Tamarin Prover
Original author(s)David Basin, Cas Cremers, Jannik Dreier, Simon Meier, Ralf Sasse, Benedikt Schmidt
Developer(s)Cas Cremers, Jannik Dreier, Ralf Sasse
Initial releaseApril 24, 2012 (2012-04-24)
Stable release
1.4.1 / January 18, 2019 (2019-01-18)
Repositorygithub.com/tamarin-prover/tamarin-prover
Written inHaskell
Operating systemLinux, macOS
Available inEnglish
TypeAutomated reasoning
LicenseGNU GPL v3
Websitetamarin-prover.github.io

Tamarin Prover is a computer software program for formal verification of cryptographic protocols. It has been used to verify Transport Layer Security 1.3,[1] ISO/IEC 9798,[2] DNP3 Secure Authentication v5,[3] and WireGuard.[4][5][6][7]

References

  1. Cremers, Cas; Horvat, Marko; Scott, Sam; van der Merwe, Thyla (2016). "Automated Analysis and Verification of TLS 1.3: 0-RTT, Resumption and Delayed Authentication". IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy, 2016, San Jose, CA, USA, May 22-26, 2016. IEEE S&P 2016. pp. 470–485. doi:10.1109/SP.2016.35. ISBN 978-1-5090-0824-7.
  2. Basin, David; Cremers, Cas; Meier, Simon (2013). "Provably repairing the ISO/IEC 9798 standard for entity authentication" (PDF). Journal of Computer Security. 21 (6): 817–846. doi:10.3233/JCS-130472.
  3. Cremers, Cas; Dehnel-Wild, Martin; Milner, Kevin (2017). "Secure Authentication in the Grid: A Formal Analysis of DNP3: SAv5" (PDF). Computer Security - ESORICS 2017 - 22nd European Symposium on Research in Computer Security, Oslo, Norway, September 11-15, 2017, Proceedings, Part I. ESORICS 2017. Oslo, Norway: Springer. pp. 389–407. doi:10.1007/978-3-319-66402-6_23. ISBN 978-3-319-66401-9.
  4. Donenfeld, Jason A.; Milne, Kevin (2018), Formal Verification of the WireGuard Protocol (PDF), archived (PDF) from the original on 2023-05-28, retrieved 2023-11-23; Donenfeld, Jason A., Formal Verification, archived from the original on 2023-11-13, retrieved 2023-11-23
  5. Schmidt, Benedikt; Meier, Simon; Cremers, Cas; Basin, David (2012). "Automated analysis of Diffie-Hellman protocols and advanced security properties" (PDF). 25th IEEE Computer Security Foundations Symposium, CSF 2012, Cambridge, MA, USA, June 25-27, 2012. CSF 2012. Cambridge, MA: IEEE Computer Society. pp. 78–94.
  6. Schmidt, Benedikt (2012). Formal analysis of key exchange protocols and physical protocols (PhD thesis). doi:10.3929/ethz-a-009898924.
  7. Meier, Simon (2012). Advancing automated security protocol verification (PhD thesis). doi:10.3929/ethz-a-009790675.
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