Asynchrony (game theory)

In game theory, asynchrony occurs when gameplay does not proceed in consistently paced rounds. A system is synchronous if agents in a game move in lockstep according to a global timing system, whereas "in an asynchronous system, there is no global clock. The agents in the system can run at arbitrary rates relative to each other."^[1]

External links

Abraham, I., Alvisi, L., & Halpern, J. Y. (2011). Distributed computing meets game theory: combining insights from two fields. Acm Sigact News, 42(2), 69–76.

Ben-Or, M. (1983). Another Advantage of Free Choice: Completely Asynchronous Agreement Protocols. In Proc. 2nd ACM Symp. on Principles of Distributed Computing, pp. 27–30.

Solodkin, L., & Oshman, R. (2021). Truthful Information Dissemination in General Asynchronous Networks. In 35th International Symposium on Distributed Computing (DISC 2021). Schloss Dagstuhl-Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik. https://drops.dagstuhl.de/opus/volltexte/2021/14839/pdf/LIPIcs-DISC-2021-37.pdf

Yifrach, A., & Mansour, Y. (2018, July). Fair leader election for rational agents in asynchronous rings and networks. In Proceedings of the 2018 ACM Symposium on Principles of Distributed Computing (pp. 217-226). https://arxiv.org/pdf/1805.04778.pdf

References

↑ Halpern, J. Y. (2003). A computer scientist looks at game theory. Games and Economic Behavior, 45(1), p. 120

Topics in game theory
Definitions	Congestion game Cooperative game Determinacy Escalation of commitment Extensive-form game First-player and second-player win Game complexity Graphical game Hierarchy of beliefs Information set Normal-form game Preference Sequential game Simultaneous game Simultaneous action selection Solved game Succinct game
Equilibrium concepts	Bayesian Nash equilibrium Berge equilibrium Core Correlated equilibrium Epsilon-equilibrium Evolutionarily stable strategy Gibbs equilibrium Mertens-stable equilibrium Markov perfect equilibrium Nash equilibrium Pareto efficiency Perfect Bayesian equilibrium Proper equilibrium Quantal response equilibrium Quasi-perfect equilibrium Risk dominance Satisfaction equilibrium Self-confirming equilibrium Sequential equilibrium Shapley value Strong Nash equilibrium Subgame perfection Trembling hand
Strategies	Backward induction Bid shading Collusion Forward induction Grim trigger Markov strategy Dominant strategies Pure strategy Mixed strategy Strategy-stealing argument Tit for tat
Classes of games	Bargaining problem Cheap talk Global game Intransitive game Mean-field game Mechanism design n-player game Perfect information Large Poisson game Potential game Repeated game Screening game Signaling game Stackelberg competition Strictly determined game Stochastic game Symmetric game Zero-sum game
Games	Go Chess Infinite chess Checkers Tic-tac-toe Prisoner's dilemma Gift-exchange game Optional prisoner's dilemma Traveler's dilemma Coordination game Chicken Centipede game Lewis signaling game Volunteer's dilemma Dollar auction Battle of the sexes Stag hunt Matching pennies Ultimatum game Rock paper scissors Pirate game Dictator game Public goods game Blotto game War of attrition El Farol Bar problem Fair division Fair cake-cutting Cournot game Deadlock Diner's dilemma Guess 2/3 of the average Kuhn poker Nash bargaining game Induction puzzles Trust game Princess and monster game Rendezvous problem
Theorems	Arrow's impossibility theorem Aumann's agreement theorem Folk theorem Minimax theorem Nash's theorem Negamax theorem Purification theorem Revelation principle Sprague–Grundy theorem Zermelo's theorem
Key figures	Albert W. Tucker Amos Tversky Antoine Augustin Cournot Ariel Rubinstein Claude Shannon Daniel Kahneman David K. Levine David M. Kreps Donald B. Gillies Drew Fudenberg Eric Maskin Harold W. Kuhn Herbert Simon Hervé Moulin John Conway Jean Tirole Jean-François Mertens Jennifer Tour Chayes John Harsanyi John Maynard Smith John Nash John von Neumann Kenneth Arrow Kenneth Binmore Leonid Hurwicz Lloyd Shapley Melvin Dresher Merrill M. Flood Olga Bondareva Oskar Morgenstern Paul Milgrom Peyton Young Reinhard Selten Robert Axelrod Robert Aumann Robert B. Wilson Roger Myerson Samuel Bowles Suzanne Scotchmer Thomas Schelling William Vickrey
Miscellaneous	All-pay auction Alpha–beta pruning Bertrand paradox Bounded rationality Combinatorial game theory Confrontation analysis Coopetition Evolutionary game theory First-move advantage in chess Game Description Language Game mechanics Glossary of game theory List of game theorists List of games in game theory No-win situation Solving chess Topological game Tragedy of the commons Tyranny of small decisions

This article is issued from Wikipedia. The text is licensed under Creative Commons - Attribution - Sharealike. Additional terms may apply for the media files.