The estimated hydropower potential of the lower Mekong Basin (i.e., excluding China) is 30,000 MW,[1][2] while that of the upper Mekong Basin is 28,930 MW.[3] In the lower Mekong, more than 3,235 MW has been realized via facilities built largely over the past ten years, while projects under construction will represent an additional 3,209 MW. An additional 134 projects are planned for the lower Mekong, which will maximize the river's hydropower generating capacity.[4] The single most significant impact—both now and in the future—on the use of water and its management in the Mekong Region is hydropower.[5]
Given current development trends in the region, power demands are expected to rise seven percent per year between 2010 and 2030,[2] yielding a substantial and potentially lucrative energy market. Hydropower is the favoured energy option for the Mekong's riparian countries.[6][7]
The development of the Mekong River Basin is highly controversial,[8][9] and is one of the most prominent components in the discussion about the river and its management. This debate occurs in both the academic literature, as well as the media, and is a focus for many activist groups.[10][11][12]
Country-specific impacts
As part of China's Great Western Development program, China's five large state-owned hydropower companies planned, underwrote, and built the majority of dams on the river and its tributaries.[13]: 220 Chinese firms are invested in approximately half of the Lao dams which are either being built as of 2023 or intended to be built by 2030.[13]: 223
The Lao government has also prioritized hydropower development on the river and its tributaries, describing itself as the "Battery of Asia."[13]: 220–221 Hydropower has brought in significant foreign exchange reserves to Laos.[13]: 221 Much of the Lao hydropower has been exported to Thailand, which in turn has benefited from Lao hydropower in developing its poorer areas, especially in Thailand's northeast.[13]: 221
Downstream countries Vietnam and Cambodia generate some hydropower, but primarily experience negative ecological and social effects of upstream hydropower development.[13]: 221
Existing hydropower infrastructure
Table 1: Commissioned dams in the Mekong River Basin (15 MW installed capacity and above)[14]
Hydropower infrastructure under construction
Table 2: Hydropower dams under construction in the Mekong River Basin (15 MW installed capacity and above)[14]
Planned hydropower infrastructure
The CGIAR Research Program on Water, Land and Ecosystems, which monitors dams development in the Mekong Region, distinguishes between "planned" dams—those for which bureaucratic processes to license, or enable the dam to be constructed (for example, feasibility studies, concession agreements, environmental impact assessments, power purchase agreements and other government authorisations); and "proposed" dams that have been suggested, but for which these processes have not commenced.
Table 3: Planned and Proposed Hydropower dams in the Mekong River Basin (15 MW installed capacity and above)[14]
| Country | No. Planned dams | No. Proposed dams |
|---|---|---|
| Cambodia | 12 | 0 |
| China | 11 | 2 |
| Laos | 43 | 20 |
| Myanmar | 7 | 0 |
| Thailand | 7 | 0 |
| Vietnam | 1 | 1 |
| Totals | 74 | 23 |
Proposed mainstream dams
Table 4: Dams on the Mekong Mainstream[14]
| Project | Country | Location | Expected Commissioning Year | Installed capacity (MW) | Mean Annual Energy (GWh) | Height (m) | Crest length (m) | Total storage (million m3) | Max reservoir area (km2) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Ban Kum |  | 15°25′04″N 105°35′15″E / 15.417881°N 105.587364°E | 2030 | 1,872 | 8,434 | 53 | 780 | 132.5 | |
| Dongzhong |  | 31°52′22″N 96°59′24″E / 31.872777°N 96.99°E | Proposed. COD Unknown. | 108 | 41.2 | ||||
| Gushui | | 28°36′31″N 98°44′46″E / 28.608683°N 98.746133°E | COD Unknown. | 2,600 | 8,337 | 310 | 540 | 3,912 | |
| Guxue | | 29°10′59″N 98°36′24″E / 29.18295°N 98.6067°E | Planned. COD Unknown. | 1,700 | 7,816 | 229 | 599 | 7,752 | |
| Kagong | | 30°37′21″N 97°26′40″E / 30.622567°N 97.444417°E | Planned. COD Unknown. | 240 | 1,264 | 97 | 237 | 81.4 | |
| Latsua | | 15°19′53″N 105°34′58″E / 15.33146°N 105.582803°E | 2023 | 800 | 3,504 | 22 | 1,300 | 13 | |
| Lin Chang | | 31°10′49″N 97°11′07″E / 31.1804°N 97.1852°E | Planned. COD Unknown. | 72 | 362 | 38 | 9 | ||
| Luangprabang | | 20°04′00″N 102°11′32″E / 20.06663°N 102.192339°E | 2030 | 1,200 | 6,500 | 57.5 | 318 | 1,589.5 | 72.4 |
| Pak Beng | | 19°50′38″N 101°00′59″E / 19.843927°N 101.016502°E | 2022 | 912 | 4,846 | 85 | 943 | 87 | |
| Pak Lay | | 18°19′39″N 101°31′50″E / 18.327581°N 101.530575°E | 2030 | 1,320 | 4,252 | 35 | 630 | 108 | |
| Ru Mei | | 29°39′00″N 98°20′52″E / 29.649933°N 98.3477°E | Planned. COD Unknown. | 2,100 | 10,582 | 315 | 724 | 3,602 | |
| Sambor |  | 12°47′13″N 105°56′19″E / 12.786849°N 105.938582°E | after 2020 | 2,600 | 11,749 | 56 | 18,002 | 3,794 | 620 |
| Sanakham | | 17°49′45″N 101°33′25″E / 17.829183°N 101.556969°E | 2024 | 700 | 5,015 | 25 | 1,144 | 81 | |
| Santhong-Pakchom | | 18°12′04″N 102°03′02″E / 18.201038°N 102.050588°E | Planned. COD Unknown. | 1,079 | 5,052 | 55 | 1,200 | 80.3 | |
| Stung Treng | | 13°18′09″N 105°14′44″E / 13.302404°N 105.245516°E | Planned. COD unknown. | 980 | 4,870 | 22 | 10,884 | 70 (active) | 211 |
| Yue Long | | 30°52′05″N 97°20′50″E / 30.868008°N 97.347124°E | Planned. COD Unknown. | 129 | 644 | 60.7 | 377 |
COD = Commercial Operating Date.
Environmental impacts
A study by the Mekong River Commission (MRC)[18] presented at the Third MRC International Conference in March 2018, concluded that hydropower development on the Mekong River will aggravate food insecurity and poverty in the region. The report forecasts that Thailand is expected to suffer the most economically and ecologically. According to the report, full scale dam development will decrease GDP growth for lower Mekong basin countries by US$29 billion. Thailand would have the greatest economic loss, as much as US$11 billion. Laos and Cambodia would each face losses of US$9 billion in GDP growth. Native fish stocks would be particularly hard hit: more than 900,000 tonnes of fish biomass, worth US$4.3 billion, would disappear by 2040 from the Mekong as a result of dams. Thailand would have the highest rate of fish loss, 55 percent, followed by Laos, 50 percent; Cambodia, 35 percent; and Vietnam, 30 percent. The creation of reservoirs would result in many parts of the Mekong becoming a lake ecosystem, unsuitable for many native aquatic species of the river environment and will eventually drive them to extinction.[19] A Lao government executive dismissed the research findings as "just an estimation". He insisted that hydropower dams were crucial to solving poverty and that they would provide large economic benefits to the entire region.[20][21] Effective from 4 March 2021, a decree issued by the government of Laos requires all hydropower operators to inform authorities whenever dam reservoirs reach full capacity or when river levels fall to a critical level. The new guidelines aim to improve the management of hydropower dams and minimize flooding and water shortages.[22]
Social Impacts
Social impacts such as livelihood and food insecurity largely effect riparian communities because of hydropower projects and these effects are multiplied by environmental issues of decreased water quality, decreased fish quantity and unstable water flow.[23] Loss of livelihood has become more significant as more dams are constructed along the Mekong River and this has become more evident by the change in the river's biodiversity.[24] For example, fisherman in a town in northeastern Thailand (Isan) estimate that their 2015 fish yield was only 30% of a normal year.[25] The villagers of this same town also experience vulnerability in their cultural patterns as irregular flooding causes holidays and celebrations based on a water calendar to no longer coincide.[26] Villages near dams experience other social issues alongside livelihood and food insecurity. A study of the Xe Pian Xe Namnoy Dam found that local communities face forced relocation, economic loss, livelihood insecurities, PTSD, food insecurity, and UXOs.[24][27] Due to PTSD and psychological impacts incurred, many villagers also hesitate to return to their former villages and the stress about the present has resulted in increased anxiety over the future.[28] As for food insecurity, the changing of the river flow due to hydropower projects has severely influenced agriculture and aquaculture as necessary nutrients for rice cultivation and fishery production are limited.[29] Issues of food and livelihood security are also faced by those relocated. In Laos, the Nam Theun 2 Dam project moved 6300 people from 14 villages on the Nakai Plateau as part of the Resettlement Programme and another 155,000 people along the Xe Bangfai River were identified as affected but were given less financial support.[30] The Nam Theun 2 Hydropower Company (NTPC) and the GoL implemented the resettlement programme but the Livelihood Resettlement Program’s 5 pillars designed for livelihood (forestry, fisheries, agriculture, livestock and off-farm activities), showed consistent failure in providing benefits and instead led to increased poverty levels. The Livelihood Resettlement Program is also at odds with the community's cultural practices which has caused additional vulnerability.[30][31] The social impacts of hydropower projects permeate many different sectors of society and particularly those of riparian communities as they are not properly taken into account.[27]
See also
References
- ↑ "Mekong Mainstream Dams". International Rivers. Retrieved 2017-09-09.
- 1 2 Mekong River Commission (2010). "State of the Basin Report, 2010" (PDF). MRC, Vientiane, Laos.
- ↑ J. Dore; Y. Xiaogang; K. Yuk-shing (2007). "China's energy reforms and hydropower expansion in Yunnan". In L. Lebel; J. Dore; R. Daniel; Y.S. Koma (eds.). Democratizing Water Governance in the Mekong Region. Chiang Mai: Silkworm Books. pp. 55–92. ISBN 978-9749511251.
- ↑ Mekong River Commission (2005). "Overview of the Hydrology of the Mekong Basin" (PDF). MRC, Vientiane, Laos. Archived from the original (PDF) on 2018-07-13. Retrieved 2012-05-18.
- ↑ CGIAR Challenge Program on Water and Food. "CPWF Mekong". Archived from the original on April 28, 2012. Retrieved May 19, 2012.
- ↑ "Cambodian Villagers Petition Chinese Embassy to Scrap Dam Projects". Radio Free Asia. Retrieved 2017-09-09.
- ↑ Nijhuis, Michelle. "Harnessing the Mekong or Killing It?". National Geographic. Archived from the original on April 16, 2015. Retrieved 2017-09-09.
- ↑ "Thousands Call for Regional Governments to Save the Mekong". International Rivers. Retrieved 2017-09-09.
- ↑ "Neighbors on Alert as China Releases Deluge of Water from Mekong Dam". Radio Free Asia. Retrieved 2017-09-09.
- ↑ "'I Will Lose My Identity': Cambodian Villagers Face Displacement By Mekong Dam". NPR.org. Retrieved 2017-09-09.
- ↑ "A Dangerous Trajectory for the Mekong River". International Rivers. Retrieved 2017-09-09.
- ↑ Yeophantong, Pichamon. "China's Lancang Dam Cascade and Transnational Activism in the Mekong Region: Who's Got the Power?". Asian Survey. 54 (4): 700–24. doi:10.1525/as.2014.54.4.700.
- 1 2 3 4 5 6 Harrell, Stevan (2023). An Ecological History of Modern China. Seattle: University of Washington Press. ISBN 9780295751719.
- 1 2 3 4 "WLE, 2016. Dataset on the Dams of the Irrawaddy, Mekong, Red and Salween River Basins. Vientiane, Lao PDR: CGIAR Research Program on Water, Land and Ecosystems - Greater Mekong". CGIAR Research Program on Water, Land and Ecosystems (Greater Mekong). Retrieved 2018-04-04.
- ↑ "A Waterfight Like No Other May be Brewing over Asia's Rivers". Bloomberg.com. November 2016.
- ↑ "Archived copy" (PDF). Archived from the original (PDF) on 2018-08-12. Retrieved 2018-08-12.
{{cite web}}: CS1 maint: archived copy as title (link) - ↑ Intralawan, Apisom; Wood, David; Frankel, Richard (March 2017). "Economic Evaluation of Hydropower Projects in the Lower Mekong Basin" (PDF). Mekong River Commission (MRC). p. 10. Retrieved 21 July 2019.
- ↑ "Home". mrcmekong.org.
- ↑ Rujivanarom, Pratch (19 July 2019). "Aquatic life faces extinction as upstream dams leave Mekong River dry". The Nation. Retrieved 20 July 2019.
- ↑ Rujivanarom, Pratch (4 April 2018). "Mekong River dams 'will harm food security'". The Nation. Retrieved 10 April 2018.
- ↑ Boyle, David; Narin, Sun (5 April 2018). "Mekong Leaders Mostly Mum on Risks Tied to Intense Damming". VOA. Retrieved 10 April 2018.
- ↑ "Laos issues new decree on dams aimed at minimising harm". Reuters. February 25, 2021.
- ↑ Soukhaphon, Akarath; Baird, Ian G.; Hogan, Zeb S. (January 2021). "The Impacts of Hydropower Dams in the Mekong River Basin: A Review". Water. 13 (3): 265. doi:10.3390/w13030265. ISSN 2073-4441.
- 1 2 Soukhaphon, Akarath; Baird, Ian G.; Hogan, Zeb S. (2021-01-22). "The Impacts of Hydropower Dams in the Mekong River Basin: A Review". Water. 13 (3): 265. doi:10.3390/w13030265. ISSN 2073-4441.
- ↑ Johnson, Andrew Alan (September 2019). ""The river grew tired of us"". HAU: Journal of Ethnographic Theory. 9 (2): 390–404. doi:10.1086/706045. ISSN 2575-1433. S2CID 213367918 – via HAU.
- ↑ Johnson, Andrew Alan (2019-11-13). "The river grew tired of us: Spectral flows along the Mekong River". HAU: Journal of Ethnographic Theory. 9 (2): 390–404.
- 1 2 Baird, Ian G. (2020-10-21). "Catastrophic and slow violence: thinking about the impacts of the Xe Pian Xe Namnoy dam in southern Laos". The Journal of Peasant Studies. 48 (6): 1167–1186. doi:10.1080/03066150.2020.1824181. ISSN 0306-6150. S2CID 226325997.
- ↑ Baird, Ian G. (2021-09-19). "Catastrophic and slow violence: thinking about the impacts of the Xe Pian Xe Namnoy dam in southern Laos". The Journal of Peasant Studies. 48 (6): 1167–1186.
- ↑ Cosslett, Tuyet L.; Cosslett, Patrick D. (2014). Water Resources and Food Security in the Vietnam Mekong Delta. doi:10.1007/978-3-319-02198-0. ISBN 978-3-319-02197-3.
- 1 2 Blake, David J. H.; Barney, Keith (2021-06-01). "Impounded rivers, compounded injustice: contesting the social impacts of hydraulic development in Laos". International Journal of Water Resources Development: 1–22. doi:10.1080/07900627.2021.1920373. ISSN 0790-0627. S2CID 236331928.
- ↑ Hunt, Glenn; Samuelsson, Marika; Higashi, Satomi (2018). "Broken Pillars: The Failure of the Nakai Plateau Livelihood Resettlement Program/Glenn Hunt, Marika Samuelsson, and Satomi Higashi". In Hirsch, Philip; Shoemaker, Bruce; Robichaud, William (eds.). Dead in the Water: Global Lessons from the World Bank's Model Hydropower Project in Laos. Madison, Wisconsin: University of Wisconsin Press. ISBN 978-0-299-31793-5. OCLC 1040031855.
External links
- 3S Rivers Protection Network
- Australian Mekong Resource Centre
- Cambodia National Mekong Committee
- Department of Energy Business (DEB), Ministry of Energy and Mines (Lao PDR) Archived 2021-07-28 at the Wayback Machine
- Department of Water Resources (Thailand)
- Electricité du Laos Archived 2010-11-22 at the Wayback Machine
- Electricity Authority of Cambodia
- Electricity Generating Authority of Thailand Archived 2018-01-26 at the Wayback Machine
- Fisheries Action Coalition Team (Cambodia)
- GMS Academic and Research Network
- Greater Mekong Sub-region
- Greater Mekong Subregion Environment Operations Center
- Greater Mekong Sub-region Social Studies Center -
- International Rivers
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- Mekong Environment and Resource Institute
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- Probe International Archived 2016-03-04 at the Wayback Machine
- Save the Mekong Campaign
- Stimson Institute Mekong Policy Project Archived 2009-03-07 at the Wayback Machine
- Sustainable Mekong Research Network (SUMERNET)
- TERRA
- Thailand National Mekong Committee
- Vietnam Electricity
- Vietnam National Mekong Committee
- WWF Greater Mekong Programme
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