Mohammed bin Salman
  • محمد بن سلمان
A photograph of Mohammed aged 34
Mohammed in 2019
Crown Prince of Saudi Arabia
Tenure21 June 2017 – present
PredecessorMuhammad bin Nayef
MonarchSalman bin Abdulaziz
Prime Minister of Saudi Arabia
Tenure27 September 2022 – present
PredecessorSalman bin Abdulaziz
MonarchSalman bin Abdulaziz
First Deputy Prime Minister of Saudi Arabia
Tenure21 June 2017 – 27 September 2022
PredecessorMuhammad bin Nayef
SuccessorVacant
MonarchSalman bin Abdulaziz
Tenure29 April 2015 – 21 June 2017
PredecessorMuhammad bin Nayef
SuccessorVacant
MonarchSalman bin Abdulaziz
Minister of Defense
Tenure23 January 2015 – 27 September 2022
PredecessorSalman bin Abdulaziz
SuccessorKhalid bin Salman
Prime MinisterSalman bin Abdulaziz
Born (1985-08-31) 31 August 1985
Riyadh, Saudi Arabia
Spouse
(m. 2008)
Issue
  • Prince Salman
  • Prince Mashour
  • Princess Fahda
  • Princess Noura
  • Prince Abdulaziz
Names
Mohammed bin Salman bin Abdulaziz bin Abdul Rahman
HouseAl Saud
FatherSalman bin Abdulaziz
MotherFahda bint Falah Al Hithlain
Signature
Alma materKing Saud University

Mohammed bin Salman Al Saud (Arabic: محمد بن سلمان آل سعود, romanized: Muḥammad bin Salmān ʾĀl Su‘ūd; born 31 August 1985), also known by his initials MBS or MbS, is Crown Prince and Prime Minister of Saudi Arabia. He is also the chairman of the Council of Economic and Development Affairs and the chairman of the Council of Political and Security Affairs. He is considered the de facto ruler of Saudi Arabia, being deemed as such even before his appointment as prime minister in 2022. He was minister of defense from 2015 to 2022. He is the seventh son of King Salman.

Mohammed was born as the first child of Prince Salman bin Abdulaziz and his third wife, Fahda bint Falah Al Hithlain. After obtaining a law degree from King Saud University, he was an advisor to his father. After Salman became king, he appointed Mohammed defense minister and deputy crown prince in 2015. Mohammed was promoted to crown prince in 2017 after the dismissal of Crown Prince Muhammad bin Nayef, King Salman's nephew. Salman ceded the position of prime minister to his son in 2022.

Mohammed rules an authoritarian government. There are no democratic institutions in Saudi Arabia, and repression is widespread. Islamic scholars, human rights activists, women's rights activists, journalists, former insiders, Islamists, and other political dissidents are systematically repressed through tactics including torture and jailing, and some reports have alleged that Mohammed uses a group known as the Tiger Squad to carry out extrajudicial killings. A CIA report released in 2021 implicated him of having orchestrated the assassination of Jamal Khashoggi, a Saudi Arabian Washington Post columnist and critic of Saudi government. Mohammed has denied involvement in the killing. Mohammed was the architect of Saudi Arabian-led intervention in Yemen which has exacerbated the humanitarian crisis and famine there. His government was also involved in the escalation of the Qatar diplomatic crisis, the 2017 detention of Lebanese prime minister Saad Hariri, a 2018 diplomatic spat with Canada, the arrest of Saudi princes and billionaires in 2017, the 2018–2019 Saudi crackdown on feminists, an alleged phone hack against Amazon chairman Jeff Bezos in 2019, and treason charges against his cousin and rival Muhammad bin Nayef in 2020. Saudi Arabia's relations with the Biden administration have been strained, especially after Mohammed's refusal to increase oil production in the wake of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. However, the relations have warmed up with Joe Biden's official visit to Saudi Arabia,[1] The Pentagon's approval of a $500m arms deal,[2] a bipartisan group visit of US Senators to Saudi Arabia,[3] and relaxing restrictions on offensive weapons sales.[4]

Since his appointment as Crown Prince in 2017, Mohammed has spearheaded a series of social and economic reforms. These include regulations restricting the powers of the religious police and improving women's rights, such as the removal of the ban on female drivers in 2018 and weakening the male-guardianship system in 2019. Other cultural developments under his reign include the first Saudi public concerts by a female singer, the first Saudi sports stadium to admit women, an increased presence of women in the workforce, and opening the country to international tourists by introducing an e-visa system, allowing foreign visas to be applied for and issued via the Internet. The Saudi Vision 2030 program aims to diversify the country's economy through investment in non-oil sectors including technology and tourism. Under Mohammed, Saudi Arabia started co-ordinating its energy policy with Russia since 2016, and also strengthened its relations with China, signing a comprehensive strategic partnership with Chinese president Xi Jinping in 2022. In 2023, Saudi Arabia restored full diplomatic relations with Iran leading to a wider regional rapprochement, including negotiations for a peace deal with the Houthis, following talks mediated by China.

Early life

Mohammed bin Salman was born on 31 August 1985[5][6][7] to Prince Salman bin Abdulaziz and his third spouse,[8] Fahda bint Falah Al Hithlain.[9] Fahda is a granddaughter of Rakan bin Hithlain and great-granddaughter of Dhaydan bin Hithlain, who were heads of the Al Ajman tribe.[10] In 1915 the Al Ajman tribe, under Dhaydan's leadership, fought against the Al Saud, during which Salman's uncle Saad bin Abdul Rahman was killed in the Battle of Kanzan.[11]

Mohammed is the eldest among his mother's six children and is the eighth child and seventh son of his father.[8] His full siblings include Prince Turki and Prince Khalid.[12] Mohammed holds a bachelor's degree in law from King Saud University, where he graduated second in his class.[13]

Early career

After graduating from university, Mohammed spent several years in the private sector before becoming a personal aide to his father. He worked as a consultant for the Experts Commission, working for the Saudi Cabinet.[14] On 15 December 2009, at the age of 24, he entered politics as a special advisor to his father when the latter was the governor of Riyadh Province.[15] At this time Mohammed began to rise from one position to another, such as secretary-general of the Riyadh Competitive Council, special advisor to the chairman of the board for the King Abdulaziz Foundation for Research and Archives, and a member of the board of trustees for Albir Society in the Riyadh region.[16] In October 2011, Crown Prince Sultan bin Abdulaziz died. Prince Salman began his ascent to power by becoming second deputy prime minister and minister of defence. He made Mohammed his private advisor.[17]

Chief of the Court

As chief of the crown prince court, 2014

In June 2012, Crown Prince Nayef bin Abdulaziz died. Mohammed moved up into the number two position in the hierarchy, as his father became the new crown prince and first deputy prime minister. He soon began remaking the court in his own image. On 2 March 2013, Chief of the Crown Prince Court Saud bin Nayef Al Saud was appointed governor of the Eastern Province, and Mohammed succeeded him as chief of the court. He was also given the rank of minister.[18][19][20] On 25 April 2014, Mohammed was appointed state minister.[16]

Rise to power

Minister of Defence

With King Salman, Barack Obama and other leaders at the GCC summit in Saudi Arabia, 21 April 2016
With US secretary of state John Kerry (left) and Saudi foreign minister Adel al-Jubeir, 13 June 2016

On 23 January 2015, King Abdullah died and Salman ascended the throne. Mohammed was appointed minister of defence[21] and secretary general of the royal court.[22] In addition, he retained his post as the minister of state.[23][24]

The political unrest in Yemen (which began escalating in 2011) rapidly became a major issue for the newly appointed minister of defence, with Houthis taking control of northern Yemen in late 2014, followed by the resignation of President Abdrabbuh Mansur Hadi and his cabinet. Mohammed's first move as minister was to mobilise a pan-GCC coalition to intervene following a series of suicide bombings in the Yemeni capital Sana'a via air strikes against Houthis, and impose a naval blockade.[25] In March 2015, Saudi Arabia began leading a coalition of countries allied against the Houthi rebels.[26] While there was agreement among those Saudi princes heading security services regarding the necessity of a response to the Houthis' seizure of Sana'a, which had forced the Yemeni government into exile, Mohammed launched the intervention without full coordination across security services. Saudi National Guard minister Mutaib bin Abdullah Al Saud, who was out of the country, was left out of the loop of operations.[27] While Mohammed sold the war as a quick win on Houthi rebels in Yemen and a way to put President Hadi back in power, however, it became a long war of attrition.[28]

In April 2015, King Salman appointed his nephew Muhammad bin Nayef as crown prince and his son Mohammed as deputy crown prince.[29] In late 2015, at a meeting between his father and Barack Obama, Mohammed bin Salman broke protocol to deliver a monologue criticising US foreign policy. When he announced an anti-terrorist military alliance of Islamic countries in December 2015, some of the countries involved said they had not been consulted.[27]

Regarding his role in the military intervention, Mohammed gave his first on-the-record interview on 4 January 2016 to The Economist, which had called him the "architect of the war in Yemen". Denying the title, he explained the mechanism of the decision-making institutions actually holding stakes in the intervention, including the council of security and political affairs and the ministry of foreign affairs from the Saudi side. He added that the Houthis usurped power in Sana'a before he was minister of defence.[30][31]

Shaking hands with Japanese prime minister Shinzo Abe at their meeting in Tokyo, 1 September 2016
Speaking with Donald Trump in Washington, DC, 14 March 2017

In response to the threat from ISIL, Mohammed established the Islamic Military Counter Terrorism Coalition (IMCTC), a Saudi-led Islamic alliance against terrorism, in December 2015.[32] The IMCTC's first meeting took place in Riyadh in November 2017 and involved defence ministers and officials from 41 countries.[33]

Crown prince

Mohammed was appointed crown prince on 21 June 2017, following the King's decision to depose Muhammad bin Nayef and make his own son the heir to the throne.[34] The change of succession had been predicted in December 2015 by an unusually blunt and public memo published by the German Federal Intelligence Service,[35][36] which was subsequently rebuked by the German government.[37]

On the day Mohammed bin Salman became crown prince, Donald Trump called him to "congratulate him on his recent elevation". Trump and Mohammed pledged "close cooperation" on security and economic issues, according to the White House, and the two leaders also discussed the need to cut off support for terrorism, the recent diplomatic dispute with Qatar, and the push to secure peace between Israel and the Palestinians. [38] Mohammed told The Washington Post in April 2017 that without America's cultural influence on Saudi Arabia, "we would have ended up like North Korea."[39]

2017 purge

In May 2017, Mohammed publicly warned "I confirm to you, no one will survive in a corruption case—whoever he is, even if he's a prince or a minister".[40] In November 2017, he ordered some 200 wealthy businessmen and princes to be placed under house arrest in The Ritz-Carlton, Riyadh.[41] On 4 November 2017, the Saudi press announced the arrest of the Saudi prince and billionaire Al-Waleed bin Talal, a frequent English-language news commentator and a major shareholder in Citi, News Corp and Twitter, as well as over 40 princes and government ministers at the behest of the Crown Prince on corruption and money laundering charges.[42]

Others arrested or fired in the purge included Prince Mutaib bin Abdullah, head of the Saudi Arabian National Guard; Minister of Economy and Planning Adel Fakeih; and the commander of the Royal Saudi Navy, Admiral Abdullah bin Sultan bin Mohammed Al-Sultan.[42][43]

Those arrested in the Ritz Carlton were the subject of what became called "the night of beating".[44] Most were beaten, and some were tied to walls in stress positions as part of torture by Saudi agents.[44] The interrogators knew very little outside of the victims' assets within Saudi Arabia and wanted to know more about their off-shore holdings, while the victims did not know why they were detained.[44] The detainees were threatened with blackmail.[44] At one point, the interrogators told the victims to contact their bank managers in Geneva and elsewhere and ask for large sums of money, and were surprised due to their inexpertise that the assets were not entirely in cash.[44] Swiss banks identified some of the transactions as under duress and were able to stop some of them.[44] During the proceedings, there was no due process nor plea bargains.[44] US officials described the actions as "coercion, abuse, and torture".[45] Detainees were denied sleep, had their heads covered, and were beaten.[45] Seventeen had to be hospitalised.[45] After many days, the remaining detainees were moved to Al-Ha'ir Prison, while some released are banned from travelling abroad.[45]

One hypothesis for the arrests was that they were part of a power grab on the part of Mohammed. The New York Times wrote:

The sweeping campaign of arrests appears to be the latest move to consolidate the power of Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, the favorite son and top adviser of King Salman. The king had decreed the creation of a powerful new anticorruption committee, headed by the crown prince, only hours before the committee ordered the arrests.[43]

Writing for The Huffington Post, University of Delaware professor of Islam and Global Affairs, Muqtedar Khan, speculated as to whether the removal of Al-Waleed bin Talal, a critic of Donald Trump, amounted to a coup.[46] BBC correspondent Frank Gardner was quoted as saying that "Prince Mohammed is moving to consolidate his growing power while spearheading a reform programme". Yet "[i]t is not clear what those detained are suspected of."[47]

Another hypothesis was that the purge was part of a move towards reform. Steven Mufson of The Washington Post argues that Mohammed "knows that only if he can place the royal family under the law, and not above as it was in the past, can he ask the whole country to change their attitudes relative to taxes [and] subsidies."[48] An analysis from the CBC claimed that "the clampdown against corruption resonates with ordinary Saudis who feel that the state has been asking them to accept belt tightening while, at the same time, they see corruption and the power elite accumulating more wealth".[49] Mohammed's reform agenda is widely popular with Saudi Arabia's burgeoning youth population, but faces resistance from some of the old guard more comfortable with the kingdom's traditions of incremental change and rule by consensus.[50] According to a former British ambassador to Riyadh, Mohammed "is the first prince in modern Saudi history whose constituency has not been within the royal family, it's outside it. It's been young Saudis, particularly younger Saudi men in the street".[51] The 2018 Arab Youth Survey found that nine out of ten 18–24 year-olds in the MENA region support Mohammed's campaign against corruption.[52]

Robert W. Jordan, former US ambassador to Saudi Arabia, said that "certainly Saudi Arabia has had a corruption problem for many years. I think the population, especially, has been very unhappy with princes coming in and grabbing business deals, with public funds going to flood control projects that never seem to get built... I would also say it's a classical power grab move sometimes to arrest your rivals, your potential rivals under the pretext of corruption".[53]

Trump expressed support for the move, tweeting "I have great confidence in King Salman and the Crown Prince of Saudi Arabia, they know exactly what they are doing....Some of those they are harshly treating have been 'milking' their country for years!"[54] French president Emmanuel Macron, who visited Riyadh days after the purge, when asked about the purge stated "this is not the role of a president, and similarly I would not expect a leader of a foreign country to come and infringe on domestic matters."[55]

On 30 January 2019, the Saudi government announced the conclusion of the Anti-Corruption Committee's work.[56][57] According to the Corruption Perceptions Index, Saudi Arabia is slowly improving its public sector, while figures of 2016 indicated a score of 46, whereby 0 implies a highly corrupt score and 100 a clear one, the index gives Saudi Arabia a score of 49 in 2017 and 2018, and 53 in 2019 the highest score achieved by Saudi Arabia until now.[58]

Prime minister

On 27 September 2022, Mohammed was appointed as prime minister of Saudi Arabia by King Salman. Traditionally, the king has held the title of prime minister.[59]

Administration

Ideology

Mohammed's ideology has been described as nationalist[60][61] and populist,[62][63] with a conservative attitude towards politics, and a liberal stance on economic and social issues.[64][65] It has been heavily influenced by the views of his former adviser Saud al-Qahtani[66][67] and the ruler of Abu Dhabi, Mohammed bin Zayed.[68][69] His style of ruling has been described as extremely brutal by journalist Rula Jebreal and authoritarian by Jamal Khashoggi[70] and Theodor Winkler.[65] Mohammed bin Salman has also been championing an Arab nationalist ideology domestically and through foreign policy; with a focus on opposing Islamist movements.[71]

Authoritarianism

Mohammed heads a repressive authoritarian government in Saudi Arabia. Human rights activists and women's rights activists in Saudi Arabia routinely face abuse and torture by the regime.[72] Critics, journalists and former insiders are tortured and killed.[72][73] The government has targeted Saudi dissidents who are located abroad, most famously Jamal Khashoggi, a columnist of The Washington Post, who was murdered by the regime.[73] Mohammed has justified the mass arrests of human rights activists as being as necessary for enacting reforms in Saudi Arabia and for establishing a state based on Arab nationalism.[74][75]

Mohammed has increasingly consolidated power in Saudi Arabia during his tenure as leader.[74] He significantly restricted the powers of the Saudi religious police.[27] On 29 January 2015, Mohammed was named the chair of the newly established Council for Economic and Development Affairs,[76] replacing the disbanded Supreme Economic Commission.[76] In April 2015, Mohammed was given control over Saudi Aramco by royal decree following his appointment as deputy crown prince.[77]

Domestic policies

Religious policy

According to David Ottaway of the Wilson Center, "[o]f all [Mohammed's] domestic reforms," the most "consequential" has been his work limiting the influence of Saudi Wahhabi clergy, "who still command millions of followers in the country and beyond".[78] Mohammed's inviting of "a constant stream of Western male and female singers, bands, dancers and even American female wrestlers" to perform in Saudi Arabia is in complete conflict with religious conservatives who have spoken "against the opening up of the kingdom to secular Western culture".[78] Under Mohammed, the Saudi government has promoted a new Saudi identity and nationalist history that downplays religious heritage and restricts Islamic influence in the cultural sphere.[79] Journalist Graeme Wood writes, "it is hard to exaggerate how drastically this sidelining of Islamic law will change Saudi Arabia."[80] Gabriella Perez argues that the new social changes implemented by MBS are oriented towards secularist repression, with the potential to adversely impact freedom of religion in the country.[81]

In a 2018 interview with The Atlantic editor-in-chief Jeffrey Goldberg, Mohammed stated regarding his basic approach to religion in Saudi Arabian society:

"We believe we have, in Saudi Arabia, Sunni and Shiite. We believe we have within Sunni Islam four schools of thought, and we have the ulema [the religious authorities] and the Board of Fatwas [which issues religious rulings].. our laws are coming from Islam and the Qur'an, but we have the four schoolsHanbali, Hanafi, Shafi’i, Maliki—and they argue about interpretation. And you will find a Shiite in the cabinet, you will find Shiites in government, the most important university in Saudi Arabia is headed by a Shiite. So we believe that we are a mix of Muslim schools and sects."[82]

Restrictions on religious police

In 2016, Mohammed took steps to drastically curtail the powers of the "Committee for the Promotion of Virtue and the Prevention of Vice" (CPVPV), or Islamic religious police.[83][84] The "feared" CPVPV, which had thousands of officers on the streets and powers to arrest, detain, and interrogate those suspected of violating of sharia, was banned "from pursuing, questioning, asking for identification, arresting and detaining anyone suspected of a crime".[85] Cinema industry was reinstated, social liberties were expanded, gender mixing and dating have been normalised by the state in public sphere. Schmidt-Feuerheerd argues that the new state policies are also accompanied by an increasing clampdown on political and religious activities independent of the government.[79]

Mohammed states that "in Islamic law, the head of the Islamic establishment is wali al-amr[86] (Arabic: وَلِيّ الأمر ), the ruler.[80] While Saudi rulers "have historically stayed away from religion", and "outsourced" issues of theology and religious law to "the big beards", traditionally conservative and orthodox religious scholars, Mohammed has "a law degree from King Saud University" and "flaunts his knowledge and dominance over the clerics", according to Graeme Wood. He is "probably the only leader in the Arab world who knows anything about Islamic epistemology and jurisprudence", according to American historian Professor Bernard Haykel. In an interview televised in Saudi Arabia on 25 April 2021, Mohammed criticised the devotion of Saudi religious leaders to Wahhabi doctrines "in language never before used by a Saudi monarch", saying "there are no fixed schools of thought and there is no infallible person", and that fatwas "should be based on the time, place and mindset in which they are issued", rather than regarded as immutable.[78]

In interviews with Wood, Mohammed

explained that Islamic law is based on two textual sources: the Quran and the Sunnah, or the example of the Prophet Muhammad, gathered in many tens of thousands of fragments from the Prophet's life and sayings. Certain rules—not many—come from the unambiguous legislative content of the Quran, he said, and he cannot do anything about them even if he wants to. But those sayings of the Prophet (called Hadith), he explained, do not all have equal value as sources of law, and he said he is bound by only a very small number whose reliability, 1,400 years later, is unimpeachable. Every other source of Islamic law, he said, is open to interpretation—and he is therefore entitled to interpret them as he sees fit. The effect of this maneuver is to chuck about 95 percent of Islamic law into the sandpit of Saudi history and leave MBS free to do whatever he wants. "He's short-circuiting the tradition," Haykel said. ".. That leaves him to determine what is in the interest of the Muslim community. If that means opening movie theaters, allowing tourists, or women on the beaches on the Red Sea, then so be it.”

As of early 2021, Mohammed has "ordered a codification of Saudi laws that would end the power of individual Wahhabi judges to implement" their own interpretation of Sharia.[78] According to Wood, many conservative clerics strongly appear to have succumbed to "good old-fashioned intimidation" by the government to reverse their religious positions and supporting the government line on issues such as "the opening of cinemas and mass layoffs of Wahhabi imams".[80]

Abaya ban

In December 2022, Saudi Arabia's Education and Training Evaluation Commission (ETEC) declared a governmental ban on Muslim female students from wearing the traditional abaya clothing to examination centres; insisting that students should wear only school uniforms.[87][88][89] A later clarification from ETEC reported by The Milli Chronicle stated that the ban on abayas was restricted only for all-female examination centres run by the ETEC.[90]

Economic policy

Vision 2030

Mohammed took the leadership in the restructuring of Saudi Arabia's economy, which he officially announced in April 2016 when he introduced Vision 2030, the country's strategic orientation for the next 15 years. Vision 2030 plans to reform Saudi Arabia's economy towards a more diversified and privatised structure. It details goals and measures in various fields, from developing non-oil revenues and privatisation of the economy to e-government and sustainable development.[91]

One of the major motives behind this economic restructure through Vision 2030 can be traced back to Saudi Arabia's reliance on a rentier economy, as a limit on oil resources makes its sustainability a problem in the future. While the country claims to own a proven reserve of 266.58 billion barrels of crude oil, the energy analyst Matthew R. Simmons estimates the true number to be far less, as the last non-Saudi report by the General Accounting Office in 1978 only mentioned 110 billion barrels.[92]

At the inaugural Future Investment Initiative conference in Riyadh in October 2017, Mohammed announced plans for the creation of Neom, a $500 billion economic zone to cover an area of 26,000 square kilometres on Saudi Arabia's Red Sea coast, extending into Jordan and Egypt.[93] Neom aims to attract investment in sectors including renewable energy, biotechnology (especially genetically modified agriculture),[94] robotics and advanced manufacturing.[95][96] The announcement followed plans to develop a 34,000 square kilometre area across a lagoon of 50 islands on Saudi Arabia's Red Sea coastline into a luxury tourism destination with laws on a par with international standards.[97][98] In a further effort to boost the tourism industry, in November 2017 it was announced that Saudi Arabia would start issuing tourist visas for foreigners, beginning in 2018.[99]

Mohammed's biggest bet was his plan to restore Saudi dominance in global oil markets by driving the new competition into bankruptcy, by keeping the oil price low enough for a long enough period. Saudi Arabia persuaded OPEC to do the same. A few small players went bankrupt, but American frackers only shut down their less-profitable operations temporarily, and waited for oil prices to go up again. Saudi Arabia, which had been spending $100 billion a year to keep services and subsidies going, had to admit defeat in November 2016. It then cut production significantly and asked its OPEC partners to do the same.

In the last week of September 2018, Mohammed inaugurated the much-awaited $6.7bn high-speed railway line connecting Mecca and Medina, the two holiest cities of Islam. The Haramain Express is 450 km line travelling up to 300 km/h that can transport around 60 million passengers annually. The commercial operations of the railway began on 11 October 2018.[100]

With Brazilian president Jair Bolsonaro (left, seated) at the 2019 G20 Osaka summit

In October 2018, Mohammed announced that the Public Investment Fund of Saudi Arabia's assets were approaching $400 billion and would pass $600 billion by 2020.[101]

Mohammed announced a project to build Saudi Arabia's first nuclear reactor in November 2018. The kingdom aims to build 16 nuclear facilities over the next 20 years.[102] Efforts to diversify the Saudi energy sector also include wind and solar, including a 1.8 gigawatt solar plant announced in the same month as part of a long-term project in partnership with SoftBank.[103]

Saudi petroleum industry

Saudi Arabia, OPEC's largest producer, has the second-largest amount of oil reserves in the world. On 28 September 2021, Joe Biden's national security adviser, Jake Sullivan, met with Mohammed in Saudi Arabia to discuss the high oil prices.[104] In October 2022 in protest of Saudi Arabia cutting oil production, US National Security Council]] spokesman John Kirby said Saudi Arabia knew the cut would "increase Russian revenues and blunt the effectiveness of sanctions" and accused Saudi Arabia of "coercing" other oil producing countries to agree.[105] The record-high energy prices were driven by a global surge in demand as the world quit the economic recession caused by COVID-19, particularly due to strong energy demand in Asia.[106][107][108]

The relations between Russia and Saudi Arabia evolved under Mohammed, granting the two nations the ability to conspire in oil export decisions.[109][110]

Sport sector

Mohammed has presided over unprecedented spending on sport since becoming Saudi Arabia's de facto ruler in 2017. He has also been assiduous in striking deals to bring top sports events to Saudi, including this year’s FIFA Club World Cup and the Asian Games in 2029. In 2023, Mohammed said this approach is central to the country's goal of becoming one of the world's top 10 tourist destinations, stating: "When you want to diversify an economy you have to work in all sectors: mining, infrastructure, manufacturing, transportation, logistics all this… Part of it is tourism and if you want to develop tourism part of it is culture, part of it is your sport sector, because you need to create a calendar." [111]

Domestic reforms

Mohammed established an entertainment authority that began hosting comedy shows, professional wrestling events, and monster truck rallies.[27] In 2016, he shared his idea for "Green cards" for non-Saudi foreigners with Al Arabiya journalist Turki Aldakhil.[112] In 2019 the Saudi cabinet approved a new residency scheme (Premium Residency) for foreigners.[113] The scheme will enable expatriates to permanently reside, own property and invest in the Kingdom.[114][115]

The first measures undertaken in April 2016 included new taxes and cuts in subsidies, a diversification plan, the creation of a $2 trillion Saudi sovereign wealth fund, and a series of strategic economic reforms called the National Transformation Programme.[116] Mohammed's plans to raise capital for the sovereign wealth fund included selling off shares of Saudi Aramco, the state-owned petroleum and natural gas company,[77] with the capital to be re-invested in other sectors such as to implement the diversification plans.[117] In October 2017, the plan for Aramco's IPO listing was criticised by The Economist, which called it "a mess".[118] Mohammed slashed the state budget, freezing government contracts and reducing the pay of civil employees as part of drastic austerity measures.[119]

In April 2017, Mohammed announced a project to build one of the world's largest cultural, sports and entertainment cities in Qiddiya, southwest of Riyadh. The plans for a 334-square kilometre city include a safari and a Six Flags theme park.[120][121]

Portraits of King Salman and Prince Mohammed at the Jenadriyah festival

In October 2017, Mohammed said that the ultra-conservative Saudi state had not been "normal" for the past 30 years, blaming rigid doctrines that had governed society in a reaction to the Iranian Revolution, which successive leaders "didn't know how to deal with".[122] He stated that he aimed to have Saudi Arabia start "returning to what we were before—a country of moderate Islam that is open to all religions and to the world".[123] This amounted to telling the country's clerics that the deal the royal family struck with them after the Grand Mosque seizure was to be renegotiated.[124] Building an industrial culture was seen as incompatible with Wahhabism. The Wahhabis were committed to fixed social and gender relationships. These were consistent with an economy built on oil sales, but industrialization requires a dynamic culture with social relations constantly shifting.[125] The regime's commitment to "moderate Islam" and secularization drive through repressive methods has been questioned.[126]

Further cultural transformations followed in December 2017 with Saudi Arabia's first public concert by a female singer, and in January 2018 a sports stadium in Jeddah became the first in the Kingdom to admit women.[127] In April 2018, the first public cinema opened in Saudi Arabia after a ban of 35 years, with plans to have more than 2,000 screens running by 2030.[128][129]

In an interview with a CBS 60 Minutes that aired on 29 September 2019, Mohammed invited people to visit the kingdom to see the transformation, asking for people to meet Saudi citizens for themselves.[130]

On 26 April 2020, the Supreme Judicial Council of Saudi Arabia abolished flogging as a punishment in the country, stating that the decision was "an extension of the human rights reforms introduced under the direction of King Salman and the direct supervision of Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman".[131] The following day, the Human Rights Commission of Saudi Arabia reported the enactment of a royal decree abolishing the death penalty for crimes committed by minors.[132]

Human rights

Early in his leadership tenure, Mohammed sought to cultivate an image of Saudi Arabia as implementing various reforms. Human rights groups say that repression has worsened under his tenure.[72][74] According to human rights groups, arrests of human rights activists have risen under Mohammed.[133] He has reportedly created the Tiger Squad, a team of assassins that act as a death squad, to target Saudi critics inside and outside Saudi Arabia.[134][135] Among those detained in a wave of arrests in September 2017 were Abdulaziz al-Shubaily, a founding member of the Saudi Civil and Political Rights Association (ACPRA); Mustafa al-Hassan, an academic and novelist; and Essam al-Zamel, an entrepreneur.[136][137] Ahead of the lifting of the ban on women driving in June 2018, 17 women's rights activists were arrested, including the women to drive and anti-male guardianship campaigner Loujain al-Hathloul.[138][139] Eight of the 17 were subsequently released.[140] Hatoon al-Fassi, an associate professor of women's history at King Saud University,[141] was arrested shortly afterwards.[142][143]

In August that year, the human rights activist Israa al-Ghomgham and her husband, both arrested in 2015, were put under legal threat of beheading.[144] Human Rights Watch warned that the al-Ghomgham case set a "dangerous precedent" for other women activists currently detained.[145] HRW's Middle East director Sarah Leah Whitson said, "Any execution is appalling, but seeking the death penalty for activists like Israa al-Ghomgham, who are not even accused of violent behaviour, is monstrous. Every day, the Saudi monarchy's unrestrained despotism makes it harder for its public relations teams to spin the fairy tale of 'reform' to allies and international business."[145][146][147] On 23 April 2019, 37 people, mostly Shia human rights activists involved in the Qatif conflict, were executed in one of the largest mass executions of the minority sect in the kingdom's history.[148]

In August 2019, Loujain al-Hathloul's brother Walid informed that his sister was offered release on denying the human rights abuses committed against her in Saudi prison. Walid wrote on Twitter that the Saudi state security laid a proposal for Loujain to sign a document and appear on camera to deny that she had been tortured and sexually harassed in jail. He stated that Loujain mentioned to the family that she had been whipped, beaten, electrocuted in a chair, and harassed by masked men, who would wake her up in the middle of the night to shout threats at her in cell. Walid also tweeted that Loujain refused the offer proposed by Saudi authorities and "immediately ripped the document".[149]

In response to foreign criticism and women's rights activism, Mohammed has implemented modest reforms to improve women's rights in Saudi Arabia. In September 2017, he implemented the women to drive movement's multi-decade demand to lift the ban on female drivers.[150] He legislated against some elements of Saudi Arabia's Wali system, also a topic of a decades-long campaign by women's rights activists.[151] In response to the Saudi anti male-guardianship campaign,[152] the Saudi government enacted a law that allows women above 21 years old to obtain passports and travel abroad without needing the permission of their male guardians.[153][154] In February 2018, it became legally possible for Saudi women to open their own business without a male's permission.[155] According to the Saudi Information Ministry, as of March 2018, mothers in Saudi Arabia became authorised to retain immediate custody of their children after divorce without having to file any lawsuits.[156]

In February 2017, Saudi Arabia appointed its first woman to head the Saudi Stock Exchange.[157][158]

Arrest of Muhammad bin Nayef

Muhammad bin Nayef was arrested on 6 March 2020, along with his half-brother Nawwaf bin Nayef and King Salman's brother Ahmed bin Abdulaziz. The three princes were charged with treason. The Saudi government claimed the princes were trying to overthrow Mohammed bin Salman.[159]

Accusations of poisoning attempt against King Abdullah

In 2021, the former Saudi intelligence official Saad al-Jabri said in an interview with CBS that Mohammed bin Salman mentioned to Interior Minister Muhammad bin Nayef Al Saud plans to kill King Abdullah in 2014. This would allow Mohammed's father to take the throne. Al-Jabri has called Mohammed "a psychopath, killer ... with infinite resources, who poses threat to his people, to the Americans and to the planet".[160] Mohammed has rejected all allegations; the Saudi embassy called al-Jabri "a discredited former government official with a long history of [fabrication]".[161]

Foreign policy

Interventions in Syria and Yemen

Palestinians protest in the Gaza Strip, 9 December 2017

Some have called Mohammed the architect of the war in Yemen.[162][163] On 10 January 2016, The Independent reported that "the BND, the German intelligence agency, portrayed...Saudi defence minister and Deputy Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman...as a political gambler who is destabilising the Arab world through proxy wars in Yemen and Syria."[164][31][165] German officials reacted to the BND's memo, saying the published statement "is not the position of the federal government".[37]

Protest in London against Mohammed's state visit to the United Kingdom, 7 March 2018

Mohammed leads the Saudi-led intervention in Yemen against the Houthi rebels, who in 2015 seized Sana'a and ousted the Saudi-backed Hadi government, ending multilateral efforts towards a political settlement following the 2011 Yemeni uprising.[166][167][168] Coalition airstrikes during the intervention have resulted in thousands of civilians killed or injured,[169] prompting accusations of war crimes in the intervention.[170][171][172] Following a Houthi missile attack against Riyadh in December 2017, which was intercepted by Saudi air defence, airstrikes killed 136 Yemeni civilians and injured 87 others in eleven days.[173][174] In August 2018, the United Nations reported that all parties in the conflict were responsible for human rights violations and for actions which could be considered war crimes.[175]

The war and blockade of Yemen has cost Saudi Arabia tens of billions of dollars, further aggravated the humanitarian crisis in the country and destroyed much of Yemen's infrastructure, but failed to dislodge the Shiite Houthi rebels and their allies from the Yemeni capital.[176][119] More than 50,000 children in Yemen died from starvation in 2017. From 2015 to May 2019 the number of total deaths of children is said to be approximately 85,000.[177][178][179][180] The famine in Yemen is the direct result of the Saudi-led intervention and blockade of the rebel-held area.[176][181] In October 2018, Lise Grande, the United Nations Humanitarian Coordinator for Yemen, warned that 12 to 13 million Yemenis were at risk of starvation if the war continued for another three months.[182] On 28 March 2018, Saudi Arabia, along with its coalition partner the UAE, donated US$930 million to the United Nations which, according to UN secretary-general António Guterres, "...(will) help to alleviate the suffering of millions of vulnerable people across Yemen". The funds cover almost one-third of the $2.96 billion required to implement the UN's 2018 Yemen Humanitarian Response Plan.[183] Following the Houthi missile attack against Riyadh in December 2017, which was intercepted by Saudi air defence,[184] Mohammed retaliated with a ten-day barrage of indiscriminate airstrikes against civilian areas in Yemen held by Houthi forces, killing dozens of children.[185]

With US defense secretary James Mattis (right), 22 March 2018

Following the assassination of Jamal Khashoggi, the United States Senate Committee on Foreign Relations approved a resolution to impose sanctions on people blocking humanitarian access in Yemen and suspend arms sales to Saudi Arabia. Senator Lindsey Graham said the Saudi Arabia–United States relationship "is more of a burden than an asset." He also said, "The crown prince [of Saudi Arabia] is so toxic, so tainted, so flawed."[186]

Andrew Smith, of Campaign Against Arms Trade (CAAT), said that British foreign secretaries Boris Johnson and Jeremy Hunt "have played an utterly central and complicit role in arming and supporting the Saudi-led destruction of Yemen."[187] Hunt's Conservative leadership campaign was partly funded by a close associate to Mohammed.[188][187]

On 16 August 2020, a lawsuit filed by a former top intelligence official, Saad al-Jabri, revealed that in 2015 Mohammed secretly called for Russia to intervene in Syria at a time when Bashar al-Assad's regime was close to falling apart. The Saudi monarchy had been supporting anti-Assad rebels, including Ahrar al-Sham,[189] while Russian and Syrian forces were bombing rebel-held cities in support of Assad, killing tens of thousands of Syrian civilians in the process. Western diplomats say that Mohammed was strongly influenced by Emirati politician Sheikh Mohammed bin Zayed Al Nahyan (who later became ruler of Abu Dhabi). The UAE was pushing for the idea of helping Russia stabilise Syria and enabling the Assad regime in the country.[190] In 2017 it was reported that Saudi Arabia provided weapons to Syrian opposition groups, fighting against the Assad regime. Conflict Armament Research (CAR) reported that these weapons frequently ended up in the hands of the Islamic State members.[191] In 2018, Mohammed reportedly wanted the US military presence to maintain in Syria, despite Donald Trump's declaring the withdrawal of American forces from the war-torn country.[192]

In March 2023, Saudi Arabia began talks to bring Syria back into the Arab League, and provided economic support after the 2023 Turkey–Syria earthquake on 6 February.[193] In May 2023, Syrian president Bashar al-Assad attended the Arab League summit in Jeddah where he was received by Mohammed.[194]

Relations with Israel

In December 2017, Mohammed criticised the United States' decision to recognise Jerusalem as the capital of Israel.[195] In 2018, he voiced his support for a Jewish homeland of Israel,[196] the first time that a senior Saudi royal has expressed such sentiments publicly.[197][198] In September 2019, Mohammed condemned Israeli prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu's plans to annex the eastern portion of the occupied West Bank known as the Jordan Valley.[199] In 2023, there were ongoing negotiations to establish diplomatic relations between Saudi Arabia and Israel.[200] Mohammed has also said that his country was moving steadily closer to normalising relations with Israel.[201] However, Saudi Arabia paused normalisation talks with Israel amid the 2023 Israel–Hamas war.[202] Mohammed subsequently called for a global arms embargo against Israel.[203]

Relationship with Russia

With Russian president Vladimir Putin (left) in Moscow, 14 June 2018

Under Mohammed's leadership, Saudi Arabia strengthened its relationship with Russian president Vladimir Putin.[204] In 2016, Mohammed signed an agreement to cooperate with Russia in global oil markets.[204] After Mohammed was accused of murdering Jamal Khashoggi, Putin was one of few world leaders to publicly embrace the prince.[205] Russia has also abstained from criticising Saudi-led intervention in Yemen and has supported the United Nations arms embargo against the Houthis in the Security Council.[206][207] In 2021, Mohammed signed a military cooperation agreement with Russia.[208]

Amidst Western isolation following Russia's invasion of Ukraine, Mohammed strengthened his personal relationship with Vladimir Putin and expanded Saudi-Russia relations.[75] Russia and Saudi Arabia have since been co-operating through the OPEC to cut oil output and increase oil prices.[209][210] In September 2022, five British and two American POWs captured in Ukraine were released by Russia through Saudi mediation.[211] Russia's new foreign policy concept unveiled in 2023 has given priority to enhancing friendly relations with Saudi Arabia.[212]

Relations with Turkey

In March 2018, Mohammed referred to Turkey as part of a "triangle of evil" alongside Iran and the Muslim Brotherhood.[213][214] However, Mohammed later led a reconciliation with Turkey in 2022, leading to improved relations between the countries.[215] In July 2023, the Crown Prince and Turkish president Recep Tayyip Erdogan agreed a major deal for Saudi Arabia to purchase Turkish Baykar Bayraktar Akıncı drones.[216]

Relations with United States

Relations with the Trump Administration

In August 2016 Donald Trump Jr., the son of US presidential candidate Donald Trump, had a meeting with an envoy representing Mohammed bin Salman and the crown prince of Abu Dhabi, Mohammed bin Zayed. The envoy offered help to the Trump campaign.[217] The meeting included Joel Zamel, an Israeli specialist in social media manipulation, Lebanese-American businessman George Nader, and Blackwater founder Erik Prince.[218][217]

With Donald Trump, June 2019

Upon Trump's election, support for Mohammed bin Salman was described as one of the few issues where rival White House advisers Jared Kushner and Steve Bannon agreed.[69] Mohammed, then deputy crown prince, was subsequently invited to the White House and given the treatment typically afforded to foreign heads of state by diplomatic protocol.[219] He subsequently defended the Trump administration's travel ban for nationals of 7 Muslim-majority countries, stating that "Saudi Arabia does not believe that this measure is targeting Muslim countries or the religion of Islam".[220] Kushner also inquired as to how the US could support Mohammed in the succession process.[219] After Mohammed became crown prince, Trump reportedly said, "We've put our man on top".[221] Trump initially supported the Saudi-led blockade of Qatar,[222] despite opposition from US secretary of state]] Rex Tillerson and Secretary of Defense James Mattis,[223] though he later changed his position.[224] Mohammed later reportedly claimed Kushner had provided intelligence assistance on domestic rivals to Mohammed during the 2017–19 Saudi Arabian purge,[225] which Trump had personally expressed support for.[226] The Trump administration also firmly supported Mohammed during global backlash following the assassination of Jamal Khashoggi.[227]

Relations with the Biden administration

Arab leaders, Joe Biden and Mohammed (fifth from right) at the GCC+3 summit in Jeddah, 16 July 2022

In 2019, during the Trump administration, Joe Biden criticised Mohammed, describing him as a pariah due to the 2018 killing of Jamal Khashoggi.[228] In July 2021, six months into the Biden presidency, Saudi deputy defence minister Khalid bin Salman Al Saud (Mohammed's brother) visited the United States. It was the first meeting between senior US and Saudi officials after Jamal Khashoggi was murdered in 2018.[229] In September 2021, Biden's national security adviser Jake Sullivan met with Mohammed. In the meeting, Mohammed reportedly ended up shouting at Sullivan after he raised the killing of Khashoggi.[228]

US-Saudi trade relations has also sunk drastically from a height of 76 billion dollars in 2012 to just about 29 billion dollars in 2021. After Russia invaded Ukraine in 2022, Saudi Arabia declined US requests to increase oil production and thus undercut Russia's war finances.[228][230][231] The Wall Street Journal wrote in April 2022 that the US-Saudi relationship was at "its lowest point in decades."[228] In April 2022, CIA director William Burns traveled to Saudi Arabia to meet with Mohammed, asking him to increase the country's oil production. They also discussed Saudi weapons purchases from China.[232]

With US secretary of state Antony Blinken in Jeddah, 7 June 2023

Relations between the United States and Saudi Arabia became weak after OPEC+ announced a cut in oil production by two million barrels a day. The US government was angered by the move, accusing Saudi Arabia of siding with Russia in its war against Ukraine. The Saudi government denied these claims, claiming that the move was not politically motivated but to bring stability in global oil markets.[233] The Saudi government also declined a US request to postpone an OPEC decision until after the 2022 United States elections, leading Biden to threaten "consequences" against Saudi Arabia.[234]

Relations with Qatar

On 5 June 2017, Saudi Arabia under Mohammed spearheaded a diplomatic crisis with Qatar together with the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain and Egypt, with the countries severing diplomatic relations with Qatar and effectively imposing a blockade on the country. The countries cited Qatar's alleged support for terrorism as the main reason for the actions, also citing Al Jazeera and Qatar's relations with Iran. Reuters reported that Mohammed "said the dispute with Qatar could be long-lasting, comparing it to the US embargo against Cuba imposed 60 years before, but played down its impact, dismissing the Gulf emirate as "smaller than a Cairo street".[214] In August 2018, a report by The Intercept cited unnamed sources claiming that former US secretary of state Rex Tillerson had in June 2017 intervened to stop a Saudi-Emirati plan to invade Qatar, resulting in increased pressure from Saudi Arabia and the UAE for his removal from office.[235]

On 4 January 2021, Qatar and Saudi Arabia agreed to a resolution of the crisis brokered by Kuwait and the United States, which stated that Saudi Arabia will reopen its border with Qatar and begin the process for reconciliation. An agreement and final communiqué signed on 5 January 2021 following a GCC summit at Al-'Ula marks the resolution of the crisis.[236]

Resignation of Saad Hariri

In November 2017, Mohammed forced Lebanese prime minister Saad Hariri to resign when he visited Saudi Arabia. Mohammed believed that Hariri was in the pocket of Iran-backed Hezbollah, which is a major political force in Lebanon. Hariri eventually was released, went back to Lebanon and annulled his resignation.[41]

Saudi–Canadian dispute

Chrystia Freeland, Canada's minister of foreign affairs, issued a statement via Twitter on 2 August 2018 expressing Canada's concern over the recent arrest of Samar Badawi, a human rights activist and sister of imprisoned Saudi blogger Raif Badawi, and called for the release of human rights activists.[237] In response to Canada's criticism, Saudi Arabia expelled Canada's ambassador and froze trade with Canada.[238][239] The Toronto Star reported that the consensus among analysts indicated that the actions taken by Mohammed were a "warning to the world — and to Saudi human rights activists — that his Saudi Arabia is not to be trifled with".[240] The diplomatic ties were restored on 24 May 2023.[241]

Assassination of Jamal Khashoggi

With US secretary of state Mike Pompeo (right), 16 October 2018
With Major General Ahmad Asiri (right), 2016

In October 2018, Saudi journalist Jamal Khashoggi, a critic of Mohammed, went missing after entering the Saudi consulate in Istanbul. Turkish officials reportedly believe that Khashoggi was murdered at the consulate, claiming to have specific video and audio recordings proving that he was first tortured and then murdered, and that a medical forensics expert was part of the 15-man Saudi team seen entering and leaving the consulate at the time of the journalist's disappearance.[242] Saudi Arabia denied the accusations and 13 days later Mohammed invited Turkish authorities to search the building as they "have nothing to hide". Saudi officials said they are "working to search for him".[243] The Washington Post reported that Mohammed had earlier sought to lure Khashoggi back to Saudi Arabia and detain him.[244]

According to Middle East Eye, seven of the fifteen men suspected of killing Khashoggi are members of Mohammed's personal bodyguard.[245] John Sawers, a former head of the British MI6, stated that in his judgment of the evidence it is "very likely" that Mohammed ordered the killing of Khashoggi.[246]

In the aftermath of Khashoggi's death, multiple commentators referred to Mohammed as "Mister Bone Saw", a play on the initials MBS. The name refers to the alleged use of a bone saw to dispose of Khashoggi's remains.[247][248]

Mohammed has denied any involvement in the murder and blamed the assassination on rogue operators. However, Western countries are not convinced and believe this could not have happened without Mohammed's knowledge or approval. Donald Trump described the Saudi response to the killing as "one of the worst in the history of cover-ups." Trump also believes that Mohammed at least knew about the plan, saying that "the prince is running things over there more so at this stage."[249]

After the murder, Mohammed's close confidant Ahmad Asiri was sacked,[250] as was former advisor Saud al-Qahtani.[251][252]

The recording of Khashoggi's killing collected by Turkish intelligence reportedly reveals that one of the members of the kill team instructed someone over the phone to "tell your boss, the deed was done." American intelligence officials believe that "boss" was a reference to the Crown Prince. The person who made the call was identified as Maher Abdulaziz Mutreb, a security officer who is frequently seen travelling with the prince.[253]

Seven weeks after Khashoggi's death, Saudi Arabia, in order to "distance ... Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, from the grisly murder" stated it would pursue the death penalty for five suspects charged with "ordering and executing the crime."[254][255]

On 16 November 2018, it was reported that the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) had concluded with "high confidence" that Mohammed ordered Khashoggi's murder. The CIA based its conclusion on several pieces of evidence, including an intercepted conversation in which Mohammed's brother Khalid offered Khashoggi assurances that it would be safe for the journalist to enter Saudi Arabia's consulate in Istanbul. Although the CIA reportedly had not determined whether Khalid had any foreknowledge of Khashoggi's ultimate fate upon entering the consulate, it believed that Khalid conveyed this message to Khashoggi at Mohammed's behest. In the CIA's analysis, the killing was most likely motivated by Mohammed's privately stated belief that Khashoggi was an Islamist with problematic connections to the Muslim Brotherhood, a perception that differs markedly from the Saudi government's public remarks on Khashoggi's death.[256]

On 4 December 2018, a group of United States senators were briefed by CIA director Gina Haspel on the murder of Khashoggi. After the briefing, the senators were more than certain that Mohammed played a major role in the killing.[257] Senator Lindsey Graham said, "You have to be willfully blind not to come to the conclusion that this was orchestrated and organised by people under the command of MBS and that he was intrinsically involved in the demise of Mr. Khashoggi." Senator Bob Corker said that the prince "ordered, monitored, the killing" and "If he were in front of a jury, he would be convicted of murder in about 30 minutes."[258] On 5 December 2018, UN Human Rights chief Michelle Bachelet asked for an international investigation to determine who was behind Khashoggi's murder.[259]

A former Saudi intelligence chief and senior member of the Saudi royal family, Prince Turki bin Faisal, dismissed the CIA's reported finding that Mohammed ordered the journalist's killing, saying that "The CIA has been proved wrong before. Just to mention the invasion of Iraq for example."[260]

In March 2019, US senators accused Saudi Arabia for a number of repetitive misdeeds and criticised Mohammed, saying he has gone "full gangster".[261] The senators said the list of human rights violations by Saudi Arabia is too long to comprehend the situation in the kingdom or even work with Mohammed.[262]

In June 2019, a UN report entitled "Annex to the Report of the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions: Investigation into the unlawful death of Mr. Jamal Khashoggi" linked Mohammed to the assassination.[263][264]

In a June 2019 article, The Guardian claimed that after Khashoggi's assassination, the media group became a target of hacking attempts made by a Saudi cybersecurity subdivision, as per an internal order document obtained by the group, with Saud al-Qahtani undersigned.[265] According to an interview in a PBS documentary film recorded in December 2018 and parts released in September 2019, Mohammed bears responsibility for the killing of Khashoggi since it happened under his watch but he denies any knowledge of the murder in advance.[266][267][268] He denied in an interview with CBS' 60 Minutes aired on 29 September 2019 any personal involvement in the killing, adding that "once charges are proven against someone, regardless of their rank, it will be taken to court, no exception made", but said that he had to take "full responsibility for what happened".[130][269]

On 25 February 2021, the Office of the Director of National Intelligence issued a declassified report approved by Director Avril Haines. The report, "Assessing the Saudi Government's Role in the Killing of Jamal Khashoggi" stated that, "We assess that Saudi Arabia's Crown Prince Muhammad bin Salman approved an operation in Istanbul, Turkey to capture or kill Saudi journalist Jamal Khashoggi."[270]

On 26 February 2021, the United Nations Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions Agnès Callamard released a statement urging, "The United States Government should impose sanctions against the Crown Prince, as it has done for the other perpetrators targeting his personal assets but also his international engagements."[271]

On 18 November 2022, due to his new role as the Saudi prime minister, Mohammed got US immunity over Khashoggi's murder. However, Biden's administration emphasized that this was not a determination of innocence.[272]

Intimidation of Saad al-Jabri

On 9 July 2020, four United States senators urged President Trump to secure the freedom of Saad al-Jabri's children Omar and Sarah, calling it a "moral obligation" to support a man who aided the US intelligence for years and had close ties with key members of the Saudi royal family. The Saudi government detained Omar and Sarah in March 2020 and, to date, their whereabouts remain unknown.[273][274] Saudi Arabia had issued an extradition request and Interpol notices to bring back Saad al-Jabri, who was the US anti-terrorism contact in the Middle East and was staying in Canada since 2018. The Interpol notice against al-Jabri was removed, citing that he was a political opponent of Mohammed.[275]

In August 2020, al-Jabri filed a federal lawsuit in Washington, DC, alleging that Mohammed dispatched a "Tiger Squad" to Canada during October 2018 to assassinate al-Jabri, who was the closest adviser to Mohammed's chief rival, Muhammad bin Nayef. The squad was identified and returned by Canadian authorities.[276][277] Following the lawsuit, the US District Court for the District of Columbia issued the summons against Mohammed bin Salman, along with 11 other people. The summons stated that a judgement would be taken by default against the concerned parties if they fail to respond.[278] Documents filed to the court revealed that Mohammed was served the lawsuit on 22 September 2020 at 4:05 p.m. ET via WhatsApp, and twenty minutes later the message was marked as "read".[279][280]

Relations with China

Relations between China and Saudi Arabia have deepened under the leadership of Mohammed; since he became crown prince in 2017, trade between the two countries have increased from $51.5 billion to $87.5 billion in 2021.[281] In February 2019, Mohammed defended China's policies in Xinjiang, where more than 1 million Uyghurs were put into internment camps, saying "China has the right to carry out anti-terrorism and de-extremisation work for its national security.".[282][283][284] Miqdaad Versi, spokesperson for the Muslim Council of Britain, called Mohammed's remarks "disgusting" and a defence of "the use of concentration camps against Uighur Muslims".[285] China has been Saudi Arabia's largest economic partner since 2014 and Saudi Arabia is the biggest source of China's oil imports.[286] In 2019, Chinese officials announced plans to incorporate Saudi Vision 2030 into the Belt and Road Initiative, and expand economic, cultural, strategic and military co-operation.[287]

Since 2021, China has been assisting in Saudi Arabia's ballistic missile programme by transferring technology and making joint ventures for missile production.[288][289] Mohammed hosted Chinese president Xi Jinping in Riyadh for talks on 7–10 December 2022.[290] During the visit, Xi met with numerous Arab leaders, including members of the Gulf Cooperation Council.[290] Xi also signed numerous commercial deals with Saudi Arabia and formally elevated the relationship to comprehensive strategic partnership, highest level in China's formal ranking of relations with other countries.[291] The deal also epxanded military and security ties, with both sides agreeing for joint production of UAV systems in Saudi Arabia.[292] Describing the GCC summit as a "milestone event" in the history of Sino-Arab friendship, Xi urged the Gulf countries to start making oil transaction through Renminbi, a move widely seen as China's efforts to establish Renminbi as a world currency.[293]

During the 2022 Airshow China held in Zhuhai, Saudi Arabia and China concluded arms deal worth $4 billion. Under the contract, Saudi Arabia purchased hundreds of Chinese drones, ballistic missiles, Silent Hunter DEWs in addition to technology transfer that enables indigenous manufacturing of various armaments.[294][295] On 10 March 2023, Saudi Arabia and Iran agreed to restore diplomatic ties cut in 2016 after a deal brokered between the two countries by China following secret talks in Beijing.[296]

Hack of Jeff Bezos's phone

In March 2019, Gavin de Becker, a security specialist working for Jeff Bezos, accused Saudi Arabia of hacking Bezos's phone.[297] Bezos was the owner of The Washington Post, the leader of the company Amazon, and the world's richest man at the time.[297]

In January 2020, the results of FTI Consulting's forensic investigation of Bezos' phone were made public. The company concluded with "medium to high confidence" that Bezos' phone was hacked by a multimedia message sent in May 2018 from Mohammed's WhatsApp account, after which the phone begun transmitting dramatically higher amounts of data.[298] The report points to circumstantial evidence: first, a November 2018 message from Mohammed to Bezos includes an image resembling the woman Bezos was having an affair with, despite the affair not being public knowledge at the time; second, a February 2019 text from Mohammed to Bezos urges Bezos not to believe everything, after Bezos was briefed on the phone regarding an Internet campaign against him conducted by Saudis.[298]

United Nations special rapporteurs Agnès Callamard and David Kaye reacted that the alleged hack suggests that Mohammed participated "in an effort to influence, if not silence, The Washington Post's reporting on Saudi Arabia".[299] They declared that the alleged hacking was relevant to the issue of whether Mohammed was involved in the killing of Jamal Khashoggi, who worked for The Washington Post.[300]

Environmentalism

Under Mohammed's leadership, Saudi Arabia has lobbied to weaken global carbon emissions-reduction agreements.[301] In June 2023, Mohammed visited a summit in France "aimed at bringing together private and public funding" to fight climate change and protect biodiversity. He met French president Emmanuel Macron in Paris.[302]

Personal life

From left to right: FIFA president Gianni Infantino, Panamanian president Juan Carlos Varela, Mohammed bin Salman, and former French president Nicolas Sarkozy at the 2018 FIFA World Cup

On 6 April 2008, Mohammed married his first cousin Sara bint Mashour, a daughter of his paternal uncle Mashour bin Abdulaziz. The couple have five children; the first four were named after their grandparents, and the fifth one is named after his great-grandfather King Abdulaziz, the founder of Saudi Arabia.[9][303][304][305] In 2022, The Economist reported that on at least one occasion, Mohammed beat Sara so severely that she required medical treatment.[306]

In 2015, Mohammed purchased the Italian-built and Bermuda-registered yacht Serene from Russian vodka tycoon Yuri Shefler for €500 million.[307][308] In 2015, he purchased the Château Louis XIV in France for over $300 million.[309][310] In 2018, he was ranked by Forbes as the eighth most powerful person in the world,[311] with a personal wealth of at least $25 billion.[312]

In December 2017, a number of sources reported that Mohammed, using his close associate Prince Badr bin Abdullah bin Mohammed Al Farhan as an intermediary, had bought Salvator Mundi by Leonardo da Vinci; the sale in November at $450.3 million set a new record price for a work of art.[313][314][315][316] This report has been denied by the auctioneer Christie's, the Saudi Arabian embassy,[317] and the UAE government, which has announced that it is the actual owner of the painting.[318] The exact current location of the painting is unknown,[319][320] as it has not been seen publicly since the auction. However, it has been suggested that Mohammed's yacht Serene houses Salvator Mundi.[321]

Mohammed has travelled extensively around the world, meeting with politicians, business leaders and celebrities.[308] In June 2016, he travelled to Silicon Valley and met key people in the US high tech industry, including Facebook founder Mark Zuckerberg.[322] In early 2018, he visited the United States, where he met with many politicians, business people and Hollywood stars, including President Trump, Bill and Hillary Clinton, Henry Kissinger, Michael Bloomberg, George W. Bush, George H. W. Bush, Bill Gates, Jeff Bezos, Oprah Winfrey, Rupert Murdoch, Richard Branson, Eric Garcetti, Michael Douglas, Morgan Freeman, and Dwayne Johnson.[323][324] Trump praised his relationship with Mohammed.[325] The prince also visited the United Kingdom, where he met with Theresa May, Queen Elizabeth II and Prince William, Duke of Cambridge.[326]

In 2018, Mohammed's personal net worth was estimated at US$3.0 billion.[327]

On 25 December 2020, as part of the Saudi Arabian Ministry of Health's national COVID-19 vaccination plan, the Crown Prince was shown receiving the vaccine in a video released by the Saudi Press Agency.[328]

In December 2020, Mohammed invested money into Take-Two Interactive, Electronic Arts, and Activision Blizzard through Saudi Arabia's sovereign wealth fund. The investments amounted to 14.9 million shares in Activision Blizzard, 7.4 million shares in Electronic Arts, and 3.9 million shares in Take-Two Interactive. Mohammed has stated that he grew up playing video games.[329]

On 19 November 2022, Mohammed was awarded an honorary doctorate from Kasetsart University in the field of land knowledge for sustainable development.[330]

Honours

Styles of
Prince Mohammed bin Salman Al Saud
Reference styleHis Royal Highness
Spoken styleYour Royal Highness

See also

References

  1. "Biden arrives in Saudi Arabia, holds 'important discussions' with king, crown prince". Arab News. 15 July 2022. Retrieved 1 January 2024.
  2. "Saudi Arabia – Cooperative Logistics Supply Support Arrangement (CLSSA) Program, Foreign Military Sales Order (FMSO) II | Defense Security Cooperation Agency". www.dsca.mil. Retrieved 1 January 2024.
  3. "Collins, Bipartisan Senate Delegation Arrive in Saudi Arabia | U.S. Senator Susan Collins of Maine". www.collins.senate.gov. 20 October 2023. Retrieved 1 January 2024.
  4. Kelly, Kate; Wong, Edward; Nereim, Vivian (22 December 2023). "U.S. Prepares to Lift Ban on Sales of Offensive Weapons to Saudi Arabia". The New York Times. ISSN 0362-4331. Retrieved 1 January 2024.
  5. "Ministries". Royal Embassy of Saudi Arabia – Washington, D.C. 30 April 2003. Archived from the original on 1 December 2017. Retrieved 2 January 2018.
  6. "Who is Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed?". BBC News. 6 November 2017. Archived from the original on 14 October 2017. Retrieved 2 January 2018.
  7. Tisdall, Simon (24 June 2017). "Mohammed bin Salman Al Saud: The young hothead who would be king". The Guardian. Archived from the original on 26 October 2017. Retrieved 2 January 2018.
  8. 1 2 Kirkpatrick, David D. (6 June 2015). "Surprising Saudi Rises as a Prince Among Princes". The New York Times. Archived from the original on 6 September 2015. Retrieved 29 October 2015.
  9. 1 2 "Profile: Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman". Al Jazeera. 21 June 2017. Archived from the original on 22 June 2017. Retrieved 2 January 2018.
  10. Al Labbad, Mustafa (27 January 2016). "The new Saudi power triangle". Al Monitor. Archived from the original on 25 April 2017. Retrieved 24 April 2017.
  11. House, Karen Elliott (27 April 2019). "Profile of a Prince: Promise and Peril in bin Salman's Vision 2030". Belfer Center. Archived from the original on 23 October 2020. Retrieved 2 September 2020.
  12. Alexander Bligh (2018). "Changes in the Domestic-Foreign Policies Relationship in the Saudi Context in the Wake of the Change of the Guard". The Journal of the Middle East and Africa. 9 (1): 110. doi:10.1080/21520844.2018.1450015. S2CID 170051189. Archived from the original on 15 February 2023. Retrieved 23 April 2022.
  13. "Profile: Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman". Arab News. 22 June 2017. Retrieved 19 September 2023.
  14. "Profile of Prince Mohammed bin Salman - Defense Minister of Saudi Arabia". 23 December 2015. Archived from the original on 23 December 2015. Retrieved 16 September 2022.
  15. "HRH Prince Mohammed bin Salman bin Abdulaziz to inaugurate Cityscape Riyadh 2011". AMEinfo.com. 31 October 2011. Archived from the original on 1 November 2011. Retrieved 2 March 2013.
  16. 1 2 "Chairman of the Board". MISK.org.sa. MISK Foundation. Archived from the original on 28 January 2015. Retrieved 25 January 2015.
  17. "Prince Sultan arrives to Bahrain to attend Bahrain Grand Prix". Bahrain News Agency. 22 April 2012. Archived from the original on 27 September 2013. Retrieved 23 April 2012.
  18. "Leadership's trust in me is my motivation – Muhammad". Saudi Gazette. 3 March 2013. Archived from the original on 20 August 2014. Retrieved 2 March 2013.
  19. "Prince Mohammed appointed president of crown prince court". Saudi Business News. 2 March 2013. Archived from the original on 11 April 2013. Retrieved 2 March 2013.
  20. "Prince Mohammed bin Salman appointed Special Advisor to Crown Prince". Asharq Alawsat. 3 March 2013. Archived from the original on 11 March 2013. Retrieved 12 April 2013.
  21. "Saudi King Abdullah passes away". Al Arabiya. 23 January 2015. Archived from the original on 23 January 2015. Retrieved 23 January 2015.
  22. "Saudi Prince Mohammad bin Salman named defense minister". Al Arabiya English. 23 January 2015. Archived from the original on 25 February 2021. Retrieved 16 September 2022.
  23. "Profile: Prince Mohammed bin Salman bin Abdulaziz Al Saud". Al Arabiya. 27 January 2015. Archived from the original on 2 April 2015. Retrieved 28 February 2015.
  24. Cordesman, Anthony H. (24 January 2015). "Saudi Succession: The King Is Dead, Long Live the King". Newsweek. Archived from the original on 26 January 2015. Retrieved 26 January 2015.
  25. "Yemen profile - Timeline". BBC News. 6 November 2019. Archived from the original on 30 January 2016. Retrieved 16 September 2022.
  26. "Saudi and Arab allies bomb Houthi positions in Yemen". Al Jazeera. 26 March 2015. Archived from the original on 26 March 2015.
  27. 1 2 3 4 Mazzetti, Mark; Hubbard, Ben (16 October 2016). "Rise of Saudi Prince Shatters Decades of Royal Tradition". The New York Times. p. A1. Archived from the original on 16 October 2016. Retrieved 17 October 2016.
  28. Law, Bill (8 January 2016). "The most dangerous man in the world?". The Independent. Archived from the original on 15 June 2017.
  29. Osborne, Samuel (22 January 2016). "King Salman: The man in charge of the 'most dangerous man in the world'". The Independent. Archived from the original on 15 June 2017.
  30. "Transcript: Interview with Muhammad bin Salman". The Economist. 6 January 2016. Archived from the original on 10 January 2016. Retrieved 11 January 2016.
  31. 1 2 "Prince Mohammed bin Salman: Naive, arrogant Saudi prince is playing with fire". The Independent. 10 January 2016. Archived from the original on 10 January 2016.
  32. Browning, Noah; Irish, John (15 December 2015). "Saudi Arabia announces 34-state Islamic military alliance against terrorism". Reuters. Archived from the original on 8 June 2018. Retrieved 5 July 2018.
  33. McKernan, Bethan (27 November 2017). "More than 40 Islamic countries just met and vowed to wipe terrorism off the map". The Independent. Archived from the original on 18 March 2018. Retrieved 5 July 2018.
  34. "Mohammed bin Salman named Saudi Arabia's crown prince". Al Jazeera. 21 June 2017. Archived from the original on 21 June 2017.
  35. Huggler, Justin (2 December 2015). "Saudi Arabia 'destabilising Arab world', German intelligence warns". The Telegraph. Archived from the original on 9 January 2016.
  36. Cockburn, Patrick (9 January 2016). "Prince Mohammed bin Salman: Naive, arrogant Saudi prince is playing with fire: German intelligence memo shows the threat from the kingdom's headstrong defence minister". The Independent. Archived from the original on 10 January 2016.
  37. 1 2 Smaledec, Alison (3 December 2015). "Germany Rebukes Its Own Intelligence Agency for Criticizing Saudi Policy". The New York Times. Archived from the original on 7 July 2017.
  38. Miller, Jake (21 June 2017). "Trump congratulates newly-elevated Saudi Arabian crown prince". CBS News. Archived from the original on 12 August 2019. Retrieved 12 August 2019.
  39. Ignatius, David (20 April 2017). "A young prince is reimagining Saudi Arabia. Can he make his vision come true?". The Washington Post. Archived from the original on 10 July 2017.
  40. Waldman, Peter; Carey, Glen (9 November 2017). "The Saudi Purge Isn't Just a Power Grab". Bloomberg Businessweek. Archived from the original on 11 November 2017. Retrieved 12 November 2017.
  41. 1 2 Bergen, Peter (17 November 2018). "Trump's uncritical embrace of MBS set the stage for Khashoggi crisis". CNN. Archived from the original on 4 November 2018. Retrieved 13 January 2019.
  42. 1 2 "Alwaleed bin Talal, two other billionaires tycoons among Saudi arrests". Daily Sabah. 4 November 2017. Archived from the original on 5 November 2017.
  43. 1 2 Kirkpatrick, David D. (4 November 2017). "Saudi Arabia Arrests 11 Princes, Including Billionaire Waleed bin Talal". The New York Times. Archived from the original on 8 November 2017.
  44. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 "'Night of the beating': details emerge of Riyadh Ritz-Carlton purge". The Guardian. 19 November 2020. Archived from the original on 19 October 2021. Retrieved 19 October 2021.
  45. 1 2 3 4 "How Saudi Arabia's crown prince crushed his rivals at the Ritz". NBC News. 3 November 2018. Archived from the original on 19 October 2021. Retrieved 19 October 2021.
  46. Khan, Muqtedar (4 November 2017). "Power Consolidation Or Failed Coup In Saudi Arabia?". HuffPost. Archived from the original on 5 November 2017. Retrieved 6 November 2017.
  47. Gardner, Frank (5 November 2017). "Saudi princes among dozens detained in anti-corruption purge". BBC. Archived from the original on 5 November 2017.
  48. Mufson, Steven (6 November 2017). "What the royal purge means for Saudi Arabia — and its oil". The Washington Post. Archived from the original on 6 November 2017. Retrieved 6 November 2017.
  49. Stoffel, Derek (6 November 2017). "Saudi Arabia 'at a crossroads': What the arrests of several princes mean for the kingdom's future". CBC. Archived from the original on 6 November 2017. Retrieved 6 November 2017.
  50. Pfeffer, Anshel (8 November 2017). "The Saudi purge: The real reason behind Mohammed bin Salman's unprecedented crackdown". Middle East News. Archived from the original on 11 November 2017. Retrieved 11 November 2017.
  51. Malsin, Jared (6 November 2017). "Inside the Arrest of Saudi Arabia's Alwaleed bin Talal". Time. Archived from the original on 9 November 2017. Retrieved 11 November 2017.
  52. Langton, James; Duncan, Gillian (8 May 2018). "Arab Youth Survey 2018: Saudi Crown Prince and his reforms win huge support from young people across the Middle East". www.thenational.ae. Archived from the original on 12 June 2018. Retrieved 10 June 2018.
  53. Belvedere, Matthew J. (6 November 2017). "Saudi crackdown 'would be like' the US arresting Warren Buffett". CNBC. Archived from the original on 8 November 2017. Retrieved 11 November 2017.
  54. Trump, Donald J. (6 November 2017). "I have great confidence in King Salman and the Crown Prince of Saudi Arabia, they know exactly what they are doing....Some of those they are harshly treating have been 'milking' their country for years!". Twitter. Archived from the original on 10 November 2017. Retrieved 11 November 2017.
  55. Al-Shihri, Abdullah; Batrawyi, Aya (25 October 2017). "More than 200 detained in Saudi Arabia in $100 billion corruption sweep". Chicago Tribune. Associated Press. Archived from the original on 11 November 2017. Retrieved 11 November 2017.
  56. "Statement by the Royal Court: Anti Corruption Committee Concludes Its Tasks The official Saudi Press Agency". spa.gov.sa. Archived from the original on 31 January 2019. Retrieved 25 February 2019.
  57. "Saudi king presented with final corruption crackdown report, $107 bln recovered". Al Arabiya. 30 January 2019. Archived from the original on 3 February 2019. Retrieved 25 February 2019.
  58. "Corruption Perceptions Index 2019 for New Zealand". Transparency.org. 24 January 2020. Archived from the original on 18 March 2021. Retrieved 15 February 2021.
  59. "Saudi Arabia's Crown Prince to become Kingdom's Prime Minister: Royal decree". Al Arabiya English. 27 September 2022. Archived from the original on 27 September 2022. Retrieved 27 September 2022.
  60. "Beating Up on Canada Again: the Canada Letter". The New York Times. 10 August 2018. Archived from the original on 12 August 2018. Retrieved 12 August 2018. Prince Mohammed is a Saudi nationalist
  61. "Saudi Arabia's Dark Nationalism". The Atlantic. 2 June 2018. Archived from the original on 12 August 2018. Retrieved 12 August 2018.
  62. "Saudi Arabia's Populist King in Waiting". Politico. 22 September 2017. Archived from the original on 24 November 2017. Retrieved 23 November 2017.
  63. "Saudi Arabia's corruption crackdown risks scaring off investors". Financial Times. 30 January 2018. Archived from the original on 12 August 2018. Retrieved 12 August 2018. MbS, who also controls foreign and defence policy, has combined populism at home with hawkish nationalism abroad
  64. "Heir's modernising vision risks conservative discontent". The Times. 22 June 2017. Archived from the original on 12 August 2018. Retrieved 12 August 2018. Prince Mohammed's vision is conservative in a political sense — he will be an autocratic king — but it is socially more liberal.
  65. 1 2 Winkler, Theodor (2018). The Dark Side of Globalization. LIT Verlag Münster. p. 192. combines a more liberal economic and societal system with reinforced authoritarian rule
  66. "How the man behind Khashoggi murder ran the killing via Skype". Reuters. 22 October 2018. Archived from the original on 26 November 2018. Retrieved 10 January 2019.
  67. "Spotlight: Inside the stricken court of crown prince Mohammed Bin Salman". GQ. 27 December 2018. Archived from the original on 13 January 2019. Retrieved 10 January 2019.
  68. "Meet the Two Princes Reshaping the Middle East". Politico. 13 June 2017. Archived from the original on 3 July 2018. Retrieved 12 August 2018.
  69. 1 2 "A Saudi Prince's Quest to Remake the Middle East". The New Yorker. 9 April 2018. Archived from the original on 9 August 2018. Retrieved 12 August 2018.
  70. Rula, Jebreal (19 October 2018). "Jamal Khashoggi Secret Interview: The Saudi Journalist's Views of Islam, America and the 'Reformist' Prince Implicated in His Murder". Newsweek. Archived from the original on 21 October 2018. Retrieved 20 October 2018.
  71. Duran, Burhanettin (31 October 2017). "Is "Moderate Islam" just another Way of saying Arab Nationalism?". SETA. Archived from the original on 28 February 2018.
  72. 1 2 3 "Critics cite worsening Saudi repression two years after journalist's gruesome slaying". Los Angeles Times. 1 October 2020. Archived from the original on 6 August 2021. Retrieved 18 July 2021.
  73. 1 2 "Saudi Arabia Case Study | Understanding Transnational Repression". Freedom House. Archived from the original on 18 July 2021. Retrieved 18 July 2021.
  74. 1 2 3 "The High Cost of Change". Human Rights Watch. 4 November 2019. Archived from the original on 18 July 2021. Retrieved 18 July 2021.
  75. 1 2 Chulov, Martin (5 October 2022). "Putin and the prince: fears in west as Russia and Saudi Arabia deepen ties". The Guardian. Archived from the original on 8 October 2022.
  76. 1 2 Simeon Kerr (30 January 2015). "Saudi king stamps his authority with staff shake-up and handouts". Financial Times. Riyadh. Archived from the original on 1 February 2015. Retrieved 1 February 2015.
  77. 1 2 Waldman, Peter (21 April 2016). "Project to Get Saudi Arabia's Economy Off Oil". Bloomberg Businessweek. Archived from the original on 15 October 2016. Retrieved 17 October 2016.
  78. 1 2 3 4 Ottaway, David (6 May 2021). "Saudi Crown Prince Lambasts His Kingdom's Wahhabi Establishment". Wilson Center, Viewpoint Series. Archived from the original on 7 May 2021. Retrieved 4 March 2022.
  79. 1 2 Holleis, Jennifer (10 March 2023). "Saudi Arabia rebrands as Ramadan approaches". Deutsche Welle. Archived from the original on 11 March 2023.
  80. 1 2 3 Wood, Graeme (3 March 2022). "ABSOLUTE POWER". The Atlantic. Archived from the original on 3 August 2022. Retrieved 4 March 2022.
  81. Perez, Gabriella (15 September 2022). "The Saudi Mirage of Religious Freedom". Archived from the original on 18 December 2022.
  82. "What did Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman say about Shiites in Saudi Arabia?". Al Arabiya News. 2018. Archived from the original on 17 October 2021.
  83. "Haia can't chase, arrest suspects". arabnews.com. 14 April 2016. Archived from the original on 21 June 2016. Retrieved 14 April 2016.
  84. Commins, David Dean (2015). Islam in Saudi Arabia. I.B. Tauris. p. 66. ISBN 9781848858015. Archived from the original on 15 February 2023. Retrieved 4 March 2022.
  85. Bashraheel, Aseel (22 September 2019). "Rise and fall of the Saudi religious police". Arab News. Archived from the original on 3 December 2020. Retrieved 28 February 2021.
  86. Brown, Nathan J. (5 March 2019). "Who or What Is the Wali al Amr: the Unposed Question". SSRN. SSRN 3346372. Archived from the original on 5 March 2022. Retrieved 5 March 2022.
  87. "Saudi Arabia bans abaya in exam halls". Arabian Business. 21 December 2022. Archived from the original on 24 December 2022.
  88. "Saudi Arabia bans abayas in examination halls". Gulf Business. 21 December 2022. Archived from the original on 21 December 2022.
  89. Fatima, Sakina (19 December 2022). "Saudi Arabia bans abaya in exam halls". The Siasat Daily. Archived from the original on 19 December 2022.
  90. "EXPLAINED: 'Saudi Arabia bans Hijab in Exam Halls'—How far it's true?". Milli Chronicle. 26 December 2022. Archived from the original on 26 December 2022.
  91. "Full text of Saudi Arabia's Vision 2030". Al Arabiya. Saudi Vision 2030. 13 May 2016. Archived from the original on 24 May 2016. Retrieved 23 May 2016.
  92. Alboaouh, Kamel; Mahoney, Jon. "Religious and Political Authority in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia: Challenges and Prospects". Manas Journal for Social Studies: 248. Archived from the original on 14 September 2022. Retrieved 25 January 2021 via dergipark.org.
  93. Al Omran, Ahmed; Kerr, Simeon; Raval, Anjli (24 October 2017). "Saudis aim to diversify economy with new $500bn city". Financial Times. Archived from the original on 10 February 2018. Retrieved 1 February 2018.
  94. "The future of food". Neom. 6 September 2021. Archived from the original on 23 November 2021. Retrieved 6 December 2021.
  95. Wachman, Richard (24 October 2017). "Robots to roam $500 billion Saudi city". Arab News. Archived from the original on 25 October 2017. Retrieved 1 February 2018.
  96. Glen, Carey; Nereim, Vivian; Cannon, Christopher (26 October 2017). "Sun, sea and robots: Saudi Arabia's sci-fi city in the desert". Bloomberg. Archived from the original on 5 November 2017. Retrieved 1 February 2018.
  97. Shahine, Alaa; Nereim, Vivian (1 August 2017). "Saudi Arabia plans a huge Red Sea Beach tourism project". Bloomberg. Archived from the original on 27 January 2018. Retrieved 1 February 2018.
  98. "Saudi crown prince launches mega Red Sea tourism project". Arab News. 1 August 2017. Archived from the original on 4 October 2017. Retrieved 1 February 2018.
  99. "Saudi aims to issue tourist visas next year, official says". Reuters. 23 November 2017. Archived from the original on 2 January 2018. Retrieved 1 February 2018.
  100. "Saudi Arabia opens high-speed railway linking holy cities". BBC News. 25 September 2018. Archived from the original on 25 September 2018. Retrieved 25 September 2018.
  101. "Saudi crown prince says sovereign wealth fund will surpass $600 billion target by 2020". Reuters. 5 October 2018. Archived from the original on 6 October 2018. Retrieved 9 October 2018.
  102. "Saudi's Mohammed bin Salman launches project for kingdom's first nuclear plant". The National. 6 November 2018. Archived from the original on 6 November 2018. Retrieved 13 November 2018.
  103. Martin, Matthew; Nair, Dinesh (6 November 2018). "SoftBank Is Planning a $1.2 Billion Solar Plant in Saudi Arabia". Bloomberg News. Archived from the original on 8 November 2018. Retrieved 13 November 2018.
  104. "Top White House aide discussed oil prices with Saudi Arabia". Reuters. 1 October 2021. Archived from the original on 26 October 2021. Retrieved 26 October 2021.
  105. Northam, Jackie (13 October 2022). "The White House accuses Saudi Arabia of aiding Russia and coercing OPEC oil producers". NPR. Archived from the original on 13 October 2022. Retrieved 14 October 2022.
  106. "Energy crunch: How high will oil prices climb?". Al-Jazeera. 27 September 2021. Archived from the original on 28 October 2021. Retrieved 26 October 2021.
  107. "Oil analysts predict a prolonged rally as OPEC resists calls to ramp up supply". CNBC. 5 October 2021. Archived from the original on 26 October 2021. Retrieved 26 October 2021.
  108. "OPEC-Plus in Driver's Seat As Global Energy Crisis Intensifies". Natural Gas Intelligence. 6 October 2021. Archived from the original on 28 October 2021. Retrieved 26 October 2021.
  109. "Exclusive: Saudi Arabia doubles second-quarter Russian fuel oil imports for power generation". Reuters. 15 July 2022. Archived from the original on 7 September 2022. Retrieved 31 July 2022.
  110. "Putin discusses oil market with Saudi crown prince who hosted Biden last week". Reuters. 21 July 2022. Archived from the original on 28 September 2022. Retrieved 31 July 2022.
  111. "Mohammed bin Salman says he will 'continue doing sport washing' for Saudi Arabia | Sport | the Guardian".
  112. Salman, Mohammed bin. "Interview of Prince Mohammed bin Salman – His vision for the future Saudi Arabia". Interviewed by Turki Al-Dakhil. Al Arabia. Archived from the original on 10 November 2016 via mohammadbinsalman.com.
  113. "Saudi cabinet approves new expatriate residency scheme". ArabNews.com. 14 May 2019. Archived from the original on 16 July 2019. Retrieved 15 July 2019.
  114. "Saudi Arabia to Give "Green Card" Residency Permit for the First Time in 2019". mohammadbinsalman.com. Archived from the original on 8 July 2019. Retrieved 8 July 2019.
  115. "Rights and benefits of the Saudi 'Green Card'". Arab News. 20 May 2019. Archived from the original on 14 July 2019. Retrieved 8 July 2019.
  116. Ian Black (25 April 2016). "Saudi Arabia approves ambitious plan to move economy beyond oil". The Guardian. United Kingdom. Archived from the original on 17 May 2016. Retrieved 23 May 2016.
  117. Saad Al-Qahtani, Saudi Aramco IPO part of Kingdom's diversification plan Archived 7 July 2017 at the Wayback Machine, Thomsonreuters.com, 10 May 2017
  118. "Saudi Aramco's IPO is a mess". The Economist. 19 October 2017. Archived from the original on 20 October 2017.
  119. 1 2 "Rise of Prince Mohammed bin Salman rattles Saudi Arabia". The Times of India. 17 October 2016. Archived from the original on 2 February 2017.
  120. "Prince Mohammed bin Salman announces Saudi plans for largest entertainment city". Al Arabiya. 8 April 2017. Archived from the original on 28 December 2017. Retrieved 1 February 2018.
  121. "World-class entertainment park coming up in Al-Qiddiya". Saudi Gazette. 26 October 2017. Archived from the original on 9 February 2018. Retrieved 1 February 2018.
  122. Chulov, Martin (24 October 2017). "I will return Saudi Arabia to moderate Islam, says crown prince". The Guardian. Archived from the original on 5 November 2017. Retrieved 5 November 2017.
  123. "Kingdom a country of moderate Islam". saudigazette.com.sa. 24 October 2017. Archived from the original on 25 October 2017. Retrieved 5 November 2017.
  124. Denning, Liam (5 November 2017). "Saudi Sweep Is a Double-Edged Sword". Bloomberg News. Archived from the original on 6 November 2017. Retrieved 6 November 2017.
  125. "Saudi Arabia's Saturday Night Massacre". Geopolitical Futures. 8 November 2017. Archived from the original on 15 November 2017.
  126. Uniacke, Robert (2020). "Authoritarianism in the information age: state branding, depoliticizing and 'de-civilizing' of online civil society in Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates". British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies. 48 (5): 979–999. doi:10.1080/13530194.2020.1737916. ISSN 1353-0194. S2CID 216323924.
  127. Smith, Lydia (9 December 2017). "Saudi Arabia hosts first-ever concert by female performer". The Independent. Archived from the original on 10 February 2018. Retrieved 1 February 2018.
  128. Ellyat, Holly (18 April 2018). "Saudi Arabia brings back movie theaters — and 'staggering' demand is expected". CNBC. Archived from the original on 12 June 2018. Retrieved 10 June 2018.
  129. Reid, David (11 December 2017). "Saudi Arabia to reopen public cinemas for the first time in 35 years". CNBC. Archived from the original on 25 January 2018. Retrieved 1 February 2018.
  130. 1 2 "Mohammad bin Salman denies ordering Khashoggi murder, but says he takes responsibility for it". cbsnews.com. 29 September 2019. Archived from the original on 2 October 2019. Retrieved 30 September 2019.
  131. "Saudi Arabia to end flogging as a form of punishment". The Guardian. 25 April 2020. ISSN 0261-3077. Archived from the original on 29 April 2020. Retrieved 30 April 2020.
  132. "Saudi Arabia ends death penalty for crimes committed by minors". The Guardian. 27 April 2020. ISSN 0261-3077. Archived from the original on 29 April 2020. Retrieved 30 April 2020.
  133. "Rights groups condemn Saudi arrests as crackdown on dissent". Reuters. 15 September 2017. Archived from the original on 18 September 2018. Retrieved 3 October 2018.
  134. "REVEALED: The Saudi death squad MBS uses to silence dissent". Middle East Eye. 22 October 2018. Archived from the original on 22 October 2018. Retrieved 22 October 2018.
  135. "Is Saudi Arabia safe in Mohammed bin Salman's hands?". Middle East Eye. 22 October 2018. Archived from the original on 22 October 2018. Retrieved 22 October 2018.
  136. "Saudi Arabia: Arrest of two prominent activists a deadly blow for human rights". Amnesty International. 18 September 2017. Archived from the original on 14 December 2017. Retrieved 14 December 2017.
  137. Al Omran, Ahmed; Kerr, Simon (19 September 2017). "Saudi security forces clamp down on dissent". Financial Times. Archived from the original on 22 October 2018. Retrieved 3 October 2018.
  138. Batrawy, Aya; Al-Shihri, Abdullah (3 June 2018). "Saudi Prosecutor Says 17 Detained in Case Against Activists". Bloomberg. Riyadh. Archived from the original on 16 October 2018. Retrieved 3 October 2018.
  139. McKernan, Bethan (23 May 2018). "Saudi police arrest three more women's rights activists". The Guardian. Archived from the original on 24 May 2018. Retrieved 23 May 2018.
  140. "Saudi Arabia releases eight people held in activist crackdown". Reuters. Riyadh. 2 June 2018. Archived from the original on 16 October 2018. Retrieved 3 October 2018.
  141. al-Fassi, Hatoon Ajwad (2011). "Dr Hatoon Ajwad al-Fassi هتون أجواد الفاسي". King Saud University. Archived from the original on 29 August 2011. Retrieved 29 May 2011.
  142. Dadouch, Sarah (27 June 2018). "Prominent Saudi women's rights activist detained as driving ban lifted: sources". Reuters. Riyadh. Archived from the original on 16 October 2018. Retrieved 3 October 2018.
  143. "Saudis arrest another women's right activist". Al Jazeera. 27 June 2018. Archived from the original on 27 June 2018. Retrieved 27 June 2018.
  144. Graham-Harrison, Emma (22 August 2018). "Saudi Arabia seeks death penalty against female human rights activist". The Guardian. Archived from the original on 1 October 2018. Retrieved 3 October 2018.
  145. 1 2 "Saudi Arabia 'seeks death penalty for woman activist'". BBC News. 22 August 2018. Archived from the original on 23 August 2018. Retrieved 22 August 2018.
  146. "Saudi Prosecution Seeks Death Penalty for Female Activist". Human Rights Watch. 21 August 2018. Archived from the original on 23 August 2018. Retrieved 23 August 2018.
  147. Brennan, David (21 August 2018). "Who Is Israa al-Ghomgham? Female Saudi Activist May Be Beheaded After Death Sentence". Newsweek. Archived from the original on 24 August 2018. Retrieved 24 August 2018.
  148. "Saudi gentrifies Shiite old quarter after crushing revolt". Al-Monitor. 4 June 2019. Archived from the original on 5 June 2019. Retrieved 5 June 2019.
  149. "A jailed Saudi activist was told she would be released if she denied being tortured, her family says. She refused". The Washington Post. Archived from the original on 2 January 2020. Retrieved 15 August 2019.
  150. "Saudi Arabia will finally allow women to drive". The Economist. 27 September 2017. Archived from the original on 28 September 2017.
  151. "At last Saudi women will be allowed to take the wheel". The Economist. 30 September 2017. Archived from the original on 29 September 2017.
  152. al-Rasheed, Madawi (2 August 2019). "Saudi women can now travel without consent – but this progress is fragile". The Guardian. Archived from the original on 2 August 2019. Retrieved 2 August 2019.
  153. "Saudi Arabia Gives Women Travel Rights in Major Policy Shakeup". bloomberg.com. 1 August 2019. Archived from the original on 4 September 2020. Retrieved 1 August 2019.
  154. Jessie Yeung and Hamdi Alkhshali. "Saudi Arabian women finally allowed to hold passports and travel independently". CNN. Archived from the original on 2 August 2019. Retrieved 2 August 2019.
  155. "Saudi women to start own business without male permission". Al Arabiya. 18 February 2018. Archived from the original on 31 March 2018. Retrieved 30 March 2018.
  156. "Divorced Saudi women win right to get custody of children". CNN. Archived from the original on 22 March 2018. Retrieved 30 March 2018.
  157. "Saudi stock exchange appoints first female chair". Reuters. Archived from the original on 31 March 2018. Retrieved 30 March 2018.
  158. "Saudi Stock Exchange appoints first female chief in history of the kingdom". Independent. Archived from the original on 31 March 2018. Retrieved 30 March 2018.
  159. Summer Said; Justin Scheck; WarrenStrobel. "Top Saudi Royal Family Members Detained". The Wall Street Journal. Archived from the original on 30 March 2021. Retrieved 6 March 2020.
  160. Pelley, Scott (24 October 2021). "Former Saudi official calls Mohammed bin Salman a "psychopath," says Saudi crown prince fears what he knows". CBS News. Archived from the original on 25 October 2021. Retrieved 25 October 2021.
  161. "Saudi crown prince suggested killing King Abdullah, ex-official says". BBC News. 25 October 2021. Archived from the original on 25 October 2021. Retrieved 25 October 2021.
  162. "The war in Yemen is disastrous. America is only making things worse". The Guardian. 11 June 2018. Archived from the original on 20 October 2018. Retrieved 20 October 2018.
  163. "Saudi Crown Prince Aids Yemen as He Hits It With Airstrikes". Time. 6 April 2018. Archived from the original on 26 April 2018. Retrieved 20 October 2018.
  164. "Risk-taking Saudi prince gambling with stability". London Free Press. 8 February 2017. Archived from the original on 14 August 2017. Retrieved 27 January 2019.
  165. "Saudi Prince Mohammed bin Salman has Western leaders very worried". News. 13 January 2016. Archived from the original on 25 July 2016.
  166. Robertson, Nic (21 June 2018). "Mohammed bin Salman is on a make or break mission". CNN. Archived from the original on 31 August 2018. Retrieved 1 September 2018.
  167. "Yemen crisis: President resigns as rebels tighten hold". BBC. 23 January 2015. Archived from the original on 20 August 2018. Retrieved 1 September 2018.
  168. Carapico, Sheila (25 February 2015). "Yemen on brink as Gulf Co-operation Council initiative fails". BBC. Archived from the original on 31 August 2018. Retrieved 1 September 2018.
  169. Raghavan, Sudarsan (29 July 2018). "US allies have killed thousands of Yemenis – including 22 at a wedding". The Independent. Archived from the original on 30 July 2018. Retrieved 1 September 2018.
  170. "Saudi Arabia accused of Yemen war crimes as crown prince completes UK visit". The Herald. 10 March 2018. Archived from the original on 20 October 2018. Retrieved 20 October 2018.
  171. MacAskill, Ewen (27 January 2016). "UN report into Saudi-led strikes in Yemen raises questions over UK role". The Guardian. Archived from the original on 2 February 2016.
  172. "Airstrikes hit Médecins Sans Frontières hospital in Yemen Archived 29 December 2016 at the Wayback Machine". The Guardian. 27 October 2015.
  173. Paul, Katie; El Gamal, Rania (19 December 2017). "Saudi Arabia intercepts Houthi missile fired toward Riyadh; no reported casualties". Reuters. Riyadh. Archived from the original on 1 October 2018. Retrieved 3 October 2018.
  174. "Over 130 civilians killed in 11 days in airstrikes in Yemen, reports UN rights office". United Nations. 19 December 2017. Archived from the original on 27 September 2018. Retrieved 3 October 2018.
  175. Vonberg, Judith; Elbagir, Nima (28 August 2018). "All sides in Yemen conflict could be guilty of war crimes, says UN". CNN. Archived from the original on 30 August 2018. Retrieved 1 September 2018.
  176. 1 2 Kristof, Nicholas (31 August 2017). "The Photos the U.S. and Saudi Arabia Don't Want You to See". The New York Times. Archived from the original on 24 May 2018. Retrieved 24 May 2018.
  177. Kara Fox. "85,000 children under 5 may have died of starvation in Yemen war". CNN. Archived from the original on 7 June 2019. Retrieved 3 July 2019.
  178. Wintour, Patrick (16 November 2017). "Saudis must lift Yemen blockade or 'untold' thousands will die, UN agencies warn". The Guardian. Archived from the original on 23 December 2017. Retrieved 20 October 2018.
  179. "50,000 children in Yemen have died of starvation and disease so far this year, monitoring group says". Chicago Tribune. Associated Press. 16 November 2017. Archived from the original on 1 November 2018. Retrieved 20 October 2018.
  180. "Is Intentional Starvation the Future of War?". The New Yorker. 11 July 2018. Archived from the original on 20 October 2018. Retrieved 20 October 2018.
  181. "In blocking arms to Yemen, Saudi Arabia squeezes a starving population". Reuters. 11 October 2017. Archived from the original on 15 December 2018. Retrieved 20 October 2018.
  182. Summers, Hannah (15 October 2018). "Yemen on brink of 'world's worst famine in 100 years' if war continues". The Guardian. Archived from the original on 21 October 2018. Retrieved 21 October 2018.
  183. "UN receives nearly $1 billion from Saudi Arabia and UAE for humanitarian response to Yemen crisis". United Nations. 28 March 2018. Archived from the original on 29 March 2018. Retrieved 30 March 2018.
  184. "Saudi Arabia says it intercepts Houthi missile fired toward Riyadh, no reported damage". CNBC. 19 December 2017. Archived from the original on 3 September 2018. Retrieved 22 October 2018.
  185. Emily Thornberry (7 March 2018). "Britain's red carpet for the Saudi ruler is shameless". The Guardian. Archived from the original on 23 November 2018. Retrieved 22 October 2018.
  186. "Menendez and Graham announce resolution on Saudi Arabia in wake of Khashoggi killing". Fox News Channel. 12 December 2018. Archived from the original on 13 December 2018. Retrieved 13 December 2018.
  187. 1 2 "Jeremy Hunt and Boris Johnson accused of 'central role' in arming Saudi Arabia as UK's relationship with Riyadh reaches crossroads". iNews. 5 July 2019. Archived from the original on 15 July 2019. Retrieved 15 July 2019.
  188. "Jeremy Hunt's bid for prime minister is being funded by a close ally of Saudi prince Mohammed Bin Salman". Business Insider. 5 July 2019. Archived from the original on 14 August 2021. Retrieved 15 July 2019.
  189. Butler, Desmond (7 May 2015). "Turkey Officials Confirm Pact With Saudi Arabia To Help Rebels Fighting Syria's Assad". Huffington Post. AP. Archived from the original on 8 May 2015.
  190. "Saudi strongman 'encouraged' Russia intervention in Syria, lawsuit claims". The Guardian. Archived from the original on 16 August 2020. Retrieved 1 August 2020.
  191. "Arms supplied by U.S., Saudi ended up with Islamic State, researchers say". Reuters. 14 December 2017. Archived from the original on 14 December 2017. Retrieved 14 December 2017.
  192. "Saudi Crown Prince Says U.S. Troops Should Stay in Syria". Time. Archived from the original on 11 October 2018. Retrieved 30 March 2018.
  193. "Analysis: How important is Syria's return to the Arab League?". Al Jazeera. 19 May 2023.
  194. "Syria's Assad wins warm welcome at Arab summit after years of isolation". Reuters. 19 May 2023.
  195. "Who's Speaking Out Against Trump's Jerusalem Move". J Street. 12 December 2017. Archived from the original on 7 July 2019. Retrieved 18 September 2019.
  196. "Saudi crown prince says Israelis have right to their own land". Reuters. 3 April 2018. Archived from the original on 14 June 2018. Retrieved 25 June 2018.
  197. "Saudi crown prince recognizes Israel's right to exist, talks up future ties". The Times of Israel. Archived from the original on 25 June 2018. Retrieved 25 June 2018.
  198. Goldberg, Jeffrey (2 April 2018). "Saudi Crown Prince: Iran's Supreme Leader 'Makes Hitler Look Good". The Atlantic. Archived from the original on 24 June 2018. Retrieved 25 June 2018.
  199. "UN condemns Israeli PM's West Bank annexation plans". CBC News. 11 September 2019. Archived from the original on 11 September 2019. Retrieved 18 September 2019.
  200. Nissenbaum, Dion; Lieber, Dov; Kalin, Stephen (9 March 2023). "Saudi Arabia Seeks U.S. Security Pledges, Nuclear Help for Peace With Israel". The Wall Street Journal. Retrieved 16 May 2023.
  201. "Saudi Crown Prince MBS says Israel normalisation getting 'closer'".
  202. "Saudi Arabia pauses normalisation talks with Israel amid ongoing war with Hamas". 14 October 2023.
  203. "Saudi Crown Prince calls on all countries to stop arms exports to Israel". Al Arabiya. 21 November 2023.
  204. 1 2 Klippenstein, Ken (23 February 2022). "Saudi-Russia Collusion Is Driving Up Gas Prices — and Worsening Ukraine Crisis". The Intercept. Archived from the original on 23 February 2022. Retrieved 25 February 2022.
  205. Kerr, Simeon; Al-Atrush, Samer; England, Andrew (28 February 2022). "Gulf states' neutrality on Ukraine reflect deeper Russian ties". Financial Times. Archived from the original on 2 January 2020. Retrieved 28 February 2022.
  206. "UN Security Council extends Yemen arms embargo to all Houthis". Al Jazeera. 28 February 2022. Archived from the original on 28 February 2022.
  207. Nichols, Michelle (28 February 2022). "U.N. arms embargo imposed on Yemen's Houthis amid vote questions". Reuters. Archived from the original on 13 May 2022.
  208. "How could the Ukraine crisis affect the Middle East? | DW | 16.02.2022". Deutsche Welle. Archived from the original on 16 February 2022. Retrieved 25 February 2022.
  209. Chulov, Martin (5 October 2022). "Putin and the prince: fears in west as Russia and Saudi Arabia deepen ties". The Guardian. Archived from the original on 8 October 2022.
  210. "Putin and Saudi crown prince discuss OPEC+ cooperation to maintain price stability -Kremlin". Reuters. 30 January 2023. Archived from the original on 31 January 2023.
  211. Sabbagh, Dan (22 September 2022). "Aiden Aslin among 10 international 'prisoners of war' released by Russian authorities". The Guardian. Archived from the original on 24 September 2022.
  212. "The Concept of the Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation". Permanent Mission of the Russian Federation to the European Union. 1 March 2023. Archived from the original on 10 April 2023.
  213. "Iran dismisses Saudi talk of 'triangle of evil' as 'childish'". Al-Monitor. 8 March 2018. Archived from the original on 11 March 2018. Retrieved 20 December 2018.
  214. 1 2 "Saudi prince says Turkey part of 'triangle of evil': Egyptian media". Reuters. 7 March 2018. Archived from the original on 20 December 2018. Retrieved 20 December 2018.
  215. "Saudi crown prince visits Turkey as relations thaw after Khashoggi murder". The Guardian. 22 June 2022.
  216. Al-Atrush, Samer; Samson, Adam; England, Andrew (18 July 2023). "Saudi Arabia agrees deal to buy Turkish drones". Financial Times. Retrieved 15 August 2023.
  217. 1 2 Mazzetti, Mark; Bergman, Ronen; Kirkpatrick, David D. (19 May 2018). "Trump Jr. and Other Aides Met With Gulf Emissary Offering Help to Win Election". The New York Times. ISSN 0362-4331. Archived from the original on 3 February 2020. Retrieved 16 September 2022.
  218. "Trump Jr. met Gulf princes' emissary in 2016 who offered campaign help". Reuters. 19 May 2018. Archived from the original on 3 April 2019. Retrieved 16 September 2022.
  219. 1 2 "The Wooing of Jared Kushner: How the Saudis Got a Friend in the White House". The New York Times. 8 December 2018. Archived from the original on 4 April 2019. Retrieved 4 April 2019.
  220. "Saudi Arabia Has High Hopes for Trump". The Atlantic. 20 May 2017. Archived from the original on 4 April 2019. Retrieved 4 April 2019.
  221. "'We put our man on top', Trump said on MBS, book claims". Al-Jazeera. 5 January 2018. Archived from the original on 4 April 2019. Retrieved 4 April 2019.
  222. "Donald Trump tweets support for blockade imposed on Qatar". The Guardian. 6 June 2017. Archived from the original on 2 February 2021. Retrieved 4 April 2019.
  223. "Qatar blockade exposes rifts in Trump administration's 'peculiar' foreign policy". The Guardian. 24 June 2017. Archived from the original on 4 April 2019. Retrieved 4 April 2019.
  224. "Qatar Charm Offensive Appears to Have Paid Off, U.S. Officials Say". The New York Times. 9 April 2018. Archived from the original on 4 April 2019. Retrieved 4 April 2019.
  225. "Saudi Crown Prince Boasted That Jared Kushner Was "In His Pocket"". The Intercept. 21 March 2018. Archived from the original on 4 April 2019. Retrieved 4 April 2019.
  226. "Trump praises Saudi purge, voices confidence in King, Crown Prince". Reuters. 7 November 2017. Archived from the original on 4 April 2019. Retrieved 4 April 2019.
  227. "Trump says US stands with Saudi Arabia despite journalist Khashoggi's killing". CNBC. 20 November 2018. Archived from the original on 4 April 2019. Retrieved 4 April 2019.
  228. 1 2 3 4 Cloud, Stephen Kalin, Summer Said and David S. (19 April 2022). "How U.S.-Saudi Relations Reached the Breaking Point". The Wall Street Journal. ISSN 0099-9660. Archived from the original on 29 August 2022. Retrieved 20 April 2022.{{cite news}}: CS1 maint: multiple names: authors list (link)
  229. Gardner, Frank (14 July 2021). "Khashoggi murder: US softens towards Saudi leader". BBC News. Archived from the original on 17 November 2021. Retrieved 17 November 2021.
  230. Lonas, Lexi (8 March 2022). "Saudi, UAE leaders declined calls with Biden amid Ukraine conflict: report". The Hill. Archived from the original on 13 March 2022. Retrieved 22 May 2022.
  231. "Mohammed bin Salman Has Leverage on Biden—and Is Using It". Foreign Policy. 24 March 2022. Archived from the original on 14 May 2022. Retrieved 22 May 2022.
  232. "Inside the Secret Meeting Between the CIA Director and Saudi Crown Prince". The Intercept. 13 May 2022. Archived from the original on 11 October 2022. Retrieved 22 May 2022.
  233. "US accuses Opec+ of aligning with Russia, Gulf states deny politics at play: report". Middle East Eye. 5 October 2022. Archived from the original on 20 October 2022. Retrieved 21 October 2022.
  234. "Saudi oil power play bruises U.S. ties but won't break them". Reuters. 13 October 2022.
  235. Emmons, Alex (1 August 2018). "Saudi Arabia planned to invade Qatar last summer. Rex Tillerson's efforts to stop it may have cost him his job". The Intercept. Archived from the original on 13 October 2018. Retrieved 15 October 2018.
  236. "Gulf states agree to end three year Qatar blockade". Independent. 5 January 2021. Archived from the original on 8 January 2021. Retrieved 5 January 2021.
  237. Jon Gambrell (5 August 2018). "Saudi Arabia expels Canadian ambassador, freezes trade in human rights dispute". Toronto Star. Associated Press. Archived from the original on 24 August 2018. Retrieved 20 October 2018.
  238. "'We don't have a single friend': Canada's Saudi spat reveals country is alone". The Guardian. 11 August 2018. Archived from the original on 22 October 2018. Retrieved 20 October 2018.
  239. "U.S. refuses to back Canada in Saudi Arabia dispute". The Globe and Mail. 7 August 2018. Archived from the original on 30 October 2018. Retrieved 20 October 2018.
  240. "On Saudi Arabia, Canada's stance is principled — but conflicted". Toronto Star. 10 August 2018. Archived from the original on 10 August 2018. Retrieved 11 August 2018.
  241. Wicary, Stephen (24 May 2023). "Canada, Saudi Arabia Restore Ties Broken Before Khashoggi Crisis". Bloomberg News. Retrieved 25 May 2023.
  242. "Turkey 'has recording proving Saudi murder'". BBC News. 12 October 2018. Archived from the original on 12 October 2018. Retrieved 12 October 2018.
  243. "Jamal Khashoggi: Turkey says journalist was murdered in Saudi consulate". BBC News. 7 October 2018. Archived from the original on 9 October 2018. Retrieved 7 October 2018.
  244. Harris, Shane (10 October 2018). "Crown prince sought to lure Khashoggi back to Saudi Arabia and detain him, U.S. intercepts show". The Washington Post. Archived from the original on 15 October 2018. Retrieved 15 October 2018.
  245. "EXCLUSIVE: Seven of Mohammed's bodyguards among Khashoggi suspects". Middle East Eye. 17 October 2018. Archived from the original on 18 October 2018.
  246. Sawers, John (19 October 2018). "Evidence suggests crown prince ordered Khashoggi killing, says ex-MI6 chief". The Guardian. Archived from the original on 20 October 2018. Retrieved 20 October 2018.
  247. Rutenberg, Jim (14 October 2018). "Reality Breaks Up a Saudi Prince Charming's Media Narrative". The New York Times. Archived from the original on 21 October 2018. Retrieved 20 October 2018.
  248. Lhatoo, Yonden (20 October 2018). "What's the life of Saudi journalist Jamal Khashoggi to US President Donald Trump? Nothing". South China Morning Post. Archived from the original on 20 October 2018. Retrieved 20 October 2018.
  249. "Jamal Khashoggi: Trump says if anyone knew about plot to kill journalist 'it would be Mohammed bin Salman'". The Independent. Archived from the original on 24 October 2018. Retrieved 24 October 2018.
  250. "Who is Ahmed al-Asiri, the sacked Saudi intelligence chief?". Al Jazeera. 19 October 2018. Archived from the original on 8 November 2018. Retrieved 7 November 2018.
  251. Benner, Katie; Mazzetti, Mark; Hubbard, Ben; Isaac, Mike (20 October 2018). "Saudis' Image Makers: A Troll Army and a Twitter Insider". The New York Times. Archived from the original on 6 November 2018. Retrieved 7 November 2018.
  252. Jacinto, Leela (25 October 2018). "Saudi 'Mr. Hashtag' becomes fall guy in Khashoggi case, but is he really down?". France 24. Archived from the original on 7 November 2018. Retrieved 7 November 2018.
  253. Barnes, Julian E.; Schmitt, Eric; Kirkpatrick, David D. (12 November 2018). "'Tell Your Boss': Recording Is Seen to Link Saudi Crown Prince More Strongly to Khashoggi Killing". The New York Times. Archived from the original on 12 November 2018. Retrieved 12 November 2018.
  254. "Saudis shield crown prince as death penalty sought over Khashoggi murder". The Guardian. 15 November 2018. Archived from the original on 15 November 2018. Retrieved 15 November 2018.
  255. "Saudi prosecutor seeks death penalty for Khashoggi murder, says journalist was killed by sedative overdose". CNN. 15 November 2018. Archived from the original on 15 November 2018. Retrieved 15 November 2018.
  256. Harris, Shane; Miller, Greg; Dawsey, Josh (16 November 2018). "CIA concludes Saudi crown prince ordered Jamal Khashoggi's assassination". The Washington Post. Archived from the original on 17 November 2018. Retrieved 17 November 2018.
  257. "Khashoggi murder: Saudi crown prince crazy, says US senator". BBC News. 4 December 2018. Archived from the original on 4 December 2018. Retrieved 4 December 2018.
  258. "Saudi crown prince 'ordered, monitored' killing of Khashoggi, Corker says". CNN. 4 December 2018. Archived from the original on 5 December 2018. Retrieved 5 December 2018.
  259. "U.N. rights boss Bachelet seeks international inquiry into Khashoggi murder". Reuters. Archived from the original on 13 January 2019. Retrieved 5 December 2018.
  260. "Saudi Prince Slams CIA Assessment Report on Khashoggi Murder". Bloomberg. 24 November 2018. Archived from the original on 28 November 2018. Retrieved 5 December 2018.
  261. "U.S. senators say Saudi crown prince has gone 'full gangster'". Reuters. 6 March 2019. Archived from the original on 6 March 2019. Retrieved 6 March 2019.
  262. Gaouette, Nicole; Conte, Michael (7 March 2019). "Saudi prince has gone 'full gangster,' says Rubio, as lawmakers decry kingdom's abuses". CNN. Archived from the original on 7 March 2019. Retrieved 7 March 2019.
  263. "'Credible evidence' ties Saudi prince to Khashoggi murder, UN expert says". Times of Israel. 19 June 2019. Archived from the original on 19 June 2019.
  264. Callamard, Agnes. "Annex to the Report of the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions: Investigation into the unlawful death of Mr. Jamal Khashoggi" (PDF). United Nations Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner (OHCHR). Archived (PDF) from the original on 30 April 2020. Retrieved 26 February 2021.
  265. "Guardian told it was target of Saudi hacking unit after Khashoggi killing". The Guardian. 19 June 2019. Archived from the original on 19 June 2019. Retrieved 19 June 2019.
  266. Malsin, Jared (26 September 2019). "Saudi Crown Prince Says Khashoggi Was Killed 'Under My Watch'". The Wall Street Journal. Archived from the original on 27 September 2019. Retrieved 28 September 2019.
  267. "Mohammad Bin Salman: Jamal Khashoggi murder 'happened under my watch,' Saudi crown prince tells PBS". The Times of India. Reuters. 26 September 2010. Archived from the original on 26 September 2019. Retrieved 26 September 2019.
  268. "Mohammed bin Salman accepts responsibility for Jamal Khashoggi murder". Salon. 26 September 2019. Archived from the original on 28 September 2019. Retrieved 28 September 2019.
  269. Christina Maxouris. "Mohammed bin Salman denies personal involvement in Khashoggi killing in '60 Minutes' interview but says it was carried out by Saudi officials". CNN.com. Archived from the original on 1 October 2019. Retrieved 30 September 2019.
  270. "Assessing the Saudi Government's Role in the Killing of Jamal Khashoggi" (PDF). Office of the Director of National Intelligence. 11 February 2021. Archived from the original (PDF) on 26 February 2021.
  271. "U.S. should sanction MbS, lead bid for justice in Khashoggi murder – U.N. expert". Reuters. 26 February 2021. Archived from the original on 26 February 2021. Retrieved 26 February 2021. Agnes Callamard, U.N. investigator for summary executions, in a statement posted on Twitter after a declassified U.S. intelligence assessment was released, urged the U.S. government to impose sanctions on Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman "targeting his personal assets but also his international engagements."
  272. "Mohammed bin Salman: Saudi leader given US immunity over Khashoggi killing". BBC News. 18 November 2022. Archived from the original on 18 November 2022. Retrieved 18 November 2022.
  273. Kirchgaessner, Stephanie (3 June 2020). "'Sarah and Omar have disappeared': children of ex-Saudi official missing since March". The Guardian. Archived from the original on 7 July 2020. Retrieved 18 August 2020.
  274. "Senators Press Trump to Help Free Children of Saudi Ex-Official". Bloomberg.com. 9 July 2020. Archived from the original on 19 July 2020. Retrieved 9 July 2020.
  275. "Saudi Arabia Wants Its Fugitive Spymaster Back". The Wall Street Journal. 17 July 2020. Archived from the original on 18 July 2020. Retrieved 17 July 2020.
  276. Ignatius, David. "The Saudi crown prince, Interpol and an alleged assassination plot". The Washington Post. No. 7 August 2020. Archived from the original on 7 August 2020. Retrieved 7 August 2020.
  277. "Aljabri Complaint: Case 1:20-cv-02146-TJK Document 1" (PDF). Court House News. Archived (PDF) from the original on 16 August 2020. Retrieved 7 August 2020.
  278. "US court issues summons for Saudi Arabia's Mohammed bin Salman". Al Jazeera. Archived from the original on 10 August 2020. Retrieved 10 August 2020.
  279. Haroun, Azmi. "Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman got served a lawsuit via WhatsApp. Court documents show that he received and read the message". Business Insider. Archived from the original on 4 November 2020. Retrieved 3 November 2020.
  280. "Exhibit A filled with US Court" (PDF). DocumentCloud (PDF). 29 October 2020. Archived (PDF) from the original on 30 August 2021. Retrieved 3 November 2020.
  281. Bartenstein, Ben; Westall, Sylvia (6 December 2022). "Saudis Roll Out Red Carpet for Xi Jinping as Gulf Looks Past US". Bloomberg News. Archived from the original on 3 May 2023. Retrieved 10 March 2023.
  282. Ensor, Josie (22 February 2019). "Saudi crown prince defends China's right to put Uighur Muslims in concentration camps". The Daily Telegraph. Archived from the original on 14 November 2019. Retrieved 10 March 2019.
  283. "Saudi Arabia's Mohammed bin Salman Defends China's Use of Concentration Camps for Muslims During Visit to Beijing". Newsweek. 22 February 2019. Archived from the original on 10 October 2019. Retrieved 10 March 2019.
  284. "Saudi crown prince defended China's imprisonment of a million Muslims in internment camps, giving Xi Jinping a reason to continue his 'precursors to genocide'". Business Insider. 23 February 2019. Archived from the original on 14 September 2019. Retrieved 10 March 2019.
  285. "Saudi crown prince defends China's right to fight 'terrorism'". al-Jazeera. 23 February 2019. Archived from the original on 19 June 2019. Retrieved 10 March 2019.
  286. Bartenstein, Westall, Ben, Sylvia (6 December 2022). "Saudis Roll Out Red Carpet for Xi Jinping as Gulf Looks Past US". Bloomberg News. Archived from the original on 3 May 2023.{{cite news}}: CS1 maint: multiple names: authors list (link)
  287. Al Hamawi, Lama (8 December 2022). "How China became Saudi Arabia's top trading partner, revived ancient Silk Road". Arab News. Archived from the original on 1 January 2023.
  288. Salami, Mohammad (3 April 2022). "Saudi-Chinese Cooperation in the Production of Ballistic Missiles". Archived from the original on 1 January 2023.
  289. Malsin, Said, P. Strobel, Jared, Summer, Warren. "Saudis Begin Making Ballistic Missiles With Chinese Help: The effort is raising new worries about a Middle East arms race". The Wall Street Journal. Archived from the original on 26 December 2021.{{cite news}}: CS1 maint: multiple names: authors list (link)
  290. 1 2 Gambrell, John (10 December 2022). "China's Xi vows to buy more Mideast oil as US focus wanes". Associated Press. Retrieved 11 December 2022.
  291. Kalin, Stephen (8 December 2022). "China's Xi Jinping Deepens Saudi Ties in Pivotal Trip". The Wall Street Journal. Retrieved 11 December 2022.
  292. "Factbox: Saudi-China energy, trade and investment ties". Reuters. 9 December 2022. Archived from the original on 1 January 2023.
  293. El Dahan, El Yaakoubi, Maha, Aziz (10 December 2022). "China's Xi calls for oil trade in yuan at Gulf summit in Riyadh". Reuters. Archived from the original on 1 January 2023.{{cite news}}: CS1 maint: multiple names: authors list (link)
  294. "Saudi Arabia, China, and defense deals during Zhuhai Air Show 2022". 24 November 2022. Archived from the original on 5 May 2023.
  295. "Saudi gets huge arms deal from China worth $4 billion". Leaders. 29 November 2022. Archived from the original on 31 January 2023.
  296. Kalin, Stephen; Faucon, Benoit (10 March 2023). "Saudi Arabia, Iran Restore Relations in Deal Brokered by China". The Wall Street Journal. Retrieved 10 March 2023.
  297. 1 2 Bond, Shannon (31 March 2019). "Saudis hacked Amazon CEO's phone, says Bezos security chief". Financial Times. Archived from the original on 31 March 2019. Retrieved 2 March 2021.
  298. 1 2 Zetter, Kim; Cox, Joseph (23 January 2020). "Here Is the Technical Report Suggesting Saudi Arabia's Prince Hacked Jeff Bezos' Phone". Motherboard. Archived from the original on 28 June 2020. Retrieved 2 March 2021.
  299. O'Neill, Patrick (22 January 2020). "UN calls for investigation of Saudis allegedly hacking Jeff Bezos". MIT Technology Review. Archived from the original on 12 May 2020. Retrieved 2 March 2021.
  300. Bowman, Verity (22 January 2020). "Jeff Bezos phone hacking: UN calls for investigation after Saudi Crown Prince implicated". The Daily Telegraph. Archived from the original on 17 March 2020. Retrieved 2 March 2021.
  301. "How real is Saudi Arabia's interest in renewable energy?". The Guardian. 12 October 2019. Archived from the original on 9 October 2021. Retrieved 9 October 2021.
  302. "Poverty, climate, regional stability on agenda as Saudi crown prince visits France". Associated Press. 16 June 2023.
  303. Al Ahmed, Ali (16 March 2018). "Reports of Saudi Crown Prince's Domestic Violence Emerge". GulfInstitute.org. Archived from the original on 27 November 2020. Retrieved 17 November 2020.
  304. Langer, Marko (5 November 2017). "Saudi Arabia's Mohammed bin Salman: Reformer and hard-liner". Deutsche Welle. Archived from the original on 17 January 2018. Retrieved 16 January 2018 via dw.com.
  305. Kurtz, Steve (15 March 2018). "Mohammed bin Salman – the reformer behind Saudi Arabia's shakeup". FoxNews.com. Archived from the original on 25 March 2020. Retrieved 27 May 2019.
  306. Pelham, Nicolas (28 July 2022). "MBS: despot in the desert". The Economist. ISSN 0013-0613. Archived from the original on 28 July 2022. Retrieved 28 July 2022.
  307. "A 30-year-old Saudi prince could jump-start the kingdom – or drive it off a cliff". The Washington Post. 28 June 2016. Archived from the original on 29 June 2016.
  308. 1 2 Mazzetti, Mark; Hubbard, Ben (15 October 2016). "Rise of Saudi Prince Shatters Decades of Royal Tradition". The New York Times. Archived from the original on 1 February 2017.
  309. Kulish, Nicholas; Forsythe, Michael (16 December 2017). "World's Most Expensive Home? Another Bauble for a Saudi Prince". The New York Times. Archived from the original on 21 March 2018. Retrieved 28 March 2018.
  310. Mulholland, Rory (16 December 2017). "Pro-austerity Saudi prince buys world's most expensive home". The Telegraph. Archived from the original on 24 May 2019. Retrieved 24 May 2019.
  311. "The World's Most Powerful People". Forbes. Retrieved 15 August 2023.
  312. "Who Is Mohammed Bin Salman Bin Abdulaziz Al Saud And What Is His Total Net Worth?". zeenews.india.com. Retrieved 15 August 2023.
  313. Harris, Shane; Crow, Kelly; Said, Summer (7 December 2017). "Saudi Arabia's Crown Prince Identified as Buyer of Record-Breaking da Vinci". The Wall Street Journal. Archived from the original on 7 December 2017. Retrieved 7 December 2017.
  314. Meixler, Eli (7 December 2017). "The Mystery Buyer of a $450 Million Leonardo da Vinci Painting Was a Saudi Prince". Fortune. Archived from the original on 7 December 2017. Retrieved 7 December 2017.
  315. Kirkpatrick, David D. (6 December 2017). "Mystery Buyer of $450 Million 'Salvator Mundi' Was a Saudi Prince". The New York Times. Archived from the original on 17 April 2018. Retrieved 30 March 2018.
  316. "Mystery buyer of famed da Vinci is Saudi prince: Report". CBS News. 6 December 2017. Archived from the original on 31 March 2018. Retrieved 30 March 2018.
  317. "Embassy Statement on Art Work Purchase". saudiembassy.net. Embassy of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. Archived from the original on 28 March 2018. Retrieved 28 March 2018.
  318. "Louvre Abu Dhabi: UAE has acquired Da Vinci's Salvator Mundi". The National. 9 December 2017. Archived from the original on 28 March 2018. Retrieved 28 March 2018.
  319. "The $450 million question: Where is Leonardo da Vinci's 'Salvator Mundi'?". CNN.com. Archived from the original on 8 July 2019. Retrieved 8 July 2019.
  320. Krause, Amanda (12 June 2019). "The $450 million Leonardo da Vinci painting that's said to be sitting on a Saudi prince's yacht was once bought for just $1,000. Here's how it took over the art world". Insider.com. Archived from the original on 15 February 2023. Retrieved 3 March 2022.
  321. Sharma, Neha Tandon (28 April 2022). "Saudi prince MBS bought this $400 million megayacht from a Russian Oligarch and immediately kicked him out". Luxury launches. Archived from the original on 28 April 2022. Retrieved 29 April 2022. The 439 feet long vessel has two helipads, a submarine, and a nightclub. The royal has also hung a $450M painting in it.
  322. "Saudi's Deputy Crown Prince meets Facebook founder Mark Zuckerberg". Al Arabiya. 22 June 2016. Archived from the original on 7 February 2017. Retrieved 23 April 2017.
  323. "Saudi Arabia's Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman toured Hollywood, Harvard and Silicon Valley on US visit". The Independent. 7 April 2018. Archived from the original on 23 May 2018.
  324. "MBS meets AIPAC, anti-BDS leaders during US visit". Al Jazeera. 29 March 2018. Archived from the original on 23 May 2018.
  325. "Trump praises arms sales as he meets Saudi crown prince". Financial Times. 20 March 2018. Archived from the original on 24 June 2018. Retrieved 27 June 2018.
  326. "Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed Bin Salman meets Theresa May at Chequers on day two of UK state visit". The Independent. 8 March 2018. Archived from the original on 8 March 2018.
  327. "Prince Mohammed books out hotel to dine with Murdoch". The Sydney Morning Herald. 4 April 2018. Archived from the original on 23 May 2018.
  328. "Coronavirus: Saudi Arabia's Crown Prince gets COVID-19 vaccine". Al Arabiya. 25 December 2020. Archived from the original on 25 December 2020. Retrieved 25 December 2020.
  329. Weiss, Miles (17 February 2021). "Saudi Wealth Fund Made $3.3 Billion Bet on Video-Game Makers". Bloomberg.com. Archived from the original on 19 February 2021. Retrieved 19 February 2021.
  330. "Crown Prince receives honorary doctorate in Thailand". Saudi Gazette. 19 November 2022. Archived from the original on 19 November 2022. Retrieved 20 November 2022.
  331. Saudi Gazette [@saudi_gazette] (25 November 2018). "King Hamad of #Bahrain decorates the #Saudi #CrownPrince #MuhammadBinSalman with the Order of Sheikh Isa Bin Salman Al-Khalifa of the Exceptional Class" (Tweet). Retrieved 8 March 2020 via Twitter.
  332. "Tunisie: Mohamed Ben Salmane honoré au Palais de Carthage". directinfo.webmanagercenter.com. 28 November 2018. Archived from the original on 26 February 2019. Retrieved 4 May 2019.
  333. "President of Pakistan Dr Arif Alvi confers Nishan-e-Pakistan on Saudi Crown Prince Mohammad bin Salman". Express Tribune. 18 February 2019. Archived from the original on 12 August 2019. Retrieved 18 February 2019.
  334. "His Majesty bestows Oman Civil Order on HRH Prince Mohammed bin Salman". Times of Oman. Archived from the original on 7 December 2021. Retrieved 7 December 2021.
  335. Bashir, Hassan (7 December 2021). "Mohamed bin Zayed, Mohamed bin Salman review bilateral ties, regional issues". Emirates News Agency. Archived from the original on 29 December 2021. Retrieved 19 September 2022.
  336. "Jordan confers highest civilian award on Crown Prince". Saudi Gazette. 22 June 2022. Archived from the original on 21 June 2022. Retrieved 2 August 2022.
  337. "Zelensky decorates Rama with a state award". KOHA. 30 December 2023. Retrieved 4 January 2024.
This article is issued from Wikipedia. The text is licensed under Creative Commons - Attribution - Sharealike. Additional terms may apply for the media files.