The position and direction of the two forces shortly before impact. The combined fleet had been sailing south but Villeneuve had left standing orders that, if the rear of the column was attacked first, they were to reverse direction (by wearing ship) and they had carried out those orders. The centre, where he was located, was exposed in either case.[lower-alpha 1]
This map showing the all-important wind direction, which was NNW (or NW). Both fleets were sailing downwind, with the wind on different tacks. They were thus converging on the centre of the combined fleet, at the vertex of the angle of convergence. Seeing the battle about to begin, the French-Spanish wore ship and began to close-haul in the reverse direction. Villeneuve thought to bring the whole van crashing down on Nelson in the centre, but he lost headway against the wind and could not close. Meanwhile his former rear, now his van, appeared to Nelson to be escaping to Cadiz. He brought the weather column into the wind to pursue and caught them. The business in the centre was finished by Collingwood, lee column commander, who took on the new enemy rear piecemeal as it came slowly into range.[lower-alpha 2]

The Battle of Trafalgar was fought between British and Franco-Spanish fleets on 21 October 1805. A force of 27 British ships of the line faced 33 allied ships. Both forces were formed in two columns; the British sailed parallel, the allied one following the other.

The Battle of Trafalgar was fought by sailing vessels and therefore cannot be understood in substance except as the manoeuvring of sailing vessels according to the principles of sailing. Without understanding the importance of wind and weather, especially wind direction, the modern can make no sense of the manoeuvring. Once those principles are understood, the plan of battle unfolds in a transparent fashion. The plan is included here as well as its general applicability to real events.

Real battles do not always develop according to plan, or exactly according to plan. Commanding officers usually are empowered to respond to the battlefield situation as it develops. Such concepts as "sailing order" and "battle order" are constructs. In a column of ships sailing anywhere the first ship forward was Number 1, the second, Number 2, etc. The battle order was based on planned order of attack. Ships were assigned places in these orders by the commander, sometimes temporarily or even extemporaneously.

Nelson used the order that was best momentarily. In stormy weather or other adverse conditions the commanders might not be able to control the order. "Nelson's fleet" was not a fixed entity; ships were continually joining or leaving his fleet for various reasons: for example HMS Superb, was in the docks being repaired after four years at sea, including the chase of Villeneuve and was daily expected to re-join the fleet, where her Captain, Richard Goodwin Keats was to be Nelson’s second, but she was not repaired in time.[1] The complements of the ships also were variable. The early historians of the battle were not sure of what they were, nor did they know exactly what the casualties were. The roster lists of the ships before sailing were generally used. Afterward there were plenty of reports.

The numbers and orders of this article are based on the figures of modern scholars for the most part. There is general disagreement on the exact order and the exact numbers, but, on the whole, the different estimates are close to each other and can probably be taken as accurate within a few per cent. An effort is made to keep consistency between the tables and the graph.

The plan of battle from a sailor's point of view

The constraints of sailing and sailing vessels

The combined French-Spanish fleet left Cadiz harbour in a loose line and turned to the south along the coast of Andalusia, headed for Naples through the Straits of Gibraltar. They were taking advantage of the north-westerly wind which was blowing on the starboard (right) rear quarter, nearly amidships, pushing them along at a slow rate and causing a swell (waves) perpendicular to the wind direction. It struck the ships from the side, causing them to roll and ruining their stability as gun platforms. The column had a predetermined order, which was necessary for sailing, to prevent some ships from getting between the wind and other ships, "stealing" their wind and running the risk of collision.

Representation of the Santisima Trinidad, the largest ship in the combined fleet, with 4 decks and 136 guns, under full sail. The position of the flag and the curvature of the sails reveal the direction of the wind. The ship is depicted at maximum headway. If the ship were to wear, it would rotate clockwise. The observer is looking at the weather side.

The same wind that was moving the French and Spanish south was also bringing the British north. A sail is basically an airfoil. When full it is curved in such a way as to create a sideways "lift," or force perpendicular to its surface, one component of which is actually against the general direction of the wind. A sailing vessel can thus sail "into the wind." A keel prevents the ship from "slipping," or sliding sideways along the wind. The sails "are full;" that is, fully curved, only at certain angles to the wind direction. The angle is adjustable via "sheets," or lines, which generally have to be winched from the deck. The force required is high,[2] giving rise to the idea that one is "hauling" the ship into the wind, and therefore the ship is "close-hauled." When not full, the sails flap uselessly in the wind, or "luff." The sailors must then change the angle, or "trim the sails," until they fill.

A square rigged ship cannot sail within 6 points (67.5 degrees) either side of the wind. If the wind is coming from the north, the closest it could sail would be ENE or WNW. In order to travel in that direction, it must "fall off," or move to an angle with the wind on one side or the other, a "tack." A ship tacks back and forth against the wind, or "beats," each tack earning it some "headway". However, because of the huge distance a square-rigger had to travel before it could fill its sails again, tacking would only be done in a dire emergency; where speed of manoeuvre outweighed the enormous risk of being caught in irons. By far the most common way of working to windward was wearing round (gybing).

In addition, sailing with the wind directly aft ("abaft") or directly on either side ("abeam") was difficult and inefficient. Sails with the wind in those directions do not fill. The wind must be allowed only from the quarters. At those angles the sails fill and there is a component of force in the desired direction. If the wind is directly abeam, the ship must fall off or close up. The ship may sail on either side of a wind directly astern. A manoeuvre similar to coming about is used to move the wind from one side to another: wearing. The helm is put over, the sails go limp, they are adjusted to fill on the other side. The ship does not have to rotate as far, so the manoeuvre is less disruptive.

Wind is everything to a sailing vessel. It cannot move anywhere without it (is "becalmed"). If the wind is too great the sails may have to be shortened to present less area, a procedure call "reefing." In a storm the ship must sail close to the wind or have it close astern. As the waves are generally coming in with the wind, a ship sailing close into the wind generally cuts them perpendicularly and only pitches; i.e., drops into the troughs and rises on the crests. A ship with the storm wind abeam is struck longitudinally and rolls treacherously, running a risk of capsizing. To avoid that risk the captain must run before the wind. All directions are evaluated with regard to the wind. The side of a ship toward the wind is called the "weather" or "upwind" side; away, the "lee" or "downwind" side (refer to Windward and leeward).

Much has been made of the tactics of various great sailing captains, but the greatest constraints come from wind direction and relative position. The captain of a steam vessel has considerably more freedom to take his ship where he wishes to take it, but the tactics of a sailing captain are to a large extent already predetermined by nature. To get to any point the sailing captain must plot a course taking wind direction into consideration. He must have judgement and skill, and is evaluated by the men on that skill.

Nelson's plan of battle

Nelson's battle plan is revealed on a surviving "memorandum" to his captains scrawled on a sheet of paper. The memorandum was meant to be official, as it is signed "Nelson and Bronte"[lower-alpha 3] and dated "Victory, off Cadiz, 9th October, 1805," which was 12 days before the battle on the 21st.[3] Nelson and his fleet were patrolling off Cadiz, waiting the exit of a combined French and Spanish fleet. He knew better than to attack a heavily fortified harbour, the most heavily fortified in Spain. Meanwhile Nelson was staying out of sight and out of reach.

Sailing ships were not amenable, compared to modern ships, to this type of combat; they moved in slow motion at the mercy of wind and wave. A fleet of ships could deliver the most fire without risking hitting one of their own when it was sailing broadside in a line to the enemy, hence the designation "ship-of-the-line" for heavy ships of 50 or more guns. In variable weather, the manoeuvring required to set up a line could cost "... such a loss of time that the opportunity would probably be lost ...." While the attackers were manoeuvring, the targets might escape. Nelson therefore, had his fleet sail in order of battle.

In order "to make the business decisive," Nelson would attack on sight, going directly for the enemy line. This tactic was not standard, but neither was it new or unusual. The plan was revealed to one of Nelson’s favourite captains, Richard Goodwin Keats, in an animated conversation while the two were walking in Nelson’s garden at Merton just weeks earlier.[4][5] It did have a drawback. Only the front of the attacking column could engage. Nelson's 27 ships-of-the-line would attack in two columns. If they succeeded in breaking the enemy line, they could then take on the enemy piecemeal.

The general orders from Nelson were to "make the attack upon the enemy, and to follow up the blow until they are captured or destroyed." If individual ships were momentarily lost in the confusion, they could do no better, said Nelson, than to pull alongside an enemy and fight broadside.

Once the enemy was in sight, the British fleet would form two columns. The double column would be sailing with the wind on one side, the windward or weather side. The columns were thus described as the "weather column" or the "lee column." Nelson would take command of the weather column while his "second-in-command" would take the other. The second could act independently. However, at that time Nelson did not know which side would be the weather side. That detail could not be decided until they were on the expected final approach. At that time the second half of the single line would sail along the leeward side of the first.

As they sailed, the wind could be anywhere on the weather side, from bow to stern. It could not be from a disallowed direction. If, reasoned Nelson, the enemy fleet was first seen to windward, it was probably extended so that the van (front) could not help whatever was behind it. Such a scenario implies the enemy stretched across Nelson's port bow quarter moving anticlockwise, but he did not know where the wind would be. His column would either be able to fetch[lower-alpha 4] the enemy column or not. If not, the opportunity was lost; they would have to fall off to leeward, wear, and come up on the other side, by which time the hoped-for battle would be only a pursuit.

If they could fetch the enemy on the current tack, they were to turn to port perpendicular to the enemy column (or near it). The lee column would now be facing the enemy's rear. Taking a bearing on the 12th ship from the end, they were to sail through to it, while the weather column sailed through to the centre. The 20 ships to the front were to be ignored. Nelson hoped to destroy all the ships to the rear before the enemy's van could wear round and join the battle. They were hoping to capture Villeneuve, whom they supposed to be in the centre. If the enemy van tacked or wore in an effort to stage a rescue, the British fleet would station itself between them and the captured and disabled ships, and defeat them in further battle.

If on the other hand the enemy fleet was first seen off the lee side; that is, off the starboard bow, the British would be in the strongest position. Turning to starboard they could glide downwind to the enemy and strike him wherever they pleased. Nelson seems to have believed the enemy line would have the same direction of travel, anticlockwise around the British line. Thus the lee line would act by the same instructions, turning to starboard, sail through to the 12th ship from the end.

As luck would have it, in the real battle, the enemy appeared to the lee. However, they were sailing clockwise around the British fleet, forcing the weather column to attack their rear. The real situation changed rapidly as the enemy column reacted but the direct attack on the centre and doubling of the column were planned and resulted in victory.

Matching the plan to the real battle

The French and Spanish were crowded into Cadiz Harbour, protected by shore batteries. Nelson entertained briefly a proposal to sail up to the entrance to the harbour and saturate it with the new Congreve Rocket, setting the enemy ships on fire. That is exactly what Villeneuve was hoping they would do. He believed the combined fire of shore and ship was the best chance of destroying Nelson. He delayed, hoping to exploit any impetuosity and impatience the younger commander might evidence.

Nelson's link to the enemy was an unobtrusive line of spy ships. The enemy saw only the first in line observing them at a distance. That ship was in signal range of another, which was in range of another, all the way back to Nelson, wherever he happened to be.

Higher-level decisions were being made by Napoleon, who could not wait indefinitely for the opportunity to invade Britain, and who had switched his attention to war on the continent, especially Austria and Italy. He needed Villeneuve in the Mediterranean and issued an order to sail out of Cadiz immediately.

Napoleon however, was not as skilled in naval matters and imagined that a fleet of 40 or so large vessels could leave port in an instant. It could take a considerable time for that many ships to get out of port, even under the best conditions. Moreover, they could not do so without favourable winds. If the winds were fickle, progress would be even slower and if the winds were contrary, the whole operation would be impossible.

British fleet

The table below shows the British vessels as they were deployed just prior to engagement. HMS Africa, somewhat detached to the north due to a combination of weather and a missed signal during the night, was supposed to have been fourth from last, in the lee column. The rest of the ships-of-the-line were divided into two columns, with the weather column forming the northern flank and the lee column the southern flank. The enemy line had been sailing north to south in front of the wind. Just as the battle was beginning they turned individually anticlockwise, wore ship, and came into the wind, hoping to bear down on Nelson. The order of British ships in the table is the one of that moment. Prior to closing with the enemy, they were in a single line, and after engagement, the ships manoeuvred to assume the best firing positions. The British fleet of the battle consisted of 33 warships, 27 of which were ships of the line.[6] During the battle the frigates (which had been the force observing Cadiz) and smaller vessels acted in support to the fleet, relaying messages and towing ships but did not engage. When Collingwood took command after Nelson's death he transferred to Euralyus as his own flagship, the Royal Sovereign, was badly damaged.

British fleet [7]
Ship Type Guns Fleet Const-
ruction		 Commanded by[lower-alpha 5] Complement Casualties
Killed Wounded Total  %
Attacking the Head of the Franco-Spanish Fleet
Africa[9] 2-decker 64 Royal Navy Ensign United Kingdom Capt Henry Digby 498[10] 8[11][lower-alpha 6] 44 52 10%
Weather column
Victory[12] 3-decker 104 Royal Navy Ensign United Kingdom Vice-Admiral Lord Nelson †
Capt Thomas Masterman Hardy		 821[lower-alpha 7]
nominal 850		 57 102 159 19%
Téméraire [13] 3-decker 98 Royal Navy Ensign United Kingdom Capt Eliab Harvey 718[14]
nominal 750		 47 76 123 17%
Neptune[15] 3-decker 98 Royal Navy Ensign United Kingdom Capt Thomas Francis Fremantle 741[16] 10 34 44 6%
Leviathan[17] 2-decker 74 Royal Navy Ensign United Kingdom Capt Henry William Bayntun 623[18] 4 22 26 4%
Conqueror[19] 2-decker 74 Royal Navy Ensign United Kingdom Capt Israel Pellew 573[20] 3 9 12 2%
Britannia[21] 3-decker 100 Royal Navy Ensign United Kingdom Rear-Admiral The Rt Hon. Earl of Northesk
Capt Charles Bullen		 854[22] 10 42 52 6%
Agamemnon[23] 2-decker 64 Royal Navy Ensign United Kingdom Capt Sir Edward Berry 498[24] 2 8 10 2%
Ajax[25] 2-decker 74 Royal Navy Ensign United Kingdom Lieut John Pilford (acting captain) 702[26] 2 10 12 2%
Orion[27] 2-decker 74 Royal Navy Ensign United Kingdom Capt Edward Codrington 541[28] 1 23 24 4%
Minotaur[29] 2-decker 74 Royal Navy Ensign United Kingdom Capt Charles John Moore Mansfield 625[30] 3 22 25 4%
Spartiate[31] 2-decker 74 Royal Navy Ensign France Capt Sir Francis Laforey 620[32] 3 22 25 4%
Lee column
Royal Sovereign[33] 3-decker 100 Royal Navy Ensign United Kingdom Vice-Admiral Cuthbert Collingwood
Capt Edward Rotheram		 826[34] 47 94 141 17%
Belleisle.[35] 2-decker 74 Royal Navy Ensign France Capt William Hargood 728[36] 33[lower-alpha 8] 94 127 17%
Mars[37] 2-decker 74 Royal Navy Ensign United Kingdom Capt George Duff †
Lieut William Hennah		 615[38] 27[lower-alpha 9] 71 98 16%
Tonnant[39] 2-decker 80 Royal Navy Ensign France Capt Charles Tyler 688[40] 26 50 76 11%
Bellerophon[41] 2-decker 74 Royal Navy Ensign United Kingdom Capt John Cooke †
Lieut William Pryce Cumby		 522[42] 28[lower-alpha 10] 127 155 30%
Colossus[43] 2-decker 74 Royal Navy Ensign United Kingdom Capt James Nicoll Morris 571[44] 40[lower-alpha 11] 160 200 35%
Achille[45] 2-decker 74 Royal Navy Ensign United Kingdom Capt Richard King 619[46] 13 59 72 12%
Revenge[47] 2-decker 74 Royal Navy Ensign United Kingdom Capt Robert Moorsom 598[48] 28 51 79 13%
Polyphemus[49] 2-decker 64 Royal Navy Ensign United Kingdom Capt Robert Redmill 484[50] 2 4 6 1%
Swiftsure[51] 2-decker 74 Royal Navy Ensign United Kingdom Capt William Gordon Rutherfurd 570[52] 9 8 17 3%
Dreadnought[53] 3-decker 98 Royal Navy Ensign United Kingdom Capt John Conn 725[54] 7 26 33 5%
Defiance[55] 2-decker 74 Royal Navy Ensign United Kingdom Capt Philip Charles Durham 577[56] 17 53 70 12%
Thunderer[57] 2-decker 74 Royal Navy Ensign United Kingdom Lieut John Stockham (acting captain) 611[58] 4 12 16 3%
Defence[59] 2-decker 74 Royal Navy Ensign United Kingdom Capt George Hope 599[60] 7 29 36 6%
Prince[61] 3-decker 98 Royal Navy Ensign United Kingdom Capt Richard Grindall 735[62] 0 0 0 0%
Attached
Euryalus[63] Frigate 36 Royal Navy Ensign United Kingdom Capt Hon Henry Blackwood 262[64] 0 0 0 0%
Naiad[65] Frigate 38 Royal Navy Ensign United Kingdom Capt Thomas Dundas 333[66] 0 0 0 0%
Phoebe[67] Frigate 36 Royal Navy Ensign United Kingdom Capt Hon Thomas Bladen Capel[lower-alpha 12] 256[68] 0 0 0 0%
Sirius[69] Frigate 36 Royal Navy Ensign United Kingdom Capt William Prowse 273[70] 0 0 0 0%
Pickle[71] Schooner 8 Royal Navy Ensign United Kingdom Lieut John Richards La Penotière 42[72] 0 0 0 0%
Entreprenante[73] Cutter 10 Royal Navy Ensign France Lieut Robert Benjamin Young 41[72] 0 0 0 0%

Franco-Spanish fleet

Just before the engagement the French and Spanish ships of the line had been sailing north to south. After wearing, the order of sailing was reversed, so that the former head was now the rear. During the battle itself the entire line broke into small units and individual ships. The combined fleet consisted of 40 vessels with 18 French ships of the line and 15 Spanish ships of the line.[74]

Ships of the French-Spanish fleet[75][76]
Ship Type Guns Fleet Const-
ruction		 Commanded by[lower-alpha 5] Complement Casualties Fate Killed in wreck
Killed Wounded Total  %
Neptuno[77] 2-decker 80 Spain Spain Capt Don H. Cayetano Valdés y Flores 800[78] 37[lower-alpha 13] 47 84 11% Captured 21 Oct
Recaptured 23 Oct
Foundered 23 Oct		 few
Scipion[79] 2-decker 74 France France Capt Charles Berrenger[80] 755 17 22 39 5% Escaped
Captured 4 Nov
Rayo [81] 3-decker 100 Spain Spain Commodore Don Enrique MacDonnell 830 4 14 18 2% Escaped
Surrendered 23 Oct
(to HMS Donegal)
Foundered 26 Oct		 many
Formidable[82] 2-decker 80 France France Rear-Admiral Pierre Dumanoir Le Pelley
Capt Jean-Marie Letellier[80]		 840[83] 22 45 67 8% Escaped
Captured 4 Nov
Duguay-Trouin[84] 2-decker 74 France France Capt Claude Touffet[80] 755[85] 20[86] 24 44 6% Escaped
Captured 4 Nov
Mont Blanc[87] 2-decker 74 France France Capt Guillaume-Jean-Noël de Lavillegris[80] 755 20 20 40 5% Escaped
Captured 4 Nov
San Francisco de Asis [88] 2-decker 74 Spain Spain Capt Don Luis Antonio Flórez 657[89] 5 12 17 3% Escaped, wrecked 23 Oct none
San Agustin [90] 2-decker 74 Spain Spain Capt Don Felipe Jado Cagigal 711[91] 181[92] 201 382 54% Captured 21 Oct
Abandoned and burnt 28 Oct
Héros[93] 2-decker 74 France France Cmdr Jean-Baptiste-Joseph-René Poulain (DOW)[94] 690[95] 12 24 36 5% Escaped
Nuestra Señora de la Santísima Trinidad[96] 4-decker 136 Spain Spain Rear-Admiral Báltasar Hidalgo de Cisneros
Capt Don Francisco Javier de Uriarte y Borja		 1048[97] 216 116[98] 332 32% Captured 21 Oct
Foundered 23 Oct		 few
Bucentaure[99] 2-decker 80 France France Vice-Admiral Pierre-Charles Villeneuve
Capt Jean-Jacques Magendie		 888[100] 197 85 282 32% Captured 21 Oct
Recaptured 23 Oct
Wrecked 23 Oct		 400
on Indomptable
Neptune[101] 2-decker 80 France France Commodore Esprit-Tranquille Maistral[80] 888[102] 15 39 54 6% Escaped
Redoutable[103] 2-decker 74 France France Capt Jean Jacques Etienne Lucas 643 (nominal 550-600) 300[lower-alpha 14] 222 522 81% Captured 21 Oct
Foundered 23 Oct		 many
172 ?
San Leandro[104] 2-decker 64 Spain Spain Capt Don José Quevedo 606 8 22 30 5% Escaped
San Justo [105] 2-decker 74 Spain Spain Capt Don Miguel María Gastón de Iriarte 694 0 7 7 1% Escaped
Santa Ana[106] 3-decker 112 Spain Spain Vice-Admiral Ignacio María de Álava y Navarrete
Capt Don José de Gardoqui		 1189[107]
1053 nominal		 95[lower-alpha 15] 137 232 20% Captured 21 Oct
Recaptured 23 Oct
Indomptable[108] 2-decker 80 France France Capt Jean Joseph Hubert † 887 20 30 50 [lower-alpha 16] 6% Escaped
Wrecked 24 Oct[lower-alpha 17]>		 657
Fougueux[109] 2-decker 74 France France Capt Louis Alexis Baudoin † 755[110] 60 75 135[lower-alpha 18] 18% Captured 21 Oct
Wrecked 22 Oct		 502 (84% casualties)
Intrépide[111] 2-decker 74 France Spain Capt Louis-Antoine-Cyprien Infernet 745[79] 80 162 242[lower-alpha 19] 32% Captured 21 Oct
Evacuated, blown up 24 Oct
Monarca[112] 2-decker 74 Spain Spain Capt Don Teodoro de Argumosa 667[113] 101 154 255 38% Captured 21 Oct
Burnt 26 Oct
Pluton[114] 2-decker 74 France France Commodore Julien Cosmao-Kerjulien 755[115] 60 132 192 25% Escaped
Bahama [116] 2-decker 74 Spain Spain Commodore Don Dionisio Alcalá Galiano † 690 75 66 141 20% Captured 21 Oct
Aigle[117][118] 2-decker 74 France France Capt Pierre-Paulin Gourrège[80] † 755[119] 70 100 170[lower-alpha 20] 23% Captured 21 Oct
Wrecked 23 Oct		 330
Montañés[120] 2-decker 74 Spain Spain Capt Don Francisco Alsedo y Bustamante 715 20 29 49 7% Escaped
Algésiras[121] 2-decker 74 France France Rear-Admiral Charles-René Magon de Médine †
Cmdr Laurent Tourneur[80]		 755[122] 77 142 219 29% Captured 21 Oct
Recaptured 23 Oct
Argonauta[123] 2-decker 80 Spain Spain Capt Don Antonio Pareja (WIA) 798[124] 100 203 303 38% Captured, scuttled 21 Oct
Swiftsure[125] 2-decker 74 France United Kingdom Capt Charles-Eusèbe Lhospitalier de la Villemadrin[80] 755[126] 68 123 191 25% Captured 21 Oct
Argonaute[127] 2-decker 74 France France Capt Jacques Épron-Desjardins[80] 755[128] 55 132 187 25% Escaped
San Ildefonso[129] 2-decker 74 Spain Spain Capt Don Jose Ramón de Vargas y Varáez 716 [130] 34 148 [lower-alpha 21] 182 25% Captured 21 Oct
Achille [131][118] 2-decker 74 France France Capt Louis-Gabriel Deniéport † 755[132] 480  ? 480 64% Surrendered, blew up 21 Oct
Principe de Asturias[133] 3-decker 112 Spain Spain Admiral Don Federico Carlos Gravina (DOW)[lower-alpha 22]
Rear-admiral Don Antonio de Escaño
Commodore Don Ángel Rafael de Hore		 1113 54 109 [lower-alpha 23] 163 15% Escaped
Berwick[135] 2-decker 74 France United Kingdom Capt Jean-Gilles Filhol de Camas[80] † 755[136] 75 125 200[lower-alpha 24] 26% Captured 21 Oct
Foundered 22 Oct		 622
San Juan Nepomuceno[137] 2-decker 74 Spain Spain Commodore Don Cosmé Damián Churruca y Elorza † 693[138] 103 151[lower-alpha 25] 254 37% Captured 21 Oct
Attached
Cornélie [139] Frigate 40 France France Capt André-Jules-François de Martineng[80]  ? 0 0 0 0% Escaped
Hermione[140] Frigate 40 France France Capt Jean-Michel Mahé[80]  ? 0 0 0 0% Escaped
Hortense[141] Frigate 40 France France Capt Louis-Charles-Auguste Delamarre de Lamellerie[80]  ? 0 0 0 0% Escaped
Rhin[142] Frigate 40 France France Capt Michel Chesneau  ? 0 0 0 0% Escaped
Thémis[143] Frigate 40 France France Capt Nicolas-Joseph-Pierre Jugan[80]  ? 0 0 0 0% Escaped
Furet[144] Brig 18 France France Lieut Pierre-Antoine-Toussaint Dumay 130 0 0 0 0% Escaped
Argus[145] Brig 16 France France Lieut Yves-Francois Taillard[146] 110 0 0 0 0% Escaped

Losses

Below is a graph of the percentage of casualties plotted for each ship along the three battle columns. The graph is a construct only. The losses were incurred throughout the entire battle and after, most while the ships were not actually in that order. The order in the graph is shown as a convenience.

Three columns and a separate ship are shown on the horizontal axis, which represents units of conventional distance between ship positions. All units are assumed to be the same. There are three origin points, one for the beginning of each column and the Africa, which was not in the three.

The vertical axis shows percentage of casualties per ship. For example, casualties for the Victory are plotted at 20%. A casualty is someone who was known to have been wounded, someone who was known to have been killed, or someone missing in action and presumed drowned. The percentage is the ratio of casualties to ship's complement multiplied by 100. Casualties continued over the next few weeks as enemy crews rebelled, retook their ships, and were subdued. The graph covers only the main battle on the first day.

Alt text
Casualties by Ship.
Yellow = HMS Africa
Green = British Weather Column, led by Nelson
Grey = British Lee Column, led by Collingwood
The number is the order in the column.
Blue = French
Red = Spanish. The number is the order in the line. Data for this chart are from the above table.

Notes

  1. ↑ The map is based an illustration in Nofi, Al (1981). "Nelson's Last Victory: The Battle of Trafalgar, Oct. 21, 1805". Strategies and Tactics Magazine (84).. The map is identical to Map GREN 4B/10 in the Grenville Collection of the National Maritime Museum, Greenwich, London. Hand-drawn with a hand-written battle order, it is dated to 1805.
  2. ↑ Map is a reproduction of Weller, F.S. (1892). "Battle of Trafalgar, 21st October, 1805". In Gardiner, Samuel Rawson (ed.). A School Atlas of English History. London and New York: Longmans, Green and Co. p. 84.. Gardiner says in the "Preface," however, that No. 84 was taken from another work, Johnston, Alexander Keith (1850). Alison, M.R. (ed.). Atlas to Alison's History of Europe. Edinburgh and London: William Blackwood and Sons. p. 34.
  3. ↑ Nelson was the Duke of Bronte; he signed much of his official correspondence with this conceit.
  4. ↑ Bring it within the allowed angles for close-hauling.
  5. 1 2 Names marked  † were killed in action,  (DOW) were not killed immediately but died after of their wounds.[8]  (WIA) were wounded in the action but did not die of those wounds
  6. ↑ Adkin 2005 claim a "killed" of 18.
  7. ↑ Adkin 2005, p. 307 gives a crew size of 823.
  8. ↑ Broadside gives 33 killed, 93 wounded
  9. ↑ Broadside gives 29 killed, 69 wounded
  10. ↑ Broadside gives 27 killed, 123 wounded
  11. ↑ Broadside 2012 gives 46 killed, 160 wounded
  12. ↑ Goodwin 2005, pp. 145–149 gives the captain's name as Capell
  13. ↑ Adkin 2005, p. 349 has 42.
  14. ↑ Adkin 2005, p. 363 has 487 dead and 81 wounded from battle and storm.
  15. ↑ Adkin 2005, p. 372 has 97 dead and 141 wounded.
  16. ↑ Estimated. Adkin 2005, p. 522 has 657 drowned when ship sank in storm.
  17. ↑ ~1050 killed in wreck including survivors of Bucentaure who had been rescued by Indomptable
  18. ↑ Est. 502 more drowned after battle: Adkin 2005, p. 522
  19. ↑ killed and wounded are estimated, as only numbers hit is given in Adkin 2005, pp. 351, 522
  20. ↑ Estimated. Around 330 drowned on 23 October: Adkin 2005, p. 523
  21. ↑ 126 wounded according to [130]
  22. ↑ Gravina died on 9 March 1806 due to wounds received in the battle from which he never recovered.[134]
  23. ↑ Adkin 2005, p. 391 has 52 dead, 110 wounded.
  24. ↑ Estimated. Only 58 survived foundering of ship 22 October. Adkin 2005, p. 522
  25. ↑ Adkin 2005, p. 393 has 131.

References

  1. ↑ Hannah. p. 124. {{cite book}}: Missing or empty |title= (help)
  2. ↑ Mortlock 2017, p. 32 "the sailing of these vessels was a constant manual labour with skilled work that required balance, timing, and strength"
  3. ↑ "Nelson's Trafalgar Memorandum". Learning English Timeline. British Library. Retrieved 12 December 2019.
  4. ↑ Nicolas, N. H. (2011). The Despatches and letters of Vice admiral Lord Viscount Nelson. Cambridge: Cambridge University press. p. vol 7, 241, note 9.
  5. ↑ Hannah. p. 116. {{cite book}}: Missing or empty |title= (help)
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  7. ↑ Broadside
  8. ↑ Mortlock 2017, p. 32 "Many men who survived amputation succumbed later to bacterial infections.... Complicated surgical procedures on abdominal wounds were impossible ... Infections were almost inevitable."
  9. ↑ Goodwin 2005, pp. 115–122.
  10. ↑ Adkin 2005, p. 315
  11. ↑ Broadside 2012, Battle of Trafalgar Casualty List
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  80. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 Dictionnaire des capitaines de vaisseau de Napoléon, Danielle & Bernard Quintin, SPM, 2003, ISBN 2-901952-42-9
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  134. ↑ "Battle of Trafalgar - Federico Carlos Gravina y Nápoli", hnelson.iespana.es (in Spanish), archived from the original on 27 March 2010. Schom, Alan, Trafalgar, Countdown to Battle, 1803-1805 (p355 & 384) describes Gravina as mortally wounded.
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  146. ↑ "Yves-Francois Taillard". Three Decks Forum. 2020.

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