Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine
Supreme Court of the United States
Argued December 9, 1980
Decided March 4, 1981
Full case nameTexas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine
Citations450 U.S. 248 (more)
101 S. Ct. 1089; 67 L. Ed. 2d 207; 1981 U.S. LEXIS 75; 49 U.S.L.W. 4214; 25 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 113; 25 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) ¶ 31,544
Case history
Prior608 F.2d 563 (vacated and remanded)
Holding
In a Title VII discrimination claim, the ultimate burden of persuasion remains with the plaintiff throughout the trial; a shift to a defendant's burden is merely an intermediate evidentiary burden requiring the defendant to sustain only the burden of production, not the burden of persuasion.
Court membership
Chief Justice
Warren E. Burger
Associate Justices
William J. Brennan Jr. · Potter Stewart
Byron White · Thurgood Marshall
Harry Blackmun · Lewis F. Powell Jr.
William Rehnquist · John P. Stevens
Case opinion
MajorityPowell, joined by unanimous
Laws applied
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964

Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981), is a United States labor law case of the United States Supreme Court.[1]

Facts

Ms Burdine, a female employee, alleged that the defendant's failure to promote her and subsequent decision to terminate her were premised on illegal gender discrimination.[2]

Judgment

Court of Appeals

The Court of Appeals held that the defendant carried the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that he had legitimate reasons for the employment decision, and that others promoted and hired were better qualified than the plaintiff.[3]

Supreme Court

In holding that the circuit court misconstrued the defendant's evidentiary burden, the Supreme Court attempted to set out the proper approach. The Court concluded that the ultimate burden of persuasion remained with the plaintiff throughout the trial.[4] The Court explained that the defendant's burden was merely an intermediate evidentiary burden requiring the defendant to sustain only the burden of production, never the burden of persuasion.[5] The burden of proof, therefore, never actually shifted from the plaintiff to the defendant but remained with the plaintiff.[6] Furthermore, the Court specified that to rebut the plaintiff's prima facie case, the defendant must simply set forth the reasons for the plaintiff's rejection.[7] Specifically, the employer must create a genuine issue as to whether he intended to discriminate.[8]

Significance

In limiting the defendant's burden merely to producing evidence and placing the entire burden of persuasion on the plaintiff, the Court made it more difficult for the plaintiff to succeed with a disparate treatment claim.[9] A defendant could sustain his or her duty to produce evidence simply by articulating a nondiscriminatory justification for the employment decision.[6] Because this burden is so easily met, the plaintiff will almost always be forced to persuade a court that the defendant's reasons are pretexts and not the true reasons for the employment decision.[10] The plaintiff's burden, therefore, is magnified because he will have to proffer convincing evidence analyzing the employer's intent.[11] Consequently, this higher evidentiary burden has created an increased incentive for plaintiffs to allege discrimination under the disparate impact theory where the employer's intent is not at issue.[12]

See also

References

  1. ↑ Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981).
  2. ↑ Burdine, 450 U.S. at 251.
  3. ↑ Burdine v. Texas Dept. of Community Affairs, 608 F.2d 563 (5th Cir. 1979).
  4. ↑ Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253; see also 9 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW §§ 2485-2489 (1985) (contending that burden of persuasion never shifts).
  5. ↑ Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253-54.
  6. 1 2 Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253.
  7. ↑ Burdine, 450 U.S. at 257.
  8. ↑ Burdine, 450 U.S. at 254.
  9. ↑ See Smalls, The Burden of Proof in Title VII Cases, 25 HOW. L.J. 247, (1982), at 265 (commenting that Burdine approach creates severe evidentiary burden for plaintiff).
  10. ↑ See B. SCHLEI & P. GROSSMAN, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW 1326 (2d ed. 1983) at 1316-17 (asserting that majority of disparate treatment cases turn on ability of plaintiff to demonstrate that business reason was pretext for actual discriminatory intent).
  11. ↑ See Smalls, supra at 265. To illustrate pretext a plaintiff may offer direct or comparative evidence of discriminatory intent. See Corbett, supra note 8, at 231 (describing alternative methods of proof for deriving pretext). Direct evidence includes discriminatory statements or admissions. Id. Comparative evidence involves showing that the employer's justifications have been applied only to certain protected individuals or that the employer has departed from its normal policies. Id. The plaintiff usually uses statistics to make a comparative showing. Id. At this last evidentiary stage, the plaintiff's burden of showing pretext merges with his burden of persuading the court that the defendant has a discriminatory motive. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 256; cf. Clark v. Huntsville City Bd. of Educ., 717 F.2d 525, 529 (11th Cir. 1983) (holding that Title VII liability requires plaintiff to establish that employer's business justification was mere pretext for discriminatory action and that employer acted with discriminatory intent).
  12. ↑ See Comment, Disparate Impact and Subjective Employment Criteria Under Title VII, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 957, 960-62 (1987) (discussing growing importance of disparate impact theory).
  • 38 Am. U.L. Rev. 919, 929-930
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