The Yugoslav Committee (Croatian: Jugoslavenski odbor, Slovene: Jugoslovanski odbor, Serbian: Југословенски одбор) was a World War I-era unelected, ad-hoc committee largely consisting of émigré Croat, Slovene, and Bosnian Serb politicians and political activists, whose aim was the detachment of Austro-Hungarian lands inhabited by the South Slavs and unification of those lands with the Kingdom of Serbia. The group was formally established in 1915, and it last met in 1919, shortly after the breakup of Austria-Hungary and the establishment of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes (later renamed Yugoslavia). The Yugoslav Committee was led by the Croat lawyer Ante Trumbić as the committee president, and Croat politician Frano Supilo as its vice president (until 1916).
The members of the Yugoslav Committee were not entirely in agreement on the method of unification, the desired system of government or the constitution of the proposed union state. The bulk of the committee members espoused various forms of Yugoslavism – advocating either a federation where various lands constituting the new state would preserve a degree of autonomy, or a centralised state. The committee was financially supported by donations from the Croatian diaspora and by the government of the Kingdom of Serbia led by Nikola Pašić. Serbia made efforts to use the Yugoslav Committee as a propaganda tool in pursuit of its own policies including territorial expansion or the creation of a Greater Serbia.
Representatives of the Yugoslav Committee and Serbian government met at the Greek island of Corfu in 1917. There they discussed the proposed unification of South Slavs and produced the Corfu Declaration, outlining some elements of the future union’s constitution. Further meetings took place at the end of the war in Geneva in 1918. Those discussions resulted in the Geneva Declaration, determining a confederal constitution of the union. The declaration was repudiated by the government of Serbia shortly afterwards. The State of Slovenes, Croats and Serbs, formed as Austria-Hungary was breaking up, treated the Yugoslav Committee as its representative in international affairs. However, it soon came under pressure to unify with Serbia, and proceeded to do so in a manner that ignored the earlier declarations. The Committee ceased to exist shortly afterwards.
Background
The idea of South Slavic political unity predates the creation of Yugoslavia by nearly a century. First developed in Habsburg Croatia by a group of Croat intellectuals organised as the Illyrian movement in the 19th century, the concept developed through diverse forms of the proposed unity.[2] They argued Croatian history is a part of a wider history of the South Slavs and that Croats, Serbs, as well as potentially Slovenes and Bulgarians were parts of a single 'Illyrian' nation (choosing the name as a neutral reference). The movement began as a cultural one, promoting Croatian national identity and integration of all Croatian provinces within the Austrian Empire,[3] usually in reference to the Habsburg kingdoms of Croatia, Slavonia, and Dalmatia, and a part or all of Ottoman Bosnia and Herzegovina.[4] A wider aim was to gather all South Slavs or Jugo-Slaveni[lower-alpha 1] for short in a commonwealth within or outside of the Empire. The movement's two directions became known as Croatianism and Yugoslavism[lower-alpha 2] respectively, meant to counter Germanisation and Magyarisation.[3]
Fearing Drang nach Osten ('drive to the east'), the Illyrians believed Germanisation and Magyarisation could only be resisted through unity with other Slavs, especially the Serbs. They advocated the unification of Croatia, Slavonia, and Dalmatia as the Triune Kingdom expanded to include other South Slavs in Austria (or Austria-Hungary after the Compromise of 1867) before joining other South Slavic polities in a federation or confederation.[7] The proposed consolidation of variously defined Croatian or South Slavic lands led to proposals for trialism in Austria-Hungary accommodating a South-Slavic polity with a rank equal to the Kingdom of Hungary.[8] As neighbouring Serbia achieved independence through the 1878 Treaty of Berlin, the Yugoslav idea became irrelevant in the country. Before the 1912 First Balkan War, Serbia was mono-ethnic and Serbian nationalism sought to include (those considered to be) Serbs into the state. It portrayed work of bishops Josip Juraj Strossmayer and Franjo Rački as a scheme to establish Greater Croatia.[9] There was pressure to expand Serbia by a group of Royal Serbian Army officers known as the Black Hand. They carried out the May 1903 coup installing the Karađorđević dynasty to power and then organised nationalist actions in "unredeemed Serbian provinces" specified as Bosnia, Herzegovina, Montenegro, Old Serbia (meaning Kosovo), Macedonia, Central Croatia, Slavonia, Syrmia, Vojvodina, and Dalmatia.[10] This echoed Garašanin's 1844 Načertanije – a treatise anticipating the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, calling for the establishment of Greater Serbia to pre-empt Russian or Austrian expansion into the Balkans and unifying all Serbs into a single state.[11]
In the first two decades of the 20th century, various Croat, Serb, and Slovene national programmes adopted Yugoslavism in different, conflicting, or mutually exclusive forms. Yugoslavism became a pivotal idea for establishing a South Slavic political union. Most Serbs equated the idea with a Greater Serbia under a different name or a vehicle to bring all Serbs into a single state. For many Croats and Slovenes, Yugoslavism protected them against Austrian and Hungarian challenges to preservation of their Croat and Slovene identities and political autonomy.[12]
Prelude
Florence meeting
In October 1914, Serbian Prime Minister Nikola Pašić learned that the British were considering expanding the alliance against the Central Powers by enticing Hungary to secede from Austria-Hungary and by enticing the Kingdom of Italy to abandon its neutrality – so both could join the Entente Powers. Pašić found out that the British considered guaranteeing Hungarian access to the Adriatic Sea through the Port of Rijeka and overland access to Rijeka over Croatian soil, as well as resolving the Adriatic Question satisfactorily for Italy. Pašić thought that those developments, coupled with potential British–Romanian alliance would jeopardise Serbian objective of gaining access to the Adriatic and threaten Serbia itself.[13]
In response, Pašić directed Bosnian Serb members of the Austro-Hungarian Diet of Bosnia Nikola Stojanović and Dušan Vasiljević to contact émigré Croatian politicians and lawyers Ante Trumbić and Julije Gazzari with the aim of establishing a body which would cooperate with the government of Serbia on unification of South Slavs in a state created through expansion of Serbia. The policy was to be set entirely by Serbia while the proposed body would carry out propaganda activities.[13] The four met in Florence on 22 November 1914.[14] In January 1915, Frano Supilo, once a leading figure in the Croat-Serb Coalition, the ruling political party of the Austro-Hungarian realm of Croatia-Slavonia, [lower-alpha 3] met with British foreign secretary Sir Edward Grey and Prime Minister H. H. Asquith providing them with the manifesto of the nascent Yugoslav Committee and discussing benefits of South Slavic unification with them.[16] The manifesto was co-authored by Supilo and British political activist and historian Robert Seton-Watson.[17]
Niš Declaration
Serbian leadership considered the World War I an opportunity for territorial expansion beyond the Serb-inhabited areas of the Balkans. A committee tasked with determining the country's war aims produced a programme to establish a single South-Slavic state through the addition of Croatia-Slavonia, the Slovene Lands, Vojvodina, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Dalmatia.[18] Pašić thought that the process should be implemented through addition of the new territories to Serbia.[19] On 7 December, Serbia announced its war aims in the Niš Declaration.[20] The declaration called on the struggle to liberate and unify "unliberated brothers",[21] "three tribes of one people" – referring to the Serbs, the Croats, and the Slovenes.[20] This formulation was adopted instead of explicit goal of territorial expansion as a way to attract support from South Slavs living in Austria-Hungary. The Serbian government was motivated to appeal to the fellow South Slavs as it feared little material support was coming from the Entente Powers allies as it became clear the war would not be short.[20] Thus Serbia assumed the central role in state-building of the future South Slavic polity with support from the major Entente Powers.[22]
Supilo initially assumed the Niš Declaration meant that Serbia was fully supportive of his ideas on the mode of unification. He was convinced otherwise by Russian foreign minister Sergey Sazonov. He informed Supilo that Russia only supported creation of Greater Serbia.[23] As a result, Supilo and Trumbić did not trust Pašić and they considered him a proponent of Serbian hegemony.[24] Despite the mistrust, Supilo and Trumbić wanted to work with Pašić with the aim of South-Slavic unification. Pašić offered them to work towards establishment of a Serbo-Croat state where Croats would be given some concessions – which they declined.[19] Trumbić was convinced that Serbian leadership thought of the unification as a conquest of territories for Serbia.[25]
Trumbić and Supilo found another reason not to trust Pašić when Pašić dispatched envoys to address Sazonov's opposition to addition of Roman Catholic South Slavs to the proposed South Slavic union. The envoys authored a memorandum claiming that Croats only inhabit north of the Central Croatia, and that the regions of Slavonia, Krbava, Lika, Bačka, and Banat should be added to Serbia (as well as previously claimed Dalmatia, and Bosnia and Herzegovina).[26] Trumbić and Supilo became convinced that, due to the policy of the government of Serbia, that the proposed unification would be perceived as a Serbian conquest in the Croatian-inhabited areas of Austria-Hungary rather than liberation. They decided to proceed with caution, gather political support abroad, and refrain from establishment of the Yugoslav Committee until Italian entry into the war becomes certain.[13]
Treaty of London
The Entente Powers ultimately ensured alliance with Italy by offering it large areas of Austria-Hungary inhabited by South Slavs, largely Croats and Slovenes, along the eastern shores of the Adriatic Sea. The offer, formalised as the 1915 Treaty of London caused the Trumbić and Supilo to reconsider their criticism of Serbian policies. This was because they saw potential Serbian war success against Austria-Hungary as the only realistic safeguard against Italian expansion into the Slovene and Croat-inhabited lands. Furthermore, Supilo was convinced that, if the Treaty of London were to be implemented, Croatia would be partitioned between Italy, Serbia and Hungary.[27]
The matter became closely related to contemporary efforts to obtain an alliance with Bulgaria, or at least secure its neutrality,[28] in return for territorial gains against Serbia. As compensation, Serbia was promised territories which were parts of the Austria-Hungary at the time – specifically Bosnia and Herzegovina and an outlet to the Adriatic Sea in Dalmatia. Regardless of the promised compensation, Pašić was reluctant to accede to all the Bulgarian territorial demands, especially before Serbia gained the new territory.[29] Namely, Supilo obtained British support for plebiscites in Bosnia and Herzegovina and in Dalmatia where the lands would decide on their fate instead of guarantees of westward territorial expansion of Serbia.[30] Crucially, Serbia received Russian support for its dismissal of the proposed land swap.[29]
Establishment
The Yugoslav Committee was formally founded in Parisian Hôtel Madison on 30 April 1915, mere days after signing of the London Agreement ensuring Italian entry into the World War I.[31][32] The committee designated London as its seat. It was an unelected ad-hoc group of anti-Habsburg politicians and activists who fled Austria-Hungary when the World War I broke out. Work of the committee was largely funded by Croatian diaspora,[14] including Gazzari's brother, Croatian Chilean industrialist Remigio.[33] At least a portion of the costs was covered by government of Serbia.[24]
Trumbić became the Yugoslav Committee president, and Supilo its vice-president. Other members were Croatian Sabor members, namely sculptor Ivan Meštrović, Hinko Hinković, Jovan Banjanin, and Franko Potočnjak; Diet of Istria member Dinko Trinajstić; Diet of Bosnia members Stojanović and Vasiljević; Imperial Council member Gustav Gregorin; writer Milan Marjanović, literary historian Pavle Popović, ethnologist Niko Županič, jurist Bogumil Vošnjak, Miće Mičić, and Gazzari.[34] Subsequently, the membership also included Milan Srškić,[35] Ante Biankini, Mihajlo Pupin, Lujo Bakotić, Ivan De Giulli, Niko Gršković, Josip Jedlowski, and Josip Mandić. Prominent non-member supporters were Rikard Katalinić Jeretov and Josip Marohnić, the latter being the president of the North American Croatian Fraternal Union which collected money for the Yugoslav Committee.[36] The committee's central, London office was led by Hinković and Jedlowski. Some sources indicate Jedlowski used the title of the secretary of the committee, although it appears the position was an administrative one and entailed no particular authority.[37]
Members of the Yugoslav Committee believed that the Croatian question may only be resolved through abolition of Austria-Hungary and unification with Serbia.[38] Trumbić and Supilo were proponents of a political unification of South Slavs in a single nation-state through the realisation of Yugoslavist ideas. They believed that the South Slavs were one people, entitled to a national homeland through the principle of self-determination and advocated unification based on equality.[19] He advocated establishment of a federal state in which Slovene Lands, Croatia (consisting of pre-war Croatia-Slavonia and Dalmatia), Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia (expanded to include Vojvodina), and Montenegro would be five constituent elements.[24] Croat members of the Yugoslav Committee (except Hinković) thought that the federal units would ensure preservation of historical, legal and cultural traditions of individual parts of the new state.[39] Supilo proposed the new country be named Yugoslavia to avoid imposing Serbian name in areas of the new country outside pre-war Serbia. He further suggested Croatia should be given some protection against any future Serbian dominance, suggesting Zagreb might be best suited as the capital of the new country. The Yugoslav Committee held that the unification should be the result of an agreement between itself and the Serbian government.[19]
The Yugoslav Committee attracted support in Britain, especially by Seton-Watson, journalist and historian Wickham Steed, and archaeologist Arthur Evans. However, the Entente Powers did not initially consider breakup of Austria-Hungary a war aim and did not support the work of the committee whose objectives undermined territorial integrity of Austria-Hungary.[27] The Yugoslav Committee worked to be recognised by the Entente Powers as the legal representative of South Slavs living in Austria-Hungary, but Pašić kept preventing any formal recognition.[40] A further point of friction between Supilo and Trumbić on one side and Pašić on the other was the demand of the Serbian ambassador to Britain asking the Yugoslav Committee to omit mention of Dalmatia as being a part of Croatia since time immemorial because it might jeopardise Serbian territorial claims. Supilo and Trumbić were surprised, but they complied believing Croatia would be otherwise left defenceless against Italian claims.[41]
Supilo's resignation
Supilo thought that the Yugoslav Committee had to confront not only Italian and Hungarian encroachment on the lands inhabited by South Slavs, but also Greater Serbian expansionist designs pursued by Pašić. While most of the committee agreed with Supilo, they preferred not to confront Serbia openly until the South Slavic lands were safe from Italian and Hungarian threat.[42] Following Serbian military defeat in the 1915 Serbian campaign, Supilo, Gazzari, and Trinajstić concluded that the Serb members of the Yugoslav Committee held that the proposed unification should primarily encompass ethnic Serbs in a centralised state. They saw no need for the federal system because they deemed differences between Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes artificial results of Austrian rule. Supilo protested, informing the Yugoslav Committee that he sent a memo to Grey proposing establishment of an independent Croatian state unless Serbia agrees to treat Croats and Slovenes as equal to Serbs. His principal complaint in this regard was that Croatia and other Austro-Hungarian territories are thought of as compensation to Serbia for the loss of Macedonia and concessions in Banat instead of equal partners. Serb and Slovene members of the committee accused Supilo and his allies of separatism and favouring Croatian interests over Slovene ones.[43]
Trumbić believed the unification should be pursued at all costs as long as Austria-Hungary is destroyed. In March 1916, Trumbić dismissed Supilo's idea to establish the Croatian Committee fearing conflict with Serbian government and weakening position against Italy. In early May 1916, Pašić declared Serbia recognised Italian dominance in the Adriatic causing Gazzari, Trinajstić, and Meštrović to ask for a meeting of the committee where Vasiljević and Stojanović once again attacked Supilo for his opposition to policy of the Serbian government. Finally, Supilo left the Yugoslav Committee on 5 June 1916.[43] Believing that the selective approach was wrong and that problems must be dealt with immediately in the open, Supilo abandoned integral Yugoslavism and unsuccessfully urged Croat members of the Yugoslav Committee to resign and join him in pursuit of independent Croatia since Serbia prioritised uniting ethnic Serbs. He hoped to obtain Italian support for the idea as Italy was displeased with the potential unification of South Slavs close to its borders and thereby pressure Pašić into giving into his demands.[42]
Relations between the Yugoslav Committee and Serbia did not improve after Supilo's departure. A new contentious issue was the appellation of the volunteer units consisting of South Slavic prisoners of war originating from Austria-Hungary established in Odesa. While the Yugoslav Committee wanted the force to be called Yugoslav, Pašić successfully arranged through Serbian diplomatic mission in Russia to have the unit named the First Serbian Volunteer Division and commanded by officers of the Royal Serbian Army sent to Russia for the task. While the committed hoped the force would help promote common Yugoslav identity, Yugoslavism was actively suppressed by the officers on instructions given by Pašić.[44] As a result, 12,735 volunteers out of 33,000 left the force in protest against the Serbian policy. Furthermore, recruitment of volunteers slowed down significantly.[45]
Corfu Declaration
Serbian position was weakened following loss of Russian support after the February Revolution,[46] as well as because President of the United States Woodrow Wilson refused to honour secret agreements promising territorial rewards.[45] At the same time, the Entente Powers were still looking at the ways to achieve a separate peace with Austria-Hungary and isolate the German Empire in the war.[47] Moreover, South Slavic deputies on the Austro-Hungarian Imperial Council in Vienna presented the May Declaration proposing introduction of trialism in Austria-Hungary allowing the South Slavs to unite in a single polity within the monarchy.[21] Finally, France and Britain appeared supportive of new Austro-Hungarian emperor Charles's efforts to restructure the empire and seek peace.[45] This presented a problem for the Serbian government exiled on the Greek island of Corfu. It increased the risk of a trialist solution for the Habsburg South Slavs if the separate peace treaty materialised, preventing fulfilment of the Serbian war objectives.[47]
Pašić felt he had to come to an agreement with the Yugoslav Committee to strengthen Serbian position with the Entente Powers while countering Italian interests in the Balkans. Trumbić and Pašić met on the Greek island of Corfu where the Serbian government was exiled since the military defeat.[48] The Yugoslav Committee was represented at the conference by Trumbić, Hinković, Vošnjak, Vasiljević, Trinajstić, and Potočnjak. Trumbić received no information on what was to be discussed, so the committee members were unprepared, and instead talked to Pašić individually. Trumbić prioritised receiving assurances that Croatia is not left in Austria-Hungary, and that Italian occupation of Dalmatia should not take place. He also opposed complete centralisation of the proposed union state.[49] The meeting resulted in the Corfu Declaration. It was a manifesto where they declared the common objective of unification of South Slavs in a constitutional, democratic, and parliamentary monarchy headed by the Serbian ruling Karađorđević dynasty. Yugoslavia, the Yugoslav Committee’s preferred name for the unified country was rejected and the bulk of the constitutional matters were left to be decided later as Trumbić felt some agreement was necessary to curb Italian expansion.[48]
Pašić–Trumbić conflict
Relations between Pašić and Trumbić deteriorated throughout 1918 as they openly disagreed on several issues advocated by Trumbić, including the matter of recognition of the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes living in Austria-Hungary as allied peoples, recognition of the Yugoslav Committee as the representative of those peoples and the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes Volunteer Corps (formerly called the First Serbian Volunteer Division) as an allied force drawn from Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes living in Austria-Hungary. After being denied by Pašić, Trumbić was authorised by the Yugoslav Committee to bypass Pašić and present the Entente Powers directly with those demands.[50] Serbian government denied the Yugoslav Committee any agency, claiming it alone represented all South Slavs, including those living in Austria-Hungary.[51]
Pašić requested the Entente Powers to issue a declaration recognising Serbia the right to liberate and unify territories with Serbia, but this was unsuccessful. He stated that Yugoslavia would be absorbed by Serbia and not the other way around, and that Serbia was primarily waging war to liberate Serbs, and that it was Pašić who created the Yugoslav Committee. He rebuffed Trumbić's claim that only one third of population of the future union lived in Serbia and that the Corfu Declaration called for two partners by saying that the declaration was only for the foreigners and was not valid anymore. French and British governments declined two Serbian requests for the authority to annex South Slavic Austro-Hungarian lands and the British foreign secretary Arthur Balfour upheld the Corfu Declaration as an agreement of partners, demanding that Pašić aligns his views with those of the Yugoslav Committee.[52] On the other hand, the Entente Powers decided against the recognition of the Yugoslav Committee as an allied body in line with wishes of Serbia, informing the committee it would have to come to an agreement with Pašić.[53]
Potential preservation of Austria-Hungary also caused friction between Trumbić and Pašić.[54] The Entente Powers continued to separately pursue a peace with Austria-Hungary until early 1918,[55] regardless of the Corfu Declaration. In January 1918, the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom David Lloyd George confirmed his support for the survival of Austria-Hungary. In his Fourteen Points speech, Wilson agreed, by advocating for the autonomy of the peoples of Austria-Hungary.[56] In October, Lloyd George discussed potential preservation of a reformed Austria-Hungary with Pašić, observing that Serbia could annex any areas occupied by the Royal Serbian Army occupied before an armistice.[57] In return, Trumbić asked Wilson to deploy US troops to Croatia-Slavonia to quell disorder associated with the Green Cadres, and stem the tide of Bolshevism, and not to allow Italian or Serbian troops into the territory, but was not successful.[58]
Geneva Declaration
In the process of dissolution of Austria-Hungary, following the monarchy's military defeat in 1918, the State of Slovenes, Croats and Serbs was proclaimed in the South Slavic-inhabited lands of the former empire. The state was governed by the Croat-Serb Coalition-dominated National Council,[59] and it authorised the Yugoslav Committee to speak on behalf of the Council in international relations.[60] In late October 1918, the Croatian Sabor declared the end of ties with Austria-Hungary and elected the president of the National Council, Slovene politician Anton Korošec the president of the State of Slovenes, Croats and Serbs.[61]
Trumbić and Pašić met again in November in Geneva, joined by Korošec and representatives of Serbian opposition parties, to discuss unification. At the conference, Pašić was isolated and ultimately compelled to recognise the National Council as an equal partner to Serbian government. Trumbić obtained agreement from other conference participants on the establishment of a common government, where the National Council and the government of Serbia would appoint an equal number of ministers to govern a common confederal state.[62] Pašić only consented after receiving a message from the President of France Raymond Poincaré that he wished Pašić to come to an agreement with the representatives of the National Council.[63] In return, the National Council and the Yugoslav Committee agreed to a speedy unification, and signed the Geneva Declaration.[64]
A week later, however, prompted by Pašić, the Serbian government renounced the Declaration, complaining that it limited Serbian sovereignty to its pre-war borders. Vice president of the National Council, Croatian Serb politician Svetozar Pribičević supported the repudiation of the Geneva Agreement and successfully swayed the National Council against the position negotiated by Trumbić. Pribičević persuaded the Council members to proceed with unification and that details could be arranged afterwards.[62]
Aftermath
Confronted by civil unrest and a reported coup d'état conspiracy, the National Council requested help from the Serbian Army to quell the violence. At the same time, the council hoped the move would cause the Italian Army to stop its advance from the west, where it had seized Rijeka and was approaching Ljubljana.[65] Having no legal means to stop the Italian advance that was authorised by the Entente Powers, nor having forces sufficient to stop it, the National Council feared that the Italian presence on the eastern shores of the Adriatic would become permanent.[66] Pressed by the combined threats, the National Council dispatched a delegation to Prince Regent Alexander to arrange an urgent unification in a federation. The delegation ignored the instructions when it addressed the Prince Regent, omitting any terms of unification. The Prince Regent accepted the offer on behalf of Peter I of Serbia,[67] and the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes (subsequently renamed Yugoslavia) was established without any agreement on the conditions of the union.[68] Mate Drinković, a member of the delegation, informed Trumbić in a letter that the unification was proclaimed under such conditions, claiming otherwise was impossible.[69]
Trumbić appointed Trinajstić as his replacement at the helm of the Yugoslav Committee in early 1919. The newly appointed prime minister of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes Stojan Protić instructed the Yugoslav Committee to dissolve. On 12 February, Trinajstić convened a meeting, with Trumbić attending, where the majority of the committee members decided not to dissolve the body, despite Protić's instructions. Nonetheless, the Yugoslav Committee ceased to exist in March 1919.[70]
Czech historian Milada Paulová wrote a book examining the relationship between the Yugoslav Committee and the Serbian government, and its translation was published in 1925. She pointed out out that the committee had to fight for an equal position while Pašić's actions were guided by Serbian nationalism. Paulová's work had an impact on Yugoslav historiography, especially Slovene and Croatian, and contributed to the interwar period debate on the levels of Yugoslavism espoused by the Yugoslav Committee and the Pašić government. In the Communist Yugoslavia, the work of the Yugoslav Committee started to be re-examined from late 1950s – and the results exhibited the first post-war disagreements between Croatian and Serbian historiographies. Specifically, at the 1961 congress of the union of historians in Ljubljana, Franjo Tuđman argued that the Serbian government aspired to hegemony and criticised fellow historian Jovan Marjanović who had claimed otherwise. In 1965, the Zagreb-based Yugoslav Academy of Sciences and Arts published a book emphasising the Yugoslav Committee's contribution to creation of Yugoslavia.[71]
Notes
- ↑ Coined by compounding Croatian nouns 'jug' and 'Slaveni', meaning South and Slavs, respectively.[3]
- ↑ Some sources also refer to it as the Yugoslav nationalism,[5] or Yugoslavdom.[6]
- ↑ Supilo co-founded the Croat-Serb Coalition with Svetozar Pribičević, but left it following the Agram Trial and especially the Friedjung Trial initiated by the coalition and Supilo disappointed in lack of support from the coalition. He was replaced by Ivan Lorković as co-chairman of the coalition. The move left Pribičević in effective control of the coalition.[15]
References
- 1 2 Headlam 1911, pp. 2–39.
- ↑ Rusinow 2003, p. 12.
- 1 2 3 Cipek 2003, p. 72.
- ↑ Glenny 2012, p. 57.
- ↑ Glenny 2012, p. 536.
- ↑ Wachtel 1998, p. 242.
- ↑ Cipek 2003, pp. 72–73.
- ↑ Rusinow 2003, p. 23.
- ↑ Rusinow 2003, pp. 16–17.
- ↑ Pavlowitch 2003b, p. 59.
- ↑ Ramet 2006, p. 37.
- ↑ Rusinow 2003, pp. 25–26.
- 1 2 3 Boban 2019, p. 17.
- 1 2 Banac 1984, p. 118.
- ↑ Boban 2019, p. 9.
- ↑ Boban 2019, p. 18.
- ↑ Evans 2008, pp. 159–160.
- ↑ Pavlowitch 2003a, p. 29.
- 1 2 3 4 Banac 1984, pp. 118–119.
- 1 2 3 Lampe 2000, pp. 102–103.
- 1 2 Ramet 2006, p. 40.
- ↑ Pavlović 2008, p. 70.
- ↑ Boban 2019, p. 19.
- 1 2 3 Ramet 2006, pp. 41–42.
- ↑ Banac 1984, p. 119.
- ↑ Boban 2019, pp. 19–20.
- 1 2 Banac 1984, pp. 119–120.
- ↑ Robbins 1971, p. 574.
- 1 2 Robbins 1971, pp. 565–570.
- ↑ Mastilović 2012, p. 277.
- ↑ Boban 2019, pp. 20–21.
- ↑ Machiedo Mladinić 2007, p. 138.
- ↑ Leček 1998.
- ↑ Boban 2019, p. 21.
- ↑ Mastilović 2012, p. 286.
- ↑ Antoličič 2020, p. 75.
- ↑ Hameršak 2005, p. 107.
- ↑ Stančić 2014, p. 93.
- ↑ Boban 2019, pp. 21–22.
- ↑ Banac 2019, pp. 21–22.
- ↑ Banac 2019, p. 23.
- 1 2 Banac 1984, pp. 120–121.
- 1 2 Boban 2019, pp. 26–28.
- ↑ Banac 1984, pp. 121–122.
- 1 2 3 Boban 2019, p. 36.
- ↑ Banac 1984, p. 123.
- 1 2 Pavlowitch 2003a, p. 33.
- 1 2 Banac 1984, pp. 123–124.
- ↑ Banac 2019, pp. 37–39.
- ↑ Janković 1964, pp. 229–230.
- ↑ Evans 2008, p. 168.
- ↑ Boban 2019, pp. 66–70.
- ↑ Boban 2019, p. 75.
- ↑ Janković 1964, p. 229.
- ↑ Jelavich & Jelavich 2000, p. 300.
- ↑ Sovilj 2018, p. 1344.
- ↑ Sovilj 2018, pp. 1347–1349.
- ↑ Janković 1964, p. 228.
- ↑ Banac 1984, p. 127.
- ↑ Matijević 2008, p. 50.
- ↑ Ramet 2006, pp. 42–43.
- 1 2 Banac 1984, pp. 124–128.
- ↑ Janković 1964, pp. 246–247.
- ↑ Banac 1984, pp. 134–135.
- ↑ Ramet 2006, p. 44.
- ↑ Pavlović 2019, p. 275.
- ↑ Ramet 2006, pp. 44–45.
- ↑ Pavlović 2019, p. 276.
- ↑ Krizman 1970, p. 23.
- ↑ Machiedo Mladinić 2007, p. 154.
- ↑ Sretenović 2021, p. 280.
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