3-day war plan

Russia had reportedly hoped to take Kyiv rapidly and remove the Ukrainian government, allowing a pro-Russian government to be installed.^[8][9] Russia positioned a large force in Belarus, which crossed the border and invaded the north of Ukraine, while other forces attacked from Donbas, Luhansk and Crimea in the south.^[10]

After the invasion's start, Ukrainian and Western analysts tentatively assessed that Putin seemed to have assumed the Russian Armed Forces would be capable of capturing the Ukrainian capital city of Kyiv within days, eventually leading to the commonly reached conclusion that "taking Kyiv in three days" had been the original objective or expectation of the invasion.^[11][12][13] The planned "three day" capture of Kyiv was further reinforced on 2 March, when the Security Service of Ukraine (SBU) repeated the claim following its release of a video showing a captured Russian soldier claiming his unit was sent into Ukraine with food supplies for only three days.^[14]

Movements

Maxar Technologies first spotted the Kyiv convoy in satellite images on Monday 28 February 2022.^[15] The column of vehicles crossed into Ukraine from Belarus and moved south through Prybirsk, and then Ivankiv.^[16] The convoy was apparently heading towards Kyiv, the capital of Ukraine, as part of preparation for the projected Battle of Kyiv,^[9] presumably with the aim of besieging and threatening Kyiv.^[17] However, according to a 7 March 2022 intelligence update from the UK Defence Ministry, "The main body of the large Russian column advancing on Kyiv remains over 30km from the centre of the city having been delayed by staunch Ukrainian resistance, mechanical breakdown and congestion."^[3] Time reported that by 1 March, it was 25 kilometres (16 mi) from the centre of the city,^[18] and it was then reported as stalling between 25 and 30 kilometres outside Kyiv.^[16][19]

Composition and size

On 2 March, the convoy was estimated to have held up to 15,000 troops.^[16] The formation itself was made up of a variety of military vehicles, which satellite footage shows vehicles parked three abreast across wider sections of the road.^[17] The convoy has been noted for its size, stretching about 65 kilometres (40 mi).^[20] Satellite photos of the convoy indicate the column is composed of Russian supply trucks, troops, weapons,^[21] and artillery.^[22] Reuters revised the size of the convoy, estimating it to be larger than previously considered, at 64 kilometres (40 mi) long,^[10] with The Independent estimating that it had grown to 64 kilometres (40 mi) long by 1 March, from its initial size estimate of 27 kilometres (17 mi).^[23]

Air cover

The convoy was protected by mobile anti-aircraft systems.^[20] It is not known how effective these were, because elsewhere, Ukrainian Baykar Bayraktar TB2 drones had successfully attacked and "destroyed three [Russian] SAM missile systems and four 152mm artillery pieces, along with more than 10 trucks and several tanks" by 1 March.^{[24][25]: 20:49} The effectiveness of the Turkish-manufactured TB2 drones has been partly attributed to the Russian failure to achieve air supremacy in the opening phase of the war,^[24] as well as poor Russian coordination and communications.^{[25]: 20:53} Ukrainian commanders were therefore considering using them against the convoy, but they had relatively few deployable TB2 drones, few military personnel were trained to operate them effectively, and Russian forces might be able to track them and shoot them down via their radio emissions.^[24] Moreover, by 3 March, aviation researcher Justin Bronk stated that Russian forces appeared to have moved more air defence systems forward, including around the column.^{[25]: 21:40} Bronk argued that the convoy had thus become 'a very, very difficult target for the Ukrainian Air Force', because it was within reach of the S-400 missile systems along the Belarusian–Ukrainian border, excluding almost any conventional crewed aircraft attacks on the convoy (except perhaps very low-level flying, visual-targeting operations).^{[25]: 21:46}

Reasons of malfunction

There has been lots of discussion about why the convoy stalled. The UK Defence Ministry noted that by 7 March, it had been "delayed by staunch Ukrainian resistance, mechanical breakdown and congestion. The column has made little discernible progress in over three days."^[3]

• Fuel and food shortages: Much commentary theorises that the convoy stalled due to fuel and food shortages.^[3][27] In the wider conflict, fuel and supply issues have been apparent, with trucks and vehicles running out of fuel, leading to them being abandoned.^[2] In some cases, Russian soldiers asked local Ukrainians for food or fuel for their vehicles.^[28]
• Weather, terrain, and congestion: Other media suggests that vehicles became stuck in mud, triggering traffic jams.^[21] There have been a number of examples of Russian vehicles being unable to travel across muddy or boggy terrain. In this case, the terrain appears not to have frozen solid due to the mild winter that year. Images have been widely published on social media of heavy-tracked vehicles that Russian soldiers abandoned after they became trapped in the mud.^[19] This issue was particularly notable in northern Ukraine, made worse as the Rasputitsa, the seasonal thaw during springtime, takes hold in more areas.^[19]
• Ukrainian attacks: Others have suggested that the convoy stalled as a result of attacks by the Ukrainian military, though little verified information has been published about this. It has been suggested that the column was attacked by artillery, Turkish-made drones, or ground ambushes.^[2][3][7] On 28 March, it was reported that the convoy had been stopped by Ukrainian drone attacks.^[4]
• Maintenance: Poor vehicle maintenance may have contributed to the convoy's failure.^[2][28][29] Trent Telenko, previously a Pentagon staff specialist and military history writer, and Karl Ruth, government advisor and economist, both supported the maintenance theory, with Telenko also noting that the Russian army "simply cannot risk them off-road during the [mud season]."^[30]
• Waiting: Other commentary theorised that the convoy was simply waiting to set up a forward base of operations.^[31][32]
• Overall bad planning and disorganisation: Janes Information Services theorised that overall Russian unpreparedness for the invasion of Ukraine, tied with the fact that Russia has not operated at this scale since WW2, has resulted in communications problems, and different units not being able to work together, resulting in the stall and apparent disorganisation of the armoured column.^[33]

"Attack the first" method

The ABC reported on 3 March that ground attacks with anti-tank weapons had destroyed numerous vehicles. It noted that the attacking forces had deliberately attacked the start of the column, destroying vehicles and creating ad-hoc roadblocks, with the following vehicles unable to pass.^[34] On 11 March, a senior U.S. defense official stated that Ukrainian forces had made several attacks on the convoy with ground fire, such as shoulder-fired FGM-148 Javelin anti-tank missiles delivered by Western countries.^[34] Ukrainian units have set up various obstacles and roadblocks in its anticipated path, including "parking trams, buses and large vehicles".^[37]

Ukrainian snipers have engaged troops from their position and killed individual Russian soldiers.^[19] High-level Russian officials at the convoy have been killed by Ukrainian snipers. On 3 March, Major General Andrei Sukhovetsky, deputy commander of the Combined Arms Army of the Central Military District, was killed by Ukrainian sniper fire when he ventured to the front of the stalled convoy. At that point, he was the highest-ranking Russian official killed.^[19]

Ukrainian Aerorozvidka group also assisted with their own-built drones, some capable of dropping up to 1.5 kg bombs and firing rocket-propelled anti-tank grenades.^[38]