In May 2017 Palestinian political and military organization Hamas unveiled A Document of General Principles and Policies (وثيقة المبادئ والسياسات العامة لحركة حماس), often referred to as the new or revised Hamas charter. It advocated for a Palestinian state in the 1967 borders, describing this as a "formula of national consensus". It also referred to Israel as an "illegal entity" and retained the organization's commitment to armed struggle.

While the 1988 Hamas Charter had been widely criticized for its antisemitism, the 2017 document stated that Hamas' fight was not with Jews as such because of their religion but with the Zionist project. However, Hamas fell short of repudiating the original, 1988 charter, saying it was a document of its time and the new document represented Hamas's position for now.

Views on the 2017 document varied. While some welcomed it as a sign of pragmatism and increased political maturity, and a potential step on the way to peace, many others dismissed it as a merely cosmetic effort designed to make Hamas sound more palatable while changing nothing about Hamas' underlying aims and methods.[1][2]

Presentation

Hamas leader Khaled Mashal presented the new document at a press conference in Doha on 1 May 2017

Hamas leader Khaled Mashal presented the document at a press conference in Doha on 1 May 2017,[3][4] shortly before being replaced as leader by Ismail Haniyeh.[5] The new document was the result of years of internal discussions; many Hamas members still regarded its text as controversial.[6]

In his presentation, Mashal described the Hamas movement as following a middle way between two poles: extremism (tatarruf or tashaddud) and flexibility (muyu'a, literally: "liquidity").[4] In comparison to the Hamas Charter of 1988, which was marked by religious rhetoric and utopian ideas, the newer document was characterized by simple and mostly pragmatic political language.[7] It contained a preamble and 42 paragraphs in which Hamas outlined its positions on the fundamental aspects of the Arab–Israeli conflict.[7] The document affirmed the movement's adherence to its founding principles, but also left open gray areas to allow Hamas political room for maneuver in the future.[7]

In a departure from the tone of the original charter, which presented the fight against Israel as a religious struggle, the new document said that there was a nationalist conflict "with the Zionist project not with the Jews because of their religion".[7][6] However, the old charter, which was much criticized for its antisemitic language, was not explicitly revoked[8] When asked, Hamas leaders explained: "The original charter has now become a historical document and part of an earlier stage in our evolution. It will remain in the movement's bookshelf as a record of our past."[6] Mashal stated that the new document reflected "our position for now, which means that we are not a rigid ideological organization ... The old charter was a product of its era, 30 years ago. We live in a different world today."[9] Hamas also declared its willingness to support any peace agreement accepted in a popular referendum and distanced itself from all foreign Islamic organisations, including the Muslim Brotherhood, which, having lost power in Egypt, had come to be classed as a terrorist organization there.[6][10] The Brotherhood is not even mentioned by name in the new document, although there are still traceable echoes of their ideology.[4][11]

Contents

The document was published in two languages: Arabic and English.[3] There are some slight differences between the two language versions, but these are not significant.[12] They mainly concern differences in nuance and connotation.[3]

The Charter was notable for describing a Palestinian state with the 1967 borders as a "formula of national consensus" while at the same time rejecting "any alternative to the full and complete liberation of Palestine, from the river to the sea".[7]

Preamble

The preamble of the document contains the following non-religious definition of Palestine: "Palestine is the land of the Arab Palestinian people, from it they originate, to it they adhere and belong, and about it they reach out and communicate." This formulation differs significantly from the 1988 Charter, in which Palestine is described as an "Islamic endowment" (waqf) belonging to the entire Muslim nation.[7][6] Rhetorically, however, the new document also affirms the Islamic aspect with the following statement: "Palestine is the spirit of the Ummah and its central cause; it is the soul of humanity and its living conscience."[7]

Paragraphs 1–42

The first paragraph describes Hamas as a nationalist liberation and resistance movement characterized by Islam.[11] Under the heading "The Land of Palestine" (paragraph 2), the document then names the geographical borders of Palestine, which extends "from the River Jordan in the east to the Mediterranean in the west and from Ras Al-Naqurah in the north to Umm Al-Rashrash in the south". Here it is affirmed that Palestine "is an integral territorial unit. It is the land and the home of the Palestinian people". This clear and precise nationalist definition is followed by a general Islamic reference (paragraph 3): "Palestine is an Arab Islamic land. It is a blessed sacred land that has a special place in the heart of every Arab and every Muslim."[7]

This is followed by a definition of Palestinians (paragraphs 4 to 6): "The Palestinians are the Arabs who lived in Palestine until 1947, irrespective of whether they were expelled from it, or stayed in it; and every person that was born to an Arab Palestinian father after that date, whether inside or outside Palestine, is a Palestinian. ... The Palestinian identity is authentic and timeless; it is passed from generation to generation."[7]

The following part (paragraphs 7 to 11) describes Palestine as the heart of the Arab and Islamic Ummah and emphasizes the special status of Jerusalem in Islam.[13] In the next part (paragraphs 12 and 13), the right of the displaced Palestinians to return to their homeland is postulated to exist under divine law, human rights law and international law.[14]

The "Zionist project" (paragraphs 14 to 17) is described as a "racist, aggressive, colonial and expansionist project based on seizing the properties of others" that is hostile to the Palestinian people and their aspirations for freedom, return and self-determination.[15] This project, the document says, not only poses a threat to the Palestinians, but also threatens the "security and interests" of the entire Arab and Islamic Ummah.[15] The document goes on to state that the conflict revolves solely around this project and that there is no religiously based conflict with Jews.[7][6] It states that "Hamas rejects the persecution of any human being or the undermining of his or her rights on nationalist, religious or sectarian grounds. Hamas is of the view that the Jewish problem, anti-Semitism and the persecution of the Jews are phenomena fundamentally linked to European history and not to the history of the Arabs and the Muslims or to their heritage."[3][16]

Under the heading "The position toward Occupation and Political Solutions" (paragraphs 18 to 23), the document describes the two-state solution, i.e. the creation of an independent Palestinian state according to the 1967 borders with Jerusalem as its capital, as a "formula of national consensus", but without giving up the claim to the whole of Palestine, "from the river to the sea", and "without compromising its rejection of the Zionist entity."[7] Rickard Lagervall viewed this as an "ambiguous formulation".[11] Israeli colonel Shaul Bartal assessed the two-state solution as a temporary stage and the long-term goal remained the liberation of the whole of Palestine.[17] The agreements reached in the Oslo Accords are criticized and rejected as incompatible with international law.[7] The state of Israel, created with the help of Western nations, is still regarded as "completely illegal" (bâtil in Arabic, a word that also has religious connotations).[3]

The section on "Resistance and Liberation" (paragraphs 24 to 26) also refers to international law and states that this legitimizes armed resistance against an occupying power, with armed resistance seen as "the strategic choice for protecting the principles and the rights of the Palestinian people".[7][3] At the same time, the document speaks of "diversifying the means and methods" of resistance and its "escalation and de-escalation".[3]

In the section "The Palestinian Political System" (paragraphs 27 to 34), the document adopts a very conciliatory tone – commonalities with other Palestinian groups are emphasized, differences are downplayed.[6] The national role of the PLO and the Palestinian Authority is explicitly recognized, and the document concludes by referring in secular language to the "fundamental" role of Palestinian women in the "project of resistance, liberation and building the political system."[7]

In the last two sections titled "The Arab and Islamic Ummah" (paragraphs 35 to 37) and "The Humanitarian and International Aspect" (paragraphs 38 to 42) Hamas makes it clear that it has no interest in interfering in the internal affairs of other countries in the region that have seen upheaval as part of the Arab Spring uprisings.[7]

Reception

The reception of the paper ranged from cautious welcomes to harshest rejection by those viewing it as a deceptive, merely cosmetic PR exercise.

Mohammed Ayoob, Distinguished Professor of International Relations at Michigan State University, and Danielle Nicole Lussier saw the policy paper as a sign of "pragmatism", as it left open the possibility of a two-state solution and expressed willingness to co-operate with the Palestinian Authority.[18] Khaled Hroub (University of Cambridge) wrote that with the paper, Hamas wanted to distance itself from the reputation of a terrorist organisation and instead "present itself as a responsible political partner whose leadership had won free and fair elections and was able to speak the language of politics and resistance in its own way."[7][18]

Beverley Milton-Edwards, a political scientist at the University of Belfast, said the declaration was an important starting point for future peace negotiations, one that other Arab parties to the conflict such as Syria, Egypt and the PLO had also advocated as part of a formula for resolving the conflicts and building peace.[19] Muhammad Abu Saada, a professor at Al-Azhar University in Gaza, said: "Hamas is trying to walk a fine line between its hardliners and its own moderates [...] In one way, the moderates can say they accepted a Palestinian state on the 1967 borders, but the hardliners can still say they are not recognising Israel."[20]

Azzam Tamimi, a British-Palestinian political scientist close to the Hamas movement[21] said that the new document would "practically" replace the founding charter of 1988.[20] Mustafa Barghouti, party chairman of the Palestinian National Initiative, said, "Acceptance of a Palestinian state along the 1967 borders ... means accepting a two-state solution"[20] and described the document as "a sign of maturity and a sign of political development."[22] Michael Schulz (Gothenburg University) thought the statement on the two-state solution being a "formula of national consensus" showed a readiness on the part of Hamas to accept such a solution permanently even if it wasn't its own preference, provided it could be shown to be the declared will of the Palestinian people.[10] According to Schulz, this would require a legitimate future referendum involving all Palestinians living in the West Bank, Gaza and East Jerusalem as well as those living in the Diaspora.[10] Tristan Dunning, a political scientist at the University of Queensland, wrote in 2017 that Hamas had been open to some kind of permanent solution with Israel since the mid-1990s. The changes to the charter were therefore "positive and long overdue but, in many ways, [...] perhaps too little, too late to make any meaningful change to the dynamics of the Palestine-Israel conflict."[23] The Palestinian Authority's Mohammed Shtayyeh accused Hamas of being decades behind in its thinking, telling CNN: "Hamas is debating things [the PLO] did 43 years ago."[22]

Jerome Slater (Professor Emeritus, State University of New York at Buffalo) pointed out that while the document seemed to accept an Israel within the 1967 borders, it also called for the right of Palestinians to return to their original homes, now in Israel.[24] That represented an obvious logical contradiction, but an Israeli government genuinely interested in a political settlement would have used the new charter and other signs of moderation on the part of Hamas as a basis for further talks, which did not happen.[24] This argument us also raised by Joseph Spoerl, a researcher of Islam at Saint Anselm College. Spoerl further claims that anti-Semitism is still central to Hamas ideology and one cannot take seriosly Hamas' statement, expressed in the new charter, that their conflict is wth the Zionist who occupy Palestine and not with the Jews.[25]

Jonathan A. Greenblatt, director of the Anti-Defamation League, said the "new charter does little to advance peace but does much to sustain conflict."[26] Journalist Tim Aßmann saw a more moderate choice of words in the policy paper, but no significant change in Hamas' position.[27] Matthew Levitt and Maxine Rich, researchers at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, saw the document as an attempt by Hamas to present itself in a more moderate light in order to gain greater international support, given its now more tenuous relations with Iran, the Egyptian government's fight against the Muslim Brotherhood and the bleak economic situation in the Gaza Strip, recently exacerbated by an energy crisis.[28][29]

Shaul Bartal, an Israeli military analyst and lecturer in Palestinian affairs at Bar-Ilan University, stated that the Palestinian state created by a two-state solution would then be a state without concessions regarding Palestinians' right of return and without a permanent solution that would also be binding for future generations.[17] David Keyes, spokesman for Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu from 2016 to 2018, described the policy paper as an attempt by Hamas "to fool the world."[20] Netanyahu himself crumpled up a copy of the document on camera and threw it in a wastepaper basket.[7][30] "The new Hamas document says that Israel has no right to exist, it says every inch of our land belongs to the Palestinians, it says there is no acceptable solution other than to remove Israel ... they want to use their state to destroy our state," Netanyahu said.[30]

The Israeli Meir Amit Intelligence and Terrorism Information Centre assessed that the 2017 Hamas document presented "no change in Hamas's basic ideology and principles, which are based on an uncompromising effort to destroy Israel through violence and terrorism, even if this is carried out in stages (presenting conditional willingness to establish a Palestinian state within the 1967 borders). The adjustments, changes and additions that appear in the Political Document are intended to present the appearance of Hamas's renewal and adaptation to the current reality, but without any significant change in the principles and basic perception that constitute the core of the Document."[12] In the European Union, the US and Russia, the new document was also received rather coldly, much to Hamas's surprise and dismay; internal critics of the document saw themselves vindicated and became louder again.[31]

Post-October 7 asessments

According to extremism researcher Armin Pfahl-Traughber, who pointed out the continuities in the 2017 document compared to the earlier one, the "formal moderation" of the new charter had "a clear objective", namely "strategic deception". In his view, its use of "from the river to the sea" alone implied "a corresponding intention of destruction characterized by violence" towards the state of Israel, and he viewed Hamas's October 2023 attack on Israel as but the latest illustration of this.[32] The Wilson Center's Mark A. Green noted that while Hamas said in its 2017 charter that it "rejects the persecution of any human being or the undermining of his or her rights on nationalist, religious or sectarian grounds," it nevertheless carried out a terrorist attack on Israel on 7 October 2023 that killed around 1,200 people in Israel.[33] Thus, in reality, little had changed since Hamas' antisemitic, anti-human and jihadist beginnings: "In 2017, Hamas dressed up their terrorist objectives in more ambiguous, less violent terms. But in 2023, they made clear what they really stood for—in President Biden's words, 'the destruction of the State of Israel and the murder of Jewish people.'"

Daniel Byman (Georgetown University) and Mackenzie Holtz, in an analysis for the Center for Strategic and International Studies on December 6, 2023, said the negative reactions to the new charter could partly explain Hamas' terrorist attack on Israel on October 7: Netanyahu binned the document, wanted to cut funding for the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine, and gave a platform to far-right ideologues such as Bezalel Smotrich.[34] There was thus no incentive for moderation, probably making the idea of a large-scale attack more attractive.[34] To support this view, Byman and Holtz cited an interview statement by Hamas official Basem Naim: "We knew there was going to be a violent reaction. ... But we didn't choose this road while having other options. We have no options."[34] Yahya Sinwar, the political and military leader of Hamas in Gaza, reportedly supported the new charter but then took a more extreme position when it failed to lead to a political settlement with Israel.[35]

References

  1. ↑ Clarke, Colin P. (17 May 2017). "Hamas's Strategic Rebranding".
  2. ↑ Spoerl, Joseph S. (2020). "Parallels between Nazi and Islamist Anti-Semitism". Jewish Political Studies Review. 31 (1/2): 210–244. ISSN 0792-335X.
  3. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Jean-François Legrain: Hamas according to Hamas: A reading of its Document of General Principles. In: Shahram Akbarzadeh (Hrsg.): Routledge Handbook of Political Islam, Routledge, London 2020, pp. 79–90.
  4. 1 2 3 Sagi Polka: Hamas as a Wasati (Literally: Centrist) Movement: Pragmatism within the Boundaries of the Sharia. In: Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, Vol. 42, No. 7, 2019, p. 683–713, doi:10.1080/1057610X.2017.1402432
  5. ↑ Al-Mughrabi, Nidal (2017-05-06). "Hamas elects former deputy Haniyeh as new political chief". Reuters. Retrieved 2023-12-08.
  6. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Brenner, Bjorn (2021-11-30). Gaza Under Hamas: From Islamic Democracy to Islamist Governance. Bloomsbury Academic. pp. 205–207. ISBN 978-0-7556-3439-2.
  7. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 Khaled Hroub: A Newer Hamas? The Revised Charter. In: Journal of Palestine Studies. Vol. 46, No. 4 (184), Summer 2017, p. 100–111.
  8. ↑ Seurat, Leila (2019). The Foreign Policy of Hamas. Bloomsbury. pp. 61–62. ISBN 9781838607449.
  9. ↑ Younes, Ali (2 May 2017). "Meshaal: Hamas is not a rigid ideological organisation". Al Jazeera. Retrieved 2023-12-07.
  10. 1 2 3 Schulz, Michael (2020-11-03). Between Resistance, Sharia Law, and Demo-Islamic Politics. Rowman & Littlefield. p. 70. ISBN 978-1-5381-4610-1.
  11. 1 2 3 Rickard Lagervall: The Muslim Brotherhood. In: Muhammad Afzal Upal, Carole M. Cusack (eds.): Handbook of Islamic Sects and Movements. Brill, Leiden 2021, p. 82.
  12. 1 2 Meir Amit Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center: The goals and significance of Hamas's new political document. 8 May 2017, pp. 3–5 (PDF).
  13. ↑ Luz, Nimrod (2023-09-07). The Politics of Sacred Places: A View from Israel-Palestine. Bloomsbury Publishing. p. 163. ISBN 978-1-350-29573-5.
  14. ↑ "Charters of Hamas". Contemporary Review of the Middle East. 4 (4): 393–418. 2017-11-01. doi:10.1177/2347798917727905. ISSN 2347-7989.
  15. 1 2 Schulz, Michael (2020-11-03). Between Resistance, Sharia Law, and Demo-Islamic Politics. Rowman & Littlefield. p. 72. ISBN 978-1-5381-4610-1.
  16. ↑ Alsoos, Imad (2021-09-03). "From jihad to resistance: the evolution of Hamas's discourse in the framework of mobilization". Middle Eastern Studies. 57 (5): 833–856. doi:10.1080/00263206.2021.1897006. ISSN 0026-3206.
  17. 1 2 Bartal, Shaul (2021). "Ḥamās: The Islamic Resistance Movement". In Upal, Muhammad Afzal; Cusack, Carole M. (eds.). Handbook of Islamic Sects and Movements. Brill. p. 397. ISBN 978-90-04-42525-5. JSTOR 10.1163/j.ctv1v7zbv8.23. Retrieved 2023-11-26.
  18. 1 2 Ayoob, Mohammed; Lussier, Danielle Nicole (2020). The Many Faces of Political Islam: Religion and Politics in Muslim Societies. University of Michigan Press. p. 135. ISBN 978-0-472-03765-0.
  19. ↑ "Ausgangspunkt für Friedensverhandlungen" – DW, 2 May 2017 (in German)
  20. 1 2 3 4 Hamas accepts Palestinian state with 1967 borders, Al Jazeera, 2 May 2017.
  21. ↑ Khaled Hroub: Recent Books: Insiders' Views of Hamas. In: Journal of Palestine Studies. Vol. 37, No. 3, Spring 2008, pp. 93–96. Taylor & Francis, Ltd.
  22. 1 2 Hamas presents new policy document, CNN, 3 May 2017.
  23. ↑ New Hamas Charter: Too little, too late? (newarab.com), 2 May 2017.
  24. 1 2 Slater, Jerome (2020). Mythologies Without End: The US, Israel, and the Arab-Israeli Conflict, 1917-2020. Oxford University Press. pp. 333–334. ISBN 978-0-19-045909-3.
  25. ↑ Spoerl, Joseph S. (2020). "Parallels between Nazi and Islamist Anti-Semitism". Jewish Political Studies Review. 31 (1/2): 210–244. ISSN 0792-335X.
  26. ↑ Hamas: New Charter, Same Old Anti-Semitism | ADL, 3 May 2017, retrieved 5 November 2023.
  27. ↑ Sinneswandel oder Lippenbekenntnis? – DW, 3 May 2017.
  28. ↑ "Hamas's Moderate Rhetoric Belies Militant Activities | The Washington Institute". www.washingtoninstitute.org. Retrieved 2023-12-19.
  29. ↑ Ljiljana Radonić: New Antisemitism and New Media: Leftist Derealization of Islamist "Emancipation". In: Armin Lange, Kerstin Mayerhofer, Dina Porat, Lawrence H. Schiffman (eds.): Confronting Antisemitism in Modern Media, the Legal and Political Worlds. De Gruyter, Berlin / Boston 2021, ISBN 978-3-11-058243-7, pp. 111f.
  30. 1 2 "Netanyahu tosses Hamas policy paper on Israel into waste bin". The Jerusalem Post. 2017-05-08. Retrieved 2023-11-25.
  31. ↑ Brenner, Bjorn (2021-11-30). Gaza Under Hamas: From Islamic Democracy to Islamist Governance. Bloomsbury Academic. pp. 208–209. ISBN 978-0-7556-3439-2.
  32. ↑ Armin Pfahl-Traughber: Antisemitismus und Antizionismus in der ersten und zweiten Charta der Hamas www.bpb.de, 8 November 2023.
  33. ↑ Hamas: Words and Deeds..., Wilson Center, 24 October 2023.
  34. 1 2 3 Daniel Byman and Mackenzie Holtz, Why Hamas Attacked When It Did, Center for Strategic and International Studies, 6 December 2023.
  35. ↑ "Does Hamas want to keep fighting Israel or start talking peace?". The Economist. 2023-11-30. ISSN 0013-0613. Archived from the original on 2023-11-30. Retrieved 2023-12-08.
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