1873年恐慌
1873年恐慌(英語:)是出发了1873年至1877年或1879年欧洲和北美经济萧条的金融危机,即长萧条。恐慌最初来自奥匈帝国维也纳,后扩散至欧美地区。
The Panic of 1873 was a 金融危机 that triggered an economic depression in 欧洲 and 北美洲 that lasted from 1873 to 1877 or 1879 in 法国 and in 英国. In Britain, the Panic started two decades of 经济停滞 known as the "长期萧条" that weakened the country's economic leadership.[1] In the 美国, the Panic was known as the "Great Depression" until the 大萧条 set a new standard.[2]
The Panic of 1873 and the subsequent depression had several underlying causes for which economic historians debate the relative importance. American 通货膨胀, rampant speculative investments (overwhelmingly in railroads), the demonetization of silver in 德国 and the United States, ripples from economic dislocation in Europe resulting from the 普法戰爭 (1870–1871), and major property losses in the 芝加哥大火 (1871) and the Great Boston Fire (1872) helped to place massive strain on 銀行準備, which, in 纽约, plummeted from $50 million to $17 million between September and October 1873.
The first symptoms of the crisis were financial failures in 維也納, the capital of 奥匈帝国, which spread to most of Europe and to North America by 1873.
美國
因素
The 南北战争 (1861–1865) was followed by a boom in railroad construction. 33,000英里(53,000) of new track were laid across the country between 1868 and 1873,[3] with much of the craze in railroad investment being driven by government land grants and subsidies to the railroads.[4] The railroad industry was the largest employer outside agriculture in the US and involved large amounts of money and risk. A large infusion of cash from speculators caused spectacular growth in the industry and in the construction of docks, factories, and ancillary facilities. Most 资本 was involved in projects offering no immediate or early returns.[5]
Coinage Act of 1873
A period of economic overexpansion arose from the northern railroad boom before a series of economic setbacks: the 黑色星期五 (1869年), the 芝加哥大火, an outbreak of equine influenza and the Boston fire of 1872, and the 1873年硬幣法令.
The decision of the German Empire to cease minting silver 塔勒 coins in 1871 caused a drop in demand and downward pressure on the value of silver, which, in turn, affected the US since much of the supply of silver was mined there. As a result, the 美国国会 passed the 1873年硬幣法令, which changed the national silver policy.
Before the Act, the US had backed its currency with both gold and silver and minted both types of coins. The Act moved the United States to a de facto 金本位, which meant it would no longer buy silver at a statutory price or convert silver from the public into silver coins, but it would still mint silver dollars for export in the form of 贸易银元 (美国).[6]
The Act had the immediate effect of depressing silver prices, hurting Western mining interests, who labeled the Act "The Crime of '73", but its effect was offset somewhat by the introduction of a silver trade dollar for use in Asia and the discovery of new silver deposits at 弗吉尼亚城 (内华达州), that resulted in new investment in mining activity.[7] The Act also reduced the domestic 貨幣供應量, raising interest rates and hurting farmers and others who normally carried heavy debt loads. The resulting outcry raised serious questions about how long the new policy would last.[8] The perception of US instability in its monetary policy caused investors to shy away from long-term obligations, particularly long-term 债券. The problem was compounded by the railroad boom, which was then in its later stages.
In September 1873, the 美國經濟 entered a crisis.
Jay Cooke & Company fails
In September 1873, Jay Cooke & Company, a major component of the country's banking establishment, found itself unable to market several million dollars in Northern Pacific Railway bonds. Jay Cooke's firm, like many others, had invested heavily in the railroads. Some 投资银行 were then anxious for more capital for their enterprises, US President 尤利西斯·格兰特's 货币政策 of contracting the money supply and thus raising interest rates made matters worse for those in debt. Businesses were expanding, but the money they needed to finance that growth was becoming scarcer.
Cooke and other entrepreneurs had planned to build the second transcontinental railroad, the Northern Pacific Railway. Cooke's firm provided the financing, and ground for the line was broken near 杜魯斯, on 15 February 1870. The railroad had borrowed more than $1.5 million from Cooke & Co but were incapable of paying it back.[9] Due to the financial crises in Europe, Cooke couldn't sell the securities abroad.[9] Just as Cooke was about to swing a $300 million government loan in September 1873, reports circulated that his firm's credit had become nearly worthless. On 18 September, the firm declared bankruptcy.[9][10]
Insurance industry
Many US insurance companies went out of business, as the deteriorating financial conditions created solvency problems for life insurers. The common factor of the surviving companies was that all marketed tontines.[11]
Effects
The failure of Jay Cooke's bank and soon afterward of Henry Clews' set off a chain reaction of bank failures and temporarily closed the 纽约证券交易所. Factories began to lay off workers as the country slipped into depression. The effects of the panic were quickly felt in New York and more slowly in Chicago, 弗吉尼亚城 (内华达州) (where silver mining was active), and San Francisco.[12][13]
The New York Stock Exchange closed for ten days starting on 20 September.[14] By November 1873, some 55 of the nation's railroads had failed, and another 60 had gone bankrupt by the first anniversary of the crisis.[15] Construction of new rail lines, formerly one of the backbones of the economy, plummeted from 7,500英里(12,100) of track in 1872 to just 1,600英里(2,600) in 1875,[15] and 18,000 businesses failed between 1873 and 1875. Unemployment peaked in 1878 at 8.25%.[16] Building construction was halted, wages were cut, real estate values fell, and corporate profits vanished.[17]
In 1874, Congress passed a "the Ferry Bill"[18] to allow for the printing of currency, increasing inflation and reducing the value of debts.[19] The bill was vetoed by President Grant.[19] The following year, Congress passed the Specie Resumption Act, which would back United States currency with gold.[19] Backing American currency with gold helped curb inflation and stabilize the dollar.[19]
Railroad strike
The railroad industry in the United States had seen major growth in the decades before 1873, driven in part by strong European interest in bonds issued by railroad companies.[20][21] The failure of Jay Cooke & Co., heavily invested in railroad bonds, triggered a crisis in the railroad industry.
In 1877, steep wage cuts led American railroad workers to launch the series of protests and riots later dubbed 1877年铁路大罢工. Initial protests broke out in 马丁斯堡 (西弗吉尼亚州), after the 巴爾的摩與俄亥俄鐵路 (B&O) cut workers' pay for the third time in a year. 西弗吉尼亚州州长 Henry M. Mathews sent the militia, under Colonel Charles J. Faulkner, to restore order but was unsuccessful, largely because the militia sympathized with the workers. The governor called on US President 拉瑟福德·伯查德·海斯 for federal assistance, and Hayes dispatched federal troops. That restored peace to Martinsburg but proved controversial, with many newspapers critical of Mathews' characterization of the strikes as an "insurrection", rather than an act of desperation and frustration. One notable paper recorded a striking worker's perspective that he "had might as well die by the bullet as to starve to death by inches".
Within a week, similar protests had erupted in other cities.[22][23] In 巴爾的摩 where strikers set fire to buildings owned by B.& O. Railroads and an outnumbered militia guard division opened fire when they were surrounded by rioters, killing 10 and injuring 25 more[24] leading to a days-long standoff at 金鶯公園.
In New York, striking workers began pelting arriving trains with thrown objects, prompting a response from local police.[25] Pennsylvania saw perhaps the worst violence of the railroad strikes;[26][27] see Pittsburgh railroad strike of 1877, Reading Railroad massacre and Scranton general strike. In 芝加哥, striking workers brought freight and passenger trains to a standstill, leading to an order from judge Thomas Drummond that such actions were illegal.[28] The 美国法警 responded by arresting dozens of strikers. In Missouri, strikers also brought rail traffic to a halt, and at least 18 people died in conflicts.[29]
In July 1877, the market for lumber crashed, leading several Michigan lumber companies to go bankrupt.[30] Within a year, the effects of this second business slump reached all the way to California.[31]
Aftermath in the United States
The depression ended in the spring of 1879, but tension between workers and the leaders of banking and manufacturing interests lingered on.
Poor economic conditions also caused voters to turn against the 共和黨 (美國). In the 1874 congressional elections, the 民主党 (美国) assumed control of the House for the first time since the Civil War.[32]
Public opinion made it difficult for the Grant administration to develop a coherent policy on the Southern states, and the North began to steer away from 美國重建時期. With the depression, ambitious railroad building programs crashed across the South, leaving most states deep in debt and burdened with heavy taxes. Retrenchment was a common response of the South to state debts during the depression. One by one, each state fell to the Democrats in the South, and the 共和黨 (美國) lost power.
The end of the crisis coincided with the beginning of the great wave of immigration to the United States, which lasted until the early 1920s.
Europe
The panic and depression hit all of the industrial nations.
Germany and Austria-Hungary
A similar process of overexpansion took place in Germany and Austria-Hungary, where the period from German unification in 1870 and 1871 to the crash in 1873 came to be called the ("Founders' Years"). A liberalized incorporation law in Germany gave impetus to the foundation of new enterprises, such as , and the incorporation of established ones. Euphoria over the military victory against France in 1871 and the influx of capital from the payment by France of war reparations fueled stock market speculation in railways, factories, docks, steamships; the same industrial branches that expanded unsustainably in the United States.[33] In the immediate aftermath of his victory against France, Bismarck began the process of silver demonetization. The process began on 23 November 1871 and culminated in the introduction of the gold mark on 9 July 1873 as the currency for the newly united Reich, replacing the silver coins of all constituent lands. Germany was now on the 金本位.[34] Demonetization of silver was thus a common element in the crises on both sides of the 大西洋.
On 9 May 1873, the Vienna Stock Exchange crashed since it was unable to sustain the bubble of false expansion, insolvencies, and dishonest manipulations. A series of Viennese bank failures ensued, causing a contraction of the money available for business lending. One of the more famous private individuals who went bankrupt in 1873 was Stephan Keglevich of Vienna, a relative of Gábor Keglevich, who had been the master of the royal treasury (1842–1848) and in 1845 had cofounded a financial association to fund the expansion of Hungarian industry and to protect the loan repayments, similar to the 1870 Kreditschutzverband, an Austrian association for the protection of creditors and the interests of its members in cases of bankruptcy. That made it possible for a number of new Austrian banks to be established in 1873 after the Vienna Stock Exchange crash.[35]
In Berlin, the railway empire of Bethel Henry Strousberg crashed after a ruinous settlement with the government of 羅馬尼亞, bursting the speculation bubble in Germany. The contraction of the German economy was exacerbated by the conclusion of war reparations payments to Germany by France in September 1873. Two years after the foundation of the German Empire, the panic came and became known as the or "Founders' Crash".[36][37][38] In 1865, Keglevich and Strousberg had come into direct competition in a project in what is now Slovakia. In 1870 the Hungarian government, and in 1872 the Emperor-King 弗朗茨·约瑟夫一世, resolved the question of the competing projects.[39][40]
Although the collapse of the foreign loan financing had been predicted, the events of that year were in themselves comparatively unimportant. 布达, the old capital of Hungary, and 欧布达 were officially united with Pest,[41] thus creating the new metropolis of 布达佩斯 in 1873. The difference in stability between 維也納 and Berlin had the effect that the French indemnity to Germany flowed into Austria and Russia, but the indemnity payments aggravated the crisis in Austria, which had benefited by the accumulation of capital not only in Germany but also in England, the Netherlands, Belgium, France, and Russia.[42]
Recovery from the crash occurred much more quickly in Europe than in the United States.[43][44] Moreover, German businesses managed to avoid the sort of deep wage cuts that embittered American labor relations.[44] There was an anti-Semitic component to the economic recovery in Germany and Austria, as small investors blamed Jews for their losses in the crash.[45][46] Soon, more luxury hotels and villas were built in 奧帕蒂亞, and a new railway line was extended in 1873 from the Vienna–的里雅斯特 line to 里耶卡 (Fiume), making it possible to go by tram from there to Opatija. The strong increase of port traffic generated a permanent demand for expansion.[47] The 苏伊士运河 was opened in 1869.[48] 1875–1890 became "the golden years" of Giovanni de Ciotta in Rijeka.
Britain
The opening of the 苏伊士运河 in 1869 was one of the causes of the Panic of 1873 because goods from the 遠東 had been carried in sailing vessels around the 好望角 and were stored in British warehouses. As sailing vessels were not adaptable for use through the Suez Canal (because the prevailing winds of the 地中海 blow from west to east), the British 轉口港 trade suffered.[49]
When the crisis came, the 英格兰银行 raised interest rates to 9 percent. Despite this, Britain did not experience the scale of financial mayhem seen in America and Central Europe, perhaps forestalled by an expectation that the liquidity-constraining provisions of the 1844年銀行特許狀法令 would be suspended as they had been in the crises of 1847, 1857, and 1866. The ensuing economic downturn in Britain seems to have been muted – "stagnant" but without a "decline in aggregate output".[50] However, there was heavy unemployment in the basic industries of coal, iron and steel, engineering, and shipbuilding, especially in 1873, 1886, and 1893.[51]
Comparison with Germany
From 1873 to 1896, a period sometimes referred to as the Long Depression, most European countries experienced a drastic fall in prices. Still, many corporations were able to reduce production costs and achieve better productivity rates with industrial production increasing by 40% in Britain and by over 100% in Germany. A comparison of capital formation rates in both countries helps to account for the different industrial growth rates. During the depression, the British ratio of net national capital formation to net national product fell from 11.5% to 6.0%, but the German ratio rose from 10.6% to 15.9%. During the depression, Britain took the course of static supply adjustment, but Germany stimulated effective demand and expanded industrial supply capacity by increasing and adjusting capital formation. For example, Germany dramatically increased investment of social overhead capital, such as in the management of electric power transmission lines, roads, and railroads, thereby stimulating industrial demand in that country, but similar investment stagnated or decreased in Britain. The resulting difference in capital formation accounts for the divergent levels of industrial production in the two countries and the different growth rates during and after the depression.[52]
奥斯曼帝国
奧斯曼帝國的經濟也受到了影響。對外貿易增長率下降,對外貿易條件惡化,小麥價格下跌影響了農民生產者,歐洲對奧斯曼財政的控制導致了海外巨額債務支付。長期蕭條時期農業和總產的增長率也低於後期。[54]
拉丁貨幣同盟
白銀的普遍非貨幣化和貶值導致拉丁貨幣同盟在1873年暫停將白銀轉換為硬幣。
全球保護主義
After the 1873 depression, agricultural and industrial groups lobbied for protective 关税s. The 1879 tariffs protected these interests, stimulated economic revival through state intervention, and refurbished political support for the conservative politicians 奥托·冯·俾斯麦 in Germany and 约翰·亚历山大·麦克唐纳 in Canada. Bismarck gradually veered away from classical liberal economic policies in the 1870s, embracing many economic interventionist policies, including high tariffs, 國有化 of railroads, and compulsory social insurance.[55][56][57] The political and 經濟民族主義 also reduced the fortunes of the German and Canadian classical liberal parties. France, like Britain, also entered into a prolonged stagnation that extended to 1897. The French also attempted to deal with their economic problems by the implementation of tariffs. New French laws in 1880 and in 1892 imposed stiff tariffs on many agricultural and industrial imports.[58] The U.S., still in the period after the 南北战争, continued to be very protectionist.[59][60]
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