Pre-20th century

The history of the region has become highly politicised, with both Chinese and nationalist Uyghur historians frequently overstating the extent of their groups' respective ties to the region.^[100][101] In reality, it has been home to many groups throughout history, with the Uyghurs arriving from Central Asia in the 10th century.^[102] Although various Chinese dynasties have at times exerted control over parts of what is now Xinjiang,^[103] the region as it exists today came under Chinese rule as a result of the westward expansion of the Manchu-led Qing dynasty, which also saw the annexation of Mongolia and Tibet.^[104]

Early Qing rule was marked by a "culturally pluralist" approach, with a prohibition on Chinese settlement in the region, and indirect rule through supervised local officials.^[104][105] An increased tax burden placed on the local population due to rebellions elsewhere in China later led to a number of Hui-led Muslim rebellions.^[101][106] The region was subsequently recaptured, and was established as an official province in 1884.

Near the end of their rule the Qing tried to colonize Xinjiang along with other parts of the imperial frontier. To accomplish this goal they began a policy of settler colonialism by which Han Chinese where resettled on the frontier.^[107]

20th century

After the 1928 assassination of Yang Zengxin, governor of the semi-autonomous Kumul Khanate in east Xinjiang under the Republic of China, he was succeeded by Jin Shuren. On the death of the Kamul Khan Maqsud Shah in 1930, Jin abolished the Khanate entirely and took control of the region as warlord.^[108] Corruption, appropriation of land, and the commandeering of grain and livestock by Chinese military forces were all factors which led to the eventual Kumul Rebellion that established the First East Turkestan Republic in 1933.^{[109][110][111]} In 1934, it was conquered by warlord Sheng Shicai with the aid of the Soviet Union. Sheng's leadership was marked by heavy Soviet influence, with him openly offering Xinjiang's valuable natural resources in exchange for Soviet help in crushing revolts, such as in 1937.^[112] Although already in use,^{[lower-alpha 6]} it was in this period that the term "Uyghur" was first used officially over the generic "Turkic", as part of an effort to "undermine potential broader bases of identity" such as Turkic or Muslim. In 1942, Sheng sought reconciliation with the Republic of China, abandoning the Soviets.

In 1944, the Ili Rebellion led to the Second East Turkestan Republic. Though direct evidence of Soviet involvement remains circumstantial, and rebel forces were primarily made up of Turkic Muslims with the support of the local population, the new state was dependent on the Soviet Union for trade, arms, and "tacit consent" for its continued existence.^[114] When the Communists defeated the Republic of China in the Chinese Civil War, the Soviets helped the Communist People's Liberation Army (PLA) recapture it, and it was annexed by the People's Republic in 1949.

The Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region was established in 1955.^[115]

In the late 1950s and early 1960s, between 60,000 and 200,000 Uyghurs, Kazakhs, and other minorities fled China to the USSR, largely as a result of the Great Leap Forward.^[116][117] As the Sino-Soviet split deepened, the Soviets initiated an extensive propaganda campaign criticising China, encouraging minority groups to migrate – and later revolt – and attempting to undermine Chinese sovereignty by appealing to separatist tendencies. In 1962, China stopped issuing exit permits for Soviet citizens, as the Soviet consulate had been distributing passports to enable the exodus.^[118] A resulting demonstration in Yining was met with open fire by the PLA, sparking further protests and mass defections. China responded to these developments by relocating non-Han populations away from the border, creating a "buffer zone" which would later be filled with Han farmers and Bingtuan militia.^{[116][117][118]} Tensions continued to escalate throughout the decade, with ethnic guerrilla groups based in Kazakhstan frequently raiding Chinese border posts,^[119][120] and Chinese and Soviet forces clashing on the border in 1969.^{[119][121][122]}

From the 1950s to the 1970s, a state-orchestrated mass migration into Xinjiang has raised the number of Han from 7% to 40% of the population, exacerbating ethnic tensions.^[123] On the other hand, a declining infant-mortality rate, improved medical care and non-applicability of China's one-child policy on minorities have helped the Uyghur population in Xinjiang grow from four million in the 1960s to eight million in 2001.^[124]

In 1968, the East Turkestan People's Party was the largest militant Uyghur separatist organization, and may have received support from the Soviet Union.^{[125][126][127]} During the 1970s, the Soviets likely supported the United Revolutionary Front of East Turkestan (URFET),^[7] which issued a series of press releases responsible for creating the impression of an active, organized resistance movement, despite involving only a handful of individuals.^{[128][129][130]} Its founder, Yusupbek Mukhlis came to be resented by other Uyghur groups for "exaggerating Uyghur involvement in militant activities", including falsely claiming credit for terrorist attacks.^[131]

Xinjiang's importance to China increased after the 1979 Soviet assistance to Afghanistan, which led to China's perception of being encircled by the Soviets.^[132] China supported the Afghan mujahideen during the Soviet assistance to the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan and broadcast reports of Soviet atrocities committed on Afghan Muslims to Uyghurs to counter Soviet broadcasts to Xinjiang that Soviet Muslim minorities had a better life.^[133] Anti-Soviet Chinese radio broadcasts targeted Central Asian ethnic minorities, such as the Kazakhs.^[134] The Soviets feared disloyalty by the non-Russian Kazakh, Uzbek, and Kyrgyz in the event of a Chinese invasion of Soviet Central Asia, and Russians were taunted by Central Asians: "Just wait till the Chinese get here, they'll show you what's what!"^[135] Chinese authorities viewed Han migrants in Xinjiang as vital to defence against the Soviet Union.^[136] China established camps to train the Afghan mujahideen near Kashgar and Hotan, investing hundreds of millions of dollars in small arms, rockets, mines, and anti-tank weapons.^[137] During the 1980s, student demonstrations and riots against police action assumed an ethnic aspect, and the April 1990 Baren Township riot has been acknowledged as a turning point.^[138]

The Soviet Union supported Uyghur nationalist propaganda and Uyghur separatist movements against China. Soviet historians claimed that the Uyghur native land was Xinjiang; and Uyghur nationalism was promoted by Soviet versions of history on turcology.^[139] This included support of Uyghur historians such as Tursun Rakhimov, who wrote more historical works supporting Uyghur independence, claiming that Xinjiang was an entity created by China made out of the different parts of East Turkestan and Zungharia.^[140] Bellér-Hann describes these Soviet Uyghur historians were waging an "ideological war" against China, emphasizing the "national liberation movement" of Uyghurs throughout history.^[141] The CPSU supported the publication of works which glorified the Second East Turkestan Republic and the Ili Rebellion against China in its anti-China propaganda war.^[142]

1990s to 2007

China's "Strike Hard" campaign against crime, beginning in 1996, saw thousands of arrests, as well as executions, and "constant human rights violations", and also marked reduction in religious freedom.^[143] These policies, and a feeling of political marginalisation, contributed to the fermentation of groups who carried out numerous guerrilla operations, including sabotage and attacks on police barracks, and occasionally even acts of terrorism including bomb attacks and assassinations of government officials.

A February 1992 Ürümqi bus bombing, attributed to the Shock Brigade of the Islamic Reformist Party, resulted in three deaths.^[143]

A police roundup and execution of 30 suspected separatists^[144] during Ramadan resulted in large demonstrations in February 1997, characterised as riots by Chinese state media outlet China Daily^[145] and peaceful by Western media.^[146] The demonstrations culminated in the 5 February Ghulja incident, in which a People's Liberation Army (PLA) crackdown led to at least nine deaths^[147] and possibly more than 100.^[144] 25 February Ürümqi bus bombings killed nine people and injured 68. Responsibility for the attacks was acknowledged by Uyghur exile groups.^[148][149]

In Beijing's Xidan district, a bus bomb killed two people on 7 March 1997; Uyghur separatists claimed responsibility for the attack.^[150] Uyghur participation in the bombing was dismissed by the Chinese government, and the Turkish-based Organisation for East Turkistan Freedom admitted responsibility for the attack.^[143][149] The bus bombings triggered a change in policy, with China acknowledging separatist violence.^[151] The situation in Xinjiang quieted until mid-2006, although ethnic tensions remained.^[152]

In 2005, Uygur author Nurmemet Yasin was sentenced to ten years' imprisonment for inciting separatism following his publication of an allegorical short story, "The Blue Pigeon".^[153]

2007–present

It is apparent that the number of violent incidents and uprisings increased from the 1990s, peaking in 2014, although their extent is difficult to confirm independently due to restrictions on the access of independent observers and international journalists.^[154] Nonetheless, the majority of events during this period were characterised as spontaneous clashes or riots by "disorganized, disgruntled, fairly impulsive young men".^[154][155]

According to Vaughan Winterbottom, although the Turkistan Islamic Party distributes propaganda videos and its Arabic Islamic Turkistan magazine (documented by Jihadology.net and the Jamestown Foundation) the Chinese government apparently denied the party's existence; China claimed that there was no terrorist connection to its 2008 bus bombings as the TIP claimed responsibility for the attacks.^[156] In 2007, police raided a suspected TIP terrorist training camp.^[157] The following year, an attempted suicide bombing on a China Southern Airlines flight was thwarted^[158] and the Kashgar attack resulted in the death of sixteen police officers four days before the beginning of the Beijing Olympics.^[159]

During the night of 25–26 June 2009, in the Shaoguan incident in Guangdong, two people were killed and 118 injured.^[160] The incident reportedly triggered the July 2009 Ürümqi riots; others were the September 2009 Xinjiang unrest and the 2010 Aksu bombing, after which 376 people were tried.^[161] The July 2011 Hotan attack led to the deaths of 18 people, 14 of whom were attackers. Although the attackers were ethnic Uyghurs,^[162]both Han and Uyghurs were victims.^[163] That year, six ethnic Uyghur men unsuccessfully attempted to hijack an aircraft heading to Ürümqi, a series of knife and bomb attacks occurred in July and the Pishan hostage crisis occurred in December.^[164] Credit for the attacks was professed by the Turkistan Islamic Party.^[165]

On 28 February 2012, an attack in Yecheng left 20 people dead, including seven attackers.^[166] On 24 April 2013, clashes in Bachu occurred between a group of armed men and social workers and police near Kashgar. The violence left at least 21 people dead, including 15 police and officials.^{[167][168][169]} According to a local government official, the clashes broke out after three other officials reported that suspicious men armed with knives were hiding in a house outside Kashgar.^[170] Two months later, on 26 June, riots in Shanshan left 35 dead, including 22 civilians, 11 rioters and 2 police officers.^[171]

On 28 October 2013, an SUV ploughed through a group of pedestrians near Tiananmen Square in central Beijing, crashed into a stone bridge and caught fire, causing dozens of casualties. Chinese authorities quickly identified the driver as Uyghur.^[172][156]

In 2014, the conflict intensified. In January, eleven Uighur militants were killed by Kyrgyz security forces.^[173][174] They were identified as Uyghurs by their appearance, and their personal effects indicated that they were separatists.^[175]

On 1 March, a group of knife-wielding terrorists attacked the Kunming Railway Station, killing 31 and injuring 141.^[176] China blamed Xinjiang militants for the attack,^[177] and over 380 people were arrested in the following crackdown. A captured attacker and three others were charged on 30 June.^[178] Three of the suspects were accused of "leading and organising a terror group and intentional homicide", although they did not directly take part since they had been arrested two days earlier.^[179] On 12 September, a Chinese court sentenced three people to death and one to life in prison for the attack.^[180] Social media had initially been the main portal for covering the attack, due to lack of coverage on Chinese TV.^{[181][182][57]} The attack was praised by ETIM.^[183]

On 18 April, a group of 16 Chinese citizens identified as ethnic Uyghurs engaged in a shootout with Vietnamese border guards after seizing their guns when they were being detained to be returned to China. Five Uyghurs and two Vietnamese guards died in the incident. Ten of the Uyghurs were men, and the rest were women and children.^{[184][185][186][187]}

Twelve days later, two attackers stabbed people before detonating their suicide vests at an Ürümqi train station. Three people, including the attackers, were killed.^{[188][189][190]}

On 22 May, two suicide car bombings occurred after the occupants threw explosives from their vehicles at an Ürümqi street market. The attacks killed 43 people and injured more than 90, one of the deadliest attacks to date in the Xinjiang conflict.^{[190][191][192]} On 5 June, China sentenced nine people to death for terrorist attacks in Xinjiang.^[193]

According to the Xinhua News Agency, on 28 July, 37 civilians were killed by a gang armed with knives and axes in the towns of Elixku and Huangdi in Shache County and 59 attackers were killed by security forces. Two hundred fifteen attackers were arrested after they stormed a police station and government offices. The agency also reported that 30 police cars were damaged or destroyed and dozens of Uyghur and Han Chinese civilians were killed or injured. The Uyghur American Association claimed that local Uyghurs had been protesting at the time of the attack. Two days later, the moderate imam of China's largest mosque was assassinated in Kashgar after morning prayers.^[194]

On 21 September, Xinhua reported that a series of bomb blasts killed 50 people in Luntai County, southwest of the regional capital Ürümqi. The dead consisted of six civilians, four police officers and 44 rioters.^[195]

On 12 October, four Uyghurs armed with knives and explosives attacked a farmers' market in Xinjiang. According to police, 22 people died (including police officers and the attackers).^[196]

On 29 November, 15 people were killed and 14 injured in a Shache County attack. Eleven of the killed were Uyghur militants.^[197]

On 18 September 2015, in Aksu, an unidentified group of knife-wielding terrorists attacked sleeping workers at a coal mine and killed as many as 50 people, before fleeing into the mountains.^[10] The Turkistan Islamic Party has claimed responsibility for the attack.^[198] On 18 November, a 56-day manhunt for the attackers concluded with security forces killing 28 assailants. One member of the gang surrendered to authorities.^[10][199]

The Bangkok bombing is suspected to have been carried out by the Turkish ultranationalist organisation known as the Grey Wolves in response to Thailand's deportation of 100 Uyghur asylum-seekers back to China. A Turkish man was arrested by Thai police in connection with the bombing and bomb-making materials were found in his apartment.^{[200][201][202]} Due to the terrorist risk and counterfeiting of passports, Uyghur foreigners in Thailand were placed under surveillance by Defence Minister Prawit Wongsuwon^{[203][204][205][206]} and Thai police were placed on alert after the arrival of two Turkish Uyghurs.^[207]

On 30 August 2016, Kyrgyzstan's Chinese embassy was struck by a suicide bombing by a Uyghur, according to Kyrgyz news.^[208] The suicide bomber was the only fatality from the attack. The casualties included wounds suffered by Kyrgyz staff members and did not include Chinese.^[174][209] A Kyrgyzstan government agency pointed the finger at Nusra allied Syrian based Uyghurs.^[210]

Police killed 4 militants who carried out a bombing on 28 December 2016 in Karakax.^[211]

On 14 February 2017, three knife wielding attackers killed five people before being killed by police.^[212][213]

In the period 2013–2017 there were 330,918 arrests in the province accounting for 7.3% of total arrests in China. This compares to 81,443 arrests in the previous five years.^[12] In March 2019, Chinese officials said that they have arrested more than 13,000 militants in Xinjiang since 2014.^[214]

Aftermath

In 2014, the Chinese government launched the Strike Hard Campaign Against Violent Terrorism in Xinjiang.^[215] Since that year, the government has pursued a policy which has led to more than one million Muslims (the majority of them Uyghurs) being held in secretive detention camps without any legal process^[216][217] in what has become the largest-scale detention of ethnic and religious minorities since the Holocaust.^[218] Critics of the policy have described it as the sinicization of Xinjiang and called it an ethnocide or cultural genocide,^{[216][219][220][221][222][223]} with many activists, NGOs, human rights experts, government officials, and the U.S. government calling it a genocide.^{[224][225][226][227][228][229][230][231]}

Critics of the programme have highlighted the concentration of Uyghurs in state-sponsored re-education camps,^[232][233] suppression of Uyghur religious practices,^[234][235] political indoctrination,^[217][236] severe ill-treatment,^[217][237] and testimonials of alleged human rights abuses including forced sterilization and contraception.^{[238][232][239]} Chinese government statistics show that from 2015 to 2018, birth rates in the mostly Uyghur regions of Hotan and Kashgar plunged by more than 60%.^[240] In the same period, the birth rate of the whole country decreased by 9.69%, from 12.07 to 10.9 per 1,000 people.^[241] Chinese authorities acknowledged that birth rates dropped by almost a third in Xinjiang in 2018, but they denied reports of forced sterilization and genocide.^[242] Birth rates have continued to plummet in Xinjiang, falling nearly 24% in 2019 alone when compared to just 4.2% nationwide.^[240] China paid ethic minority women who were exempt from the standard family planning size limits a lump sum then annual allowance to agree to undergo tubal ligation or IUD implantation after three children in an attempt to keep birthrates to the nationwide standard without imposing strict limits on ethnic minority family sizes. In 2017 the standard rural limit was applied to Uyghurs which lowered their allowed births to the standard for Han Chinese (which had increased from two to three children in 2016).^[70] This program may explain the reported fall in Uyghur birthrates, the increase in sterilisation and IUD implantation, and slight increase in Han Chinese births.

In 2021, Shirzat Bawudun, the former head of the Xinjiang department of justice, and Sattar Sawut, the former head of the Xinjiang education department, were sentenced to death on terrorism and extremism charges.^[243] Three other educators and two textbook editors were given lesser sentences.^[244]

Al-Qaeda links

The TIP are believed to have links to al-Qaeda and affiliated groups such as the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan,^[252] and the Pakistani Taliban.^[253] Philip B. K. Potter writes that despite the fact that "throughout the 1990s, Chinese authorities went to great lengths to publicly link organizations active in Xinjiang—particularly the ETIM—to al-Qaeda [...] the best information indicates that prior to 2001, the relationship included some training and funding but relatively little operational cooperation."^[3][254] Meanwhile, specific incidents were downplayed by Chinese authorities as isolated criminal acts.^[2][18] However, in 1998 the group's headquarters were moved to Kabul, in Taliban-controlled Afghanistan, while "China's ongoing security crackdown in Xinjiang has forced the most militant Uyghur separatists into volatile neighboring countries, such as Pakistan," Potter writes, "where they are forging strategic alliances with, and even leading, jihadist factions affiliated with al-Qaeda and the Taliban." The East Turkestan Islamic Movement dropped "East" from its name as it increased its domain.^[2] The U.S. State Department have listed them as a terrorist organisation since 2002,^[255] and as having received "training and financial assistance" from al-Qaeda.^[254] In October 2020, this designation was lifted.^[256]

A number of members of al-Qaeda have expressed support for the TIP, Xinjiang independence, and/or jihad against China. They include Mustafa Setmariam Nasar,^[257] Abu Yahya al-Libi,^[258][259] and late al-Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahiri who has on multiple occasions issued statements naming Xinjiang (calling it "East Turkestan") as one of the "battlegrounds" of "jihad to liberate every span of land of the Muslims that has been usurped and violated."^{[260][261][262][263][264]} Additionally, the al-Qaeda aligned al-Fajr Media Center distributes TIP promotional material.^[265]

Andrew McGregor, writing for the Jamestown Foundation, opines that "though there is no question a small group of Uyghur militants fought alongside their Taliban hosts against the Northern Alliance [...] the scores of terrorists Beijing claimed that Bin Laden was sending to China in 2002 never materialized" and that "the TIP's “strategy” of making loud and alarming threats (attacks on the Olympics, use of biological and chemical weapons, etc.) without any operational follow-up has been enormously effective in promoting China's efforts to characterise Uyghur separatists as terrorists."^[266]

East Turkestan Islamic Movement

The East Turkestan Islamic Movement has been recognised as a terrorist organisation by the United Nations,^[269] the United States,^[270] the European Union,^[271] Russia,^[272] the United Kingdom,^[273][274] Kyrgyzstan,^{[lower-alpha 7][277][278]} Kazakhstan,^[279] Malaysia,^[280] Pakistan,^[281] Turkey,^[282][283] and the United Arab Emirates.^[284] It is also subject to UN sanctions by the Security Council.^[285]

United Nations

In July 2019, 22 countries issued a joint letter to the 41st session of the United Nations Human Rights Council (UNHRC), condemning China's mass detention of Uyghurs and other minorities, calling upon China to "refrain from the arbitrary detention and restrictions on freedom of movement of Uyghurs, and other Muslim and minority communities in Xinjiang".^{[286][287][288]}

In the same UNHRC session, 50 countries issued a joint letter supporting China's Xinjiang policies,^{[286][289][290]} criticising the practice of "politicizing human rights issues". The letter stated, "China has invited a number of diplomats, international organizations officials and journalist to Xinjiang" and that "what they saw and heard in Xinjiang completely contradicted what was reported in the media."^[289]

In October 2019, 23 countries issued a joint statement at the UN urging China to "uphold its national and international obligations and commitments to respect human rights".^[291]

In response, 54 countries issued a joint statement supporting China's Xinjiang policies. The statement "spoke positively of the results of counter-terrorism and de-radicalization measures in Xinjiang and noted that these measures have effectively safeguarded the basic human rights of people of all ethnic groups."^[291][292]

In August 2022, the UN Human Rights Office assessment of human rights concerns in Xinjiang concluded that the extent of arbitrary and discriminatory detention of members of Uyghur and other predominantly Muslim groups in China, since 2017, pursuant to law and policy, in context of restrictions and deprivation more generally of fundamental rights enjoyed individually and collectively, may constitute international crimes, in particular crimes against humanity.^{[293][294][295]}

Uyghur Human Rights Policy Act

The United States Senate and House of Representatives passed the Uyghur Human Rights Policy Act in September 2019 and December 2019 respectively in reaction to the conflict.^{[296][297][298][299]} The bill requires United States President Donald Trump to impose sanctions under the Global Magnitsky Act on Xinjiang Communist Party Secretary Chen Quanguo, which would be the first time such sanctions would be imposed on a member of CCP politburo.^[300][301] The bill was signed by President Trump into law on 17 June 2020.^[302]

Deportation of Uyghurs

Hundreds of Uyghurs fleeing China through Southeast Asia have been deported back by the governments of Cambodia, Thailand, Malaysia, and others, drawing condemnation from the U.S., the UNHCR, and human rights groups.^[303][304] The U.S. State Department said deported Uyghurs "could face harsh treatment and a lack of due process" while the UNHCR and Human Rights Watch have called the deportations a violation of international law.^[305][306]

Involvement of foreign enterprises

The role of commercial entities has become increasingly scrutinized, due to the presence of Western enterprises such as Coca-Cola, Volkswagen and Siemens in the region. The major concern here is the fact that the presence of these entities could finance human rights violations and enable the supervision of ethnic minorities by technological cooperation. Moreover, reports have claimed that forced labor prevails in Xinjiang's textile industry.^[307]

Based on these allegations, international organizations such as the World Bank have begun to reconsider their involvement in Xinjiang, while textile manufacturers including Adidas or Badger Sportswear have withdrawn from Xinjiang. Divestment also concerns collaboration in the realm of AI and digital technologies, and some enterprises have decided to discontinue the handover of technologies and knowledge to Chinese entities involved in the human rights violations in Xinjiang.^[308]

Citations

Sources