AuthorSarah McGrath
LanguageEnglish
Subjectmoral epistemology
PublisherOxford University Press
Publication date
2019
Media typehardcover, ebook
Pages240
ISBN9780198805410

Moral Knowledge is a 2019 book by Sarah McGrath in which the author discusses possibilities, sources, and vulnerabilities of moral knowledge.

Synopsis

Sarah McGrath deals with different topics on the basis of the «working hypothesis» that she states in the opening chapter, according to which moral knowledge can be acquired and lost in any of the ways in which we acquire and lose ordinary empirical knowledge. The hypothesis consists of two parts: (1) any source of empirical knowledge is also a potential source of moral knowledge; (2) our efforts to acquire and preserve moral knowledge are subject to frustration in all of the same ways that our efforts to acquire and preserve ordinary empirical knowledge are. Chapters 2, 3, and 4 are devoted to defending the first part of the working hypothesis, whereas the second part is defended in Chapter 5; the concluding chapter contains a summary of the theses argued for by McGrath. [1]

Reception

The book was reviewed in the European Journal of Philosophy (by Hallvard Lillehammer), Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews (by David Phillips), Philosophy in Review (by Eric Wilkinson) and Philosophical Inquiries (by Luciana Ceri).[2][3][4][1]

References

  1. 1 2 Ceri, Luciana (24 March 2023). "Moral Knowledge, by Sarah McGrath". Philosophical Inquiries. 11 (1): R9–R13. ISSN 2282-0248. This article incorporates text available under the CC BY 3.0 license.
  2. ↑ Lillehammer, Hallvard (December 2020). "Moral knowledge. SarahMcGrath. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2019, × + 218 pp., £50 Hbk". European Journal of Philosophy. 28 (4): 1103–1106. doi:10.1111/ejop.12616. ISSN 0966-8373.
  3. ↑ Phillips, David (14 October 2020). "Review of Moral Knowledge". NDPR. ISSN 1538-1617.
  4. ↑ Wilkinson, Eric (2021). "Sarah McGrath, "Moral Knowledge."". Philosophy in Review.
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