A minimum-cost spanning-tree game (MCST game) is a kind of a cooperative game. In an MCST game, each player is a node in a complete graph. The graph contains an additional node - the supply node - denoted by s. The goal of the players is that all of them will be connected by a path to s. To this end, they need to construct a spanning tree. Each edge in the graph has a cost, and the players build the minimum cost spanning tree. The question then arises, how to allocate the cost of this MCST among the players?
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The solution offered by cooperative game theory is to consider the cost of each potential coalition - each subset of the players. The cost of each coalition S is the minimum cost of a spanning tree connecting only the nodes in S to the supply node s. The value of S is minus the cost of S. Using these definitions, various solution concepts from cooperative game theory can be applied. MCST games were introduced by Bird in 1976.[1]
Properties
Computation
- One solution in the core can be read directly from any minimum cost spanning tree graph associated with the problem.[2]
- There is an algorithm that requires O(n2) elementary operations for computing each additional point in the core.[3]
- In general MCST games, computing the nucleolus is NP-hard; the proof is by reduction from the minimum set cover problem.[5] There is an algorithm that computes the nucleolus in time O(n3|B|), where B is the set of relevant coalitions (in general, |B|=2n, but in some special cases, only a subset of the coalitions are relevant).[6]
- If the underlying network is a tree, then the nucleolus can be computed in O(n3) time, and the Shapley value can be computed in O(n) time.[7] The run-time of computing the nucleolus can be reduced to O(n log n) using efficiently mergeable heaps.[8] In particular cases, the nucleolus can be computed in O(n) time.[4]
Spanning forest games
A minimum-cost spanning-forest game (MCSF game) is a generalization of an MCST game, in which multiple supply-nodes are allowed. In general, the core of an MCSF game may be empty.[1] However, if the underlying network is a tree, the core is always non-empty, and core points can be computed in strongly-polynomial time.[9]
References
- 1 2 3 Bird, C. G. (1976). "On cost allocation for a spanning tree: A game theoretic approach". Networks. 6 (4): 335–350. doi:10.1002/net.3230060404.
- 1 2 Granot, Daniel; Huberman, Gur (1981-12-01). "Minimum cost spanning tree games". Mathematical Programming. 21 (1): 1–18. doi:10.1007/BF01584227. ISSN 1436-4646. S2CID 26198019.
- 1 2 Granot, Daniel; Huberman, Gur (1984-07-01). "On the core and nucleolus of minimum cost spanning tree games". Mathematical Programming. 29 (3): 323–347. doi:10.1007/BF02592000. ISSN 1436-4646. S2CID 12124235.
- 1 2 Granot, D.; Maschler, M.; Owen, G.; Zhu, W. R. (1996-06-01). "The kernel/nucleolus of a standard tree game". International Journal of Game Theory. 25 (2): 219–244. doi:10.1007/BF01247104. ISSN 1432-1270. S2CID 120669939.
- ↑ Faigle, Ulrich; Kern, Walter; Kuipers, Jeroen (1998-12-01). "Computing the nucleolus of min-cost spanning tree games is NP-hard". International Journal of Game Theory. 27 (3): 443–450. doi:10.1007/s001820050083. ISSN 0020-7276. S2CID 46730554.
- ↑ Kuipers, Jeroen; Solymosi, Tamás; Aarts, Harry (2000-09-01). "Computing the nucleolus of some combinatorially-structured games". Mathematical Programming. 88 (3): 541–563. doi:10.1007/PL00011385. ISSN 1436-4646. S2CID 13149058.
- ↑ Megiddo, Nimrod (August 1978). "Computational Complexity of the Game Theory Approach to Cost Allocation for a Tree". Mathematics of Operations Research. 3 (3): 189–196. doi:10.1287/moor.3.3.189. ISSN 0364-765X.
- ↑ Galil, Zvi (1980-01-01). "Applications of efficient mergeable heaps for optimization problems on trees". Acta Informatica. 13 (1): 53–58. doi:10.1007/BF00288535. ISSN 0001-5903. S2CID 39221796.
- ↑ Granot, Daniel; Granot, Frieda (1992). "Computational Complexity of a Cost Allocation Approach to a Fixed Cost Spanning Forest Problem". Mathematics of Operations Research. 17 (4): 765–780. doi:10.1287/moor.17.4.765. ISSN 0364-765X. JSTOR 3690069.