The resource curse, also known as the paradox of plenty or the poverty paradox, is the phenomenon of countries with an abundance of natural resources (such as fossil fuels and certain minerals) having less economic growth, less democracy, or worse development outcomes than countries with fewer natural resources.[1] There are many theories and much academic debate about the reasons for and exceptions to the adverse outcomes. Most experts believe the resource curse is not universal or inevitable but affects certain types of countries or regions under certain conditions.[2][3]

Thesis

As far back as in 1711, The Spectator noted, "It is generally observed, that in countries of the greatest plenty there is the poorest living."[4]

The idea that resources might be more of an economic curse than a blessing emerged in debates in the 1950s and the 1960s about the economic problems of low and middle-income countries.[5] In 1993 Richard Auty first used the term resource curse to describe how countries rich in mineral resources were unable to use that wealth to boost their economies and how, counter-intuitively, these countries had lower economic growth than countries without an abundance of natural resources. An influential 1995 study by Jeffrey Sachs and Andrew Warner found a strong correlation between natural resource abundance and poor economic growth.[6] As of 2016, hundreds of studies have evaluated the effects of resource wealth on a wide range of economic outcomes, and offered many explanations for how, why, and when a resource curse is likely to occur.[2][7] While "the lottery analogy has value but also has shortcomings",[8] many observers have likened the resource curse to the difficulties that befall lottery winners who struggle to manage the complex side-effects of newfound wealth.[9][10][11][12]

As of 2009, scholarship on the resource curse has increasingly shifted towards explaining why some resource-rich countries succeed and why others do not, as opposed to just investigating the average economic effects of resources.[13] Research suggests that the manner in which resource income is spent, the system of government, institutional quality, type of resources, and early vs. late industrialization all have been used to explain successes and failures.[13]

Since 2018, a discussion has emerged concerning the potential for a resource curse related to critical materials for renewable energy.[14] This could concern either countries with abundant renewable energy resources, such as sunshine, or critical materials for renewable energy technologies, such as neodymium, cobalt, or lithium.

Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, who developed selectorate theory, explains that when an autocratic country has lots of natural resources, the ruler's optimal strategy for political survival is to use that revenue to buy the loyalty of critical support groups and oppress the rest of the population by denying them civil liberties and underfunding education and infrastructure. Education, liberty, and infrastructure can make the people more productive, but they also make it easier for them to organize opposition movements. Since the ruler can obtain sufficient revenue from his country's natural resources, he has no need for a productive populace and therefore does not have to risk liberalization. By contrast, in a dictatorship with few natural resources, there may be a necessity for the ruler to liberalize his society somewhat so that the economy can be organized more efficiently, and to invest in education and healthcare to create a skilled and healthy workforce. Bueno de Mesquita cites Ghana and Taiwan as examples of countries where the rulers permitted democratization out of necessity.[15]

Economic effects

The International Monetary Fund classifies 51 countries as "resource-rich," which are defined as countries that derive at least 20% of exports or 20% of fiscal revenue from nonrenewable natural resources; 29 of those countries are low- and lower-middle-income. Common characteristics of the 29 countries include (i) extreme dependence on resource wealth for fiscal revenues, export sales, or both; (ii) low saving rates; (iii) poor growth performance; and (iv) highly volatile resource revenues.[2]

A 2016 meta-study found weak support for the thesis that resource richness adversely affects long-term economic growth.[16] The authors noted that "approximately 40% of empirical papers finding a negative effect, 40% finding no effect, and 20% finding a positive effect" but "overall support for the resource curse hypothesis is weak when potential publication bias and method heterogeneity are taken into account."[16]

A 2018 study showed that most specifications, the impact of oil correlated with regime leaders as well as being between two and three times larger than the marginal effect of increases during the leader's term.[17]

A 2021 meta-analysis of 46 natural experiments found that price increases in oil and lootable minerals increased the likelihood of conflict.[18] A 2011 study in the journal Comparative Political Studies found that "natural resource wealth can be either a "curse" or a "blessing" and that the distinction is conditioned by domestic and international factors, both amenable to change through public policy, namely, human capital formation and economic openness."[19]

Dutch disease

Dutch disease, defined as the relationship between the increase in the economic development of a specific sector (for example natural resources) and a decline in other sectors, first became apparent after the Dutch discovered a huge natural gas field in Groningen in 1959. The Netherlands sought to tap this resource in an attempt to export the gas for profit. However, when the gas began to flow out of the country, its ability to compete against other countries' exports declined. With the Netherlands focusing primarily on the new gas exports, the Dutch currency began to appreciate, which harmed the country's ability to export other products. With the growing gas market and the shrinking export economy, the Netherlands began to experience a recession.

This process has been witnessed in multiple countries around the world including but not limited to Venezuela (oil), Angola (diamonds, oil), the Democratic Republic of the Congo (diamonds), and various other nations. All of these countries are considered "resource-cursed".[20]

Dutch disease makes tradable goods less competitive in world markets. Absent currency manipulation or a currency peg, appreciation of the currency can damage other sectors, leading to a compensating unfavorable balance of trade. As imports become cheaper in all sectors, internal employment suffers and with it the skill infrastructure and manufacturing capabilities of the nation. To compensate for the loss of local employment opportunities, government resources are used to artificially create employment. The increasing national revenue will often also result in higher government spending on health, welfare, military, and public infrastructure, and if this is done corruptly or inefficiently it can be a burden on the economy. While the decrease in the sectors exposed to international competition leaves the economy vulnerable to price changes in the natural resource and consequently even greater dependence on natural resource revenue, this can be managed by active and effective use of hedge instruments such as forwards, futures, options, and swaps; however, if it is managed inefficiently or corruptly, this can lead to disastrous results. Also, since productivity generally increases faster in the manufacturing sector than in the government, the economy will have lower productivity gains than before.

According to a 2020 study, giant resource discoveries led to a substantial appreciation of the real exchange rate.[21]

Revenue volatility

Prices for some natural resources are subject to wide fluctuation; for example, crude oil prices rose from around $3 per barrel to $12/bbl in 1974 following the 1973 oil crisis and fell from $27/bbl to below $10/bbl during the 1986 glut. In the decade from 1998 to 2008, it rose from $10/bbl to $145/bbl, before falling by more than half to $60/bbl over a few months. When government revenues are dominated by inflows from natural resources (for example, 99.3% of Angola's exports came from just oil and diamonds in 2005),[22] the volatility can disrupt government planning and debt service. Abrupt changes in economic realities that result from this often provoke widespread breaking of contracts or curtailment of social programs, eroding the rule of law and popular support. Responsible use of financial hedges can mitigate that risk to some extent.

Susceptibility to that volatility can be increased when governments choose to borrow heavily in foreign currency. Real exchange rate increases, through capital inflows or the "Dutch disease" can make it appear an attractive option by lowering the cost of interest payments on the foreign debt, and they may be considered more creditworthy because of the existence of natural resources. If the resource prices fall, however, the governments' capacity to meet debt repayments will be reduced. For example, many oil-rich countries like Nigeria and Venezuela saw rapid expansions of their debt burdens during the 1970s oil boom; however, when oil prices fell in the 1980s, bankers stopped lending to them and many of them fell into arrears, triggering penalty interest charges that made their debts grow even more. As Venezuelan oil minister and OPEC co-founder Juan Pablo Pérez Alfonzo presciently warned in 1976: "Ten years from now, twenty years from now, you will see, oil will bring us ruin... It is the devil's excrement."[23]

A 2011 study in The Review of Economics and Statistics found that commodities have historically always shown greater price volatility than manufactured goods and that globalization has reduced this volatility.[24] Commodities are a key reason why poor countries are more volatile than rich countries.[24]

Enclave effects

"Oil production generally takes place in an economic enclave, meaning it has few direct effects on the rest of the economy." Michael Ross describes how there are limited economic linkages with other industries in the economy. Consequently, economic diversification may be delayed or neglected by the authorities in light of the high profits that can be obtained from limited natural resources. The attempts at diversification that do occur are often white elephant public works projects which may be misguided or mismanaged. However, even when the authorities attempt diversification in the economy, this is made difficult because resource extraction is vastly more lucrative and out-competes other industries for the best human capital and capital investment. Successful natural-resource-exporting countries often become increasingly dependent on extractive industries over time, further increasing the levels of investment in this industry as it is necessary to maintain their states' finances. There is a lack of investment in other sectors of the economy which is further exacerbated by declines the commodity's price. While resource sectors tend to produce large financial revenues, they often add few jobs to the economy, and tend to operate as enclaves with few forward and backward connections to the rest of the economy.[25]

Human capital

Another possible effect of the resource curse is the crowding out of human capital; countries that rely on natural resource exports may tend to neglect education because they see no immediate need for it. Resource-poor economies like Singapore, Taiwan or South Korea, by contrast, spent enormous efforts on education, and this contributed in part to their economic success (see East Asian Tigers). Other researchers, however, dispute this conclusion; they argue that natural resources generate easily taxable rents that can result in increased spending on education.[26] However, the evidence for whether this increased spending translates to better education outcomes is mixed. A study on Brazil found that oil revenues were associated with sizable increases in education spending, but only with small improvements in education provision.[27] Similarly, an analysis of early-20th century oil booms in Texas and neighboring states found no effect of oil discoveries on student teacher ratios or school attendance. However, oil-rich regions participated more intensively in the Rosenwald schoolbuilding program.[28] A 2021 study found that European regions with a history of coal mining had 10% smaller per-capita GDP than comparable regions. The authors attribute this to lower investments in human capital.[29]

Resource extraction driven economies can be argued to potentially have negative effects on human capital through several different means. "Addictive economies" is a term that was coined by William Freudenburg to describe how resource extraction driven economies can lead to short term economic benefits and sometimes short-sightedness by policymakers. Freudenberg also did research in an effort to understand more of the human capital implications of these types of economies and why results vary so widely across regions and industries. Although there is plentiful research of these types of economies, an understanding of the socioeconomic effects are still murky. Researchers Robert Purdue and Gregory Pavela did research on the West Virginia coal mining economy to further investigate these concerns. Their research includes data from all of West Virginia's 55 counties over a 13-year period of (1997-2009). In this research, significant ecological costs can be noted in the area which, in turn, effect the people negatively. The research also poses the fact that West Virginia ranked last on the Gallup-Healthways Well-Being Index in the years of 2009-2010 in the categories of "physical health", "emotional health", "life evaluation", and "overall well-being". Arguments against the "resource curse" often claim economic benefits from the resource. The Purdue and Pavela case study reflects an example of negative economic impacts of this type of reliance on resource extraction; as even when the price of surface level coal goes up on the market, the poverty levels of people within those communities rises alongside it.[30]

Adverse effects of natural resources on human capital formation might come through several channels. High wages in the resource extraction industry could induce young workers to drop out of school earlier in order to find employment. Evidence for this has been found for coal[31] and fracking booms.[32] In addition, resource booms can lower the wages of teachers relative to other workers, increasing turnover and impairing students' learning.[33]

Incomes and employment

A study on coal mining in Appalachia suggests that "the presence of coal in the Appalachian region has played a significant part in its slow pace of economic development. Our best estimates indicate that an increase of 0.5 units in the ratio of coal revenues to personal income in a county is associated with a 0.7 percentage point decrease in income growth rates. No doubt, coal mining provides opportunities for relatively high-wage employment in the region, but its effect on prosperity appears to be negative in the longer run."[34]

Another example was the Spanish Empire which obtained enormous wealth from its resource-rich colonies in South America in the sixteenth century. The large cash inflows from silver reduced incentives for industrial development in Spain. Innovation and investment in education were therefore neglected, so that the prerequisites for successful future development were given up. Thus, Spain soon lost its economic strength in comparison to other Western countries.[35]

A study of US oil booms found positive effects on local employment and income during booms but found that after the boom, incomes "per capita" decreased, while "unemployment compensation payments increased relative to what they would have been if the boom had not occurred."[36]

Tradeable sectors

A 2019 study found that active mining activity had an adverse impact on the growth of firms in tradeable sectors but a positive impact on the growth of firms in non-tradeable sectors.[37]

Other effects

Natural resources are a source of economic rent which can generate large revenues for those controlling them even in the absence of political stability and wider economic growth. Their existence is a potential source of conflict between factions fighting for a share of the revenue, which may take the form of armed separatist conflicts in regions where the resources are produced or internal conflict between different government ministries or departments for access to budgetary allocations. This tends to erode governments' abilities to function effectively.[38][39]

Even when politically stable, countries whose economies are dominated by resource extraction industries tend to be less democratic and more corrupt.[40][41]

Violence and conflict

A 2019 meta-analysis of 69 studies found "that there is no aggregate relationship between natural resources and conflict."[42] According to a 2017 review study, "while some studies support the link between resource scarcity/abundance and armed conflict, others find no or only weak links."[43] According to one academic study, a country that is otherwise typical but has primary commodity exports around 5% of GDP has a 6% risk of conflict, but when exports are 25% of GDP the chance of conflict rises to 33%.[44] "Ethno-political groups are more likely to resort to rebellion rather than using nonviolent means or becoming terrorists when representing regions rich in oil."[45]

There are several factors behind the relationship between natural resources and armed conflicts.[3] Resource wealth may increase the vulnerability of countries to conflicts by undermining the quality of governance and economic performance[46] (the "resource curse" argument). Secondly, conflicts can occur over the control and exploitation of resources and the allocation of their revenues (the "resource war" argument). Thirdly, access to resource revenues by belligerents can prolong conflicts (the "conflict resource" argument).[47][48] A 2018 study in the Journal of Conflict Resolution found that rebels were particularly likely to be able to prolong their participation in civil wars when they had access to natural resources that they could smuggle.[49]

A 2004 literature review finds that oil makes the onset of war more likely and that lootable resources lengthen existing conflicts.[50] One study finds the mere discovery (as opposed to just the exploitation) of petroleum resources increases the risk of conflict, as oil revenues have the potential to alter the balance of power between regimes and their opponents, rendering bargains in the present obsolete in the future.[51] One study suggests that the rise in mineral prices over the period 1997–2010 contributed to up to 21 percent of the average country-level violence in Africa.[52] Research shows that declining oil prices make oil-rich states less bellicose.[53] Jeff Colgan observed that oil-rich states have a propensity to instigate international conflicts as well as to be the targets of them, which he referred to as "petro-aggression".[54][55] Arguable examples include Iraq's invasions of Iran and Kuwait; Libya's repeated incursions into Chad in the 1970s and 1980s; Iran's long-standing suspicion of Western powers; the United States' relations with Iraq and Iran. It is not clear whether the pattern of petro-aggression found in oil-rich countries also applies to other natural resources besides oil.[54] Some scholars argue that the relationship between oil and interstate war is primarily driven by the case of the Iran–Iraq War and that the overall evidence points in the direction of an oil-peace.[56]

A 2016 study finds that "oil production, oil reserves, oil dependence, and oil exports are associated with a higher risk of initiating conflict while countries enjoying large oil reserves are more frequently the target of military actions."[57] As of 2016, the only six countries whose reported military expenditures exceeded 6 percent of GDP were significant oil producers: Oman, South Sudan, Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Libya, Algeria (data for Syria and North Korea were unavailable).[58] A 2017 study in the American Economic Review found that mining extraction contributed to conflicts in Africa at the local level over the period 1997–2010.[59] A 2017 study in Security Studies found that while there is a statistical relationship between oil wealth and ethnic war, the use of qualitative methods reveals "that oil has rarely been a deep cause of ethnic war."[60]

The emergence of the Sicilian Mafia has been attributed to the resource curse. Early Mafia activity is strongly linked to Sicilian municipalities abundant in sulphur, Sicily's most valuable export commodity.[61] A 2017 study in the Journal of Economic History also links the emergence of the Sicilian Mafia to surging demand for oranges and lemons following the late 18th-century discovery that citrus fruits cured scurvy.[62]

A 2016 study argues that petrostates may be emboldened to act more aggressively because of the inability of allied great powers to punish the petrostate.[63] The great powers have strong incentives not to upset the relationship with its client petrostate ally for both strategic and economic reasons.[63]

A 2017 study found evidence of the resource curse in the American frontier period of the Western United States in the 19th century (the Wild West).[64] The study found, "In places where mineral discoveries occurred before formal institutions were established, there were more homicides per capita historically and the effect has persisted to this day. Today, the share of homicides and assaults explained by the historical circumstances of mineral discoveries is comparable to the effect of education or income."[64]

A 2018 study in the Economic Journal found that "oil price shocks are seen to promote coups in onshore-intensive oil countries, while preventing them in offshore-intensive oil countries."[65] The study argues that states which have onshore oil wealth tend to build up their military to protect the oil, whereas states do not do that for offshore oil wealth.[65] A 2020 study determined that low levels of oil and gas revenue actually increases the likelihood of nonviolent resistance in autocratic countries, despite the general logic of the resource curse.[66]

Democracy and human rights

Research shows that oil wealth lowers levels of democracy and strengthens autocratic rule because political leaders in oil-rich countries refuse democratic development because they will have more to give up from losing power. Similarly, political leaders of oil-rich countries refuse democratic development because the political elite collects the revenues from the oil export and use the money for cementing its political, economic, and social power by controlling government and its bureaucracy,[67][68][69][70] Military spending generally increases with oil wealth and so a military coup, one of the strongest tools in toppling autocracies, is less likely in oil-rich countries since dictators can quell resistance through additional funding.[71] According to Michael Ross, "only one type of resource has been consistently correlated with less democracy and worse institutions: petroleum, which is the key variable in the vast majority of the studies that identify some type of curse."[3] A 2014 meta-analysis confirms the negative impact of oil wealth on democratization.[72] A 2016 study challenges the conventional academic wisdom on the relationship between oil and authoritarianism.[73] A 2022 study found that the resource curse is tied only to easily-extractable oil, not to oil that requires complex extraction.[74] Other forms of resource wealth have also been found to strengthen autocratic rule.[75] A 2016 study found that resource windfalls have no political impact on democracies and deeply entrenched authoritarian regimes, but significantly exacerbate the autocratic nature of moderately authoritarian regimes.[76] A third 2016 study finds that while it is accurate that resource richness has an adverse impact on the prospects of democracy, this relationship has held only since the 1970s.[77] A 2017 study found that the presence of multinational oil companies increases the likelihood of state repression.[78][79] Another 2017 study found that the presence of oil reduced the likelihood that a democracy would be established after the breakdown of an authoritarian regime.[80] A 2018 study found that the relationship between oil and authoritarianism primarily holds after the end of the Cold War. The study argues that without American or Soviet support, resource-poor authoritarian regimes had to democratize, but resource-rich authoritarian regimes resisted domestic pressures to democratize.[81] Prior to the 1970s, oil-producing countries did not have democratization levels that differed from other countries.[82] Oil-abundant authoritarian governments are suggested to earn high levels of income for oil but spend an extremely minimal amount on social expenditures for individuals being ruled and democracies are suggested to do the opposite.[83]

Research by Stephen Haber and Victor Menaldo found that increases in natural resource reliance do not induce authoritarianism but may instead promote democratization.[84][85][86] The authors say that their method rectifies the methodological biases of earlier studies which revolve around random effects: "Numerous sources of bias may be driving the results [of earlier studies on the resource curse], the most serious of which is omitted variable bias induced by unobserved country-specific and time-invariant heterogeneity."[84] In other words, this means that countries might have specific, enduring traits that get left out of the model, which could increase the explanation power of the argument. The authors claim that the chances of this happening are larger when assuming random effects, an assumption that does not allow for what the authors call "unobserved country-specific heterogeneity".[84] The criticisms have themselves been subject to criticism. One study reexamined the Haber-Menaldo analysis by using Haber and Menaldo's own data and statistical models. It reported that their conclusions were only valid for the period before the 1970s, but since about 1980, there has been a pronounced resource curse. Authors Andersen and Ross suggest that oil wealth became a hindrance to democratic transitions only after the transformative events of the 1970s, which enabled the governments of developing countries to capture the oil rents that were previously siphoned off by foreign-owned firms.

There are two ways that oil wealth might negatively affect democratization. The first is that oil strengthens authoritarian regimes, making transitions to democracy less likely.[3] The second is that oil wealth weakens democracies.[3] Research generally supports the first theory but is mixed on the second.[3] A 2019 study found that oil wealth is associated with increases in the level of personalism in dictatorships.[87]

Both pathways might result from the ability of oil-rich states to provide citizens with a combination of generous benefits and low taxes. In many economies that are not resource-dependent, governments tax citizens, who demand efficient and responsive government in return. This bargain establishes a political relationship between rulers and subjects. In countries whose economies are dominated by natural resources, however, rulers don't need to tax their citizens because they have a guaranteed source of income from natural resources.[88][89] Because the country's citizens aren't being taxed, they have less incentive to be watchful with how government spends its money.[90] In addition, those benefiting from mineral resource wealth may perceive an effective and watchful civil service and civil society as a threat to the benefits that they enjoy, and they may take steps to thwart them.[40] As a result, citizens are often poorly served by their rulers,[91] and if the citizens complain, money from the natural resources enables governments to pay for armed forces to keep the citizens in check. It has been argued that rises and falls in the price of petroleum correlate with rises and falls in the implementation of human rights in major oil-producing countries.[92][93]

Corrupt members of national governments may collude with resource extraction companies to override their own laws and ignore objections made by indigenous inhabitants.[94] The United States Senate Foreign Relations Committee report entitled "Petroleum and Poverty Paradox" states that "too often, oil money that should go to a nation's poor ends up in the pockets of the rich, or it may be squandered on grand palaces and massive showcase projects instead of being invested productively."[95] A 2016 study found that mining in Africa substantially increases corruption; an individual within 50 kilometres (31 mi) of a recently opened mine is 33% more likely to have paid a bribe the past year than a person living within 50 km of mines that "will open" in the future.[96] The former also pay bribes for permits more frequently, and perceive their local councilors to be more corrupt.[96] In a study examining the effects of mining on local communities in Africa, researchers concluded that active mining areas are associated with more bribe payments, particularly police bribes.[97] Their findings were consistent with the hypothesis that mining increases corruption.

The Center for Global Development argues that governance in resource-rich states would be improved by the government making universal, transparent, and regular payments of oil revenues to citizens and then attempting to reclaim it through the tax system, which they argue will fuel public demand for the government to be transparent and accountable in its management of natural resource revenues and in the delivery of public services.[98]

One study found that "oil producing states dependent on exports to the USA exhibit lower human rights performance than those exporting to China". The authors argue that this stems from the fact that US relationships with oil producers were formed decades ago, before human rights became part of its foreign policy agenda.[99]

One study found that resource wealth in authoritarian states lowers the probability of adopting freedom of information laws.[100] However, democracies that are resource-rich are more likely than resource-poor democracies to adopt such laws.[100]

One study looking at oil wealth in Colombia found "that when the price of oil rises, legislators affiliated with right-wing paramilitary groups win office more in oil-producing municipalities. Consistent with the use of force to gain power, positive price shocks also induce an increase in paramilitary violence and reduce electoral competition: fewer candidates run for office, and winners are elected with a wider vote margin. Ultimately, fewer centrist legislators are elected to office, and there is diminished representation at the center."[101]

A 2018 study in International Studies Quarterly found that oil wealth was associated with weaker private liberties (freedom of movement, freedom of religion, the right to property, and freedom from forced labor).[102]

Research by Nathan Jensen indicates that countries that have resource wealth are considered to have a greater political risk for foreign direct investors. He argues that this is because leaders in resource-rich countries are less sensitive to being punished in elections if they take actions that adversely affect foreign investors.[103][104]

Distribution

According to a 2017 study, "social forces condition the extent to which oil-rich nations provide vital public services to the population. Although it is often assumed that oil wealth leads to the formation of a distributive state that generously provides services in the areas of water, sanitation, education, health care, or infrastructure... quantitative tests reveal that oil-rich nations who experience demonstrations or riots provide better water and sanitation services than oil-rich nations who do not experience such dissent. Subsequent tests find that oil-rich nations who experience nonviolent, mass-based movements provide better water and sanitation services than those who experience violent, mass-based movements."[105]

Gender inequality

Studies suggest countries with abundant natural resources have higher levels of gender inequality in the areas of wages, labor force participation, violence, and education. Research links gender inequality in the Middle East to resource wealth.[106] According to Michael Ross:

Oil production affects gender relations by reducing the presence of women in the labor force. The failure of women to join the nonagricultural labor force has profound social consequences: it leads to higher fertility rates, less education for girls, and less female influence within the family. It also has far-reaching political consequences: when fewer women work outside the home, they are less likely to exchange information and overcome collective action problems; less likely to mobilize politically, and to lobby for expanded rights; and less likely to gain representation in government. That leaves oil-producing states with atypically strong patriarchal cultures and political institutions.[106]

Ross argues that in oil-rich countries, across the Middle East, Africa, Latin America, and Asia, the need for female labor reduces as export-oriented and female-dominated manufacturing is ousted by Dutch disease effects.[107] This hypothesis has received further support by the analysis of mining booms in Africa.[108] For the United States, the evidence is mixed. State-level comparisons suggest that resource wealth leads to lower levels of female labor force participation, lower turnout and fewer seats held by women in legislatures.[109] On the other hand, a county-level analysis of resource booms in the early 20th century found an overall positive effect of resource wealth on single women's labor force participation.[110]

Research has also linked resource wealth to greater domestic violence,[111] and a gender gap in education.[112][113]

International cooperation

Research finds that the more that states depend on oil exports, the less cooperative they become. They become less likely to join intergovernmental organizations, accept the compulsory jurisdiction of international judicial bodies, and agree to binding arbitration for investment disputes.[114]

Foreign aid

There is an argument in political economy that foreign aid can have the same negative effects in the long run towards development as in the case of the resource curse. The so-called "aid curse" results from giving perverse political incentives to a weak body of civil servants, lowering politicians' accountability towards citizens and decreasing economic pressure thanks to the income of an unearned resource to mitigate economic crisis.[115] When foreign aid represents a major source of revenue to governments, especially in low-income countries, state-building capacity is hindered by undermining responsiveness toward taxpayers or by decreasing the incentive for governments to look for different sources of income or the increase in taxation.[116]

Crime

A 2018 study found that "a 1% increase in the value of oil reserves increases murder by 0.16%, robbery by 0.55% and larceny by 0.18%."[117]

Petro-aggression

Petro-aggression is the tendency for a petrostate to be involved in international conflicts, or to be the target of them. The term was popularized by a 2013 book by Jeff Colgan that found that petrostates (states with 10% or more GDP from petroleum) are 250 percent more likely to instigate international conflicts than a typical country.[118][119]

Examples of oil-rich countries engaging in conflict include:

As of 1999, it remained unclear whether the pattern of petro-aggression found in oil-rich countries also applies to other natural resources besides oil.[122]

Oil-rich states also tend to have a poor record of human rights abuses, as well as revolutionary, revisionist ambitions, making them more conflict-prone. Unfortunately, the lack of data allows no way of discerning high oil prices turning petro-states more aggressive as public thought might deduce. Natural disasters turn out to be far more hurtful to the price of oil than any conflict.

Examples in biology and ecology

Microbial ecology studies have also addressed if resource availability modulates the cooperative or competitive behaviour in bacteria populations. When resources availability is high, bacterial populations become competitive and aggressive with each other, but when environmental resources are low, they tend to be cooperative and mutualistic.[123]

Ecological studies have hypothesised that competitive forces between animals are major in high carrying capacity zones (i.e. near the Equator), where biodiversity is higher, because of natural resources abundance. This abundance or excess of resources, causes animal populations to have R reproduction strategies (many offspring, short gestation, less parental care, and a short time until sexual maturity), so competition is affordable for populations. Also, competition could select populations to have R behaviour in a positive feedback regulation.[124]

Contrary, in low carrying capacity zones (i.e. far from the equator), where environmental conditions are harsh K strategies are common (longer life expectancy, produce relatively fewer offspring and tend to be altricial, requiring extensive care by parents when young) and populations tend to have cooperative or mutualistic behaviors. If populations have a competitive behaviour in hostile environmental conditions they mostly are filtered out (die) by environmental selection, hence populations in hostile conditions are selected to be cooperative.[125]

Mutualism hypothesis was first described while Peter Kropotkin studied the fauna of the Siberian steppe, where environmental conditions are harsh, he found animals tend to cooperate in order to survive.[126] Extreme competition is observed in the Amazonian forest where life requires low energy to find resources (i.e. sunlight for plants) hence life could afford being selected by biotic factors (i.e. competition) rather than abiotic factors.[127]

Criticisms

A 2008 study argues that the curse vanishes when looking not at the relative importance of resource exports in the economy but rather at a different measure: the relative abundance of natural resources in the ground. Using that variable to compare countries, it reports that resource wealth in the ground correlates with slightly higher economic growth and slightly fewer armed conflicts. That a high dependency on resource exports correlates with bad policies and effects is not caused by the large degree of resource exportation. The causation goes in the opposite direction: conflicts and bad policies created the heavy dependence on exports of natural resources. When a country's chaos and economic policies scare off foreign investors and send local entrepreneurs abroad to look for better opportunities, the economy becomes skewed. Factories may close and businesses may flee, but petroleum and precious metals remain for the taking. Resource extraction becomes the "default sector" that still functions after other industries have come to a halt.[128]

A 2008 article by Thad Dunning argues that while resource revenues can promote or strengthen authoritarian regimes, in certain circumstances they can also promote democracy. In countries where natural resource rents are a relatively small portion of the overall economy and the non-resource economy is unequal, resources rents can strengthen democracy by reducing economic elites' fear of ceding power since social welfare policies can be funded with resource rents and not redistribution.[129] Dunning proposes Venezuela's democratic consolidation during the oil boom of the 1970s as a key example of this phenomenon.[130]

A 2011 study argues that previous assumptions that oil abundance is a curse were based on methodologies which failed to take into account cross-country differences and dependencies arising from global shocks, such as changes in technology and the price of oil. The researchers studied data from the World Bank over the period 1980–2006 for 53 countries, covering 85% of world GDP and 81% of world proven oil reserves. They found that oil abundance positively affected both short-term growth and long-term income levels.[131] In a companion paper, using data on 118 countries over the period 1970–2007, they show that it is the volatility in commodity prices, rather than abundance per se, that drives the resource curse paradox.[132][133]

A 2019 article by Indra Overland argues that concerns about a new form of resource curse related to renewable energy are overblown, as renewable energy resources are more evenly distributed around the world than fossil fuel resources.[14] Some countries could still experience windfalls from critical materials for renewable energy technologies, but this depends on how the technologies evolve and which materials they require.

See also

References

  1. ↑ Smith, Benjamin; Waldner, David (2021). Rethinking the Resource Curse. Cambridge University Press. doi:10.1017/9781108776837. ISBN 9781108776837. S2CID 233539488.
  2. 1 2 3 Venables, Anthony J. (February 2016). "Using Natural Resources for Development: Why Has It Proven So Difficult?". Journal of Economic Perspectives. 30 (1): 161–184. doi:10.1257/jep.30.1.161. S2CID 155899373.
  3. 1 2 3 4 5 6 Ross, Michael L. (May 2015). "What Have We Learned about the Resource Curse?". Annual Review of Political Science. 18: 239–259. doi:10.1146/annurev-polisci-052213-040359. S2CID 154308471.
  4. ↑ Steele (19 October 1711). The Spectator. Vol. 200.
  5. ↑ Ross, Michael L. (January 1999). "The Political Economy of the Resource Curse". World Politics. 51 (2): 297–322. doi:10.1017/S0043887100008200. S2CID 154826053.
  6. ↑ Sachs, Jeffrey; Warner, Andrew (1995). "Natural Resource Abundance and Economic Growth". NBER Working Paper (5398). doi:10.3386/w5398.
  7. ↑ Frankel, Jeffrey (2012). "The Natural Resource Curse: A Survey of Diagnoses and Some Prescriptions". HKS Faculty Research Working Paper Series (RWP12-014).
  8. ↑ Bryan, James B.; Castillo, Sarah Lamarche (2012). "Politics, the Preservation of Natural Resource Wealth, and the Funding of a Basic Income Guarantee". In Widerquist, Karl; Howard, Michael W. (eds.). Alaska's Permanent Fund Dividend: Examining its Suitability as a Model. Springer. p. 81. ISBN 978-1137015020.
  9. ↑ "Turning Oil into Cash: How Developing Countries Can Win the Resource Lottery and Avoid the Curse" (Press release). Center for Global Development. 3 June 2015.
  10. ↑ Coll, Steve (2012). Private Empire: ExxonMobil and American Power. Penguin. p. 107. ISBN 978-1101572146.
  11. ↑ Weeks, Jennifer (20 December 2011). "The Resource Curse". CQ Researcher. 5 (24).
  12. ↑ Marron, Donald (15 June 2010). "Afghanistan and the natural resource curse". Christian Science Monitor.
  13. 1 2 Torvik, Ragnar (2009-07-01). "Why do some resource-abundant countries succeed while others do not?". Oxford Review of Economic Policy. 25 (2): 241–256. doi:10.1093/oxrep/grp015. ISSN 0266-903X. S2CID 9992028.
  14. 1 2 Overland, Indra (2019-03-01). "The geopolitics of renewable energy: Debunking four emerging myths". Energy Research & Social Science. 49: 36–40. doi:10.1016/j.erss.2018.10.018. ISSN 2214-6296.
  15. ↑ Bruce Bueno de Mesquita (2011). The Dictator's Handbook
  16. 1 2 Havranek, Tomas; Horvath, Roman; Zeynalov, Ayaz (2016). "Natural Resources and Economic Growth: A Meta-Analysis" (PDF). World Development. 88: 134–151. doi:10.1016/j.worlddev.2016.07.016. hdl:10419/125528. S2CID 53600732.
  17. ↑ Fairs, Matthew (2020). "Oil income and the personalization of autocratic policies". Political Science Research and Methods. 8 (1): 772–779. doi:10.1017/psrm.2019.14. S2CID 159372031.
  18. ↑ Blair, Graeme; Christensen, Darin; Rudkin, Aaron (2021). "Do Commodity Price Shocks Cause Armed Conflict? A Meta-Analysis of Natural Experiments". American Political Science Review. 115 (2): 709–716. doi:10.1017/S0003055420000957. ISSN 0003-0554. S2CID 232422450.
  19. ↑ Kurtz, Marcus J.; Brooks, Sarah M. (2011-03-15). "Conditioning the "Resource Curse": Globalization, Human Capital, and Growth in Oil-Rich Nations". Comparative Political Studies. 44 (6): 747–770. doi:10.1177/0010414011401215. S2CID 153449998.
  20. ↑ O'Neil, Patrick (2004). Essentials of Comparative Politics. New York, London: Norton. p. 147. ISBN 9780393976540.
  21. ↑ Harding, Torfinn; Stefanski, Radoslaw; Toews, Gerhard (2020). "Boom Goes the Price: Giant Resource Discoveries and Real Exchange Rate Appreciation". The Economic Journal. 130 (630): 1715–1728. doi:10.1093/ej/ueaa016.
  22. ↑ "Angola: Selected Issues and Statistical Appendix" (PDF). International Monetary Fund. October 2007. Retrieved 2012-07-26.
  23. ↑ Useem, Jerry (3 February 2003). "'The Devil's Excrement'". Fortune.
  24. 1 2 Jacks, David S.; O'Rourke, Kevin H.; Williamson, Jeffrey G. (2011-07-21). "Commodity Price Volatility and World Market Integration since 1700" (PDF). Review of Economics and Statistics. 93 (3): 800–813. doi:10.1162/rest_a_00091. S2CID 57559662.
  25. ↑ Ross, M.L. (2012) The Oil Curse: How Petroleum Wealth Shapes the Development of Nations, Princeton University Press, Oxford
  26. ↑ Stijns, Jean-Philippe (2006). "Natural resource abundance and human capital accumulation". World Development. 34 (6): 1060–1083. CiteSeerX 10.1.1.197.1418. doi:10.1016/j.worlddev.2005.11.005.
  27. ↑ Caselli, Francesco; Michaels, Guy (2013). "Do Oil Windfalls Improve Living Standards? Evidence from Brazil" (PDF). American Economic Journal: Applied Economics. 5: 208–238. doi:10.1257/app.5.1.208. S2CID 1137888.
  28. ↑ Maurer, Stephan (2019). "Oil discoveries and education provision in the Postbellum South". Economics of Education Review. 73: 101925. doi:10.1016/j.econedurev.2019.101925. S2CID 204420629.
  29. ↑ Esposito, Elena; Abramson, Scott F. (2021-03-04). "The European coal curse". Journal of Economic Growth. 26: 77–112. doi:10.1007/s10887-021-09187-w. ISSN 1573-7020.
  30. ↑ Perdue, R. and G. Pavela. 2012.  Addictive Economies and Coal Dependency: Methods of Extraction and                  Socioeconomic Outcomes in West Virginia 1997-2009. Organization and Environment.                  25(4): 368-384.
  31. ↑ Black, Dan; McKinnish, Terra; Sanders, Seth (2021-06-07). "Tight Labor Markets and the Demand for Education: Evidence from the Coal Boom and Bust". Industrial and Labor Relations Review. 59: 3–16. doi:10.1177/001979390505900101. hdl:10161/2535. S2CID 15175248.
  32. ↑ Cascio, Elizabeth; Narayan, Ayushi (2021-06-07). "Who Needs a Fracking Education? The Educational Response to Low-Skill-Biased Technological Change". Industrial and Labor Relations Review. 75: 56–89. doi:10.1177/0019793920947422. S2CID 225246974.
  33. ↑ Marchand, Joseph; Weber, Jeremy (2021-06-07). "How Local Economic Conditions Affect School Finances, Teacher Quality, and Student Achievement: Evidence from the Texas Shale Boom". Journal of Policy Analysis and Management. 39: 36–63. doi:10.1177/0019793920947422. S2CID 225246974.
  34. ↑ Douglas, Stratford; Walker, Anne (2017). "Coal Mining and the Resource Curse in the Eastern United States" (PDF). Journal of Regional Science. 57 (4): 568–590. Bibcode:2017JRegS..57..568D. doi:10.1111/jors.12310. S2CID 157987462. SSRN 2385560. Archived from the original (PDF) on 2016-06-03.
  35. ↑ Baten, Jörg (2016). A History of the Global Economy. From 1500 to the Present. Cambridge University Press. p. 159. ISBN 9781107507180.
  36. ↑ Jacobsen, Grant D.; Parker, Dominic P. (2014-10-01). "The Economic Aftermath of Resource Booms: Evidence from Boomtowns in the American West". The Economic Journal. 126 (593): 1092–1128. doi:10.1111/ecoj.12173. ISSN 1468-0297. S2CID 14300122.
  37. ↑ De Haas, Ralph; Poelhekke, Steven (2019-01-19). "Mining matters: Natural resource extraction and firm-level constraints". Journal of International Economics. 117: 109–124. doi:10.1016/j.jinteco.2019.01.006. hdl:1871.1/d02ab5b2-d0e5-4b5c-9bc0-aa5b7be1b35d. ISSN 0022-1996. S2CID 53997444.
  38. ↑ Gray, Cheryl W.; Kaufmann, Daniel (1998). "Corruption and development" (PDF). Finance and Development. 35 (1): 7–10. hdl:10986/11545.
  39. ↑ Ross, Michael L. (2012). The oil curse how petroleum wealth shapes the development of nations. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press. ISBN 9781400841929.
  40. 1 2 Ross, Michael L. (13 June 2011). "Does Oil Hinder Democracy?". World Politics. 53 (3): 325–361. doi:10.1353/wp.2001.0011. S2CID 18404.
  41. ↑ Palley, Thomas I. (December 2003). "Lifting the Natural Resource Curse". Foreign Service Journal.
  42. ↑ o'Brochta, William (2019). "A meta-analysis of natural resources and conflict". Research & Politics. 6: 205316801881823. doi:10.1177/2053168018818232.
  43. ↑ Koubi, Vally; Spilker, Gabriele (2017-06-28). "Natural Resources, Climate Change, and Conflict". Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Politics. Vol. 1. doi:10.1093/acrefore/9780190228637.013.346. ISBN 9780190228637.
  44. ↑ Bannon, Ian; Collier, Paul (eds.), Natural Resources and Violent Conflict: Options and Actions. World Bank (2003), p.3.
  45. ↑ Dreher, Axel; Kreibaum, Merle (2016-07-01). "Weapons of choice: The effect of natural resources on terror and insurgencies". Journal of Peace Research. 53 (4): 539–553. doi:10.1177/0022343316634418. ISSN 0022-3433. S2CID 143350892.
  46. ↑ Norman, C. S. (2008). "Rule of Law and the Resource Curse". Environmental and Resource Economics. 43 (2): 183–207. doi:10.1007/s10640-008-9231-y. S2CID 59417490.
  47. ↑ Le Billon, Philippe (2006), "Fuelling War: Natural Resources and Armed Conflicts", Adelphi Paper 373, IISS & Routledge
  48. ↑ Adhvaryu, Achyuta; Fenske, James E.; Khanna, Gaurav; Nyshadham, Anant (February 2018). "Resources, Conflict, and Economic Development in Africa". NBER Working Paper No. 24309. doi:10.3386/w24309. S2CID 31976233.
  49. ↑ Conrad, Justin M; Greene, Kevin T; Walsh, James Igoe; Whitaker, Beth Elise (2018). "Rebel Natural Resource Exploitation and Conflict Duration". Journal of Conflict Resolution. 63 (3): 591–616. doi:10.1177/0022002718755853. S2CID 158710051.
  50. ↑ Ross, Michael L. (2004). "What Do We Know about Natural Resources and Civil War?". Journal of Peace Research. 41 (3): 337–356. doi:10.1177/0022343304043773. S2CID 85511470.
  51. ↑ Bell, Curtis; Wolford, Scott (2015-09-01). "Oil Discoveries, Shifting Power, and Civil Conflict". International Studies Quarterly. 59 (3): 517–530. doi:10.1111/isqu.12150. ISSN 1468-2478.
  52. ↑ Berman, Nicolas; Couttenier, Mathieu; Rohner, Dominic; Thoenig, Mathias (2015-06-29). "This Mine is Mine! How Minerals Fuel Conflicts in Africa". SSRN 2627073. {{cite journal}}: Cite journal requires |journal= (help)
  53. ↑ Hendrix, Cullen S. (2015-10-19). "Oil prices and interstate conflict". Conflict Management and Peace Science. 34 (6): 575–596. doi:10.1177/0738894215606067. ISSN 0738-8942. S2CID 155477031.
  54. 1 2 Colgan, Jeff (2013). Petro-Aggression: When Oil Causes War. Cambridge University Press. ISBN 9781107654976.
  55. ↑ Colgan, Jeff D (2021). "Oil and Security: The Necessity of Political Economy". Journal of Global Security Studies. 6 (1). doi:10.1093/jogss/ogaa008. ISSN 2057-3170.
  56. ↑ Jang, Hye Ryeon; Smith, Benjamin (2021). "Pax Petrolica? Rethinking the Oil–Interstate War Linkage". Security Studies. 30 (2): 159–181. doi:10.1080/09636412.2021.1914718. ISSN 0963-6412. S2CID 236221366.
  57. ↑ Strüver, Georg; Wegenast, Tim (2016-04-01). "The Hard Power of Natural Resources: Oil and the Outbreak of Militarized Interstate Disputes". Foreign Policy Analysis: orw013. doi:10.1093/fpa/orw013. ISSN 1743-8586.
  58. ↑ "SIPRI Military Expenditure Database". Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. Retrieved 13 July 2016.
  59. ↑ Nicolas, Berman; Mathieu, Couttenier; Dominic, Rohner; Mathias, Thoenig (June 2017). "This Mine Is Mine! How Minerals Fuel Conflicts in Africa". American Economic Review. 107 (6): 1564–1610. CiteSeerX 10.1.1.715.4065. doi:10.1257/aer.20150774. ISSN 0002-8282. S2CID 53402320.
  60. ↑ Tang, Shiping; Xiong, Yihan; Li, Hui (2017-07-03). "Does Oil Cause Ethnic War? Comparing Evidence from Process-tracing with Quantitative Results". Security Studies. 26 (3): 359–390. doi:10.1080/09636412.2017.1306392. ISSN 0963-6412. S2CID 148921315.
  61. ↑ Buonanno, Paolo; Durante, Ruben; Prarolo, Giovanni; Vanin, Paolo (2015-08-01). "Poor Institutions, Rich Mines: Resource Curse in the Origins of the Sicilian Mafia". The Economic Journal. 125 (586): F175–F202. doi:10.1111/ecoj.12236. hdl:10446/41026. ISSN 1468-0297. S2CID 55694103.
  62. ↑ Dimico, Arcangelo; Isopi, Alessia; Olsson, Ola (2017). "Origins of the Sicilian Mafia: The Market for Lemons". The Journal of Economic History. 77 (4): 1083–1115. doi:10.1017/S002205071700078X. ISSN 0022-0507.
  63. 1 2 Kim, Inwook; Woods, Jackson (2016-08-01). "Gas on the Fire: Great Power Alliances and Petrostate Aggression". International Studies Perspectives. 17 (3): 231–249. doi:10.1093/isp/ekv004. hdl:10722/229405. ISSN 1528-3577.
  64. 1 2 Couttenier, Mathieu; Grosjean, Pauline; Sangnier, Marc (2017). "The Wild West IS Wild: The Homicide Resource Curse" (PDF). Journal of the European Economic Association. 15 (3): 558–585. doi:10.1093/jeea/jvw011.
  65. 1 2 Nordvik, Frode Martin (2018). "Does Oil Promote or Prevent Coups? the Answer Is Yes". The Economic Journal. 129 (619): 1425–1456. doi:10.1111/ecoj.12604. ISSN 1468-0297. S2CID 158738285.
  66. ↑ Pinckney, Jonathan (2020). "Curving the resource curse: Negative effects of oil and gas revenue on nonviolent resistance campaign onset". Research and Politics. 7 (2): 1–6. doi:10.1177/2053168020936890. S2CID 220069995.
  67. ↑ Ulfelder, Jay (2007-08-01). "Natural-Resource Wealth and the Survival of Autocracy". Comparative Political Studies. 40 (8): 995–1018. doi:10.1177/0010414006287238. ISSN 0010-4140. S2CID 154316752.
  68. ↑ Andersen, Jørgen J.; Ross, Michael L. (2014-06-01). "The Big Oil Change A Closer Look at the Haber–Menaldo Analysis" (PDF). Comparative Political Studies. 47 (7): 993–1021. doi:10.1177/0010414013488557. hdl:11250/195819. ISSN 0010-4140. S2CID 154653329. Archived from the original (PDF) on 2018-07-23.
  69. ↑ Girod, Desha M.; Stewart, Megan A.; Walters, Meir R. (2016-07-27). "Mass protests and the resource curse: The politics of demobilization in rentier autocracies". Conflict Management and Peace Science. 35 (5): 503–522. doi:10.1177/0738894216651826. ISSN 0738-8942. S2CID 157573005.
  70. ↑ Cassidy, Traviss (2019). "The Long-Run Effects of Oil Wealth on Development: Evidence from Petroleum Geology" (PDF). The Economic Journal. 129 (623): 2745–2778. doi:10.1093/ej/uez009.
  71. ↑ Wright, Joseph; Frantz, Erica; Geddes, Barbara (April 2015). "Oil and Autocratic Regime Survival". British Journal of Political Science. 45 (2): 287–306. doi:10.1017/S0007123413000252.
  72. ↑ Ahmadov, Anar K. (2014-08-01). "Oil, Democracy, and Context A Meta-Analysis". Comparative Political Studies. 47 (9): 1238–1267. doi:10.1177/0010414013495358. ISSN 0010-4140. S2CID 154661151.
  73. ↑ Brooks, Sarah M.; Kurtz, Marcus J. (2016). "Oil and Democracy: Endogenous Natural Resources and the Political 'Resource Curse'". International Organization. 70 (2): 1–33. doi:10.1017/s0020818316000072. S2CID 58904661.
  74. ↑ Brooks, Sarah M.; Kurtz, Marcus J. (2022). "Oil "Rents" and Political Development: What Do We Really Know About the Curse of Natural Resources?". Comparative Political Studies. 55 (10): 1698–1731. doi:10.1177/00104140211060281. ISSN 0010-4140. S2CID 246560368.
  75. ↑ Krishnarajan, Suthan (2019). "Economic Crisis, Natural Resources, and Irregular Leader Removal in Autocracies". International Studies Quarterly. 63 (3): 726–741. doi:10.1093/isq/sqz006.
  76. ↑ Caselli; Tesei, Andrea (2015-08-12). "Resource Windfalls, Political Regimes, and Political Stability" (PDF). Review of Economics and Statistics. 98 (3): 573–590. doi:10.1162/REST_a_00538. ISSN 0034-6535. S2CID 5181852.
  77. ↑ Lall, Ranjit (2016-09-08). "The Missing Dimension of the Political Resource Curse Debate" (PDF). Comparative Political Studies. 50 (10): 1291–1324. doi:10.1177/0010414016666861. ISSN 0010-4140. S2CID 157376423.
  78. ↑ Wegenast, Tim; Schneider, Gerald (2017-11-01). "Ownership matters: Natural resources property rights and social conflict in Sub-Saharan Africa". Political Geography. 61: 110–122. doi:10.1016/j.polgeo.2017.07.007.
  79. ↑ "Why Multinational Resource Owners Incite Social Dissent". Political Violence at a Glance. 2017-08-31. Retrieved 2017-08-31.
  80. ↑ Houle, Christian (2017-09-12). "A two-step theory and test of the oil curse: the conditional effect of oil on democratization". Democratization. 25 (3): 404–421. doi:10.1080/13510347.2017.1366449. S2CID 149373007.
  81. ↑ Hendrix, Cullen S (2018-01-01). "Cold War Geopolitics and the Making of the Oil Curse". Journal of Global Security Studies. 3 (1): 2–22. doi:10.1093/jogss/ogx022.
  82. ↑ Treisman, Daniel (2020). "Economic Development and Democracy: Predispositions and Triggers". Annual Review of Political Science. 23: 241–257. doi:10.1146/annurev-polisci-050718-043546.
  83. ↑ Hong, Ji Yeon (December 2017). "Does Oil Hinder Social Spending? Evidence from Dictatorships, 1972–2008". Studies in Comparative International Development. 52 (4): 457–482. doi:10.1007/s12116-017-9237-y. S2CID 157642196.
  84. 1 2 3 Haber, Stephen; Menaldo, Victor (2011). "Do natural resources fuel authoritarianism? A reappraisal of the resource curse". American Political Science Review. 105 (1): 1. doi:10.1017/s0003055410000584. S2CID 7789235.
  85. ↑ Haber, Stephen; Menaldo, Victor (2010), "Lifting the Resource Curse", Hoover Digest, archived from the original on 2010-10-28
  86. ↑ Haber, Stephen; Menaldo, Victor (2010-06-15), Natural Resources in Latin America: Neither Curse Nor Blessing, SSRN 1625504
  87. ↑ Fails, Matthew D. (2019). "Oil income and the personalization of autocratic politics". Political Science Research and Methods. 8 (4): 772–779. doi:10.1017/psrm.2019.14. ISSN 2049-8470. S2CID 159372031.
  88. ↑ Bräutigam, Deborah (11 April 2008). "Taxation and Governance in Africa". American Enterprise Institute. Archived from the original on 2019-08-28.
  89. ↑ Morrison, Kevin M. (9 January 2009). "Oil, Nontax Revenue, and the Redistributional Foundations of Regime Stability". International Organization. 63 (1): 107–138. doi:10.1017/S0020818309090043.
  90. ↑ Ross, Michael L. (April 2004). "Does Taxation Lead to Representation?". British Journal of Political Science. 34 (2): 229–249. CiteSeerX 10.1.1.471.6907. doi:10.1017/S0007123404000031. S2CID 59329781.
  91. ↑ Moore, Mick; Unsworth, Sue (2007). IDS Policy Briefing How Does Taxation Affect the Quality of Governance? Archived 2011-08-13 at the Wayback Machine.
  92. ↑ Friedman, Thomas L. (2006). "The First Law of Petropolitics". Foreign Policy. Retrieved 2016-04-25.
  93. ↑ DeMeritt, Jacqueline H. R.; Young, Joseph K. (2013-04-01). "A political economy of human rights: Oil, natural gas, and state incentives to repress". Conflict Management and Peace Science. 30 (2): 99–120. doi:10.1177/0738894212473915. ISSN 0738-8942. S2CID 73608254.
  94. ↑ "The Hidden Shame of the Global Industrial Economy". Worldwatch.org. Archived from the original on 2019-01-29. Retrieved 2012-07-26.
  95. ↑ "The Petroleum And Poverty Paradox - Assessing U.S. And International Community Efforts To Fight The Resource Curse" (PDF). Retrieved 2012-06-21.
  96. 1 2 Knutsen, Carl Henrik; Kotsadam, Andreas; Olsen, Eivind Hammersmark; Wig, Tore (2016). "Mining and Local Corruption in Africa" (PDF). American Journal of Political Science. 61 (2): 320–334. doi:10.1111/ajps.12268. hdl:10852/59624. Summary available at:
    "Mining Increases Local Corruption". American Journal of Political Science. 2016. Retrieved 2016-10-31.
  97. ↑ Knutsen, Carl Henrik; Kotsadam, Andreas; Olsen, Eivind Hammersmark; Wig, Tore (2017). "Mining and Local Corruption in Africa". American Journal of Political Science. 61 (2): 320–334. doi:10.1111/ajps.12268. hdl:10852/59624. ISSN 0092-5853. JSTOR 26384734.
  98. ↑ "Oil-to-Cash: Fighting the Resource Curse through Cash Transfers : Center for Global Development : Initiatives: Active". cgdev.org. Archived from the original on 2012-12-11.
  99. ↑ Bader, Julia; Daxecker, Ursula (2015-10-09). "A Chinese resource curse? The human rights effects of oil export dependence on China versus the United States". Journal of Peace Research. 52 (6): 774–790. doi:10.1177/0022343315593332. ISSN 0022-3433. S2CID 112605648.
  100. 1 2 Vadlamannati, Krishna C.; Soysa, Indra De (2016-08-13). "Do Resource-Wealthy Rulers Adopt Transparency-Promoting Laws?". International Studies Quarterly. 60 (3): 457–474. doi:10.1093/isq/sqw026. hdl:11250/2468349. ISSN 0020-8833. S2CID 151545694.
  101. ↑ Carreri, Maria; Dube, Oeindrila (2017-01-10). "Do Natural Resources Influence Who Comes to Power, and How?". The Journal of Politics. 79 (2): 000. doi:10.1086/688443. ISSN 0022-3816. S2CID 55566951.
  102. ↑ Wigley, Simon (December 2018). "Is There a Resource Curse for Private Liberties?". International Studies Quarterly. 62 (4): 834–844. doi:10.1093/isq/sqy031. hdl:11693/48786.
  103. ↑ Jensen, Nathan (2008). "Political Risk, Democratic Institutions, and Foreign Direct Investment". The Journal of Politics. 70 (4): 1047. doi:10.1017/s0022381608081048. ISSN 0022-3816. JSTOR 10.1017/s0022381608081048. S2CID 155002838.
  104. ↑ Jensen, Nathan M.; Johnston, Noel P. (2011-05-16). "Political Risk, Reputation, and the Resource Curse". Comparative Political Studies. 44 (6): 662–688. doi:10.1177/0010414011401208. ISSN 0010-4140. S2CID 220992450.
  105. ↑ Mazaheri, Nimah (2017). "Oil, Dissent, and Distribution". World Development. 99: 186–202. doi:10.1016/j.worlddev.2017.05.028.
  106. 1 2 Ross, Michael L. (2008-02-01). "Oil, Islam, and Women". American Political Science Review. 102 (1): 107–123. doi:10.1017/S0003055408080040. ISSN 1537-5943. S2CID 54825180.
  107. ↑ Ross, Michael L. (2012-03-04). The Oil Curse. Princeton University Press. doi:10.1515/9781400841929. ISBN 978-1-4008-4192-9.
  108. ↑ Kotsadam, Andreas; Tolonen, Anja (July 2016). "African Mining, Gender, and Local Employment". World Development. 83: 325–339. doi:10.1016/j.worlddev.2016.01.007. S2CID 153471048.
  109. ↑ Simmons, Joel W. (January 2016). "Resource Wealth and Women's Economic and Political Power in the U.S. States". Comparative Political Studies. 49 (1): 115–152. doi:10.1177/0010414015597510. S2CID 155279746.
  110. ↑ Maurer, Stephan; Potlogea, Andrei (January 2021). "Male-biased Demand Shocks and Women's Labour Force Participation: Evidence from Large Oil Field Discoveries". Economica. 88 (349): 167–188. doi:10.1111/ecca.12341. S2CID 158697381.
  111. ↑ Krauser, Mario; Wegenast, Tim; Schneider, Gerald; Hess Elgersma, Ingeborg (October 2019). "A gendered resource curse? Mineral ownership, female unemployment and domestic violence in Sub-Saharan Africa". Zeitschrift für Friedens- und Konfliktforschung. 8 (2): 213–237. doi:10.1007/s42597-019-00019-8. ISSN 2192-1741. S2CID 211451656.
  112. ↑ Gylfason, Thorvaldur (2002). Inequality and economic growth : do natural resources matter?. Birkbeck College, Dept. of Economics. OCLC 1065189720.
  113. ↑ Papyrakis Elissaios, Richard Palmer-Jones, Nitya Rao, Bola Akanji, Godwin Akpokodje, and Bayo Ajala (2009). "Gender and Growth Assessment: Macroeconomic study. Research Report." Report produced for the Department for International Development (DFID) and Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA).
  114. ↑ Ross, Michael L.; Voeten, Erik (2015-12-14). "Oil and International Cooperation". International Studies Quarterly. 60: 85–97. doi:10.1093/isq/sqv003. ISSN 0020-8833. S2CID 67832402.
  115. ↑ Moss, Todd; Pettersson, Gunilla (2006). "An aid-institutions paradox? A review essay on aid dependency and state building in sub-Saharan Africa" (PDF). Center for Global Development. Working paper 74: 5.
  116. ↑ Bräutigam, Deborah (2002). "Building Leviathan: Revenue, State Capacity, and Governance" (PDF). IDS Bulletin. 33 (3): 1–17. doi:10.1111/j.1759-5436.2002.tb00034.x.
  117. ↑ Andrews, Rodney J.; Deza, Monica (2018-07-01). "Local natural resources and crime: Evidence from oil price fluctuations in Texas". Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization. 151: 123–142. doi:10.1016/j.jebo.2018.02.011. ISSN 0167-2681. S2CID 158700671.
  118. ↑ Colgan, Jeff (2013). Petro-Aggression: When Oil Causes War. Cambridge University Press.
  119. ↑ "Petro-Aggression: When Oil Causes War | Wilson Center". www.wilsoncenter.org. Retrieved 2022-03-01.
  120. ↑ "Petro-aggression: How Russia's oil makes war more likely". Washington Post. ISSN 0190-8286. Retrieved 2022-03-01.
  121. ↑ "Analysis- There's a reason Putin can be so aggressive: Oil". Washington Post. ISSN 0190-8286. Retrieved 2022-03-01.
  122. ↑ Homer-Dixon, Thomas (1999). Environment, Scarcity, and Violence. Princeton University Press.
  123. ↑ Hoek, Tim A.; Axelrod, Kevin; Biancalani, Tommaso; Yurtsev, Eugene A.; Liu, Jinghui; Gore, Jeff (2016-08-24). "Resource Availability Modulates the Cooperative and Competitive Nature of a Microbial Cross-Feeding Mutualism". PLOS Biology. 14 (8): e1002540. doi:10.1371/journal.pbio.1002540. ISSN 1545-7885. PMC 4996419. PMID 27557335.
  124. ↑ Cardillo, Marcel (January 2002). "The life-history basis of latitudinal diversity gradients: how do species traits vary from the poles to the equator?". Journal of Animal Ecology. 71 (1): 79–87. Bibcode:2002JAnEc..71...79C. doi:10.1046/j.0021-8790.2001.00577.x. ISSN 0021-8790.
  125. ↑ Moore, Christopher M.; Catella, Samantha A.; Abbott, Karen C. (2017-02-13). "Population dynamics of mutualism and intraspecific density dependence: how θ-logistic density dependence affects mutualistic positive feedback". doi:10.1101/108175. {{cite journal}}: Cite journal requires |journal= (help)
  126. ↑ Simkhovitch, Vladimir G.; Kropotkin, P. (December 1903). "Mutual Aid a Factor of Evolution". Political Science Quarterly. 18 (4): 702. Bibcode:1903Natur..67..196F. doi:10.2307/2140787. ISSN 0032-3195. JSTOR 2140787. S2CID 85558275.
  127. ↑ Ganade, Gislene; Brown, Valerie K. (March 2002). "Succession in Old Pastures of Central Amazonia: Role of Soil Fertility and Plant Litter". Ecology. 83 (3): 743. doi:10.2307/3071878. ISSN 0012-9658. JSTOR 3071878.
  128. ↑ Brunnschweiler, C. N.; Bulte, E. H. (2008). "Linking Natural Resources to Slow Growth and More Conflict". Science. 320 (5876): 616–617. doi:10.1126/science.1154539. PMID 18451286. S2CID 153387158.
  129. ↑ Dunning, Thad (2008). Crude Democracy: Natural Resource Wealth and Political Regimes. New York: Cambridge University Press. pp. 22. ISBN 978-0521730754.
  130. ↑ Dunning, Thad (2008). Crude Democracy: Natural Resource Wealth and Political Regimes. New York: Cambridge University Press. pp. 29. ISBN 978-0521730754.
  131. ↑ Cavalcanti, Tiago; Mohaddes, Kamiar; Raissi, Mehdi (2011). "Does Oil Abundance Harm Growth?". Applied Economics Letters. 18 (12): 1181–1184. doi:10.1080/13504851.2010.528356. S2CID 155042827.
  132. ↑ Cavalcanti, Tiago; Mohaddes, Kamiar; Raissi, Mehdi (2011). "Commodity Price Volatility and the Sources of Growth". Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 1112. SSRN 1846429.
  133. ↑ Leong, Weishu; Mohaddes, Kamiar (2011). "Institutions and the Volatility Curse" (PDF). Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 1145. Archived from the original (PDF) on 2011-09-28.

Further reading


This article is issued from Wikipedia. The text is licensed under Creative Commons - Attribution - Sharealike. Additional terms may apply for the media files.