burmese army along the Gulf of Siam, as well as at Suphanburi and outside Ayutthaya. Likewise, without good leadership, the use of foreign mercenaries did not appear to have made a noticeable difference (the Burmese burned ships manned by foreign mercenaries).[36]

History shows that leadership mattered when most soldiers on both sides were conscripts. The same Siamese conscripts under more capable leaders in another ten years would prove as formidable as any in mainland Southeast Asia, and go on to redress their "historical military inferiority to Burma".[56]

Significance

The war marked the resumption of warfare between the two kingdoms that had been dormant since 1665. The inconclusive nature of this war would lead to more wars that would go on until 1854. From a geopolitical standpoint, Burma now had a firmer, though still by no means complete, hold on the upper Tenasserim coast. Still, the southward shift of the line of control was strategically important. The Burmese would launch their next invasion from Tavoy in 1765 and not Martaban as was the case in 1759.

Notes

  1. 1 2 3 4 James, SEA encyclopedia, pp. 1318–1319
  2. Harvey, p. 334
  3. Kyaw Thet, p. 290
  4. Letwe Nawrahta, p. 142
  5. Harvey, p. 246
  6. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 James, SEA encyclopedia, p. 302
  7. 1 2 3 Tarling, p. 38
  8. Baker, et al, p. 21
  9. James, Fall of Ayutthaya: Reassessment, p. 75
  10. 1 2 Steinberg, p. 102
  11. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Htin Aung, pp. 169–170
  12. 1 2 3 Harvey, p. 242
  13. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 Phayre, Sir Arthur Purves (1883). History of Burma. Trübner & Company.
  14. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 Harvey, G.E. (1983). History of Burma: From the Earliest Times to 10 March 1824 The Beginning of the English Conquest. Taylor & Francis (published 2019).
  15. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 South, Ashley (2013). Mon Nationalism and Civil War in Burma: The Golden Sheldrake. Taylor & Francis.
  16. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 Wyatt, David K. (2003). Thailand: A Short History (2nd ed.). Silkworm Books.
  17. Swope, Kenneth (2018). On the Trail of the Yellow Tiger: War, Trauma, and Social Dislocation in Southwest China During the Ming-Qing Transition. Nebraska.
  18. Dhammasami, Khammai (2018). Buddhism, Education and Politics in Burma and Thailand: From the Seventeenth Century to the Present. Bloomsbury Publishing.
  19. 1 2 Singha, Memchaton (2016). "MARRIAGE DIPLOMACY BETWEEN THE STATES OF MANIPUR AND BURMA, 18TH TO 19TH CENTURIES". Proceedings of the Indian History Congress. 77.
  20. Kshetri, Rajendra (2006). The Emergence of Meetei Nationalism: A Study of Two Movements Among the Meeteis. Mittal Publications.
  21. Andaya, Barbara Watson; Andaya, Leonard Y. (2015). A History of Early Modern Southeast Asia, 1400-1830. Cambridge University Press.
  22. 1 2 3 Moyon, Koningthung Ngoru (2023). The Lost Kingdom of Moyon (Bujuur) Iruwng (King) Kuurkam Ngoruw Moyon & The People of Manipur. Shashwat Publication.
  23. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 Lieberman, Victor B. (2014). Burmese Administrative Cycles: Anarchy and Conquest, C. 1580-1760. Princeton University Press.
  24. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 Brailey, Nigel J. (1970). "A Re-Investigation of the Gwe of Eighteenth Century Burma". Journal of Southeast Asian Studies. 1.
  25. 1 2 3 4 5 Raj Kumar Somorjit Sana (2010). The Chronology of Meetei Monarchs From 1666 CE to 1850 CE. Waikhom Ananda Meetei.
  26. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 Ruangsilp, Bhawan (2007). Dutch East India Company Merchants at the Court of Ayutthaya: Dutch Perceptions of the Thai Kingdom, C.1604-1765. Brill.
  27. 1 2 3 4 5 6 Blussé, Leonard; Gaastra, Femme S (2016). On the Eighteenth Century as a Category of Asian History. Taylor & Francis.
  28. 1 2 Kwee, Hui Kian (2005). The Political Economy of Java's Northeast Coast, C. 1740-1800. Brill.
  29. Latham, A.J.H.; Kawakatsu, Heita (2009). Intra-Asian Trade and Industrialization: Essays in Memory of Yasukichi Yasuba. Taylor & Francis.
  30. Chaiwan, Saad (1984). "A Study of Christian Mission in Thailand". East Asia Journal of Theology.
  31. Watson, Noelle; Schellinger, Paul; Ring, Trudy (2012). Asia and Oceania: International Dictionary of Historic Places. Taylor & Francis.
  32. Van Roy, Edward (2010). "Safe Haven: Mon Refugees at the Capitals of Siam from the 1500s to the 1800s" (PDF). Journal of the Siam Society. 98.
  33. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Hall, D. G. E. (2013). Burma. Read Books Limited.
  34. Phayre, pp. 150–151
  35. Topich, William J.; Leitich, Keith A. (2013). The History of Myanmar. ABC-CLIO.
  36. 1 2 3 Harvey, p. 241
  37. 1 2 3 Htin Aung, pp. 167–168
  38. 1 2 3 Hall, Chapter X, p. 24
  39. Lieberman, p. 205
  40. Harvey, pp. 241, 250
  41. Phayre, pp. 168–169
  42. Wyatt, p. 116
  43. Myint-U, pp. 287, 299
  44. Hall, Chapter X, p. 24
  45. Harvey, pp. 241, 246
  46. 1 2 Alaungpaya Ayedawbon, pp. 141–142
  47. Harvey, p. 241
  48. Alaungpaya Ayedawbon, pp. 143–145
  49. Alaungpaya Ayedawbon, p. 229
  50. Alaungpaya Ayedawbon, p. 229
  51. 1 2 Alaungpaya Ayedawbon, pp. 143–145
  52. 1 2 Alaungpaya Ayedawbon, pp. 146–147
  53. Alaungpaya Ayedawbon, pp. 147–148
  54. Kyaw Thet, p. 300
  55. Lieberman, p. 185
  56. Lieberman, p. 216

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