Japan–Korea Joint Development Zone (JDZ)
"7광구" or Block 7 in South Korea[lower-alpha 1]
A map focused on an area highlighted in purple between China to the west, South Korea to the north, and Japan to the west
Location of the JDZ in between Japan to the east, South Korea to the north, and China to the west
Location
Coordinates31°N 128°E / 31°N 128°E / 31; 128
Part ofEast China Sea
Ocean/sea sourcesPacific Ocean
Surface area24,092 nmi (44,618 km; 27,725 mi)[lower-alpha 2]
Max. depth1,000 fathoms (6,000 ft; 1,800 m)[2]
Sections/sub-basins6[lower-alpha 3]

The Japan–Korea Joint Development Zone, often abbreviated as the JDZ, is an area in the East China Sea jointly administered by Japan and the Republic of Korea since 1978. The area was first defined by the continental shelf in the waters south of Jeju Island, west of Kyushu, and north of Okinawa.

The zone is believed to hold an estimated ₩9,000 trillion worth of oil reserves, but due to a lack of cooperation in recent decades, has produced none to date. The initial lack of progress is what Japan cites as their reason for their apparent decreased interest in the JDZ since the 1990s, while some officials in South Korea claim Japan is waiting until the agreement can expire after fifty years (in 2028) to claim the area for itself. The People's Republic of China in recent decades has also showed an increased interest in the area, and has agreed to work with Japan to develop similar oil reserves bordering the JDZ since 2008 without also including South Korea, making the issue a topic of debate mainly inside of the latter.

History

Ratification

Japan and South Korea both historically had overlapping claims over the continental shelves in the East China Sea before the establishment of the JDZ, causing the area to be disputed from a lack of compromise.[3] A resolution for the dispute only became necessary though after a 1969 report by the then U.N. Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East, which revealed that the area held petroleum and natural gas reserves in "prolific" amounts[4][5] comparable to that in the Persian Gulf.[6] Following the report's findings, neither nation agreed to recognize the others' ownership of the waters, with South Korea claiming the waters first in 1970[7] citing a ruling by the International Court of Justice (ICJ) from a year prior about the principle of "natural prolongation of the […] sovereignty of the coastal state," and Japan citing a 1958 principle which proposed a median line in "the absence of agreement".[6]

In a show of friendly cooperation to resolve the issue during the Cold War[3] and after the relation-straining kidnapping of Kim Dae-jung,[7] the JDZ was established on 30 January 1974. This was done with a United Nations-sponsored agreement being signed by representatives of both nations in Seoul,[8] with Japan being represented by their ambassador to South Korea Torao Ushiroku, and South Korea by their Minister of Foreign Affairs Kim Dong-Jo.[8] Most notably in the agreement: the zone's area was broken into nine subzones,[lower-alpha 3][8] with each subzone being appointed one "concessionaire" from both nations who have the ability to recommend actions to ensure their subzone is equally taxed,[4] "explored," and "exploited" within what is allowed by the agreement, according to articles three and four.[2][8] Zone seven would be the largest subzone by a large margin at 11,761 nmi (21,781 km; 13,534 mi).[lower-alpha 2][8] While oil and natural gas were the main focus of joint development, the agreement also regulated many aspects of fishing within the area.[9][10]

The agreement would be ratified by the South Korean National Assembly in December 1974,[4] and would enter into effect after Japanese ratification about four years later on 22 June 1978,[3] with the delay caused by opposition from Socialist and Communist parties who argued for Chinese and North Korean inclusion into the JDZ.[11] The agreement ended with the clause in article thirty-one that the JDZ could be terminated after fifty-years (in 2028) if either nation gives the other a notice of their departure from the agreement three years prior.[7][8]

Post-ratification and controversies

Exploration activities would begin in the JDZ after the agreement was signed in 1979, and would continue steadily, though mainly unsuccessfully, in three joint exploration activities until 1992.[1] After this, fewer joint activities would begin to take place[3] until in 2005 when Japan refused to participate in a previously planned joint exploration in the JDZ.[1] Japan would engage in their last joint activity to date in 2010.[6] In line with this lack of activity, Japan during the 2009 to 2017 exploration period further disobeyed article four of the agreement by not appointing any concessionaires to any of the subzones.[5] This lack of recent research and joint cooperation since the 1990s has led to no significant oil and gas deposits being discovered in the zone, despite evidence of their existence.[5][12] Research done to date has only discovered five promising and thirteen potential areas for oil.[13]

A map focused on Japan showing it's Exclusive Economic Zone in shades of purple around the nation's coasts
A map of Japan's Exclusive Economic Zone, depicting the JDZ in a different   shade of purple.

Japan has expressed that their apparent lessening interest in the JDZ stems from estimates that significant oil and gas reserves in the JDZ are not enough to be commercially viable, also citing the previous failed drilling attempts.[6][5] The presence of the successful Chinese Chunxiao gas field bordering the JDZ[1] and similar estimates recently conducted by South Korean, Chinese,[6] and American[1] researchers in the region though conflict with these claims, leading some South Korean officials to accuse Japan of waiting until the agreement expires in 2028 to claim the zone for itself.[7][6] Changes to the U.N.'s law of the sea principals which among other things discusses the setting of territorial waters, has changed since the original JDZ agreement was signed[3] in 1982 towards the concept of Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZ) over claims based on continental shelves.[1] This concept, which favors a midline border between two countries, would greatly benefit Japan in the event of the end of the agreement as the JDZ lies more than 90% inside of what would be the Japanese EEZ,[1] and weakens South Korea's original claim to the area based on continental shelves.[6]

Chinese claim

A yellow oil rig in the ocean pointing left
Chunxiao gas field in the East China Sea, bordering the JDZ.

Benefitting from the dispute; China in recent years has also sought to extend a claim to the area.[6] China's 200 nmi (370 km; 230 mi) EEZ[1] overlaps with the western part of the JDZ which provides some basis for a claim, but because of their absence from the original JDZ agreement, they are currently entitled to nothing in the zone.[6] This exclusion led the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs to call the agreement an "infringement of Chinese sovereignty" one month after the agreement was first signed in 1974,[11] and file a formal protest in April 1977 for dividing the continental shelf without Chinese consent.[11]

A claim has become more plausible in recent decades though since Japan, despite mutual wariness between both parties, first held negotiations with China in October 2005 regarding joint oil and gas development in areas bordering the JDZ; including in the Chunxiao, Tianwaiten, and later Pinghu gas fields.[14] An agreement would successfully be signed on the matter at the 34th G8 summit in June and July 2008, excluding South Korea.[13][15]

In the event the agreement is terminated after 2028 but no clear decision on who will administer the area is yet made, China could legally start developing the area to legitimise a claim, as they have done with the aforementioned gas fields bordering the JDZ.[7]

In modern South Korean politics

The issue of maintaining control in whole or in part of the area the JDZ encompasses has surfaced itself as a growing issue within modern South Korean politics, especially as Chinese–Japanese cooperation increases in bordering areas.[13] Representatives of the National Assembly have debated multiple times about the JDZ, such as in 2011 and 2023,[1] calling for a diplomatic solution to avoid a potential future dispute over the region,[1][7] and to 'stop China' from expanding into the area.[7]

Despite South Korea's exclusion to these new bilateral agreements which could put their claims to JDZ area after the end of the agreement in risk, the nation has been "lukewarm" in asserting their position on the international stage.[13] In April 2008, President Lee Myung-bak announced he would discuss promoting future development of the JDZ in a visit to Japan, but no such discussion was made.[13] In May 2023, an attempt by the Democratic Party to make the JDZ an issue on the agenda for a Japan–Korea summit was also rejected.[1] Government officials in the nation have been accused on prioritizing establishing contracts with nations in Central Asia and Africa over the bordering JDZ for oil and natural resources.[13]

Resources

According to a Japanese survey done in the 1970s, the JDZ contains an estimated 6.3 billion barrels of oil.[11] More recent estimates by the American-based Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars show the JDZ containing approximately ₩9,000 trillion (≈ $6.8 trillion) worth of oil reserves, which comparatively would be "10 times more natural gas than Saudi Arabia, and 4.5 times more oil than the US".[7] The area is also believed to hold significant hydrocarbons deposits.[6][11]

Aside from the value of natural resources estimated to be in the JDZ, the development zone's geographic location runs through many shipping lanes,[6] and comprises a large part of South Korea's southern maritime access, which generally does not extend far out into the Pacific elsewhere.[6]

See also

Similar disputed maritime territory

Notes

  1. ↑ Also translated as Sector 7, and is not to be confused with Subzone 7 of the JDZ when researching. The name relates to the seven blocks of maritime territory claimed by South Korea, in which Block 7 encompasses the entirety of the JDZ.[1]
  2. 1 2 Japan's increase in their territorial waters to 12 nmi (22 km; 14 mi) between 1974 and 1977 overlapped with the originally planned area of the JDZ in subzone seven by 8.5 nmi (15.7 km; 9.8 mi). This overlap was ceded from South Korea to Japan before the JDZ officially began in 1978, reducing the zone from its planned size of 24,101 nmi (44,635 km; 27,735 mi).[2]
  3. 1 2 Multiple maps displayed in a news report by The Chosun Ilbo in 2023 show the JDZ comprising only six more evenly sized subzones, and it is unclear when this rezoning took place.[1]

References

  1. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 Tae-wan, Kim (17 April 2023). "[쟁점] 한일 대륙붕 제7광구 운명은… 정치권 "대책 세워야"" [[Issue] The fate of Block 7 of the continental shelf between Korea and Japan… Politicians "need to come up with measures"] (in Korean). The Chosun Ilbo. Archived from the original on 22 May 2023. Retrieved 27 May 2023.
  2. 1 2 3 "No. 75: Continental Shelf Boundary and Joint Development Zone: Japan - Republic of Korea" (PDF). United States Department of State. 2 September 1977. Archived (PDF) from the original on 28 May 2023. Retrieved 24 May 2023.
  3. 1 2 3 4 5 Kim, Hyun Jung (July 2020). "What did the Republic of Korea and Japan mean by the term "joint development" in their 1974 agreement?". Marine Policy. ScienceDirect. 117: 103932. doi:10.1016/j.marpol.2020.103932. S2CID 216215226. Archived from the original on 28 May 2023. Retrieved 23 May 2023.
  4. 1 2 3 Valencia, Mark J. (June 1986). Taming Troubled Waters: Joint Development of Oil and Mineral Resources in Overlapping Claim Areas (Report). Vol. 23. University of San Diego. pp. 668, 671. Retrieved 29 May 2023.
  5. 1 2 3 4 Liu, Jing (3 May 2023). "The Japan-Korea Joint Development Agreement: with Particular References to Revising the Deadlock Resolution Mechanism". Chinese Journal of International Law. Oxford University Press. 22 (1): 149–158. doi:10.1093/chinesejil/jmad012. Archived from the original on 10 July 2023. Retrieved 25 May 2023.
  6. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 Ju, Jaehyoung (24 February 2023). "Keep an Eye on the Japan-Korea Joint Development Zone". The Diplomat. Archived from the original on 28 May 2023. Retrieved 22 May 2023.
  7. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 In-joon, Choi (12 February 2023). "9000조 '7광구 油田' 독식 노리는 일본… 우리에겐 시간이 없다" [Japan aiming to monopolize the 9000 trillion 'sector 7 oil field'… we don't have time] (in Korean). The Chosun Ilbo. Archived from the original on 28 May 2023. Retrieved 28 May 2023.
  8. 1 2 3 4 5 6 "Agreement between Japan and the Republic of Korea concerning Joint Development of the Southern Part of the Continental Shelf adjacent to the Two Countries" (PDF). Seoul, South Korea: United Nations. 30 January 1974. Archived (PDF) from the original on 6 June 2023. Retrieved 23 May 2023.
  9. ↑ "Practice on Provisional Arrangements in Maritime Disputed Areas Joint Development Zones Korea and Japan Case". International institute for Law of the Sea Studies. Archived from the original on 30 May 2023. Retrieved 30 May 2023. Although there were some restrictionsin [sic] the joint regulation zone as to the number and size of fishing vessels,types of fishing gear, time of fishing operations, there had not beenserious [sic] disputes in the zone because the maximum catch had been set atsuch [sic] a high level so as to satisfy the need for the Japanese fishermen
  10. ↑ Roehrig, Terence (16 January 2021). "The Rough State of Japan–South Korea Relations". Maritime Awareness Project. National Bureau of Asian Research. Archived from the original on 31 May 2023. Retrieved 30 May 2023. The two countries have also been able to manage fishing issues through a series of fisheries agreements.
  11. 1 2 3 4 5 Ofusa, Junnosuke (15 June 1978). "Japan‐South Korea Oil Treaty Ratified". The New York Times. Tokyo, Japan. p. 11. Archived from the original on 30 May 2023. Retrieved 30 May 2023.
  12. ↑ Kim, Suk Kyoon (16 December 2022). "The Uncertain Status of the Korea-Japan Joint Development Agreement of the Continental Shelf and Its Prospects". Asia-Pacific Journal of Ocean Law and Policy. Brill Publishers. 7 (2): 197–215. doi:10.1163/24519391-07020003. ISSN 2451-9367. OCLC 972037149. S2CID 255182326. Archived from the original on 26 March 2023. Retrieved 24 May 2023.
  13. 1 2 3 4 5 6 Dong-hyun, Lee (16 May 2008). "소외 당한 MB정부 자원외교" [Resource Diplomacy of the Underprivileged MB Government]. Naver News (in Korean). Busan Ilbo. Archived from the original on 30 May 2023. Retrieved 28 May 2023.
  14. ↑ In-han, Choi (2 October 2005). "日 "동중국해 가스전 공동 개발하자" ‥ 중국에 첫 제의" [Japan "Let's jointly develop gas fields in the East China Sea" ‥ First proposal to China]. Naver News (in Korean). Tokyo, Japan: The Korea Economic Daily. Archived from the original on 30 May 2023. Retrieved 28 May 2023.
  15. ↑ "Japan-China Joint Press Statement: Cooperation between Japan and China in the East China Sea" (PDF). Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Japan). 18 June 2008. Archived (PDF) from the original on 26 April 2023. Retrieved 29 May 2023.
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